European Union Foreign Affairs Journal

Quarterly for European Foreign, Foreign Trade, Development, Security Policy, EU-Third Country Relations and Regional Integration (EUFAJ)

N° 03 – 2010 LIBERTAS **ISSN 2190-6122**

Editorial.....4
The EU Was Not Allowed to Address the UN General Assembly
Hans-Jürgen Zahorka 5
Minority Rights in a Contemporary Dictatorship: The Case of the Polish Minority in Belarus
Elżbieta Szumańska.....10
Serbia: Between Integration and Interaction
Arta Seiti 77
Europe - A Vehicle Against Cultural Barriers?
Nebojsa Vujkovic 83
U.S. Migration Experience - Historical and Philosophical Aspects
Igor Metelev 89
Since Summer 2010: The Vatican € Coins Are In Circulation 98
African Regional Integration: EAC Countries Divided on Creating a Common Currency 99
Standpoint. By *Olivier Védrine*. Turkey, the Balkans and the Mediterranean 103

Part Time MBA Program

"Management for Central and Eastern Europe"

Program Structure

9 weeks of lecturing in 18 months - that is one week every two months. All participants stay in their jobs and come to the university classroom for one week every two months.

Participants

This is the most international Modular MBA Program in Europe! Participants represent between 7 and 12 different European Nations!

What graduates appreciate

- very international, exclusive and intensive learning atmosphere
- share experience with international guest faculties from Top Management Executives
- a time structure that enables to do a fully accredited international MBA without leaving the job

Contact

European University Viadrina - MBA Office
Gr. Scharrnstr. 59, Frankfurt(Oder), Germany
MBA Office: + 49 (0) 335 553416 419
www.mba-cee.com
mba@mba-cee.com

Program is accredited by

forum
FIBAA

European Union Foreign Affairs Journal (abbreviated: EUFAJ)
eQuarterly for European Foreign, Foreign Trade, Development, Security Policy, EU-Third Country Relations and Regional Integration

ISSN 2190-6122

Published by:
LIBERTAS – Europaeisches Institut GmbH, Lindenweg 37, 72414 Rangendingen, Germany
Phone +49 7471 984996-0, fax +49 7471 984996-19, e-mail: eufaj@libertas-institut.com

Managing Director: Ute Hirschburger
Registered at AG Stuttgart, HRB 243253, USt ID no.: DE811240129, Tax no.: 53 093 05327

Internet: www.eufaj.eu, www.libertas-institut.eu

Subscription rate: zero. EUFAJ can be downloaded for free in the Internet; see www.eufaj.eu. This experiment will be under review at the end of 2011.

* * *

Chief Editor*:* Hans-Jürgen Zahorka

Editor: Olivier Védrine, *Paris, France*

Editorial Advisory Board*:*
Židas Daskalovski, *Ph.D., assistant professor of political science at Kliment Ohridski University in Bitola, president of the CRPM think-tank in Skopje, Macedonia*

Martin Pontzen, *Dr. rer. pol., economist, Bundesbank Director, German Federal Bank, Frankfurt/Main, Germany*

All authors are responsible for their published texts. If no author is mentioned, the Chief Editor is responsible. All texts published under a name do not necessarily represent the view of the editors or Advisory Board members. EUFAJ is committed to different views and a public discussion.

* * *

Copyright: Copyright requests are welcome. Reprints of certain contributions are free of charge, for others a license fee may have to be negotiated. Please ask the publisher for copyright permission.

Proposal for quotation: EUFAJ, 2-2010, then number of page (e.g. EUFAJ, 2-2010, 32)

Papers, articles, reports, contributions: They should be sent to the Chief Editor by e-mail and as attachment in Word format (not in PDF). EUFAJ follows a generous policy towards authors, who may decide themselves if they write a scientific or more practical article, or with or without footnotes (please no end notes). We reserve the right of adding annotations and commenting shortly. No guarantee for unsolicited articles which, however, may remain in our archive. All contributions are requested in English language; abstracts in other languages are possible.
EUFAJ is published in English.

Editorial

Dear readers,

Sorry for the delay of this issue – but that can happen if lawyers fight against computer technology. We always learn from our mistakes, and in some issues from now (those who have not yet been already started) we will work with more adequate programmes. In addition, please convince yourself: This issue is timeless.

In the meantime, please take note that we have changed our distribution policy completely. We take the right to work in a cyber test lab, and in this context everybody who wants to have EUFAJ can have it. Just go to our Website www.eufaj.eu and download every issue you want. We do not see the purchase power of a multinational company and its strategic headquarters, but rather of a student with very limited means. And somehow we are proud of this application of the Robin Hood principle.

At the same time, we are happy that all the editors, members of the Editorial Advisory Board and Assistant Editors – who will grow in numbers from issue 1/2011 – work at present voluntarily.

We, however, offer our readers a participation in EUFAJ – please see the Website – which allows readers to participate in its growth, from zero to hundred. We will go soon into marketing of advertisement, as well. Ads will have the big advantage to stay forever on the Website.

With best regards,

Hans-Jürgen Zahorka

The EU Was Not Allowed to Address the UN General Assembly

The 14th September 2010 was not a black day for the European Union, but neither a day of joy: It was defeated in the United Nations with the attempt to be allowed to address the UN Chamber. Many observers said this was a surprise, as nobody really has anything against the EU – just in contrary. The EU has a solid reputation of the world's biggest donor, acting in humanitarian cases pro the people as much it can, everybody acknowledges that it an economic giant. Now its first attempt to get out of the situation of political dwarf failed. What was the background for this negative vote, which for the next time will leave the EU who has UN observer status on benches shared with the Vatican and the International Red Cross?

The EU would have obtained the right to submit proposals, papers and documents, and the European Council President Herman Van Rompuy would have had the right to address the UN General Assembly, like any other head of government or state in the world, while the EU Foreign Minister, Ms. Catherine Ashton and her advisors would get seats besides him, in the plenary. And it would not have changed its status as observer.

While the EU can survive this vote, of course, the Europeans wanted to improve the EU's display before the world. This is justified, because the EU as political level has new competence under the Lisbon Treaty, and step by step it gets a higher profile. This is why the EU applied to be accepted already for the UN session in September 2010. Until now it is the UN Ambassador of the country holding the rotating Council presidency – in the 2nd half of 2010 it is Belgium – who can speak on behalf of the EU. But the EU has changed its internal system since November 2009, and now the UN should react, or better: act.

The demarche of the EU was defeated narrowly with 76:71 votes, with 26 abstentions, following a motion for delaying the final decision for some months tabled by the CARICOM countries – which is astonishing, as the EU always has supported CARICOM like all other regional integrations in the past. As the time-table for this session is rather busy, it is expected that a new vote can be held only in 2011 after various discussions. One of the reasons for the attitude of many developing countries was that the European Union should not have special rights in the UN, compared to blocs like CARICOM, Latin American integration schemes, or the African Union etc.

On the long term it is self-evident that all these regional integrations should be able to be represented. But this might be done only after they have certain competences in foreign policy – which is however now the case – at least initially - with the European Union. Neither the African Union nor CARICOM have delegations like the EU throughout the countries of the world, none

of them have a Foreign Minister or a diplomatic service on integration level. Nowadays, the EU has them all, and above all it is the political level competent towards the inside in all question of external economic policy – a field which is crucial for the effective and potential well-being of every citizen of the world.

However, already now, the Belgian presidency had reformulated the text of the motion in the sense that, in general, each regional integration should be able to address the UN Assembly. In this context, a case-to-case decision-making would be adequate, after examination if the regional integration structure has any treaty making powers, or has a common say in international politics etc. The EU complies with all these criteria, but not or not yet the other regional integrations – this is a fundamental difference.

Many UN diplomats spoke about the EU behavior – it must have been, to say the least, amateurish … Even friends of the EU like Canada, New Zealand and Australia shook their wise heads. "Confusion", "absence of tactics", "the EU acted disorganized", these were the more friendly comments. Evidently, the EU has it sometimes difficult, although there is a lot of combined experience. And this time, it seems to have been a catalogue of omissions in assuring the success by the EU Council Presidency?

Maybe this was also a shot into the own knee by those UN members who did not want Mr. Van Rompuy speaking to them – the EU being a seasoned international donor, being the biggest actor in world economy, and being considered to be a quite fair actor there? Because the United Nations have to be reformed – their basic system comes from a time when there were not yet any regional integrations, just national states. It still assumes this fiction, if motions like the one from the EU are defeated. But as a breaker, as the first to go, as a pacesetter it would have been good if the EU would be present at this stage, and it is also justified, because the EU as such does a lot in addition to the traditional members of the UN from the European Union. Organizations like CARICOM or the African Union etc. know this, but they are more driven by national member states' decisions than by supranational decisions (which are at least a part of EU decisionmaking). The EU as at least partly supranationally organized club is ahead of them, in this respect. It must be observed if those who want now a break in order to discuss internally the consequences of e. g. EU appearances in the UN see the realities within the EU and have the necessary flexibility to let Mr. Van Rompuy talk to them. For sure, he has something to say, and the world has changed a lot. That's why the UN must also change and admit to unique, *sui generis* systems which have a say now in international affairs to address the Assembly.

But this vote should also be an alarming signal for the EU. The European Union has a certain tradition of being very individualist and to have sometimes different votes in the General Assembly or the Security Council; the Austrian professor Paul Luif once made an impressing compilation on this question. Nothing against any pluralist impression the EU leaves – we have

the same situation e. g. in the German Federal Council, where there are often some *Länder* which have a very individual way of voting, often determined by local coalitions. But in the grand design votes the EU must go united. If the EU would have a reputation of being really monolithic and calculable, then permitting the Council President would only be a logical consequence. But it is not considered as such. The situation which incurred on 14.9.2010, and which did not do any harm to anybody but is symptomatic for the difficulties of a European Union foreign policy, is also an opportunity to improve this part of the performance.

And there are, in addition, models of a swap between the veto powers in the Security Council and the EU; indeed at a given time – I plead for sooner than later – the EU could take over a seat of veto power in the Security Council. This could be done while leaving the right to veto the EU positions and therefore to determine their positions to France and Great Britain as actual veto powers. Anyway, things are now in motion. The EU shows a certain political profile – even if it was temporarily refused to send its Council President to the speakers' podium. But at the next opportunity and after some (necessary and so far forgotten!) consultations the UN, the world will welcome the Council President.

Hans-Jürgen Zahorka

And this is how the UN voted on the question of admitting the EU Council President to speak; subject of the motion on 14th Sept. 2010 was if the vote should be adjourned – not on the substance! See also the list of abstentions, which of course are on the basis of a differentiated view of the EU's external power – but it is interesting.

Vote on Adjournment of Debate

The adjournment of debate on the draft resolution on participation of European Union in the work of the United Nations (document A/64/L.67 as revised) was adopted by a recorded vote of 76 in favour to 71 against, with 26 abstentions, as follows:

In favour: Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Chad, China, Comoros, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Micronesia (Federated States of), Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Palau, Philippines, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Suriname, Syria, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Mexico, Monaco, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, The former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan

Abstain: Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Belarus, Bhutan, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Gabon, Gambia, Honduras, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Oman, Pakistan, Rwanda, Samoa, Senegal, Sri Lanka, United Arab Emirates

Absent: Azerbaijan, Cape Verde, Egypt, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Vanuatu, Viet Nam

Permanent Index

of European Union Foreign Affairs Journal

You can download the Permanent Index via www.eufaj.eu.

The Index is updated from time to time and structured as following:

1. Articles & Authors

2. Book Reviews & Reviewers

3. Documentation

4. Key words

(without key words from bibliographies and book reviews)

5. Names

(without names from bibliographies, footnotes and [most] book reviews)

Réseau d'analyse et d'informationsur l'actualité internationale

Présentation

Multipol est un réseau international et interdisciplinaire de chercheurs et d'experts en droit international et relations internationales, provenant de milieux professionnels tels que la justice internationale, la diplomatie multilatérale et bilatérale, la recherche et la formation, la fonction publique internationale.

Sa première et principale réalisation est le site http://www.multipol.org, plateforme d'échanges, d'analyses et d'informations en temps réel sur l'actualité internationale. Ce nouveau media se positionne ainsi entre les publications journalistiques, qui manquent parfois de recul et de données précises sur les évènements de la scène internationale, et les publications scientifiques, qui paraissent dans un délai souvent tardif.

Multipol est né à Genève, durant l'été 2006, de la rencontre de passionnés de relations internationales. Le réseau est régi par une association de droit suisse, apolitique, non religieuse et à but non lucratif. Il est composé d'une vingtaine de membres spécialisés dans les différentes branches des relations internationales (droit international, science politique, géopolitique, économie internationale, géostratégie, etc.).

Objectifs

- Animer un réseau de chercheurs et de professionnels issus de cultures, de nationalités, de localisations, de formations et d'environnements professionnels différents.
- Proposer un support d'information innovant, rigoureux et gratuit, offrant à la fois des analyses de fond et des brèves d'actualité internationale, publiés par des chercheurs et des experts en relations internationales.
- Permettre aux membres de ce réseau de publier leurs analyses et les informations dont ils disposent dans un délai très court, et susciter des commentaires pertinents de la part des autres membres du réseau et des lecteurs.
- Organiser des colloques visant à diffuser la connaissance du droit et des relations internatio nales.
- Établir des liens avec des institutions et organismes poursuivant des buts analogues ou voisins.
- Proposer l'expertise scientifique des membres du réseau.

*Contacter Multipol : **contact.multipol@gmail.com***

Minority Rights in a Contemporary Dictatorship: The Case of the Polish Minority in Belarus

Analyzing legal standards and external, in particular European influence

Elżbieta Danuta Szumańska

The author wrote this paper as Master thesis at Europa Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder) & Wydział Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa Uniwersytet Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu (University of Poznan), which offer a common Master in European Studies. The thesis has been supervised by Prof. Dr. Gert-Rüdiger Wegmarshaus and Dr. Magdalena Musiał-Karg. The Master thesis is from Spring 2010, i. e. one has to bear in mind that several recent government excesses are not mentioned here. Elzbieta Szumanska works at present in the software sector in Berlin/Germany.

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

Abstract

1. Introduction

    1.1 Understanding the "problem of minorities"

    1.2 Substantive law

    1.3 Minorities and a dictatorship

2. Living in a dictatorship: Poles in Belarus

2.1 From defective democracy to a dictatorship

2.2 Polish Minority in the newly independent state of Belarus

3. Obligations and monitoring

3.1 Analyzing legal standards

3.1.1 Internal standards of Belarus

3.1.2 Bilateral treaty obligations

3.1.3 International standards

3.2 Analyzing monitoring mechanisms

3.2.1 Treaty-based monitoring mechanisms

3.2.2 Non-treaty based monitoring mechanisms

4. External influence

4.1 Strategies of international and domestic actors

4.2 Belarus: Change or Continuity?

5. Conclusions

6. Summary in Polish language

7. Attachment

Bibliography

List of Abbreviations

AC	Advisory Committee
AMG	Advisory and Monitoring Group
BNR	Belarusian National (People's) Republic
BPF	Belarusian Popular Front
BSSR	Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic
CB	Constitution of Belarus
CD	Copenhagen Document
CE	Committee of Experts
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CoE	Council of Europe
CRC	Convention of the Rights of the Child
DNLM	Declarations of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EConHR	European Convention on Human Rights
ECRI	European Commission against Racism and Intolerance
ED	Eastern Dimension
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ERML	European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FCNM	Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities
GA	General Assembly of the United Nation
GFC	Treaty between Poland and the Belarus on Good-neighbourly Relations and Friendly Cooperation
HCNM	High Commissioner on National Minorities
HRC	Human Rights Council
ICCPR	International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination
LRB	Law of the Republic of Belarus
MD	Moscow Document
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODIHR	Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCA	Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
PCB	Party of Communists of Belarus
SU	Soviet Union

TACIS	Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States
TEU	Treaty on European Union
UBP	Union of Poles in Belarus
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCHR	United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNO	United Nation
US	United States of America
USSR	Soviet Union
WHO	World Health Organization
9/11	Terrorist Attacks in New York, 11.09.2001

Abstract

Belarus is arguably the least democratic country in Europe. As such it has posed problems for the EU and other European and Western institutions, especially on the field of minority protection. Minorities are among the most contested issues in political life because they speak to an inherent tension in human affairs between competing desires for freedom and belonging. The diversity, aimed by the Western political actors, simply contradicts the principle that legitimates a political community in an authoritarian state. In the case of the Belarusian dictatorship it leads to enhanced conformity resulting in minority discrimination. The paper presents different kinds of the external influence in order to assess the most effective one(s) when defending minority rights in a dictatorship.

1. Introduction

1.1 Understanding the "problem of minorities"

The "problem of minorities" is both intellectually created and historically situated. In Europe, from the 18th to the mid-19th century and after the Second World War, a fundamental shift in political thinking could be observed regarding the relationship between legitimacy and community. Previously, authority came from above (the ruler king, the emperor, the pope…etc.). Today we believe that power originates from below (demos). In fact, "people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people" (**JENNINGS 1956: 56**). But how should the people be identified? At this point the so-called "diversity dilemma", which makes the existence of religious, racial, linguistic and ethnic diversity within contemporary states controversial, is brought up. This dilemma is a simple contradiction between freedom, manifested as diversity, and belonging, manifested as community. In other words: shall political order require conformity or rather recognize diversity? The dilemma can be seen as a consequence of the imperfect realization of the concept of self-determination of the national minorities within the present state systems (**COMP. JACKSON 2005: 3, 182 ET SQQ**). Diversity contradicts the principle that legitimates a political community because it threatens, weakens or destroys the basis of its ideal: collective belonging and social consensus. The "problem of minorities" exists nowadays in a majority of contemporary states. It may have serious consequences not only for individuals affected but also for domestic, regional and, in fact, global peace and security **(COMP. BAGLEY 1950).** A proper understanding of the problem is therefore essential for both academics and politicians in order to avoid such conflicts. This chapter will summarize arguments claiming minority rights as a key concept to limit the potential destabilizing effects of such exceptions to the prevailing rule of state legitimacy.

During the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the term "minorities" was included for the first time in a peace treaty. In the same year, Woodrow Wilson introduced a new principle of legitimacy – the self-determination concept. Previously the concept was understood as the right of ethnic nations, after the mid-1950s – as the right of civic nations. Since that time the nation-state system is justified by this doctrine which asserts that every nation has a right to independent political control over a given territory and its people **(MCLEAN, MCMILLAN 2009: 446).** Also minority rights, devolution, federalism, and greater acknowledgement of the legitimacy of cultural self-expression are all terms of the self-determination concept **(COMP. GRIFFITHS, O'CALLAGHAN 2002: 294 ET SEQ).** Yet, despite the doctrine, national minorities do not posses political independence in this incoherently distributed post-war territories and, as Jackson concludes, the contemporary "problem of minorities emerges as a lack of consent or entitlement to full participation in political life such that the principle of self-determination is compromised in some way" **(2005: 11).** Although the modern theory of state sovereignty postulates a neat fit between international boundaries and politically significant identities, in reality the two rarely coincide **(MOYNIHAN 1993).** Because freedom requires autonomy of action, diversity of choices, variety of values, different beliefs, identities, innovation, and on the other hand, belonging requires coordination, subordination, social cohesion, homogenous choices as well as orthodoxy, the existence of minorities and their striving for self-determination within certain systems is a potential source of insecurity and conflict. Self-determination struggles have appealed in a way opposing values of community and individuality. The potential mentioned in the controversy between freedom and belonging explains the fear of those who are different. Thus, it becomes a subject of policies designed to restructure these socially and politically destructive elements. This fear is often being politically manipulated within states where social complexity is assumed to require a certain degree of conformity **(COMP. JACKSON 2005: 7, 184).** There are two ways in order to overcome the "problem of minorities": enforcing conformity or recognize diversity through implementing, as far as possible, the self-determination principle.

Before clarifying the role of minority rights in resolving the problem, it would be useful to define the term "minority". No universally agreed upon definition of minority exists at the present. Insight into the core definitions of minority can however be gained by examining how relevant academic commentators have dealt with this concept. Francesco Capotorti in his "Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities" defines the term as "a group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of the State, in a non-dominant position, whose members – being national of the state – posses ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language" **(1979, PARA. 568, 96).** Capotorti points out the importance of nationality, non-dominant position and sense of solidarity, excluding at the same time guest workers and refugees. The possible weak point of this definition is the lack of a territorial requirement as well as not distinguishing between immigrants and the traditional national minority scenarios. Comparable features are contained in the definition of Jules Deschênes: "a group of citizens of a State, constituting a numerical minority and in a non-dominant position in that State, endowed with ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics which differ from those of the majority of the population, having

a sense of solidarity with one another, motivated, if only implicitly, by a collective will to survive and whose aim is to achieve equality with the majority in fact and in law" **(1985, PARA. 181, 30).** This definition includes the term of a "citizen of a State", which requires different legal status than Capotorti's "nationals". This is also the remarkable difference if quoting the concept of minority according to Asbjørn Eide that describes such a group of people as "persons resident within a sovereign State which constitutes less than half the population of the national society and whose members share common characteristics of an ethnic, religious or linguistic nature that distinguish them from the rest of the population**" (1993, PAR. 29, 7).**

The concept of minority also applies in international practice. The United Nations Sub-commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities was the forum in which most of the work towards a universally accepted definition was conducted during the period following the end of the Second World War. However, the United Nations has to date not included any definition of the term itself. In case of OSCE, the term "minority" is defined in documents dating from the end of 1995. The definition has got much in common with Capotorti's definition, although on the further interrogation it has been clearly limited to traditional, non-immigrant minorities. The Council of Europe, in turn, dealing with different kinds of minorities, decided to define national minorities as "separate or distinct groups, well defined and established on the territory of a state, the members of which are nationals of that state and have certain religious, linguistic, cultural or other characteristics which distinguish them from the majority of the population" (CoE, PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY RECOMMENDATION 1134, 1990)**.** This definition, also having much in common with Caportori's, does not include a desire on the group's behalf to maintain their distinct national identity or national language. Each definition reveals an intimate connection to the concept of nation – minorities are finally ethno-nations who failed to secure the independence in their own nation-state and have to exist in within political boundaries of some other nation state. Thus the term "minority" will be used in this study in the common sense of the term "national minority".

Nevertheless, the diversity remains at the sub-state level. In other words: it cannot be fully accommodated by the further redistribution of existing sovereignty to create more independent states. This is why any political community, in order to preserve territorial and political stability, has to deal with the "diversity dilemma" and possible solutions of it. The enforcement can be explained by the claim of Hannah Arendt saying:

> *"The reason why highly developed political communities, such as (...) the modern nation-states, so often insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they hope to eliminate as far as possible those natural and always present differences and differentiations. (...) The 'alien' is a frightening symbol of difference as such, of individuality as such, and indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy".*
>
> **(1972: 301)**

In practice, the political community must attempt to make the facts correspond to the ideal, regardless of the rights and interests of those among its population who do not conform to the public official identity. Discrimination, assimilation, persecution and separation as main forms of such enforcement follow from the imperative presented. Before enlightening these forms it would be worth mentioning the human need they derive from. As Hannah Arendt

describes, political order will be a human artifice and not a part of the natural, physical world around. Normative constraints on individual behavior are the "foundation of an order" **(IBID.: 302)** and thus secure collective existence. Without "Leviathan", which Thomas Hobbes defines as this human artifice, there is a "continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" **(1988: 66).** The fear of a return to the natural, non-social order ("war of all against all") makes the diversity challenging the normative basis of the existing political community so divisive.

According to the Blackwell Encyclopedia for Political Thought, discrimination is "an action that treats people differently when there are no morally relevant differences between them (…) and unfairly because of their membership in a particular social group" **(MILLER 1991: 127 ET SEQ, COMP. ALSO: MCLEAN, MCMILLAN 2009: 143)**. Enforcing conformity via discrimination involves exclusion from whatever ideal sustains community, restraining access to it and limiting benefit enjoyment to the community members. Jennifer Jackson Preece describes this practice as one intending "to make it difficult for the minority to sustain its separate existence and thus [encouraging] the attrition of its members through flight, assimilation or increased mortality" **(1998: 184).** Through assimilation persons belonging to minorities are absorbed into the larger society or dominant culture, removing all public evidence of diversity: by speaking only the official language, worshiping only according to the official religion and, broadly speaking, conducting lives like the rest of the population **(RYBARSKI 1926: 7 ET SEQ).** Persecution can be defined as "the punishment of individuals based solely on factors such as race, religion, sexual orientation and socioeconomic status" **(**library.thinkquest.org**).** It includes different kinds of violence conducted by agents of the political community: from harassment, verbal or physical abuse, to even death. The intention is here to disrupt the lives of persons belonging to minorities in order to encourage them to assimilate. The last of the main forms of enforcing conformity is separation. This method detaches minority from the rest of the community so that this community becomes more homogenous in result. It may involve legal or administrative division, physical removal to a separate geographical space (ghetto, forced migrations) or another community (transfer of population) or else even, as final act of separation, the physical annihilation (genocide) **(COMP. JACKSON 1998: 185 ET SEQ).** These scenarios present diversity as a threat per se. History however, demonstrates that such attempts to enforce conformity are temporary and inefficient. Refractory human nature makes diversity resilient. In consequence, such policies may intensify the minority/majority conflicts they hoped to avoid. Instead, minorities who are recognized and supported are less likely to challenge authority or territorial integrity **(COMP. ESSER 1996: 74 ET SEQ; JACKSON 2005).** Thus, alternatively, political communities can recognize diversity and provide special guarantees for minorities often in the form of minority rights in order to prevent political instability.

Continuously, since the 17th century and especially since the end of the 19th century, special agreements have become a standard feature when recognizing new or enlarged states. This response, presented scrupulously in the next chapter, is certainly more compassionate than enforcing conformity. However, it cannot be assumed that minority rights finally resolve the diversity dilemma. The recognition of group rights at the expense of individual ones is not consistent with the ethical attraction of the much-abused self-determination concept. It should

rather provide a moral and legal framework in which some "hard choices" can be adjudicated. Robert Jackson defines them as "the best choices in the circumstances" **(2000: 22).** This concept seems to be coherent with assumptions of normative pluralism. Michael Walzer says, "Once we see the richness and complicity of social goods, once we appreciate the different ways in which different communities understand goods, value goods and think various goods, we will no longer doubt that justice is a human construction". Furthermore he states, "The question posed by the theory of distributive justice admit of a range of answers, and there is room within the range of cultural diversity and political choice" **(1983: 5 ET SEQ).** Isaiah Berlin, in order to explain that members of one culture can recognize the values of another culture identifies it as: "the conception, that there are many different ends that men may seek and still be fully rational, fully men, capable of understanding each other" **(1990: 11).** Thus, hard choices will always arise; the incommensurability of diversity and community makes this unavoidable. However, those conflicts can be minimized by promoting equilibrium and the concept of minority rights is a response to this need.

1.2 Substantive law

Minority rights create a series of corresponding duties and procedures (judicial and political, domestic and international) fixed in constitutions, legislation, agreements, treaties and declarations. These rights are "rights of individual persons belonging to minorities" **(GRIFFITHS; O'CALLAGHAN 2002: 295)**. In other words: they principally do not recognize the rights of groups as such, they can be individually exercised however, in community with other members. The group rights are designed to preserve and protect the individual's propensity for communal attachments and associations. Furthermore, this individual right formation was made necessary by the continued refusal of sovereign rights advocates to accept any national minority guarantees because it was feared they could be abused by dissatisfied national minorities to further their own secessionist aspirations. This was the case during the interwar period for instance. Nowadays, most existing documents on minority rights recognize only individual claims. However, there are some exceptions. Article 3(2) of the Convention on the Protection of National Minorities states that "persons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention individually as well as in community with others" **(FCNM 1995).** Another example is the Copenhagen Document, Article 32.6 **(CD 1990).** This is why those states hostile to collective guarantees did not entirely escape the more rigorous duties these entailed. Nevertheless, until now it is not clear how much of a check on state sovereignty these clauses represented.

There are two schools if considering the minority and the human rights. There is considerable academic controversy whether they are a separate normative category. According to Donnelly, Sieghart and Vincent, human rights are, corresponding to their provisions, classified into civil, political, economic, social or cultural rights **(COMP. DONNELLY 2003, SIEGHART 1986, VINCENT 1986).** They try then to preserve certain common distinctiveness. Minority rights however, wish to preserve and promote the distinctiveness of minorities in particular. The other distinction is that minority rights are not given but constructed in certain social realities where

belonging to a group is a precondition for exercising those rights. The advocates of the sufficiency of the human rights believe they would be a complete solution, characterizing the problem of minorities as a struggle of individuals for civil and political equality in the face of discrimination **(RAÏKKA 1996).** For purposes of this study it will be assumed that the minority rights are not a separate normative category situated outside the human rights framework but they are rather considered to be part and parcel of it. The minority rights are to be seen as one of several sets of category specific human rights for persons belonging to especially vulnerable groups. The explanation for this is that their vulnerable position requires 'special' rights in order to obtain substantively equal level of protection of their human dignity, that is the founding principle of human rights **(COMP. HIPOLD 2005: 568, HEINTZE 2005: 86).**

Minority rights are not natural givens but the construction of particular historical moments. The history of establishing minority rights in the international law system can be divided into five periods. These periods, according to the theory of Social Constructivism, prove that only exceptional circumstances and needs create innovative legislation. A major focus of social constructivism is to uncover the ways in which individuals and groups participate in the creation of their perceived social reality and identity over time. There will be presented a model of international interaction that explores the normative influence of fundamental institutional structures and the connection between normative changes and state identity and interests **(GRIFFITHS, O'CALLAGHAN 2002: 50 ET SQQ).** It is generally understood to be the by-products of countless human choices rather than laws resulting from divine will or nature **(COMP. BURR 1995).** In order to create a new legislation on minority rights, key players (persons calling for changes), chance situation (when previously popular norms have been put in question) and socialization mechanism (legislation) were needed in every period presented below **(GRIFFITHS, O'CALLAGHAN 2002: 50 ET SQQ).** This perspective of the Social Constructivism can also be put in the analytical frameworks of the New Institutionalism, the principal focus of which concentrates on the international political process. It is, broadly speaking, a study of the way the institutions operate, relate to each other and organize themselves. The institutions are sets of rules meant to govern international behaviour. Institutionalism claims, that despite lack of common government in international politics, sustained cooperation is possible under well defined conditions (conditions include existence of mutual interests that make joint gains from cooperation possible). There is however a long-term relationship among actors and a practice of reciprocity according to agreed upon standards of appropriate behaviour needed. The cooperation is here not an antithesis of conflict but constitutes a process for the management of conflict **(BALZACQ 2008: 10 ET SQQ).** In the context of minority rights under the term institutions, fall all the structures and mechanisms of social order and cooperation governing the behaviour of a set of individuals: legislation, monitoring, enforcement.

The history of protection of minorities in Europe begins in the period of religious wars (Reformation and Counter-Reformation). Thus, the first protected minorities were religious, namely in the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, later in the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. The French Revolution resulted in protection of national minorities in 1789, beginning from the technique of the plebiscite which was somehow an unspoken implementation of the self-determination concept. This would be prejudicial to the principle of the balance of power after the defeat of

Napoleon in 1815. The second stage is associated with the rise of nationalism and social Darwinism where language and culture came in turn to be politicized. Until the end of the Second World War however, measures of protection still concentrated on religious groups. This is why specific minority treaties between the Allied and Associated Powers, and Poland, in 1919, as well as the Swedish-Finnish agreement on territorial autonomy of Swedish-speaking inhabitants of the Åland Islands, 1920, must be seen as a measure of protection ahead of their times **(ALCOCK 2000: 1).**

After the Second World War, a new international order appeared. The war experience put the emphasis on human rights for all rather than special rights for some. National minority rights were considered contrary to international peace and security. However, as result of new border-states and new minorities, it has been realized with time that non-discrimination clauses are required. This conclusion was substantiated by some states' disavowal of proposed national minority rights regime (i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia). In 1965, the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was adopted. "Vital elements of the social life of the individual member of the community can only be enjoyed as a part of a group, and the enjoyment of minority rights therefore depends on the existence and development of the group" **(IBID.: 2)**. In that respect, the Paris Agreement 1946 on South Tyrol, almost twenty years before, was an exception to the postwar trend because it proposed a political framework for the protection of the German-speaking minority in Italy for a multicultural area. The fourth stage to be distinguished begins in the 1970s with the process of Western European integration and the fall of the Spanish dictatorship. The concept of self-determination gained its renaissance with the recognition of frontiers and the rise of regionalism, both connected with regional diversity recognition. The fifth and present stage began after the fall of the Iron Curtain when many minorities, especially in Eastern Europe, gained their independence with the fall of the Soviet system and became the dominant majority in new independent states. Why did minority issues become so important after the collapse of communism? Liebich argues that ethnicity has become one, sometimes the principal, criterion for the distribution of scare resources **(1998: 5, COMP. ALSO ESSER 1996).** The need for developing standards and monitoring machinery became evident. A great majority of theorists, lawyers and policy-makers have come to the clear conclusion that recognizing diversity might be a better option than enforcing conformity. As a result, a growing list of minority rights nowadays includes such rights as provisions for identity, language, culture, ethnicity, religion, education, equality and political participation. Still, the fundamental dilemma in recognizing national minority rights – whether post -1919, post-1945, or post-1989 – concerns that gap between so-called principles of order that affirm the territorial integrity and sovereignty of existing states, and those principles of legitimacy that affirm the right of all nations to independent statehood **(COMP. JACKSON 1998: 123).** Since the beginning of the 1990s, there can be observed a certain international integration process in the form of growing acceptance for rules and norms that construct the surrounding reality. This applies exactly to the assumptions of Functionalism. The main idea of the theory is that international cooperation should begin by dealing with specific transnational problems where there is some prospect of applying specialized knowledge and where the success of ad hoc functional agreements will lead to further efforts to replicate the experience. Over time, the principle of territorial and legal sovereignty will weaken because states would transfer functional responsibilities to international

agencies in order to deal with issues on a supra-national level **(GRIFFITHS, O'CALLAGHAN 2002: 116 ET SEQ).** Correspondingly, the problem of minorities has reached this level and a certain international minority rights regime has been created.

In order to systematize the development of this regime, a certain number of international documents created and signed after 1945 can be named, with a special focus on European dimensions **(SEE: DEVELOPMENT OF DOCUMENTS ON MINORITY PROTECTION; ATTACHMENT 1).** One can observe a strong interest in the issue after the collapse of the communism (three significant international agreements in the period 1945 – 1989 and about 11 noteworthy agreements after 1989). Another reason, on the other hand, is the long process of integration in Europe. Obviously, there have been documents created on specific national issues as well, for instance: the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia, 1995; the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement, 1998; the Bougainville Peace Agreement, 2001 or the Constitutional Framework of Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo, 2001, among others. These agreements also prove an increased interest in minority issues since 1989. This interest has been partly constructed both by new conflicts which have emerged (i.e. the Balkan War) and by a more dynamic transfer of the common European values (democracy, respect of minorities, non-discrimination… etc.) onto the international platform. In this way, the political relevance of national minorities´ protection is presently very high. Although it has not become a generally accepted legally binding principle of the European Union, in several legal acts issues of national minorities have been mentioned. In external relations, the protection of national minorities has become one of the main criteria for cooperation with the EU or its accession **(ŠMIHULA 2008: 51 ET SEQ).**

1.3 Minorities and dictatorship

The regime type is the primary determinant of the minority polices of particular states. In other words: the characteristics of a regime have a strong effect on state policies and in this way changes in the conditions of ethnic groups can be explained. States that share common fundamental organizing principles belong to the same regime type **(BARANY 2001: 24)**. Regimes can be divided according to their recognition and protection of minorities, whether they support institutional-structural arrangements for the articulation of minority interests. There are several regimes types in the world's political systems, but it cannot be argued that special attention should not be paid in this context to dictatorships. The argument for this is that such states "generally pursue more repressive policies towards ethnic minorities" **(IBID.: 31).**

It is difficult to be precise about the term "dictatorship" because it has changed over time and space. Generally speaking, it is a form of totalitarian or authoritarian regime, where the state's power has been obtained through illegal measures such as violence or plots **(SOBCZAK 2002: 65).** Essentially, it is a system of government where the power is intense, unlimited, uncontrolled and not estimated in time **(BASZKIEWICZ 2002: 3).** Furthermore, according to the study of Antoszewski and Herbut, common features of a dictatorship could be distinguished:

- high level of concentration of power in hands of an individual or a particular group

- ensuring of access to public positions only to persons enjoying the confidence of political leaders or the ruling group
- deprivation of the political significance of the institution of parliament
- directing citizens' activities in the channel of dominant party
- lack of competitive elections and, in fact, depriving citizens of the power impact
- autonomy of the machinery of repression
- common and frequent human rights violations **(1997: 24 ET SEQ)**

According to Baszkiewicz, authority is satisfied with the obedience of citizens, and if necessary, it enforces desired behaviour through brutal methods **(2002: 34).** Barany states that the main reasons for such repressive policy is the state's coercive potential; a smaller number of minorities which are, consequently, easier to control; weakness of democratic processes and, last but not least, a potential of minorities to threaten state stability **(2001: 31).**

Authoritarianism became a dominant political regime in Europe after the First World War. The postwar period especially put new democracies to several tests: economic crises, national conflicts, conviction of the injustice caused by the Versailles Treaty, selfishness and incompetence of the ruling elites, and finally, ideological confusion. Classes and social groups, for which democracy was a new experience, tended to overestimate its impact. In this situation, there quickly emerged disappointment and frustration. That was extremely vulnerable ground, says Jan Baszkiewicz, for spreading the Jacobin-Bolshevik myth about the extraordinary effectiveness of political violence. When democratic procedures and compromises fail, there is a temptation to introduce order through violence **(2002: 3).**

One can say, in a dictatorship the public is limited by prohibitions, orders and restrictions. Dictators require the assistance of the people they rule in order to maintain the sources of political power. These sources could be distinguished as below:

- authority, meaning the belief that the regime is legitimate
- human resources, which means people obeying, cooperating and providing assistance to the dictator
- skills and knowledge needed to perform specific actions and projects
- intangible factors, which are psychological and ideological pressure tools for forcing people to obey the ruler
- material resources, mainly access to property, natural resources, transportation, communication, financial and economic system
- sanctions and punishments, which are applied against disobedient people in order to ensure cooperation or eliminate the threat **(COMP. SHARP 2002: 16 ET SEQ)**

To sum up, a high degree of enforcing conformity is required in the case of a dictatorial regime. Consequently, the challenge of implementing minority rights as part of the international minority protection regime, being created for at last 70 years in Europe, is here especially immense because of the named tendencies.

Special attention should be paid to the authoritarian regimes in Eastern Europe and their attitude towards national minorities. During the period of the Soviet domination in the region,

the problem of minorities lay dormant, even if it had not gone away. Generally speaking, control by the Communist Party of states and the media meant that minorities got as much or as little attention as the authorities allowed **(LIEBICH 1998: 5).** Since the collapse of communism, ethnic relations in central and Eastern Europe has been a subject of great interest to scholars, especially with a focus on the political situations and minority politics there. The drive to secure the rights of groups that had previously been discriminated against soon turned into an effort to impose a new kind of imprisonment and subordination based on nationalist principles **(EBERHARDT 2001: 5).** This is the most serious challenge to the forging of a post-Cold War international order. In the absence of external homogeneity, internally weak multi-national post-communist states face the threat of disintegration into smaller parts, only to produce unstable successor states that are themselves wracked by ethno-national conflicts. Ethnic conflict is hardly new to many societies but the spread of ethno-nationalist mobilization in recent years reflects an aspiration on the part of ethnic minorities to reassert their right of self-determination. Not only did the nationalist idea create the problem of minorities there, it was also instrumental in worsening the plight of minorities once the modern state-system was in place. Because states were sovereign, they insisted on absolute loyalty from their citizens. Ethnicity unbound can seem to resemble a machine that goes of itself, fueled by the dismal Hobbesian logic of culturally homogenizing "war of all against all". Consequently, this consideration not only precluded states, to a lesser or greater extent, from granting rights to minorities within their borders, it also induced them to increase the assimilation pressure on minorities **(COMP. TARAS 1998: 1-3, STEIN 2000: IX, 3 ET SEQ).**

Acquaintance with the structure of the relationship between the authoritarian regime and its minority politics is reflected in renewed attention to the influence of international environment on ethnic conflict within states, particularly the relational dynamic between ethnic minorities, their external homelands and the home state in which they reside. This would form the premise for efforts to come to grips with the successes and failures of intervention by intergovernmental or supranational organizations. According to Sharp, there are a few harsh realities to be presented concerning foreign intervention towards a dictatorship:

- Foreign states tolerate or even positively assist a dictatorship in order to gain some political or economic advantages
- Foreign states sell out an oppressed people instead of keeping pledges to assist their liberation at the cost of another objective
- Foreign states act against a dictatorship only in order to gain their economic, political or military control over the country
- Foreign states are actively involved for positive purposes only of and when the internal resistance movement has already begun shaking the dictatorship, having thereby focused international attention **(2002: 6)**

Investigating the situation of minorities in an Eastern European dictatorship, one must pay attention to two opposing tendencies: development of international minority rights regime in Western Europe and the aim of the authoritarian regime to conform their national minorities. As consequence of this, a research question for this study would appear: Which factors can affect

minority protection in a contemporary dictatorship and to which extent? Sharp's proposition would be slightly modified and re-directed on the minority problematic in order to answer this question. There are five groups of arguments to be distinguished:

1) co-operation treaties and their enforcement on a supra-national level

2) economic and political incentives towards an authoritarian regime

3) economic and political pressure of third states

4) bilateral actions of countries directly involved in the minority issue

5) civil society building within the dictatorship

Classifying and evaluating the named possibilities would find the best, most effective way in order to diminish the democracy deficit in a dictatorship. In doing so in this study attention will be paid to both domestic and international means, in particular European laws and policies relevant to the minority in question and how developments in this area influence those in the other.

The study will interrogate the documented evidence – both legal and political – of those international bodies that have tried to deal with the problem of anomalous minority communities in the European state system (UN, OSCE, CoE and the EU) with the emphasis on the period between 1989 and 2009. As the challenge of diversity, the study distinguishes three ways in which a group affected by the right to self-determination may be included or excluded from the political community of the country it is living in: participation, identity and interpretation. Participation indicates whether the group has got a voice in the process of the implementing the right to shape the political and social reality in the country. Identity gives the possibility for shaping perception of the group, its history and entitlements, both internally and externally. Interpretation rules, in turn, in or out the sorts of reasoning resonating most strongly with the group affected.

Three general categories of analysis will find application:

- *Experience*: How has the international minority protection towards an authoritarian state developed since the collapse of communism? Legal standards, monitoring instruments and enforcement mechanisms will be analyzed.
- *Theory*: What is the character and substance of those rights and what effects on the principle of the self-determination of peoples do they have?
- *Evidence*: What kind of external influence is the most effective one? In this perspective, the focus is on behavior arising from a given set of institutional rules: participation, identity and interpretation. In order to investigate the research question some statistical data on the three elements of the self-determination: participation in form of elections, identity in form of NGOs that represent political pluralism, interpretation in form of the press freedom.

The focus of this study is limited in two important ways: only a political community in the form of a dictatorship and a national minority with a strong distinct collective consciousness will be investigated. Because the problem of minorities in post-communist states is relatively new and important, when considering the historical aspects and significance as well as European integration process and attitude Europe's towards its neighbors, the study will examine the case of Belarus, as an example of a contemporary dictatorship, and its minority politics towards Poles, as an example of the problem of minorities.

2. Dictatorship as Belarusian experience

2.1 From defective democracy to modern dictatorship

Understanding the origin of the contemporary form of the Belarusian state would simultaneously be a political contest over Belarus' future. It explains how the national consciousness has emerged and how it has been retarded.

It is impossible to understand events in contemporary Belarus without having in mind the beginning of the Belarusian state and the Soviet period. The First World War saw Russia and Germany locked on the Belarusian territory. After the October Revolution in 1917, a small group of nationally conscious intellectuals tried to form a new state[1]. On March 25th, 1918, a Belarusian National (People's) Republic (BNR) was proclaimed. It lasted about nine months before it was deposed by Soviet forces. The main reasons for the failure of these independence aims was the fact that the territory was "a virtual battle ground" **(MARPLES 2002: 32),** as well as the late development of national consciousness.

Following the Brest-Litovsk Peace Treaty, March 2nd, the territory fell under the control of the Germans. After the Polish-Russian war, 1921, under the terms of the Treaty of Riga, Poland and Russia divided the territory between themselves. After the collapse of the BNR, Lenin created the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) in the Eastern part and made it to be one of the four founding nations of the Soviet Union in December, 1922. David Marples called this new republic "nationalist in form, socialist in content" **(IBID.: 32)**. Only then could cultural and national development start in the form of new institutions, publications and the revival of the Belarusian language. Lenin had argued on several occasions that Bolshevik policy, with respect to the national question, should be based on the principle of self-determination **(KIRKWOOD 1990: 701).** This came to an end with the Stalin era when the policy changed towards intense sovietisation and russification on one hand, as well as collectivization of agriculture and rapid industrialization of the other hand. National elite was violently suppressed and finally destroyed. In David Marples' words, Belarus became "a denationalised nation" **(1999).** The German invasion during the Second World War completely destroyed the country and cost the lives of about 20 % of the population. A large partisan movement was centered

[1] autonomous within Russia at first

there, partly coordinated through Moscow. In 1943, some nationalist groups collaborated with Nazis in the hope of bringing Belarusian independence back, which Stalin used as an argument to deport hundreds of thousands of people to Siberia later on. The Red Army drove the Germans back in 1944. Under the conditions of Yalta Conference, the Western Belarusian territories ceded to Poland in 1921 were incorporated into the Soviet Union **(TEAGUE 2002: 17 ET SQQ)**. The period of the war and the "partisan tradition" remained the strongest influence on the population of the BSSR. Two former Partisan leaders gained the leadership of the Communist Party in Belarus[2]. It can be concluded that the Soviet era, ironically, enhanced national conscious in the republic. The Gorbachev period brought changes and particularly two events had a thoughtful impact on Belarus: the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 and the discovery of mass graves of Stalin's victims at Kuropaty Las. In the first case, the Republic's authorities took little action to address the crisis except to suppress information. The second crisis was responded to only with cover-ups. The immediate danger to the survival of the nation led to an accusation of the communistic regime of either agency or complicity **(ZAPRUDNIK, URBAN 1997: 288**). Protests, among other processes at that time, resulted in declaring state sovereignty in July 1990. An interesting remark made by Steven Eke and Taras Kuzio: "all the major popular demonstrations that occurred in Belarus prior to the collapse of the USSR were economically, not politically motivated" (**EKE, KUZIO 2000: 527)**, refers first of all to the food price increases. Chernobyl and mass graves discoveries should be seen here only as a kind of release. The catastrophic drop in living standards served to alienate the Belarusian people from Russia and make them wary of pursuing a market economy. There was no support for the idea of seceding from the Union and later on, shortly before declaring national independence, Belarus was ready to sign a treaty in order to reconstitute the USSR on a new basis. Because the country was deprived of a national leadership tradition due to the war losses and the Stalin purges, the opposition movement lacked authority as many citizens found the anti-Russia faction sentiment repellent. This resulted, above all, from the family connections of the citizens of Belarus, 30 % of whom have close relatives in Russia. Many of them have been educated at Russian universities or have started their political or military careers there. These factors create a specific system of ties with Russia "which no politician aspiring to leading positions in Minsk can afford to ignore**" (GROMADZKI, KAZANECKI, MIRONOWICZ NAUMCZUK, 2001: 7).**

At this time the newborn democracy and independence in Belarus began to fail. There are several arguments of this thesis. First, the economic disaster caused by rising prices in Russia and the collapse of the new currency, *zaichik*, resulting in hyperinflation, depriving the leadership of power. Stanislav Shuskevich had been elected to the Belarusian Supreme Soviet (parliament) in 1990, with the backing of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF). The parliament however, remained dominated by the communist political and economic elite. Shuskevich was isolated, an example of this being the parliament rejection of proposed reforms (economic liberalization and privatization). Due to the economic crisis in Russia and its effects on Belarus there was a fear of completely losing the relatively privileged situation that Belarus enjoyed during the Soviet period. Shushkevich was dismissed in 1994 when he lost a parliamentary vote of confidence regarding allegations of corruption. In the same year Belarus introduced a new

[2] Kyril T. Mazurov 1956-65 and Petr M. Masherov 1965-1980

constitution under which the political power in the country would be divided between a new presidency and the unicameral Supreme Soviet, based on the former Soviet model. Democracy in the meaning of the framework constructed in the years 1990-1994 was not accepted. As result, a large part of the citizens still associate it with anarchy, inflation and empty shelves in the shops.

At the time of the first Belarusian elections it seemed "the country [has been] caught in a time warp" (**TEAGUE 2002: 25**). Civil society was weak, political parties failed to get common support, the media remained largely under state control, publications were dependent on state subsidies, and the Soviet police, the KGB, remained unconstructed. In 1994, Aleksander Lukashenko was elected as the first president of the independent Belarus. In comparison with the Soviet era, there were not many changes initiated. Although the Communist Party had been banned, a new party, Party of Communists of Belarus (PCB) was now in place. The army, the military and the secret police had a strong influence on the society, partly due to the fact that several Russian military bases were still placed in the territory. The major Soviet newspaper, *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, published entirely in Russian, remained in place. Only a few insignificant newspapers, i.e. *Svoboda*, appeared in Belarusian. Nevertheless it seemed still possible for Belarus to develop as a new national republic with close links to Central Europe and the Baltic states. On paper, parliament had a decisive voice. There was the Constitutional Court that was able to turn down decrees issued by the President. Belarus had its own white-red-white flag and national symbols **(IBID.: 26 ET SQQ).** Lukashenko did not go this direction. His main aim was to strengthen the power and reassert traditional links with Russia. He conceived the idea of using the institution of the national referendum to make changes to the Constitution in order to increase the president's power over the parliament and the Constitutional Court as well as, generally speaking, to legitimate it. There were three such referenda held in 1995, 1996 and 2004. As a result, the president gained the power to dissolve the parliament and appoint all the judges in the Belarusian legal system. Russian became a second state language and national symbols have been replaced by their Soviet versions. The president subordinated all kinds of media and strangled the opposition. BPF, which was oriented towards Europe and the development of a national state based on the Belarusian language and cultural development, won no seats in the newly-elected parliament. The opposition was unable to strengthen its position in the society, which led to its self-destruction because of constant internal conflicts, careerism in the leadership, and unwillingness to compromise (**COMP. LEWIS 2002: 104).** As consequence, the BPF party for instance, divided into two factions with different aims[3]. Consequently, together with the new centrist United Civic Party, it was forced to occupy the middle ground. Further, growing state repressions reached academic freedom, i.e. the events of 2006 at the European Humanities University, Minsk. With time the nation has subverted the notion of respect for basic civil and political rights and the rule of law. A climate of fear has been fostered, "through targeted disappearances, beatings, impositions of censorship and a wholesale attack against civil society in that country" **(HAWKES 2002: 75).**

[3] The Conservative Christian Party, led by Zenon Pozniak, and the mainstream BPF, led by Vintsuk Viachorka

Last but not least, the argument of the failure of democracy towards authoritarian dictatorship in the country are values of this society. Nationalism and the formation of the nation-states in Europe are usually treated in the context of the evolution and political

mobilization of 'national consciousness' **(JOCELYN 1998: 73).** In the case of Belarus however, national consciousness is a highly problematic concept. The Republic of Belarus is the ultimate political expression of a Belarusian nation. But this term per se does not really deliver anything useful with respect to the establishment of such a state. Jocelyn claims that the territory is "the first effective political-administrative unit that used reference to Belarus as its identifying principle and therefore created a potential collective identity" **(IBID.: 78).** Ethno-linguistic criteria do not play role in recognition of membership of the society. If so, it can be concluded that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the inhabitants were more interested in establishing a modern, stabile country, with law and order, and did not want to concentrate on the processes of quick democratic change, civil rights, relations between the state and the individual and political participation at first.

Western involvement in Belarus has been reduced to a minimum since the country has gained its independence. There were numerous strategies pursued by various Western actors, governments and institutions on how to promote democratic changes in Belarus[4]. The USA and Council of Europe policies emphasised pressure and selective engagement, whereas the OSCE and EU left room for compromise. All the actions however, have been so far poorly coordinated **(SILITSKY 2002: 351).** As a result, Belarus has been locked into an almost exclusive reliance on Russia in economic and political terms alike. This is evidence of two processes happening simultaneously: an exclusion of Belarus by the West and a self-exclusion in the Belarusian political discourse.

[4] presented in detail in the next chapter

In this way, a modern contemporary dictatorship has been created. The adjective "modern" should be added in order to distinguish this regime from ancient dictatorships of Caesar, Cromwell, Napoleon and contemporary military dictatorships in Latin America or Africa. What makes the Belarus dictatorship a modern one is its bureaucratic administration, the modernity of repressive measures of control and means of mobilization (propaganda, state security system), as well as the mass party (PCB). The explanation should also contain some pure modernizing effects in the economic, social and cultural spheres that have extended beyond their pragmatic goals: the reform of ineffective agriculture property, increased industrialization, social and cultural urbanization, the extension of mobility to the lower two-thirds of the population as well as the creation of new functional elites and new, anti-traditional values and lifestyles. These features define the modernity of the Belarusian dictatorship (**COMP. JARAUSCH 1999: 19 ET SQQ**). It is however evident that the authoritarian, repressive and dictatorial strategy limit the system's internal dynamics and its chances of success at the most basic level.

To sum up, democracy failed in Belarus slightly after obtaining independence. Factors causing this hardship include a break-down in the economic links, related to an aim at transition to democracy and market economy, a struggle for power among the new political elites and the fact that the population was not prepared for serious changes, as consequence of a special position of the republic in the former USSR. The present situation of the country is also a result of the long-standing weakness of the opposition. Today's Lukashenko's resilience hinges on the severity of the government's repression of opponents; domination in political, economic and social life; people's conservatism expressed in the lack of a feeling for democracy and Russia's sponsorship of the regime to a certain degree.

2.2 Polish Minority in the newly independent state of Belarus

Because national identity of minorities, as a key to the self-determination concept, may be mainly defined by language, religion, ethnicity and the freedom of organizations – or indeed some combination thereof (**JACKSON 2005: 17**), this chapter will briefly examine the situation of Poles in Belarus since the collapse of the Soviet state put special focus on these aspects.

The 20th century, rich in political events, brought radical demographic and political transformations in Europe. Shifts in state boundaries caused forced migrations of entire ethnic populations, leading to important changes in their structures. The Polish community in Belarus is therefore currently geographically isolated in the Western part of the country, in the Grodno region. According to the data from the 1999 census, the Polish presence in Belarus consists of some 400,000 Poles. About 17,000 Poles use Polish as a language of everyday communication. After the Russian minority, Poles certainly form the second largest minority group in Belarus **(EBERHARDT 2001: 20, GAWIN 2009).** During the Soviet period, the minority was significantly discriminated against, with a continuing policy of assimilation and sovietisation **(GAWIN 2009).** Some academics claim state independence brought into being a definite striving for ethnic identification for all the country's national groups. Kruszewski describes the phenomenon as "the somewhat unexpected revival of the Polish communities to the east of the present border of

Poland" (**1998: 131).** According to Rotman, Novikova, Golubkova and Filinskaya this has deepened the psychological boundaries of identification between Russians, Poles, Lithuanians and others living in Belarus **(2002: 111)**. However, the relations between the Belarusian government and the Polish minority remained good natured in the first years, until Lukashenko's rise to power.

The first organization uniting the Poles was founded in 1988. In the same year, the Adam Mickiewicz Scientific and Educational Society in Grodno was launched. Similar associations have been established in Brest, Minsk, Lida, and Baranovichy. In 1990, they united into the Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB[5]) **(POCZOBUT 2006: 1).** The organization concentrates on cultural, linguistic, educational and, to a certain degree, political issues. It had primarily three newspapers: *Głos znad Niemna*, *Magazin Polski* and *Echo Polessia*. Didactic support for teachers is provided by Polish Alma Mater and for youth – Scouting. The Polish Cultural Society of Lida, the Club of Polish National Traditions, the Polish Child Group "Grodzieńskie Słowiki" and the non-profit Polish National Group "Lechici" are the further examples of other Polish organizations registered in the Ministry of Justice of Belarus (www.ncpi.gov.by). In 1992 Belarus agreed with the Polish government and permitted the establishment of two Polish language schools in Grodno and Volkovysk[6]. Until the mid-1990s, Poles in Belarus were given an opportunity for articulating their aspirations and needs. This concerned mainly freedom of language, and especially the reactivation of Polish schools, and opportunities to participate in religious life.

The Polish minority faced difficulties from the beginning of the authoritarian regime of Alexander Lukashenko. After the national referendum in 1995, Polish became a less privileged language with the elevation of Russian as the second state language of Belarus. The Oxford English Dictionary refers to "the language of a particular community or country" **(OED 1989).** This collective or communal aspect makes language a potential diversity dilemma. According to Jennifer Jackson Preece, language is "the determinant of nationality" **(2005: 100).** This is why decisions of linguistic policies of a state are sometimes highly important in the context of a diversity dilemma. Although the two schools using the Polish language were opened in Belarus after 1996, money for them has been provided almost exclusively by the UPB **(GAWIN 2009).** The Belarusian government does not provide the schools with necessary materials and equipment. The project of the third school, planned for 1997, was withdrawn by the Belarusian authorities. Kruszewski stresses that "any further growth of Polish language undoubtedly would create problems for Belarusian officials" **(1998: 141).**

Religion is important if considering the minority problem in Belarus because of its political significance. Precisely religion exerts a powerful influence over the values, identities and human conduct of those who believe in it **(JACKSON 2005: 21).** In the case of Poles, there is no threat of losing members of the Catholic Church in Belarus but rather of losing certain values

[5] consists of Polish Academy of Science, Polish Medical Association, Association of Polish Plastic Artists, Polish Youth Society, Polish Veterans' Association, Union of Home Army Soldiers, Association of Polish Victims of Political Repressions, The Polish Nurses and Midwifes Association

[6] 23.06.1992; the Treaty between Poland and Republic of Belarus "Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation", in force since 30.03.1993

that used to strengthen the Polish consciousness there for ages. For many years, the only place where the Polish language was kept was in the Roman Catholic Church[7]. Currently, the Church is shifting to Belarusian. This practice can greatly accelerate de-polonization processes of the Polish community **(GROTT 2007).** According to an examiner of Polish Catholics in today's Belarus, Professor Roman Dzwonkowski, Polishness cannot survive in the long term without a support of external institutional factors. And "apart from the Catholic Church there are not serious and influential institutions or social forces capable of meeting these requirements. Changes in the liturgy language would have dramatic consequences" **(2004: 44).** Possible proof for this thesis is the comparison of the results of population censuses 1989 and 1999[8]. One would expect greater growth in the Polish population **(SEE: NATIONAL CENSUSES IN COMPARISON, ATTACHMENT 2)**. This can be a modest strengthening in the position of ethnic Belarusians at the expense of ethnic Russians and Poles, which may be a consequence of a change in declared nationality **(EBERHARDT 2001: 236).** The main reason however, responsible for hampering Polish Catholic life is a serious shortage of Polish speaking parish priests.

A series of further restrictions on rights took place later on. At the beginning of January 1999, President Lukashenko once again decided parties and social organizations should undergo re-registration[9]. Local authorities forbid Poles from protesting against violations of their rights thus "provoking illicit actions on [their] part". Special policies forces disperse unauthorized meetings and the organizers are being fined **(KHODYKO, STRZALA 1999: 2)**. In September 2004, the Polish Conservatory for Dialogue and Agreement at the Polish Club in Baranovichi was launched. Participants, activists of various Polish social organizations, decided to set up a joint Council of Poland in Belarus in order to strengthen the status of the Polish minority as a subject (and not an object) of the minority politics in the Republic **(**www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl**).** Despite this initiative, in 2005 a great crisis between Belarus and Poland due to a presidential "campaign against Polish minority" came about **(GAWIN 2009).** The authorities claimed Poland is trying to "destabilize the regime and the Polish minority is a 'fifth column'" **(**www.belarusembassy.org**)**. As result, a Polish diplomat was expelled, the Polish-language newspaper *Głos znad Niemna* was closed and the leader of the Union of Poles was replaced by one that is sympathetic to Lukashenko. The UPB turned for help to Poland and Lukashenko's regime gained proof of foreign, Polish and Western, intervention in Belarusian internal affairs **(**wiadomosci.gazeta.pl**).** The affair has damaged relations between Belarus and Poland **(**www.msz.gov.pl**)**. Poczobut states that "the regime in power is interested in taking over the control of Polish organizations and in downgrading influence of independent activists of the Polish minority" **(2006: 3 ET SEQ).** The former chairman of the UPB believes the situation of Poles in Belarus "lacks harmony" and "is partially a result of the pro-Western course of Poland" **(GAWIN 2009)**. Additionally, the introduction of the Pole's Card in 2007 enabled many thousands of inhabitants of Belarus to get it by formally declaring their Polish identity to Polish officials. The introduction caused protests from Belarusian officials. Another issue regarding the Polish minority has happened recently. The Russian-Belorussian exercises conducted in September

[7] about 350 churches with liturgy in Polish in 1998 (KRUSZEWSKI 1998: 144)
[8] The census was carried out during October 14-24, 2009. The initial results are to be announced by February 1, 2010.
[9] the same will happen in 2005

2009, *Zapad 2009*[10] were the largest operation in a decade. The military exercises involved ships of the Baltic, Black Sea and the Russian Northern Fleet. The exercises were carried out partly near the Polish border. Simulations such as the suppression of a Polish minority rebellion in Belarus and repelling an attack on the North European Gas Pipeline were subjects of the operations and caused great concern in Poland and the NATO. In November 2009, Polish activists requested the re-legalization of the UPB to President Alexander Lukashenko. In January 2010 there were again some tensions between Belarusian authorities and the Poles. The leader of the Union of Poles loyal to the regime of Alexander Lukashenko tried to take control over the local Polish House in Iwieniec. This resulted in a conflict between the two leaders of the Union (Borys, Siemaszka) as well as the authorities **(RZECZPOSPOLITA, 23.01.2010).**

3. Obligations and monitoring

The structure of the Belarusian foreign policy has remained the same throughout the period of independence. The main subject and reference point for Belarusian diplomacy has been Russia. Belarus' policy towards other international actors, including different parts of 'the West[11]', has merely been a function of this single most important relationship[12] **(MELYANTSOU, SILITSKY 2008).** The question that arises at this point is why should such an unattractive economic partner such as Belarus be an object of Western interest? Why is this country supposed to be a sovereign actor in relations with the West if Russia actually used to be the most important player here? There are several explanations in favor of this statement and they can be especially interesting if considering the question of the Polish minority in Belarus. On one hand this will be an idealistic approach, on the other hand there is a realistic explanation.

To the idealistic approach one can include the Huntingtonian theory of 'belonging' as well as aspirations of the new EU member states to promote democracy eastwards.

Belarus is located in the geographical centre of Europe. According to the critic Zbigniew Brzeziński, Belarus belongs to Eurasia's periphery: the potential border of 'Atlantic Europe' **(1997: 52).** It is the opinion of another famous researcher and political scientist, Samuel Huntington that there is a divide in Belarus among Catholic-Protestant and orthodox communities. In addition, Huntington states that it will mostly be the orthodox religious traditions which will impede the country's successful integration into Western space **(HUNTINGTON 1996).** Many other researchers of the European continent, as well as Belarusian experts, support Huntington in the idea that there are consequences to the many years Belarus was under the Russian Empire and then the SU. This point of view is also held by Russian political scientists and other public figures. Alexander Dugin, a theoretician from a prosperous Russian school of geopolitics, states that the territories of Belarus, central Ukraine, Moldova, Rumania, Serbia and Bulgaria possess contradicting geopolitical characteristics. Geographically, they belong to the southern part of central Europe, but socially and culturally, to Russia, or even

[10] West 2009
[11] the „West" understood in the subjective perception of Belarusians as the three major parties: NATO, US, the EU
[12] for details see: p. 51

further, to Eurasia **(1997: 376).** However, there are some contradictory opinions. People like Otto von Gabsburg, the leader of the pan-European movement supported by many European political scientists mainly from 'New Europe', argues that Belarusians appear to be 'forgotten Europeans'. This is separating a European cultural heritage and Belarus must become part of united Europe and accordingly part of the European Union **(IGNATIK 2008).**

The idea of spreading democracy and Western values in Eastern Europe which culturally belongs to the West, has become a part of the Eastern Dimension projects. Obviously, there are also other objectives such as the security issue and trade. New EU member states[13] aspire to be included into discussion on the future borders of the European Union and the policy towards the Eastern neighbors. Selection of such objectives is associated with specific geographic positions of the states participating in the Eastern enlargement of the EU. Their historical and cultural experiences between East and West expand the spectrum of issues, preserving Eastern politics from so-called "finlandization"[14]. Poland, as one of the initiators of the ED projects, puts under critique the dictatorship of Aleksandr Lukashenko, his concept of European security and the non-market economy. The Polish task here is to prevent the complete isolation of Belarus and its perception as being an area under the Russian sphere of influence. Poland aspires to be a mediator representing the EU and the Council of Europe in negotiations with Belarus. This is an alternative way when considering the fact that the attempts of Western countries to liberalize Lukashenko's regime through the intermediation of Moscow have been a fiasco. Not without meaning here is the fact that a lot of Poles live behind Polish borders with the states of the former SU. Russia, as an "elder brother" of Belarus caused it exclusion by the West as well as the impression of the Belarusian political elite that "nobody wants us in Europe" **(GROMADZKI, KAZANECKI, MIRONOWICZ, NAUMCZUK 2001).** Poland is trying to challenge this stereotype.

Keeping on the policy of the new EU member states, a realistic point of view must also be taken into consideration. To the realistic approaches that put inter alia Belarus in the center of European interest belongs the Eastern Partnership Policy, 'Polish Prometeism', the pragmatism of the border zones and, first of all, the importance of Russian resources flowing to Europe via the Belarusian territory. These resources are mainly gas and petroleum **(SEE: GAS PIPELINES GOING THROUGH BELARUS, ATTACHMENT 3),** but also agricultural goods, raw materials and minerals. During Putin's presidency, the oil boom was the most important source of revenues. Belarus imported cheap crude oil from Russia, refined it, and then exported oil products to Europe at market prices. Theoretically, Belarus can stop selling transit services to Gazprom and become a broker for all Russian gas that gets into its territory. Russia's non-ratification of the Energy Charter Treaty opens interesting opportunities for brokers of Russian gas in Belarus, Ukraine and other countries of Eastern Europe (www.eegas.com). Their long-term security is closely linked to political developments and the possibility of creating lasting democracy and stability in that country.

[13] states from the 2004 and 2007 EU-enlargement

[14] Limitation to the economic issues (www.yourdictionary.com) or : a foreign policy of neutrality under the influence of the Soviet Union (www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary)

There are several initiatives towards Belarus based mainly on the realistic approach. The European Neighborhood Policy is aiming for closer integration of states bordering the EU with the economy of the European Union, preventing new dividing lines, and strengthening security and prosperity. Through this policy, the EU seeks to promote greater economic development, stability, better governance and on the other hand raise the EU's profile in its neighborhood. It is similar to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) signed with CIS states in the 1990s in order to encourage political, commercial, economic and cultural cooperation (www.delrus.ec.europa.eu). The EU considers the Belarus authorities too undemocratic and therefore PCA ratification procedure has been suspended since 1997. However, the document on strategy towards Belarus from December 2009 states that the European Neighborhood Policy will cover Belarus. The fields of actions will include stability of democracy, freedom of the media, accession to the WTO, fight against corruption, tax reforms, judicial capacity and regional security (ec.europa.eu).

French president Nicolas Sarkozy brought to life the project of the Union of the Mediterranean during the French Presidency of the European Union (July - December 2008). To balance the focus of the European Neighborhood Policy, the Union of the Mediterranean and the Finnish initiative of the Northern Dimension, the Polish-Swedish duo tabled a new vision of EU´s relations with Eastern neighbors that were once part of the Soviet Union **(SEE: EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES, ATTACHMENT 4)**. The EaP is an institution aiming to improve the political and economic trade-relations of the six Post-Soviet states of "strategic importance" - Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia - with the European Union **(RETTMAN 2009).** The EaP process envisages legal approximation and joint institutions leading to the creation of a new free-trade zone embracing the 27 EU states and the 6 partners. The policy would see visa-free travel to the EU for the 76 million people and in the case of about 400.000 Poles living in Belarus and about 250.000 Belarusians living in Poland and having their relatives abroad, this matter is of a great importance. In the Grodno and Brest districts, a large part of the Belarusian citizens live from cross-border trade with Poland. News about visas and restrictions of the movement of persons has been received with concern.

Border zone pragmatism is the next reason for increased interest in Belarus issues. Two Euro-Regions[15] on the Polish-Belarusian border deal with common ecologic problems, tourism activities as well as co-operation in the field of education. As a very blunt example of such cross-border co-operation is the German-Belarusian project against the drying of Pripet marshes: The Programme in Support of Belarus, 2002 **(KNAUER 2002).**

A less peaceful theory for actions towards Belarus suggests the realistic approach of the 'Polish prometeism'. Originally it was an integral part of Józef Pilsudski's so-called 'prometeism' policy, which sought to coordinate all non-Russian and non-Soviet activities in order to make them less dangerous to Poland. A key excerpt from Pilsudski's 1904 memorandum declared:

> "Poland's strength and importance among the constituent parts of the Russian state embolden us to set ourselves the political goal of breaking up the Russian state into its main constituents and emancipating the countries that have been forcibly incorporated into that empire. We regard this

[15] The Euro-Regions „Bug" and „Niemen"

> not only as the fulfillment of our country's cultural strivings for independent existence, but also as a guarantee of that existence, since a Russia divested of her conquests will be sufficiently weakened that she will cease to be a formidable and dangerous neighbor." (www.tripatlas.com)

Nowadays prometeism is aiming at liberating "the major non-Russian peoples that Russia had subjugated since shaking off her own 'Tartar yoke' in the 16th century" (allaboutall.info).

3.1 Analyzing legal standards

Practices of the Belarusian authoritarian regime towards its Polish minority are incompatible with democratic standards. Called actions are in conflict with the country's domestic law, obligations assumed by Belarus within the framework of the United Nations, the OSCE, and partially Council of Europe and the European Union. They are also being taken in glaring contravention of the minorities-related provisions of the Polish-Belarusian treaty and constitute a negation of European democratic standards. The aim of this chapter is to prove violations of the obligations that Belarus is supposed to maintain in order to provide possible reasons for external interference of the West with Polish minority issues in the Republic.

3.1.1 Internal standards of Belarus

When investigating the legal status of the Polish minority in Belarus, one should pay attention to the fact that it is not highlighted in the legal system of the Republic as a separate entity with rights and responsibilities. Its status is governed by the provisions relating to minorities or to the status of citizens.

The Constitution of the Republic of Belarus embodies a catalogue of rights and liberties, contained, inter alia, in the Articles 2, 10, 14, 15, 22, 23, 28-31, 33-36, 40, 49, and 50. In Article 14, the role of the state has been determined by showing that it regulates "relations among social, ethnic and other communities on the basis of the principles of equality before the law and respect of their rights and interests" **(ART. 14 CB).** Article 15 deals with state responsibility for "preserving the historic, cultural and spiritual heritage, and the free development of the cultures of all the ethnic communities that live in the Republic of Belarus" **(ART. 15 CB).**

In addition to the above mentioned articles, there are other documents of state law in force. The Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 3094-XI of January 26, 1990 "On Languages" states in Article 22 that "the state ensures the protection and promotion of culture in the languages of other nations whose representatives are present in the Republic" (**ART. 26 LRB 1990**). Additionally, in Article 22 a clause can be found that states that "in accordance to the needs of citizens, the decision of local executive and legislative bodies may set up kindergartens or separate groups, in which upbringing and educational process takes place in a language of a minority" (**ART. 22 LRB 1990**).

The Law of the Republic of Belarus No. 1926-XII of November 11, 1992 "On National Minorities" recognizes the right of every person to a free determining of his or her nationality

(**ART. 2 LRB 1992**). Article 5 deals with the fact that none can be compelled to prove his (her) nationality or to refuse it. This is related to Article 4 of the Law on the prohibition of rights limitation and freedoms of citizens of the Republic of Belarus because of their belonging to a national minority as well as attempts of assimilation against their will (**ART. 4 LRB 1992**). Persons belonging to minorities are bound to uphold the Constitution and laws of Belarus and to respect the sovereignty and inviolability of its territory, as well as respect tradition of all nationalities, their cultures and languages (**ART. 3 LRB 1992**). It is linked to the prohibition of associations whose activities contradict legislation on human rights, promote national, racial and religious hostility or, if they are organizationally connected or are a part of political organization of another state (**ART. 12 LRB 1992**). Special rights are set out in the Article. 6, in which the Republic of Belarus shall guarantee its citizens referring themselves to national minority, equal political, economic and social rights and freedoms. They are, in particular, the rights to:

1) receive assistance from the state for developing national culture and education;
2) use native language, choose a language for communication as well as freely choose the language for upbringing and education;
3) establish mass media, publishing activity as well as receive, store and disseminate information in native language;
4) establish cultural bonds with countrymen abroad;
5) practice any religion or not practice any religion, participate in religious cults, rituals, rites using native language;
6) preserve historical and cultural and spiritual heritage, free development of culture including professional and amateur art;
7) create public associations and enter in public associations;
8) freely elect and be elected to state bodies of the republic of Belarus on the basis of comprehensive, equal, direct and indirect voting rights at secret balloting;
9) equal access to all offices in state bodies of the Republic of Belarus (**ART. 6 LRB 1992**).

Last but not least, the Disposition of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus issued on 13 May, 2004, states the "Organization of Teaching Children of the Representatives of National Minorities in Belarus". Concerning national minorities, Article 10 of the Law might be recalled. It ensures "favorable conditions for studying the native language and learning native language in preschools and schools according to national regulations" (**ART. 10 LRB 2004**). All the documents mentioned above ensure the Poles full rights as citizens.

The activity of the UPB has been, from the very beginning, conducted only according to the legislation of Belarus: Articles 22, 50, 53, 59 of the CB; Articles 1,3,4,5 of the LRB 1992 "On National Minorities"; Articles 22, 24 of the LRB 1990 "On Languages" as well as the Disposition of the Ministry of Education "Organization of Teaching Children of the Representatives of National Minorities in Belarus" and the decision of the Executive Committee of the Grodno Oblast: "On the implementation of the constitutional rights of citizens of the circuit to teach children in their mother tongue" (www.bankzakonov.com) as well as the international agreements signed by Belarus (**GAWIN 2009, GROTT 2007**).

Investigating the overall legal situation of minorities in Belarus, one must add that the rights regulated in the normative acts meet recognized international standards.

3.1.2 Bilateral Treaty obligations

Bilateral treaties on minorities are treaties between neighboring states with national minorities to protect their respective minorities. The role of bilateral treaties is reducing or preventing tension between kin-state and home-states of the minorities concerned **(LANTSCHNER, MEDDA 2001).**

In October 1990 Belarus and Poland failed to reach agreement on a Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation, despite the fact that Poland was able to do so with the Ukraine and Russia. Belarus did not trust the intentions of the Polish who have the potential to make claims on Belarusian territory (www.unhcr.org). In August 1991 the Supreme Soviet of Belarus declared independence and relations between Poland and Belarus began to warm at the impetus of Polish President Walesa. In March 1992 an education agreement was signed with Poland allowing for the establishment of Polish language schools in Belarus. It established an avenue for teacher exchanges and the right for their respective minorities to choose the language of their education. After 1991 Poland signed 16 international agreements containing clauses on the protection of minorities and protection of citizens. One of them was the Treaty between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Belarus on Good-neighborly Relations and Friendly Cooperation (Warsaw, 23 June 1992) (www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl) that contains extensive provisions on the protection of minorities included in the Articles 13-17. The Parties will indicate compliance with international standards (UN and OSCE) for the protection of minorities (**ART. 13 GFC**). In the Treaty the term "minority" has been used reserving collective rights, individually or together with other members of their group, to free performance, development and expression of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity without any discrimination and in full equality before the law. The Parties recognize the national minority as a matter of personal choice of every citizen, whilst no adverse consequences may arise because of the choice of the person (**ART. 14 GFC**). At the same time belonging to minorities shall not exempt a person from compliance with the laws of the State of residence (**ART. 17 GFC**). Members of minorities, under the Article 15, can individually or collectively exercise the rights in the areas of:

- free use of the mother tongue in private and public life
- establishment and maintaining of own institutions, organizations and associations
- the use of state aid for cultural and educational activities
- free access to information in the mother tongue
- use of names and first names in the mother tongue
- religious practices
- maintaining unimpeded contacts among themselves and across frontiers;
- use of legal remedies according to the national law for the realization and protection of rights

The Parties commit themselves to constructive cooperation in the field of minority protection, respect for the rights of persons belonging to them, create conditions for learning the mother language in educational institutions, as well as, where possible and necessary, use the native language for public authorities (**ART. 16 GFC**). The treaty secures the present borders and obligates each Party to respect international principles in the treatment of their minorities. It secures the "free maintaining, development and expression of one's own ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity without any form of discrimination and in conditions of full equality before law" (www.unhcr.org).

On January 21st, 1995, an agreement was signed between Poland and Belarus for the Protection of Graves and Memorials to the Victims of War and Repression. On March 25, 1995, Belarus and Poland sign an agreement on preserving the cultural heritage of both nations' peoples residing in the other's borders. They agreed to encourage the mutual presentation of musical and theatrical productions, and to promote the conditions for cultural development (lex.pl).

3.1.3 International standards

Although many individual nations previously recognized and honored minority rights in their respective national laws, it was not until the 1940s that the international community concentrated on encouraging all nations to respect this. The progress being made within national states as regards to the institutionalization of their minorities made it easier to have that institutionalization extended to the international level **(ZAPRUDNIK, URBAN 1997: 174)**. As normative entitlements, minority rights are included in the main international standard-setting documents of relevance. The aim of this sub-chapter is to present those signed by the Republic of Belarus in order to gain a normative basis for external accusation of the minority rights violations in the country. The study of international documents on minority rights provides as immediate introduction to contradictions within the Belarusian practice. Four main international organizations have been chosen in order to show different obligations of the state and different forms of international influence later on. The reason for such a choice is the character of those organizations that during the first years of Belarus' existence in many ways helped the development of democratic institutions, the rule of law and civil society, as they did in other countries in transition. Zaprudnik and Urban point out that apart from Caucasus and Belarus all the other ex-soviet states wanted to become a part of the western world as soon as possible. They wanted to belong to NATO in order to ensure defense against the return of a crusading communism in Russia or against Russian attempts to regain the territory that had once been part of the Soviet Union. They wanted to be in the OSCE[16] in order to keep peace and stability regarding the Cold War. They wanted to join the Council of Europe in order to ensure high standards of human rights. They wanted to be a part of the European Union in order to receive funds for economic reconstruction and to receive advice on changing from a command to a free market economy **(COMP. IBID.: 187).** Maybe nowadays, because of the cool Belarusian-Russian

[16] until December 1994 as CSCE (Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe)

relations, could there be a chance for the Western world to gain Belarus? Nevertheless, different attempts to be assumed as "the stick and carrot methods" need a normative basis for any action. This basis regarding the minority issue is Belarus' international obligations.

The pursuit of human rights was a main reason for creating the United Nations Organization (UN). An early objective created a legal framework for acting on complaints against human rights violations. Minority rights issue has been included in a series of documents on human rights. There are four official documents that Belarus, as a founding nation[17] of the UN, is supposed to follow:

- ICERD; International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination **(ART. 5); 21.12.1965**
- ICCPR; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights **(ART. 27); 16.12.1966**
- CRC; Convention on the Right of the Child **(ART. 30); 20.11.1989**
- DNLM; Declarations of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; **18.12.1992; (SEE: SELECTED UN OBLIGATIONS BELARUS' ON MINORITY RIGHTS, ATTACHMENT 5).**

The ICERD came into force in 1969. It is to be noted here that Article 5 says that states have to guarantee rights to everyone, without distinction as to race, color, or national or ethnic origin.

The ICCPR that came into force in 1976 is a document that deals exclusively with civil and political rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In it states seem to be required not only to not interfere in the enjoyment of minority rights, but also positive state action is required. In this sense one can distinguish positive states obligations at different levels: at the horizontal level, against infringements by private actors; at the vertical level (state-individual), in form of an obligation not to discriminate as a result of adoption of national measures in favor of majority and/or minority groups, as well as an obligation to take positive actions to protect a minority's identity to the extent necessary.

The CRC is a legally binding instrument to incorporate the full range of civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. Article 30 of the CRC states that children belonging to minorities shall not be denied the individual right to enjoy their own culture, religion and language.

Declarations of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities in turn, inspired by Article 27 of the ICCPR, is not a legally binding document but a recommendation and implicitly it is not effective because nobody can make claims based on these declarations. Nevertheless the purpose of the Declaration is to promote more effective implementation of the human rights of persons belonging to minorities and more

[17] The Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic was a co-founder of the United Nations Organization in 1945. On September 19, 1991, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic informed the United Nations Organization it had changed its name to Belarus (www.un.org).

generally to contribute to the realization of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of the human rights instruments. States are to protect and promote the rights of persons belonging to minorities by taking measures to enable them to express their characteristics and to develop their culture, language, religion, traditions and customs **(DNLM, UN DOC. E/CN.4/1992/48, ART. 4).** The aim of the Declaration is to contribute to the political and social stability of the States in which minorities live and contribute to the strengthening of friendship and cooperation among peoples and States. This document was the first universal one dedicated exclusively to persons belonging to national, ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. The main critical arguments on the Declaration include the absence of a definition of the term minority, absence of provisions of implementation and insufficient guarantees for the mentioned rights. In addition to underscoring the need to realize full and effective equality, the Declaration addresses explicitly positive obligations of states **(ART. 4(1) AND 4(2)).** Interestingly, it highlights specifically the importance of the full participation by minorities in the economic development in their country **(ART. 4(5)).**

Since January 1992, the Republic of Belarus has been a full-fledged member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. The OSCE is the world's largest regional organization, which exists in all forms in SU republics, the USA and Canada. It aims at security and cooperation between and among states, achieving security and stability for all its members. The characteristic approach of the organization is a notion of "comprehensive security", which recognizes a fundamental link between security and respect for human and minority rights. All the OSCE commitments are not legally binding obligations, but they are of great importance for the development of a common European international law. On the other hand they are politically and morally binding **(ZAPRUDNIK, URBAN 1997: 183)**. What does this mean? For the eminent UN jurist Oscar Schachter, stating that "Agreement does not engage legal responsibility of the state is quite different from stating that the Agreement need not be observed or that the Parties are free to act as if there were no such agreement" **(SCHACHTER 1991: 81).** In any case the "violation of politically but not legally binding agreements is as inadmissible as any violation of international law" **(IBID.: 95).**

The greatest importance for minority rights in Belarus is here the Copenhagen Document (CD) from 29.06.1990. It contains a catalogue of minority rights such as the rights to:

- "express, preserve and develop" their identity and culture, free from any attempts at forced assimilation **(PAR. 32 CD)**
- use their mother tongue in private and public, especially in communication with state authorities **(PARS. 32.1, 32.5 CD)**
- establish and maintain minority educational, cultural and religious institutions as well as funding for them "in conformity with national legislation" **(PAR. 32.2 CD)**
- practice their religion, including religious materials and educational activities in the minority mother tongue **(PAR. 32.3 CD)**
- maintain "unimpeded contacts" with those with whom they share common origin, heritage or religious beliefs, within and across frontiers **(PAR. 32.4 CD)**

- "effective participation in public affairs, including participation in the affairs relating to the protection and promotion of the identity of such minorities" **(PAR. 35 CD)** (www.minorityrights.org)

Also the Moscow Document on the Human Dimensions (MD) from 4.10.1994 calls Belarus to non-application of the principle of non-intervention to the human dimension and human rights issues that have priority over the principle of state sovereignty (www.osce.org). Belarus was also a signatory of the Helsinki Final Act of 26th February 1992 and Charter of Paris on 8th April 1993, the declarations in an attempt to improve relations between the Communist bloc and the West.

There is another international body of which the Republic of Belarus had special guest status between 1992 and 1997: the Council of Europe (CoE). Belarus applied for membership in the CoE in August 1993, but since 1997 the relations between parties have been frozen and Belarus' special guest status has been suspended. In order to explain this situation, which also has much in common with the national minority issue, it will be worth presenting two main documents of the CoE: the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ERML) from November 5, 1992 and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) from February 1,1995[18]. Additionally, each state applying for membership has to ratify the European Convention on Human Rights (EConHR) from 1950 and its 14 Additional Protocols that count as separate international treaties. Article 4 of the EConHR, as well as Protocol No. 12, contain a prohibition of discrimination (www.hri.org). This right is not a free-standing right to non-discrimination. It may be raised only in connection with the alleged violation of another Convention right. The aim here is not to protect minorities as such but to protect the cultural diversity in Europe.

The FCNM is the first legally binding multilateral instrument exclusively concerning minorities. It contains program-type provisions, general objectives and principles weakened by vague clauses. It aims are to establish legal principles guaranteeing the protection of national minorities, committing the states to obey these principles. It is an attempt to transform political obligations of the OSCE documents into legal obligations. The catalogue of provisions contains non-discrimination and positive measures, cultural, language and educational rights, communication rights, trans-frontier guarantees and rights to participation in cultural, social, economic life and its public affairs (www.coe.int). Some features of Recommendation 1201 of the CoE were also present, including the right to choose to belong to a minority with no disadvantage thereto, to official recognition of surnames, as well as prohibition of no interference with cross-border contacts with cultural kin **(ZAPRUDNIK, URBAN 1997: 178 ET SEQ)**.

The ERML in turn deals with the issue of minority languages. States can determine to which level they will ratify it. Their obligations may be different and the approach always can be changed, according to the principle of state sovereignty (conventions.coe.int)

[18] in September 1996 Belarus was also invited to accede to the FCNM

Belarus is among the few states in Europe that have not asked for membership in the European Union. Similarly, the European Union has not offered a membership to Minsk. However, in 1993 the young Belarusian state began the negotiations with the European Union on the PCA, signed two years later. Belarus also got the opportunity to be an active partner of the EU in the framework of the ENP provided that the country embarks on fundamental democratic and economic reforms to bring the country closer to European common values. Even if it is not currently realistic, Belarus might apply for membership in the EU in the future. One must be aware of the fact that minority rights are also a requirement for EU accession, according to the Article 49 and principles in the Article 6(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). There are some criteria (Copenhagen Criteria) that must be fulfilled in order to join the Union. They were established by the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 and strengthened by the Madrid European Council in 1995. The criteria also include, in addition to the economic requirements and Community *acquis*, stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities.

The international standards of great importance to Belarusian minorities can be analyzed in regard to the substantial law. That is to say these agreements oblige Belarus to obey the law especially in fields of:

- the minority language (acc. to Arts. 25, 27 ICCPR, Art. 30 CRC, Art. 8 EConHR, Arts. 5, 10, 11 FCNM and Arts. 2, 7, 9-11 ECRML); rights to use minority language in non-official and official matters, communication media and the school system
- freedom of religion (acc. to Arts. 18, 27 ICCPR, Art. 30 CRC, Art. 9 EConHR, Arts. 7,8 FCNM); right to manifest religion and to establish religious institutions, organizations and associations
- political representation and participation (Arts. 2, 25, 27 ICCPR, Art. 3 EConHR, Art. 15 FCNM); states shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in public affairs, in particular those affecting them.

In sum, Belarus has become a part of the international minority rights regime in two key respects. First and most obviously, its minorities are more legitimate subjects of international society. Secondly, minority rights after 1989 were no longer components of a balance of power system wherein the great Western powers imposed conditions upon the smaller and weaker states of Eastern Europe that they were themselves unwilling to assume. According to Jennifer Jackson, "The operative principle behind the 1990s minority rights regime of both the OSCE and CoE was one of the sovereign equality." (**JACKSON 1998: 139**) That is to say, such standards applied to all members of the OSCE or CoE that agreed to be bound by them. Having in mind different legal and political binding statuses (**SEE: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT STATUSES OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES SIGNED BY BELARUS, ATTACHMENT 6**) of the above named international documents on minority rights it would be worth checking the monitoring mechanisms of all the obligations as well as the possibilities of external influence of the international actors on Belarus

regarding the minority issues. It is also worth mentioning that Article 8(1) of the Constitution of Belarus recognizes the supremacy of international law over domestic law.

3.2 Analyzing international monitoring mechanisms

Bilateral agreements and international conventions on human rights protection contain provisions of control procedures, which are also of importance for minorities. The most important treaty-based control mechanisms are states reports, states complaints or communications. The non-treaty based monitoring mechanisms include organizations' observing bodies and NGOs. The aim of this chapter is to present the motives of different attitudes of international actors towards Belarus that normatively result from international obligations of the country. These motives in regard to national minorities are based on observation and monitoring of the national minorities' situation.

3.2.1 Treaty-based monitoring mechanisms

The control bodies of the UN and the OSCE can be included in the treaty-based mechanisms. In the field of UN human rights protection, according to Article 7 of the UN Charter, the main organs are active: General Assembly (GA), Economic and Social Council, Security Council, Secretariat and International Court of Justice. Additionally, as a subsidiary organ of the GA, the Human Rights Council (HRC)[19] has been created. Among the 47 seats, 6 of them belong to the Group of Eastern European States. The task of the Council is to co-ordinate human and minority rights in the UN system, to submit proposals for the development of international law to the GA as well as to supervise the fulfillment of human rights obligations of states. Additionally, there is also a new mechanism within the UN Human Rights Council, Universal Periodical Review, which inter alia Belarus is preparing for. It is a unique process which involves a review of the human rights records of all 192 UN Member States once every four years. Each State will have to declare what actions they have taken to improve the human rights situations in their countries and to fulfill their human rights obligations (humanrightshouse.org).

In 1993, after the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, a principal official of the UN was established by the GA in order to co-ordinate and advise other UN organs in the field of human rights protection: the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR). There are also other monitoring mechanisms dealing in the field of minority protection, such as the UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees and some specialized agencies, i.e. International Labour Organization, WHO, UNESCO or FAO. They are however legally independent international organizations. In 2007 the HRC issued a report on human dimensions in Belarus, "The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus, Adrian Severin" (www.idee.org). The Special Rapporteur describes the situation of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights in Belarus, which steadily deteriorated in 2006. Section IV,

[19] Resolution adopted by the General Assembly Doc. A/RES/60/251 (www.auswaertiges-amt.de)

C notes a special concern regarding the Polish minority: "Since the last report of the Special Rapporteur, the Union of Poles in Belarus (UPB) still faces difficulties with the authorities. In late October 2006, Belarusian customs officials claimed that they had found drugs in a car carrying Angelica Borys, the ousted leader of the UPB. She and her supporters say that this accusation is politically motivated." (**IBID.**) Additionally, the Rapporteur highlights the issue of minority religion stating that "the situation regarding freedom of religion has not improved since the last report of the Special Rapporteur. The Belarusian Orthodox Church still benefits from privileges not enjoyed by other religious organizations" (**IBID.**).

The OSCE has established two main monitoring mechanisms in order to observe minority rights protection. These are the Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM). The ODIHR, next to election and democratization activities, has to monitor the human dimension commitments. The HCNM is an instrument of conflict prevention. It is a one-site mission to engage in diplomacy at the earliest stage of tension. In 2005, the High Commissioner paid particular attention to the situation of the Union of Poles in Belarus, the largest organization of the Polish minority community **(OSCE ANNUAL REPORT 2005: 118)**. The HCNM cannot act on behalf of minorities but instead may decide to bring before the government in question a report with recommendations (www.osce.org/hcnm). In 2007 the Commissioner established a forum on minority issues. The forum is to provide a platform for promoting dialogue and cooperation on issues pertaining to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, which shall provide thematic contributions and expertise to the work of the independent expert on minority issues. It shall identify and analyze best practices, challenges, opportunities and initiatives for the further implementation of the DNML (www2.ohchr.org).

The OSCE maintained a high profile in Belarus after its Advisory and Monitoring Group was established in Minsk in 1997 with a mandate to "assist the Belarusian authorities in promoting democratic institutions in complying with other OSCE commitments; and to monitor and report on this process" **(SILITSKI 2002: 366 ET SEQ).** The OSCE can also send ad hoc missions of independent experts to assist in the resolution of a specific human dimension problem. Such experts request information, hold bilateral meetings, report and give possible solutions to the question raised. Throughout 2005 for instance, the *ad hoc* Working Group headed by Uta Zapf from Germany continued working for an open dialogue with the Belarusian Parliament and Government, as well as with opposition representatives and other interested parties (**OSCE ANNUAL REPORT 2005: 118**).

3.2.2 Non-treaty based monitoring mechanisms

The observing mechanisms of the CoE and the EU as well as NGOs observe the situation of national minorities in the Republic of Belarus. In the CoE there are three main monitoring bodies: the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), created in 1993, the Committee of Experts (CE), from 1992, and the Advisory Committee (AC), from 1995. The ECRI's aim is to combat racism, xenophobia, antisemitism and intolerance through necessary

measures against violence, discrimination and prejudice faced by persons or a group of persons, notably on grounds especially of race and national or ethnic origin. The monitoring method included here is the 'country-by-country approach' (www.coe.int).

The CE, established in accordance with Article 17 of ERML, is responsible for carrying out the monitoring mechanism provided by the ERML. Special focus is being put on the real situation of the regional or minority languages in states. The experts report the situation to the Committee of Ministers and, where appropriate, encourage the party to gradually reach a higher level of commitment (wcd.coe.int). Every year a special report of Ministers' Deputies Rapporteur Groups is being issued, calling for Belarus to move in the direction of these Council of Europe standards **(COMP. GR-EDS(2000)41).**

The AC, in accordance with Article 26 FCNM, appoints a group of 18 independent experts in order to evaluate the implementation of the FCNM in state parties. They also examine state reports and other sources of information as well as meetings on the spot with governmental interlocutors, national minority representatives and other relevant actors. At this very moment the AC does not monitor the situation of national minorities in Belarus (www.coe.int).

The EU has its internal monitoring mechanisms, such as the Agency for Fundamental Rights, which collect and analyze inter alia official and non-official information and data on minority rights issues, however in the EU only. In the field of EU-Belarus relations there is a regular "Resolution on bi-annual evaluation of the EU-Belarus dialogue" being issued (www.europarl.europa.eu). The European Parliament observes different humanitarian issues in the country and evaluates the dialogue between parties. In the document from 2009, the Parliament calls on Belarus to do the following: "recognise the Union of Poles in Belarus led by Angelika Borys, who was re-elected as its Chair at the Congress of the Union of Poles on 15 March 2009" **(IBID.).**

NGOs and minority associations have a key role in the monitoring mechanism of the international obligations on minority rights. According to sociological study carried out in 2001, the following 7 priority directions of NGOs activities were identified by the experts in the course of such investigation:

1. Ecology, environment protection
2. Defense of human rights and freedoms of the citizens
3. Social protection of disabled people
4. Youth and children
5. Science, security, enlightening
6. Defense of consumers' rights
7. Public health, medicine (**KUSMENKOVA 2004: 90**)

According to the author, the most important directions of increasing NGOs' role in the society are: formation of strategy aimed at extension of the region covered by the activity the

Belarusian 'third sector'[20], in the first place; tactical actions connected with coordination of goals and real potential, in the second place; and strengthening the third sector potential, its resources and capabilities for sustainable growth and development, in the third place (**IBID.: 91**). However, the sector has been greatly influenced by many political events over the past year and NGOs continued to be harassed and pressured by the government[21]. The new regulations and subsequent government actions have damaged the NGO sector by creating an even harsher legal environment, limiting advocacy efforts, depriving NGOs of support and training programs, and further preventing access to the national media (www.usaid.gov). According to the Human Rights House, Belarusian Helsinki Committee, Human Rights Center "Viasna", Belarusian Association of Journalists and other national human rights organizations have submitted a report for the procedure of UPR of Belarus within the UN Human Rights Council (**VILEITA 2009**). The overview of the Belarusian human rights organizations' websites that include monitoring of minority issues provides alternative information about the situation in the country, which otherwise is unavailable from the traditional and government-controlled media. Yet at the same time the NGO websites often remain parochial, and provide virtually no information about human rights issues abroad.

4. External influence

It has been assumed in the introductory part of this paper that minority rights are to be understood here as a subset of human rights. Such supposition is necessary in order to assess the efficiency of Western influence that is partially based on a normative assumption of human rights defense that are, widely speaking, a part of democratization means.

4.1 Strategies of international and domestic actors

Western involvement in Belarus has been reduced to a minimum since the country's fall from the democratic path of development. Still, the US and European governments and institutions as well as a wide range of Western-based NGOs have attempted to influence Belarusian politics through a variety of mechanisms, including both, political and economic pressure and sanctions, and incentives, including democracy-building assistance of a civil society.

The US government adopted in 1997 a new policy of "selective engagement" in Belarus, leading to an isolation of Belarus in hopes of forcing the regime to accept a rapid and drastic change in the political and economic system (**VAN DE VATER, WIERSMA 2002: 342**). This involved limiting contacts with the government to the essential minimum. Silitski points out an exerted

[20] Term "the third sector" indicates the status of public associations in the society, the Government and its institutions being "the first sector", and business being "the second sector". The third sector includes the structures that carry out mediation functions between the citizens, on the one part, and governmental or commercial sphere, on the other part (KUSMENKOVA 2004: 52).
[21] for the influence of NGOs in Belarus see: next chapter

pressure on Belarusian authorities to liberalize the political system, supporting the democratic opposition and the non-governmental sector while suspending all direct assistance to the state sector (**2002: 365 ET SEQ**). Under this policy the US became a principal sponsor of the third sector, that is to say programs aimed at "better-informed citizen participation in civic and private activities" (www.usaid.gov)[22]. Most of the money was channeled to NGOs and the independent press[23], many of which operate with the opposition parties and their leaders. However, over the last few years the US has become aware that this strategy has not worked well and has started a closer co-operation with the EU in this field. The events of 9/11 have changed the world. Russia has become one of the US' strongest allies in the fight against terrorism and Belarus, following its "elder brother", joined the international coalition too. The consequence was a slightly better relation at least in the field of international antiterrorist co-operation.

After a period of a great tension between the United Nations and Belarus in the area of human rights, the UN Human Rights Council agreed in 2007 that "Belarus and Cuba will be taken off a list of countries whose rights records receive special scrutiny" (www.rferl.org/1077201, www.rferl.org/1077092).

The OSCE, like the US, also refused primarily to treat Belarus as a democratically-functioning state. The regime accepted the opening of the OSCE office in Minsk, despite the Belarusian authorities calling this "foreign interference" (**VANYASHKIN 2003**). In this way the Republic has avoided a complete isolation within the OSCE. The AMG started a process of consultation with all the relevant actors in Belarus: from minority representatives and human rights defenders, through NGOs, opposition members reaching the government and the president. These actions were taken in belief that the complete isolation of Belarus would not be in the best interest of its people or conducive to strengthening democracy. Immediately after the elections of 2000, 2001, 2004, 2006 and 2008, each time the OSCE presented its conclusions that basically express a concern that free and fair elections were not being held (www.osce.org/odihr-elections). It was realized that a kind of agenda is to be developed for the parliamentary institutions concerned, as well as the international community as a whole. The guiding principle is a continuing support for the Belarusian people and the further isolation of Belarus should be avoided. In 2008, the OSCE called the international community to show a willingness to reassess its relations with the country in the light of any political progress, in particular in regards to more pluralistic political environment (**OSCE/ODIHR ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION FINAL REPORT**).

During the first years of Belarus' existence as an independent state it was the Council of Europe that in many ways helped the democratic development of the country. The Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE granted a special guest status to Belarus on 16 September 1992. In 1995, the Assembly appointed two eminent lawyers to report on how the Belarusian legal system conformed to the standards of the CoE. In December 1996, the lawyers submitted a rather positive report on the basis of a visit in Belarus. The co-operation was to be continued. Concerns started to be expressed by the opposition about the President's growing disregard for the rule of

[22] comp. ISAID's budget 2009-2010 for Russia, Belarus, Moldova and the Ukraine: Appeal No. MAA67003 (www.reliefweb.int)
[23] direct assistance to political parties is prohibited under both US and Belarusian law

law and in particular rulings of the Constitutional Court and for independence of the media and the radio stations (**WIECK 2002: 262 ET SEQ**). After the referendum in 1996, the CoE issued a statement warning that the referendum was neither legitimate nor legal. As consequence, in January 1997 the Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe decided to suspend the special guest status of Belarus. Accordingly, inter-governmental activities for assisting the approximation of Belarusian legislation to CoE standards were discontinued. Since then however, the Working Group of the CoE has kept the political situation under review, waiting for the Belarusian authorities to restore the minimal prerequisites for the resumption of such activities. In 2009, as result of "positive developments" in Belarus, such as the release of political prisoners, registration of three independent publications (*Narodnaya Volya, Nashe Niva and Uzgorak*) and permission for opening an Info-point on the Council of Europe in Minsk, "the Assembly thus [resolved] to encourage the continuation of this process by engaging in a political dialogue with the authorities, while at the same time continuing to support the strengthening of democratic forces and civil society in the country" (assembly.coe.int). CoE called on its Bureau to lift the suspension of special guest status for the Parliament of Belarus under the condition that a moratorium on the execution of the death penalty was decreed by Belarusian authorities. The CoE called also for further improvements (**IBID.**).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European Union tried to develop good and stable relations with all the newly independent states. Although EU-Belarus relations progressed soon after the EU recognized Belarus' independence in 1991, they began to take a turn for the worse soon after the election of President Lukashenko in 1994. The EU offered Belarus the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, aimed at creating stronger ties in the areas of agriculture, industry, services…etc. But PCA also includes provisions concerning democracy, human rights and the rule of law which resulted in it not being ratified by the EU until now. Due to Belarus's worsening democratization and human-rights record, relations with the EU were almost frozen after 1996. Since the enlargement of the EU in 2004 there have been significant changes in Minsk's attitudes towards the EU. The Belarusian authorities have strengthened contacts with neighboring EU Member States: Latvia, Poland and especially Lithuania (**GROMADZKI 2009: 97**).

EU Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner in November 2006 gave a "Message to the People of Belarus". The document contains concrete examples of what the people of Belarus could gain from a rapprochement between the EU and Belarus within the ENP. As example, serve the TACIS aid, cross-border co-operation, visa facilitation, administrational and social help… etc. (ec.europa.eu). In October 2008 the European Union took the decision to resume contacts with the Belarusian leadership at the highest level and to suspend, even if partially and temporarily, the visa ban against a number of high-ranking Belarusian officials, including President Lukashenko. This suspension was extended for an additional nine months in April 2009.

Belarus is also one of the six countries that will participate in the Eastern Partnership, a new instrument designed to strengthen political and economic co-operation between the European Union and its eastern European and Caucasian neighbors, with a view to enhancing

their stability and supporting democratic and market-oriented reforms. The level of Belarus' participation will depend on the overall development of its relations with the European Union. In this context, Belarus attended the Eastern Partnership summit in Prague on 7 May 2009 (www.eu2009.cz).

In December 2009 the European Parliament stated that the "Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and Belarus, on hold since 1997, should be unblocked once all necessary political reforms have been completed and implemented" calling at the same time for changes towards the Polish minority: "The resolution urges the Belarus authorities to respect the rights of national minorities and recognize the Union of Poles, in accordance with the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities" (www.europarl.europa.eu).

Finally, developing an EU Eastern Dimension that would encompass Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia would have significance for the region as a whole, but for Belarus in a particular way. Aside from the cross-border and regional economic co-operation and trade, this would also involve trans-border and regional environmental issues (i.e. the effects of Chernobyl) or local issues, such as problems of water contamination, industrial pollution…etc. Another incentive is the European assistance in creating infrastructure and the fight against organized crime and illegal migration (**GUICHERD 2002: 333 ET SQQ**).

Regarding the Polish strategy towards Belarus, there is a rather pessimistic tendency to be observed. Increasing Belarusian dependence on Russia has raised concern on the Polish side. Since 1994 there has been a continuous cooling in relations associated with a deepening political crisis in Belarus. Presidential elections have been won by Alexander Lukashenko and cooperation has become increasingly difficult. Belarus began to criticize the process of NATO enlargement to the East. Polish diplomacy efforts focused on economic policies and the protection of the Polish minority in Belarus. The government in Minsk, however, remains indifferent to the Polish border cooperation initiatives, which is reflected in the lack of active cooperation in the two Euroregions "Bug" and "Niemen" (**COMP. GRZĄDZIEL**). In the years 1996 - 1997 there was a further integration of Belarus with Russia and further distancing to Poland. In the years 1998 - 1999 the OSCE became a platform of the Polish-Belarusian conflict. Bronislaw Geremek, the chairman of the OSCE, opened an observation mission of the organization in Minsk. Consequently, the political contacts between the two countries have been limited. Also, economic relations were bad, mainly due to the anti-market economy policy of the Belarusian authorities. In 2001, Poland together with other European countries concluded that the presidential elections in Belarus that Mr. Lukashenko had won had been carried out unfairly. Polish experts agreed that the policy of isolating Belarus did not pass the exam. Subsequent attempts, however, to establish relationships Polish - Belarusian to the reluctance of this state did not produce the expected results. Unmistakably, the already bad relations with Lukashenko's dictatorship worsened in the first half of 2005, when there was an escalation of hostility on the part of Minsk. The attempt by the Belarusian authorities to control the Union of Poles in Belarus and the subsequent removal of Polish diplomats resulted in Poland recalling its ambassador to

Belarus. Up to the year 2010, relations have not improved mainly due to the Polish minority situation there (www.wosna5.pl).

In the end, the relation with Russia must also be presented. Lukashenko has not had a single, unchanging policy towards Russia throughout his 15 years of rule. In fact, we can identify 2 different policy periods that are closely linked with who was in power in Russia at the time:

- the Yeltsin years (1994-1999) and
- the Putin - Medvedev years (2000-2009).

During the first period, Lukashenko focused mainly on building up his own political position in Russia. He had serious ambitions about becoming a leading figure in Russia. There were some diplomatic steps in this direction, with an agreement on a customs union in 1995 and a treaty on the formation of a community in 1996 that foresaw the harmonization of the two countries' economic and legal systems and the co-ordination of foreign policy and the creation of a number of joint institutions. In December 1999, the two sides concluded a treaty that envisaged the creation of a council of ministers and a bicameral state parliament. Despite these formal measures, none of the practical steps needed for real political and economic integration has been taken.

Any ideas about forming a union state with Russia or having any real power in Russia came to an end with the rise of Vladimir Putin after 2000. The new team in the Kremlin quickly re-established the authority of the Russian state. Vladimir Putin emphasized that the integration process, if any, should proceed in a way that would benefit Russia. In August 2002, Putin put forward his own integration proposal that would have meant the incorporation of Belarus into Russia. Lukashenko understood the new reality and changed his approach to nationalistic rhetoric. In the meantime, the union-state project stalled over growing disagreements between Minsk and Moscow. Next, with disagreements about the constitutional rights of the Union, Putin stated that Russo-Belarusian integration could only proceed as economic union. In order to facilitate monetary integration, Moscow provided Minsk with a 200 million USD loan **(NESVETAILOVA 2002: 219 ET SEQ).** Another issue affecting the relations within the Union was the gas sanctions imposed by Russia on Belarus in February 2004 which led to a rift in the relation. As a result, the Belarusian ambassador to Moscow was withdrawn by the Belarusian president. Growing tensions between Lukashenko and Putin resulted in an open exchange of accusations between the two presidents in late 2006 and the beginning of 2007 over the price of Belarusian energy imports. In summer 2008 came to the so called "milk war[24]". This trend has not been reversed since Dmitri Medvedev became president of Russia in 2008 (**COMP. GROMADZKI 2009**). During the Yeltsin period, Lukashenko was successful in exploiting the unclear customs regulations of the planned union state in order to provide his regime with a significant source of revenues. During Putin's presidency, the oil boom was the most important source of revenues. Belarus imported cheap crude oil from Russia, refined it, and then exported oil products to Europe at market prices. Since 2007, the Belarusian economy has been in a deep crisis because of the shortage in the crude oil import from Russia due to the world financial crisis

[24] Russian ban on Belarusian dairy products

(bhtimes.blogspot.com). It has a debt of about 14 billion USD (tvnz.co.nz). The country cannot count on Russia which is facing similar problems. In January 2008 the country brought the construction of its first nuclear power station in order to reduce its dependency on Russia (www.tagesspiegel.de). In the meantime there have been two oil supply crises: in September 2008 and September 2009. At this very moment another one can be observed. The Russian oil supplies to Belarus refineries were suspended when the New Year's Eve talks collapsed **(COMP.** szczesniak.pl; wyborcza.biz).

Also, the domestic efforts of different non-governmental actors cannot be underestimated if examining external influence on the regime. Despite worsening conditions over more than a decade, civil society organizations have managed not only to survive but also to develop new strategies to cope with state control and repression. In the second half of the 1990s, the development of the civil society was characterized by a high degree of polarization between pro-state[25] and opposition NGOs (**SAHM 2009: 50**). As a consequence of the pro-GONGOs politics, the number of officially registered NGOs decreased from 2,433 in 1995 to 1,326 in 1999 (due to a re-registration procedure demanded by authorities), while in January 2009 the number of registered NGOs had increased to 2,221 (belstat.gov.by). Paradoxically, in order to survive, NGOs in Belarus have been forced to develop coherent strategies and methods for their swift and efficient implementation (**SEE: STATISTICS ON NGOS IN BELARUS, ATTACHMENT 7**). Astrid Sahm observes an interesting process among the NGOs in Belarus: "The elimination or closure of many politicized NGOs led to a significant change in the spectrum of registered NGOs after 2001. Organisations for sport and recreation became the dominant group, while social and philanthropic organisations fell into second place, followed by educational and professional interest groups" (**2009: 53**). In regard to national minorities, the number of NGOs decreased sharply in this period (**SEE: NGOS ON NATIONAL MINORITIES, ATTACHMENT 8**). In many cases, NGOs simply continue their activities without registration, although the financial situation of many of them has been critical. Because of the lack of registration there is no transparency of NGO activities which in turn makes it difficult for donors to ensure efficient monitoring of the impact of their programs. As a consequence, some donors prefer to finance projects outside Belarus, including TV channels broadcasting from neighboring countries (**NYALYUK 2009: 169 ET SQQ**). On 22 April 2009, interested NGOs adopted a resolution to welcome the establishment of an Eastern Partnership, the Civil Society Forum and to support a comprehensive dialogue between state authorities and civil society in Belarus (neurope.eu) In accordance with this position, the Assembly of Democratic NGOs published a concept paper for the development of Belarusian civil society in July 2009, formulating the idea of joint responsibility of civil society and state actors and demanding specific changes in the legal framework (nmnby.org). However, according to analysis by The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Belarusian authorities have continued to harass civic activists even as instances of imprisonment and harassment for unauthorized activities or expressing independent opinion have become less widespread. Belarusian civil society has striven to take maximum advantage of the window of opportunity opened by the half-hearted liberalization and the Belarus-EU dialogue. The self-organization and ability to present a unified platform at the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum demonstrated

[25] so called GONGOs – government orientated NGOs

the maturation of the civil society sector. The focus of NGO activity is gradually shifting from regime change towards mindset change, as civil society groups try to explore ways to engage with the public and attract broader audiences to civic activists through non-political projects (**2010: 3 ET SEQ**).

To sum up, Western involvement in Belarus has been reduced since Lukashenko came to power. With time the actors have realized that their politics of isolation do not bring the expected effect. They have attempted a variety of mechanisms, to be called "sticks and carrots[26]". These actions however, have been so far poorly coordinated, sometimes contradictory and have often failed to target the most significant blockages on Belarus' road to democracy. Also the internal NGO movement has weakened continuously since Lukashenko holds the power. Having in mind those different external and internal efforts and Belarusian relations worsening with Russia, the current situation is to be described as "between Moscow and Brussels", or even "Belarus in an economic/political traffic jam". It is becoming obvious that a Belarusian shift in politics will be a matter of survival. Belarus will need to recreate "breathing space" for itself by establishing contacts with other European and/or international actors. Is this situation a chance for the Polish minority being suppressed in the Republic since Lukashenko has held power? Are there any indicators for it?

4.2 Belarus: Change or Continuity

Broadly speaking, one can conclude that from the EU's side the freeze in EU-Belarusian relations was becoming too difficult a constraint in view of Brussels' two top priorities in Eastern Europe, as pointed out in the literature:

1) ensuring the success of enlargement, both in 2004 and 2007
2) ensuring the partnership with Russia, especially regarding energy security

Considering Belarus' relation with the West, it may be time now to question this paradigm in light of the recent political process and the cautious rapprochement between Belarus and the EU that began in 2008 (**GROMADZKI 2009: 101, SAHM 2009**). The question is whether this implies a substantial change in Belarusian foreign policy. In other words, is the Lukashenko regime trying to introduce democratic standards into his politics that could possibly have positive implications for the country's minorities? In order to assess the effectiveness of the politics presented, it will be necessary to introduce some units of measurement. Because the West's normative actions are based inter alia on the idea of liberal democracy (**HUNTINGTON 1996**), the research question here would investigate the elements of the democratization process. Additionally, the elements of self-determination would look for a link with the minority situation. Finally, some facts on the Polish minority situation after the claimed rapprochement will confirm/reject the hypothesis of the continuity of the authoritarian policy.

According to the political dictionary of Griffiths and O'Callaghan, democratization is a process of spreading and implementing of democracy (**2002: 68**). Hereby is not the electoral

[26] incentives and sanctions

democracy that is meant (democratic representation on behalf of the people), but rather the liberal one. According to the authors of the dictionary, the accurate description for this type of democracy would be the system of government that meets the following conditions:

- meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties), for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force
- a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded
- a level of civil and political liberties – freedom of expression, freedom of the press, freedom to form and join organizations – sufficient to ensure the integrity of political competition and participation (**IBID.: 69 ET SQQ**).

Having in mind the requirements of the self-determination principle and the fact that democracy protects national minorities through active participation, identity and interpretation processes, the following factors have been chosen in order to assess the research question of this chapter:

- participation - analysis of elections, that simultaneously would be proof for/against political pluralism and competition.
- identity – the presence of different NGOs in the political life of Belarus, in order to represent different interest groups.
- interpretation - press freedom in Belarus that in turn rules in or out the sorts of reasoning, proving at the same time civil and political liberties

In order to assess a possible shift in the Belarusian authoritarian policy recently claimed by the Western actors, so-called hard (statistically measurable) factors would help examine the research question: elections' standards and results, the number and character of NGOs and the number and disposition of different newspapers.

It has already been mentioned that election and referendum standards failed after Lukashenko came to power. If the West, in particular the EU, is claiming a shift in these authoritarian politics taking place over last few years, it will be worth evaluating the standards of the last parliamentary elections in Belarus, after claiming the rapprochement. On 28 September 2008, the House of Representatives elections were held. The data on the results of these elections presented in Attachment 9, provide, however, results that contradict the thesis of 2008 **(SEE: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 28 SEPTEMBER 2008, ATTACHMENT 9).** 925 international and more than 17,000 local observers, including the OSCE, attempted to monitor the election. (www.regnum.ru). According to the OSCE, "the elections were undemocratic and the work of international observers was seriously hindered as the observers were refused access to the facilities where the votes were counted" (www.spiegel.de, www.osce.org). The German Marshall Fund states: "the government failed to ensure fair procedures for monitoring and

counting the ballot, and declared victory of all 110 official candidates in the first round with roughly similar percentage of votes cast for winners in all constituencies" (**2010: 9**). Regarding political pluralism: this indicates a continuing tendency of previous practices rather than change. According to the Fund the promised reforms in the Electoral Code will most likely be reduced to insignificant improvements in non-essential areas, without touching the ability of the government to manipulate the vote. There is a possibility, however, that opposition will get better campaigning opportunities for the April 2010 local elections (**IBID: 3**).

The presence of different NGOs in the political life of Belarus cannot guarantee a fair representation of all the actors. The independent NGOs faced restrictive re-registration procedures in 1995, 1999 and 2005, difficult tax regulations and intensive state supervision and operated under a constant threat of suspension. Belarusian legislation criminalizes unauthorized civic activism, fails to offer non-governmental organizations tax-exempt status for its charitable activities, and gives courts and regional governments extensive opportunities to harass and close down NGOs for arbitrary reasons. Although the government no longer practices extensive liquidation of NGOs (most of which were outlawed anyway in 2003 to 2006), there is no movement towards expansion of the civic sector either. Thus, the total number of officially registered NGOs has stayed virtually unchanged in Belarus over the last decade (2224 in October 2009 vs. 2248 in January 2003), which has led some analysts to believe that the registrations simply mean to reinstate the 'standard' number of NGOs to constitute a 'manageable' NGO sector within limits defined by the state. Only 63 new public associations were registered by the Ministry of Justice in the first nine months of 2009 (nmnby.eu). The data presented in Attachment 7 confirms that there can be no conclusion on Belarus' democratization progress in this field. As of 1 January 2009, the number of registered NGOs had increased to 2,221. This is equal to only 0.2 officially registered NGOs per 1,000 inhabitants, while the average in Europe is 4[27].

When examining freedom of the press, it would be worth paying attention to data from 2009 on the national newspapers (**SEE: NEWSPAPERS IN BELARUS; ATTACHMENT 10**). According to the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus, there were 1314 printed periodicals in the country before the enactment of the new media law. Of these, there were 663 newspapers, 594 magazines, 42 bulletins, 6 catalogs, and 9 information agencies. Out of this number, 900 periodicals or 70% were non-government ones (**GERMAN MARSHALL FUND 2010: 14**). There is a clear tendency, according to Astrid Sahm, that "independent mass media faced […] repression. They were excluded from the state printing and distribution system, printed newspapers were confiscated on a regular basis, and media organisations were given large fines for alleged violations of the media law, insulting officials or publishing extremist material" (**2009: 51**). The Belarusian Association of Journalists provides data of registration certificates of media outlets: 1,214 were cancelled between 1996 and 2008, while only 487 were re-registered. (**BELARUSIAN ASSOCIATION FOR JOURNALISTS, ANNUAL REPORT 2009: 7).** The report of The German Marshall Fund states that the "independent journalists' worst fears that the new media law enacted on 8 February 2009 would significantly worsen conditions for their activities however did not

[27] For current data, see www.ngo.by. For a comparative analysis of Belarusian civil society, see: Chernov (2008) and www.nmnby.eu

materialize. In particular, the government abstained from censoring internet. On the other hand, most independent publications remain blocked from the state distribution networks. The European Radio for Belarus was granted permission to open a correspondent office in Belarus, though other foreign-based media (such as Belsat TV) remained under ban (**2010**). Belarusian authorities continue the authoritarian politics that limit freedom of the press.

In order to strengthen arguments on the lack of democratic shift in Belarus, some data on minorities, as another element of the normative democratization process, will be provided. There is no verification that the situation of the Polish minority in Belarus has improved. Any attempt of foreign involvement in the issue has been seen by the authorities as an "external interference with the internal issues of the Republic". The politics of isolation caused a self-exclusion of Belarus from the political life in Europe and put it away from democratic standards. Three of the four broad categories of enforcing conformity presented in the first chapter apply to the Belarusian minority politics since the country's government has been considered authoritarian. Discrimination, assimilation and persecution take place without interruption, regardless external influence of the international bodies. Separation in the form of legal, administrative division or physical annihilation does not occur.

Discrimination involves singling out those who are different in the society. Minorities, and this is the case, the Polish one, find their educational and occupational choices limited. Their freedom to live and work in certain areas is curtailed, their ability to purchase, inherit or otherwise own property is restricted and, last but not least, their participation in community institutions denied. "The group continues to face economic hardship and political exclusion along with the rest of the population, which is amplified by the social exclusion experienced by the group" stated the Minority at Risk Group in its Assessment on the Polish minority in the Republic (www.cidcm.umd.edu). Further, the Group mentions that "since 2004, Lukashenko has begun applying more pressure on the main organization for the Polish community, the Union of Poles, for fear of Western influence, resulting in greater public outcry from the ethnic minority" (**IBID.**). Evidence for this is an argument about the Polish House in Iwieniec and the conflict with authorities on this background.

Assimilation aims at removing all public evidence of diversity. Persons belonging to a minority have to adopt the outward trappings of the majority in order to gain acceptance and upward mobility. There are three assimilation tendencies regarding the Polish minority: religious, cultural and linguistic. At present, the situation of simultaneous "whiteruthenization" and de-polonization of Catholic Church in Belarus is a noticeable tendency for assimilating local Poles. The Belarusian attempts to dismiss Polish teachers aim at linguistic assimilation of Polish children into the Belarusian society. Stelmachowski presents some 'hard data': "Although Polish as a foreign language is being taught in a number of schools (during the "peak" in 306 schools), it is systematically relegated to the margins in the form of optional groups, reducing the number of hours of tuition, lack of printed books… etc." (**STELMACHOWSKI 2005**). Cultural assimilation took place mainly in the period of the diplomatic war between Poland and Belarus in 2005. As an example, organization of the traditional "Wreaths", which has regularly taken place for the

last 10 years in June, has been denied. A concert in the Polish House in Grodno was cancelled. The Polish newspaper *Głos znad Niemna* has been closed (www.bialorus.pl).

Persecution includes a wide range of actions with varying degrees of violence. There are single cases of persecution on members of Polish minority, such as journalists (Poczobut) or politicians (Borys) (comp. wyborcza.pl, **STELMACHOWSKI 2005**). The authorities continue to threaten civic activists with prosecution under Article 193-1 of the Criminal Code, acting on behalf of an unregistered organization. In February 2009, Teresa Selivonchyk, head of the unregistered Union of Poles branch in Baranavichy, received a warning, the first time an activist from this organization was accused of violating the Article 11 of the Criminal Code.

One can conclude that apart from even worse unfairness towards the Polish minority resulting from external pressure, there are no changes in the minority situation under this dictatorship. This conclusion can be put into the wider context of continuity of Belarusian authoritarian policy.

5. Conclusions

The case study presented in this paper should answer the question what kind of strategies used by the external actors in order to democratize a dictatorship are most effective and to what extent are these developments sustainable? In order to answer this question the problem is presented first in the theoretical frames and subsequently, is addressed as a case study of Belarus with its Polish minority, and the efforts and effects of Western actors aiming at fighting the dictatorship over the last two decades.

The problem from the point of view of minorities is the impossibility to entirely self-determine their existence within the state they live in. Freedom is understood here as preserving the minority's own distinctiveness and not conforming to the official public identity. On one hand, in order to survive in a dictatorship, a minority is forced to make "the best choices under the circumstances" resulting in certain compromises that make the realization of the self-determination principle imperfect. On the other hand, there is an authoritarian state that maintains its sources of political power because of stability. In order to preserve this, it forces those who are different to conform to the official political and social community: "An authoritarian ruling style is characteristic of me, and I have always admitted it. Why? […] You need to control the country, and the main thing is not to ruin people's lives" (**LUKASHENKO, JUNE 2003,** news.bbc.co.uk). The stability in Belarus is based on a strong dependency on Russia and is a guarantor of the president's power. Choosing democratization, Lukashenko would risk losing stability and his political power at the same time. This dilemma explains why the president rejects almost all forms of a democratization process. Consequently, the regime also rejects human rights protection, despite legal and moral obligations. Minority rights, here assumed as a part of the human rights system, are therefore a "bone of contention" between an authoritarian state and its minorities. The striving for self-determination makes it dangerous for the state's

stability, so that minority politics, in order to create a balance, result in different forms of enforcing conformity.

The West, as a third actor in the conflict presented, acts on one hand according to its normative aspirations to spread liberal democracy and assure a stable neighborhood. On the other hand, because of some realistic targets when considering first of all interests with Russia, the West would like to minimize divergence by promoting human and minority rights in the regime. As the evidence shows, Belarus generally meets international and domestic standards regarding minority protection. What is unique here is the authoritarian way of acting that in practice does not meet the obligations. Lukashenko positioned his regime as an anti-Western outpost for Russia in exchange for cheap resources and energy. He has been able to ignore demands for democratization formulated by Western, in particular European, organizations such as the UN, the European Union, the Council of Europe and the OSCE for a long time. As a consequence, Belarus has become politically isolated in Europe, with Russia as its only partner, whereas this relationship also shifted sharply after Putin came to power, resulting in "Belarusian stalemate". The discrepancy causes a conflict situation and the circle is being closed.

As presented in the first chapter, Ed Sharp, in his paper "From Dictatorship to Democracy" emphasizes four scenarios of international reactions to the politics of an authoritarian state. They show that external actors, for different reasons, assist or act against a dictatorship. In the case of Belarus, one can conclude some reactions and counter-reactions towards the reality both from the point of view of external/internal involvement as well as positive/negative reactions. As internal actors, all the independent NGOs, organizations, political parties, trade unions and media outlets can be included. They are balanced by the state's party, the president and the institutions. As external actors can be described the organizations that have been involved in this study: the United Nations, Council of Europe, OSCE and the European Union. Negative/passive assistance of the democratization process of Belarus is being observed from the side of Russia. There are some background factors when examining the behavior of the parties here.

	Internal	**External**
Positive Assistance	NGOs Opposition Civil society	UN CoE OSCE EU Poland
Negative Assistance	State authorities	Russia

ASSISTANCE IN DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS IN BELARUS, SOURCE: OWN DRAFT

NGOs, civil society, and partially the opposition are fighting for human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the law, and their main aim is to influence governmental decision-making. On the other side, the Belarusian leader has branded opposition politicians and the civil society activists as "a fifth column" and "enemies of the Belarusian people", expressing at the same time counter-democratization aims. The explanation of such resiliencies is based here on three factors:

- the severity of the government's repression of opponents and its unchallenged domination over all aspects of political, economic and social life
- the people's conservatism and lack of feel for democracy
- Russia's sponsorship for the regime

The stability of Belarus, together with economic and military reasons, is considered to be a Russian interest too. A possible relevant issue is the aim to maintain the Russian sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area. This became especially obvious after the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008. Still, there is a Western tendency to counteract of this process. The reasons behind have been presented in chapter 3. The economic crisis and disturbances in Belarus-Russia relations forced some policy readjustments in Belarus but unfortunately failed to shake the foundation of its authoritarian system. President Lukashenko is not willing to cede ground in the key aspects of political control. His tactics of ad-hoc adaptation and minimal concessions to the West would be sufficient if the economic and financial crisis ends before it makes a more profound blow to the Belarusian economy. Otherwise the regime would have to pay a higher political price for economic support. This is against the assumption of Ed Sharp stating that foreign intervention can be successful only "of and when the internal resistance movement *has already begun* shaking the dictatorship, having thereby focused international attention" (**2002: 6**).

Regarding the minority situation, there is no wondering about Polish concerns, before and after the crisis of 2005. Strong national self-identification is an objective threat to any authoritarian government because the human sense of identity is inherent to raising awareness of its right to freedom. A national minority originating from a country that is on the other side of Europe's border of influences is being considered as an internal enemy. Overall discrimination of the Polish minority expresses, again, a fear of diversity as a factor of instability. In this case, the West could contribute to selective improvements of its situation in structural democratic changes.

There is no one and single answer to the research question. There have been numerous strategies pursued by Western actors about how to best promote democratic change in Belarus. The US, CoE and Poland's policies have emphasized pressure and selective engagement, whereas the UN, OSCE and the EU have left room for compromise. The evidence shows that both strategies have failed and such pluralism and unnecessary competition should be avoided in the future. The Western actors should have in mind that Belarus' dictatorship is home-grown and Lukashenko has real support of a great part of the society. In order to "internally shake" the dictatorship, the main focus in the future should emphasize legislative consultations that would legitimize the civil society's actions. On the other hand, Belarus should be encouraged and

assisted in pursuing economic reform in order to make it more independent from Russia and consequently, its aims in to bulwark against the eastward expansion of Western influence.

If putting such a conclusion into the theoretical frames of this paper, then mentioned legislative consultations, especially on minority rights, could serve as socialization mechanisms, one of the third factors needed to construct a new social reality. Strengthening of the civil society and continuous working with NGOs might contribute to emerging persons calling for changes, charismatic "key players" that would exploit the chance situation. Is the chance situation there? It seems so. Bad relations with Russia and the financial crisis create in this dictatorship exceptional circumstances. Such particular historical moment in the Belarusian history would possibly result in advanced democratization that connects state's and minority interests. The existence of mutual interests making joint gains from cooperation possible is here a precondition for including Belarus in the international minority rights regime, even despite lack of common government in international politics.

6. Summary in Polish language

Białoruś jest określana jako ostatnia istniejąca dyktatura w Europie. Reżim przysparza wielu trudności Unii Europejskiej i innym instytucjom, zwłaszcza w dziedzinie ochrony praw człowieka, do których zaliczyć należy ochronę mniejszości narodowych. Problem z punktu widzenia mniejszości polega na braku możliwości samookreślania szeroko rozumianej i gwarantowanej przez prawo odrębności. Ta odrębność stanowi zagrożenie dla homogenicznej wizji autorytarnego państwa i w konsekwencji prowadzi do nasilenia dyskryminacji. Pytanie badawcze pracy ma na celu wyłonienie najbardziej efektywnego sposobu trwałego wpłynięcia na poprawę sytuacji mniejszości narodowych wpisaną w kontekst procesu demokratyzacji Aby odpowiedzieć na to pytanie, problem został wpierw zamknięty w ramach teoretycznych konstrukcjonizmu społecznego i funkcjonalizmu, a następnie zanalizowany na przykładzie relacji Białorusi, mniejszości polskiej, Rzeczpospolitej Polskiej, Rosji a także podmiotów zachodnich, priorytetowo uwzględniając szczególną rolę Unii Europejskiej. Normatywną bazę problemu stanowią regulacje prawne o ochronie mniejszości narodowych podpisane przez Białoruś i nagminnie łamane za Łukaszenki.

Mniejszość polska zmuszona jest do pewnych kompromisów, które wymuszają władze. Stabilność i silna zależność od Rosji jest gwarantem władzy prezydenta. Demokratyzacja to ryzyko narażenia tej stabilności. Oto dlaczego reżim białoruski odrzuca w praktyce system ochrony praw człowieka, mimo zobowiązań moralnych i prawnych. Zachód uczestniczy w konflikcie ze względu na swe idealistyczne aspiracje szerzenia liberalnej demokracji, a także realistyczne zapewnienie stabilnego sąsiedztwa, co jest szczególnie ważne dla aparatu Unii Europejskiej i gospodarczej roli Rosji. W konsekwencji stosowanych do tej pory strategii Białoruś stała się politycznie odizolowanym państwem, z Rosją jako prawie jedynym partnerem gospodarczym i politycznym. Jednako po dojściu Putina i Medvedeva do władzy i ochłodzeniu stosunków z „wielkim bratem" Białoruś musi szukać nowych dróg. Warunki dyktowane przez Zachód wyraźnie nawołują do respektowania praw człowieka, co, w myśl teorii konstrukcjonizmu społecznego, być może stanowi szansę poprawy sytuacji Polaków na Białorusi.

7. Attachments

No.	Document	Date	Organisation
1	European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Art. 14 and Protocol No. 12	04.11.1950/ 04.11.2000	CoE
2	International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, Art. 5	21.12.1965	UNO
3	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 27	16.12.1966	UNO
4	Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 30	20.11.1989	UNO
5	Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension	29.06.1990	CSCE
6	Treaty of Maastricht on European Union, Art. 6	07.02.1992	EU
7	European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages	05.11.1992	CoE
8	Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities	18.12.1992	UNO
9	European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities	01.02.1995	CoE
10	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 27	16.12.1996	UNO
11	Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union	18.12.2000	EU
12	Treaty establishing the European Community, Art. 13	24.12.2002	EU
13	Treaty of Fundamental Rights of the European Union	7/12.12.2007 (not yet in force)	EU
14	Reform Treaty of Lisbon amending the TEU, Art. 2	13.12.2007	EU

ATTACHMENT 1: DEVELOPMENT OF DOCUMENTS ON MINORITY PROTECTION; SOURCE: OWN DRAFT

Ethnic Group	1989	1999	%
Belarusians	7.904,600	8.159,000	+3,36
Russians	1.342,100	1.142,000	-1,85
Poles	417,700	396,000	-0,17
Total	*10.151,800*	*10.045,000*	*-10,52*

ATTACHMENT 2: NATIONAL CENSUSES IN COMPARISON; SOURCE: belstat.gov.by



ATTACHMENT 3: GAS PIPELINES GOING THROUGH BELARUS, SOURCE: www.eegas.com

ATTACHMENT 4: EASTERN PARTNERSHIP COUNTRIES (ORANGE); SOURCE: www.visegrad.info

Document	ICERD	ICCPR	DRC
	Article 5	Art: 27	Article 30
Article on Minorities	In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: (a) The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice; (b) The right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm, whether inflicted by government officials or by any individual group or institution; (c) Political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections-to vote and to stand for election-on the basis of universal and equal suffrage, to take part in the Government as well as in the conduct of public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service; (d) Other civil rights, in particular: (i) The right to freedom of movement and residence within the border of the State; (ii) The right to leave any country, including one's own, and to return to one's country; (iii) The right to nationality; (iv) The right to marriage and choice of spouse; (v) The right to own property alone as well as in association with others; (vi) The right to inherit; (vii) The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; (viii) The right to freedom of opinion and expression; (ix) The right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association; (e) Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular: (i) The rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable remuneration; (ii) The right to form and join trade unions; (iii) The right to housing; (iv) The right to public health, medical care, social security and social services;	In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to use their own language.	In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practise his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.

	(v) The right to education and training; (vi) The right to equal participation in cultural activities; (f) The right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general public, such as transport hotels, restaurants, cafes, theatres and parks.

ATTACHMENT 5: SELECTED UN OBLIGATIONS BELARUS' ON MINORITY RIGHTS;
SOURCES: www2.ohchr.org, www2.ohchr.org, un.by

	UN	OSCE	CoE	EU
CPRN				
CHRF				
ICERD	Legally and politically binding	-	-	-
ICCPR	Legally and politically binding	-	-	-
CRC	Legally and politically binding	-	-	-
DNLM	Legally and politically binding	-	-	-
CD	-	Politically binding	-	-
MD	-	Politically binding	-	-
ECoHR	-	-	Legally and politically binding	-
FCNM	-	-	Legally and politically binding	-
ERML	-	-	Legally and politically binding to a certain degree	-
TEU	-	-	-	Legally and politically binding

GREEN - BELARUS IS A MEMBER OF THE BODY

RED - BELARUS' SPECIAL GUEST STATUS IN THE BODY SUSPENDED

VIOLET - BELARUS IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE BODY

ATTACHMENT 6: COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT STATUSES OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES SIGNED BY BELARUS, SOURCE: OWN DRAFT

	NGO statistics			
	1998	2000	2004	2008
	Percentage of total NGOs			
Rights protection	9,7	5,7	7,8	1,4
Education	9,7	6,0	17,4	13,6
Veterans and military	9,6	3,0	4,4	2,7
Disabilities	6,6	3,3	7,0	4,2
Philanthropy	-	11,0	17,2	13,3
Government, self-governance	8,4	3,8	5,7	3,7
Women	2,4	1,4	3,4	2,1
History, culture	10,8	15,1	12,0	9,6
Science	5,8	5,4	8,4	6,8
Youth, children	9,5	5,1	9,8	17,2
National minorities	15,4	3,4	4,4	4,5
Professionals (guilds)	5,4	9,4	13,1	11,8
Resource centres	0,4	0,6	0,5	0,5
Social protection, rehabilitation	5,8	14,7	22,9	8,8
Recreation, sports, tourism	15,4	13,8	19,4	24,6
Hobby	5,5	5,8	7,1	8,1
Chernobyl-related	20,8	3,7	4,5	3,8
Environmental	4,3	2,8	4,3	3,3
Economy	4,1	2,7	3,2	3,0
Health protection	11,4	5,0	6,4	5,3
Other	8,4	8,9	9,5	6,8

ATTACHMENT 7: STATISTICS ON NGOS IN BELARUS; SOURCE: T.A. KUSMENKOVA (2004), FOR DATA AFTER 2004, SEE THE HOMEPAGE OF UNITED WAY BELARUS, SOURCE: www.ngo.by

NGO	1998	2000	2004	2008
	% of total NGOs			
National Minorities	15,4	3,4	4,4	4,5

ATTACHMENT 8: NGOS ON NATIONAL MINORITIES; SOURCE: T.A. KUSMENKOVA (2004), FOR DATA AFTER 2004, SEE THE HOMEPAGE OF UNITED WAY BELARUS, SOURCE: www.ngo.by

Parties	Seats
Communist Party of Belarus (*Kamunistyčnaja partyja Biełarusi*)	8
Agrarian Party of Belarus (*Ahrarnaja partyja Bełarusi*)	3
Liberal Democratic Party of Belarus (*Liberalna-demakratyčnaja partyja Biełarusi*)	1
Non-partisans (*worker's collectives, public associations and civil society organizations*)	98
People's Coalition 5 Plus (*Narodnaja kaalicyja "Piaciorka plus"*) • Belarusian Labour Party (*Biełaruskaja partyja pracy*) • Belarusian Popular Front (*Narodny front Biełarusi*) • Belarusian Social Democratic Party-Assembly (*Sacyjał-demakratyčnaja partyja Biełarusi "Hramada"*) • Party of Communists of Belarus (*Partyja kamunistov Biełarusi*) • United Civil Party of Belarus (*Abjadnanaja hramadzianskaja partyja Biełarusi*)	-
Democratic Centrist Coalition (*Kaalicyja demakratyčnych centrystaŭ*) • Republic (*Respublika*) • Young Belarus (*Maładaja Biełaruś*) • European Coalition Free Belarus (*Eŭrapiejskaja kaalicyja "Svabodnaja Biełaruś"*) • Belarusian Social Democratic Party - People's Assembly (*Sacyjal-demokratyčnaja partyja Biełarusi – "Nardonaja hramada"*) • Belarusian Women's Party Hope (*Biełaruskaja partyja žančyn "Nadzieja"*)	-
Conservative Christian Party (*Kansiervatyŭnaja chryścijanskaja partyja*)	-
Social Democratic Party of Popular Accord (*Sacyjal-demokratyčnaja partyja "Narodnaja zhoda"*)	-
Belarusian Socialist Sporting Party (*Biełaruskaja sacyjalistyčnaja spartyŭnaja partyja*)	-
Republican Party of Labour and Juctice (*Respublikanskaja partyja pracy i spraviadlivasci*)	-
Total (turnout 90.1 %)	**110**

ATTACHMENT 9: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, 28 SEPTEMBER 2008 ; SOURCE: IPU Parline: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/2027.htm

	Circulation of thousands of copies					
Newspaper	1997	2001	2003	2006	2008	2009
State owned						
Sovetskaya Belarussiya/SB Belarus segodnya	331	445	310/504	500	n.d.	400
Respublika	140	114	62	n.d.	53	50
Independent Press						
Narodnaya Volya	61	40	28	27	10	19
Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta/BDG gazeta	20	19,5	9	5	-	-
Belorusski rynok/Belorussy i rynok	15	13	10,5	11	12	13,4
Svobodnye novosti/Svobodnye novosti plyus	80	36	36	N.D.	22	25

ATTACHMENT 10: NEWSPAPERS IN BELARUS ; SOURCE: SAHM 2009 : 62

Bibliography

Books, Monographies, Articles

1. Alcock, Antony (2000): A History of the Protection of Regional Cultural Minorities in Europe. From the Edict of Nantes to the Present Day. London: Macmillian Press Ltd.
2. Antoszewski, A.; Herbut R. (Eds.) (1997): Demokracje zachodnioeuropejskie. Analiza porównawcza. Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego
3. Arendt, Hannah (1972): The Origins of Totalitarism. New York: World Publishing
4. Bagley, Tennet H. (1950): General Principles and Problems in the International Protection of Minorities: A Political Study, Geneva: Imprimeries Populaires
5. OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report: "Belarus. Parliamentary Elections 28 September 2008"., Warsaw, 28 November 2008: Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
6. Belarusian Association of Journalists (2009): *Mass Media in Belarus 2008. Annual Report*. Minsk
7. Balzacq, Thierry (2008): *The External Dimension of EU Justice and Home Affairs: Tools, Proceses, Outcomes.* In: *CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 377, 17.09.2008*
8. Barany, Zoltan (2001): The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
9. Baszkiewicz, Jan (2002): Powszechna historia ustrojów państwowych. Gdańsk: Arche
10. Berlin, Isaiah (1990): The Crocked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas. London: John Murray
11. Brzezinski, Zbigniew (1997): "*A Geostrategy for Eurasia*". In: *Foreign Affairs, 76/5, September/October 1997.*
12. Burr, Vivien (1995). An Introduction to Social Constructionism. London: Routledge.
13. Capotorti, Francesco (1979): Study on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. In: UN Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub.2/384/Rev.1, para.568,96
14. Deschênes, Jules (1985): Proposal concerning a definition of the term "minority". In: UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/31, para.181,30
15. Declarations of the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities; *UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/48 & Corr. 1 (1992) at 16-19*
16. Donnelly, Jack (2003): In Defense of the Universal Declaration Model. In: G. Lyons and J. Mayall (Eds): International Human Rights in the Twenty First Century: Protecting the Rights of Groups. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield
17. Dugin, A. (1997): "Osnovy geopolitiki: Geopoliticheskoe budushchee Rossii". Moscow: Arktogeya
18. Dzwonkowski, Roman; Gorbaniuk, Oleg; Gorbaniuk Julia (2004): Postawy katolików obrządku łacińskiego na Białorusi wobec języka polskiego. Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego
19. Eberhardt, Piotr (2001): Ethnic Groups and Population Changes in Twentieth-Century Central-Eastern Europe. History, Data, Analysis. London, New York: M. E. Sharpe
20. Eke, Steven; Kuzio, Taras (2000): *Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus.* In: *Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 52, No. 3, 2000, pp. 523-547*
21. Esser, Hartmut (1996): Ethnische Konflikte als Auseinandersetzung um den Wert von kulturellem Kapital. In: Heitmeyer, Wilhelm; Dollase, Rainer, in co-op. with Vossen, Johannes (Eds.) (1996): Die Bedrängte Toleranz. Ethnisch-kulturelle Konflikte, religiöse Differenzen und die Gefahren politisierter Gewalt. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp
22. Eide, Asbjørn (1993): Possible ways and means of facilitating the peaceful and constructive solution of problems involving minorities. In: UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, para 29,7
23. Gawin, Tadeusz (2009): Związek Polaków na Białorusi. Historia niszczenia niezależności. 1988-2005: Grodno: Tadeusz Gawin
24. German Marshall Fund, Report January 2010 (not published yet, accessed thank to Mr. Joerg Forbrig)
25. Griffiths, Martin; O'Callaghan Terry (2002): International Relations. The Key Concepts. London and New York: Rotledge
26. Gromadzki, G.; Kazanecki, P.; Mironowicz E.; Naumczuk, A. (2001): *The Forgitten Neighbour – Belarus in the Context of EU Enlargement to the East.* In: *On the Future of Europe. Policy Papers 4, 2001*. Warszawa: Stefan Batory Foundation
27. Gromadzki, G. (2009): *Belarusian foreign policy – change or continuity?* In: *Fischer, Sabine (Ed.) (2009): Back from the Cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009. Chaillot Paper, No. 119, November 2009. Paris: Institute for Security Studies: 94-104*

28. Guicherd, Catherine (2002): The EU and Belarus: from a Zero to a Positive Sum Game. In: Lewis, Ann (2002): The EU & Belarus. Between Moscow and Brussels. London: The Federal Trust: 317-335
29. Hawkes, Malcolm (2002): Republic of Belarus: An Elegant Dictatorship? In: Lewis, Ann (2002): The EU & Belarus. Between Moscow and Brussels. London: The Federal Trust: 75-88
30. Hilpold (2005): 'Article 23'. In: Weller, M. (Ed.) (2005): The Right of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework. New York: OUP
31. Heintze, H. J. (2005): 'Article 21'. In: Weller, M. (Ed.) (2005): The Right of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework. New York: OUP
32. Hobbes, T. (1988): Leviathan. London: Everyman
33. Huntington, Samuel (1996): Zderzenie Cywilizacji. Warszawa: Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie MUZA
34. Jackson Preece, Jennifer (1998): National Minorities and the European Nation-States System. Oxford: Clarendon Press
35. Jackson, Robert H. (2000): The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of State Creation. Oxford: Oxford University Press
36. Jackson Preece, Jennifer (2005): Minority Rights. Between Diversity and Community. Cambridge: Polity Press
37. Jarausch, Konrad H. (1999): Dictatorship as Experience. New York: Berghahn Books
38. Jennings, Ivor Sir (1956): The Approach of Self-Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 1-58
39. Jocelyn, Ed (1998): Nationalism, Identity and the Belarusian State. In: Taras, Ray (Ed.) (1998): National Identities and Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe. New York: St. Martin's Press: 73-83
40. Kirkwood, Michael (1990*):* Language planning in the Soviet Union. Glasgow: Palgrave Macmillan
41. Kruszewski, Anthony (1998): Poles in the Newly Independent States of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. In: Taras, Ray (Ed.) (1998): National identities and Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe. Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw 1995. New York: St. Martin's Press: 131 – 147
42. Kusmenkova, T.A. (2004): Third-sector in Belarus: Problems of formation and Development. Minsk: Mozyr: 2004
43. Lantschner, L.; Medda, R. (2001): Protection of National Minorities through Bilateral Agreements in South-Eastern Europe. Draft Raport. Strasbourg: European Academy of Bozen/Bolzano
44. Lewis, Ann (2002): The EU and Belarus: Where Next? In: Lewis, Ann (Ed.): The EU & Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels. The Federal Trust. London: 411-419
45. Liebich, Andre. (1998): Ethnic Minorities and Long-Term Implications of EU Enlargement. European University Institute, Working Paper RSC No 98/49: 5-10
46. Marples, David (1999): A Denationalised Nation. Amsterdam: Harrowed Academic Publishers
47. Marples, David (2000): Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship? In: Lewis, Ann (2002): The EU & Belarus. Between Moscow and Brussels. London: The Federal Trust: 31-50
48. Melyantsou, Dzianis; Silitski, Vitali (2008): *In the Shadow of Kremlin stars: Belarus-EU Relations Lack Substance. In: BISS Blitz no. 1, 13 II 2008*
49. Miller, David (Ed.) (1991): The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought. Cambridge: Wiley, John & Sons
50. McLean, Ian; McMillan Alistair (Eds.) (2009): The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
51. Moynihan, D. (1993): Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics. Oxford: Oxford University Press
52. Nesvetailova, Anastasia (2002): A Friend in Need... or a Friend in Need? Russia and the Belarusian Economy. In: Lewis, Ann (2002): The EU & Belarus. Between Moscow and Brussels. London: The Federal Trust: 215-227
53. Nialyuk, Syarhey (2009): *Sociological data on attitudes to the European Union in Belarus*. In: Myszkiewicz, Mariusz (Ed.) (2009): *Belarus – Towards a United Europe*. Wroclaw: Jan Nowak-Jezioranski: 147-171
54. OED, Oxford English Dictionary 1989. 2nd Ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press
55. Raïkka, J. (Ed.) (1996): Do we Need Minority Rights? Conceptual Issues. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff
56. Rotman, David; Novikova, Lidia; Golubkova, Nadezhda; Filinskaya, Larisa (2002): Value Systems and Social Transformation in Belarus. In: Lewis, Ann (2002): The EU & Belarus. Between Moscow and Brussels. London: The Federal Trust: 103 - 126
57. Rybarski, Roman (1926): *Naród, jednostka i klasa*. In: *Myśl Polska (2001), Nr. 15-17, 19*
58. Sahm, Astrid (2009): *Civil society and mass media in Belarus*. In: Fischer, Sabine (2009): *Back from the cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009. Chaillot Paper No. 19. Paris: Institute for Security Studies: 49-64*
59. Schachter, Oscar (1991): International Law in Theory and Practice. London: Martinus Nijhoff

60. Sharp, Gene (2002): From Dictatorship to Democracy. Boston: Albert Einstein Institution
61. Sieghart, Paul (1986): The Lawful Rights of Mankind. Oxford: Oxford University Press
62. Silitski, Vitali (2002): The Change is Yet to Come: Opposition Strategies and Western Efforts to Promote Democracy in Belarus. In: Lewis, Ann (2002): The EU & Belarus. Between Moscow and Brussels. London: The Federal Trust: 351-373
63. Šmihula, Daniel (2008): *National Minorities in the Law of the EC/EU*. In: *Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 8 no. 3, Sep. 2008, .51-81*
64. Sobczak, Jacek (2002): Podstawy wiedzy o państwie i prawie. Poznań: Abedik
65. Stein, Jonathan P. (Ed.) (2000): The Politics of National minority Participation in Post-communist Europe. State-building, Democracy and ethnic Mobilization. New York: East West Institute
66. Stelmachowski, A. (2005): *Polonia: Prześladowanie Polaków na Białorusi*. In: *Kwartalik „Wspólnota Polska" Nr. II 2005*
67. Taras, Ray (Ed.) (1998): National identities and Ethnic Minorities in Eastern Europe. Selected Papers from the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies, Warsaw 1995. New York: St. Martin's Press: 1-10
68. Teague, Elizabeth (2002): Belarus: A Brief History. In: Lewis, Ann (Ed.) (2002): The EU & Belarus: Between Moscow and Brussels. The Federal Trust. London:17-27
69. van de Water, Rob; Wiersma, Jan Marinus (2002): The European Union and Belarus: A View from the European Parliament. In: Lewis, Ann (2002): *The EU & Belarus. Between Moscow and Brussels*. London: The Federal Trust: 337-349
70. Vincent, R. J. (1986): Human Rights and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
71. Walzer, Michael (1983): Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. New York: Basic Books
72. Wieck, Hans-Georg (2002): The OSCE and the Council of Europe in Conflict with the Lukashenko Regime. In: Lewis, Ann (2002): *The EU & Belarus. Between Moscow and Brussels*. London: The Federal Trust: 261-276
73. Zaprudnik, Jan; Urban, Michael (1997): Belarus: from statehood to empire? In: Bremmer, Ian; Taras, Ray (Eds.) (1997): New States, New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 276-315

Internet articles and links

1. Assessment for Poles in Belarus (retrieved: 18.01.2010)
2. http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/assessment.asp?groupId=37002
3. Belarus (retrieved: 16.01.2010) http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/dem_gov/ngoindex/2004/belarus.pdf

4. Belarus asks for Russian aid http://tvnz.co.nz/view/page/536641/2232013 (retrieved: 5.1.2010)
5. Belarus: more democratisation needed before sanctions are lifted, say MEPs,17.12.2009, (retrieved: 18.1.2010) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/030-66444-348-12-51-903-20091215IPR66443-14-12-2009-2009-false/default_de.htm
6. Białoruś: Aresztowano Andżelikę Borys, szefową Związku Polaków (retrieved: 30.12.2009)
7. http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80708,4566864.html
8. Białoruś prześladuje polskiego dziennikarza, 5.03.2009 (retrieved: 13.01.2010)
9. http://wyborcza.pl/1,75477,6344364,Bialorus_przesladuje_polskiego_dziennikarza.html
10. Chronology for Poles in Belarus (retrieved: 13.11.2009) http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/topic,463af2212,488edfd52,469f38691e,0.html

11. СОГЛАШЕНИЕ МЕЖДУ МИНИСТЕРСТВОМ ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ РЕСПУБЛИКИ БЕЛАРУСЬ И МИНИСТЕРСТВОМ ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ И НАУКИ ЛАТВИЙСКОЙ РЕСПУБЛИКИ О СОТРУДНИЧЕСТВЕ В ОБЛАСТИ ОБРАЗОВАНИЯ И НАУКИ (retrieved: 20.12.2009) http://www.bankzakonov.com/inter/razdel73/time1/lavz0004.htm
12. Committee of Ministers, CM(98)142 (retrieved: 08.01.2010 https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=492507&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864
13. Constitution of the Republic of Belarus (retrieved: 29.12.2009) http://www.president.gov.by/en/press19329.html#dochttp://www.president.gov.by/en/press19329.html#doc
14. Convention on the Rights of the Child, (retrieved: 9.01.2010) http://un.by/en/documents/convention/conv-part1-3.html

15. Council of Europe, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1134, 1.2.1990 (retrieved: 21.11.2009) http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta90/erec1121.htm
16. Country Monitoring Work (retrieved: 5.01.2010) http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp
17. Khodyko, Konstantin; Strzala, Tomasz (1999): Belarusian authority and Polish minority: A personal view. http://www.apenrade.dk/m99_belarusianpolish.html (retrieved: 15.12.2009)
18. Knauer, Sebastian (2002): Die strahlenden Sümpfe am Pripjet, 12.06.2002 (retrieved: 15.01.2010) http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,199663-2,00.html
19. Kubik, Andrzej: Białoruś walczy z Rosją o tanią ropę. Czy nie ucierpią polskie rafinerie? 1.01.2010, (retrieved: 1.01.2010) http://wyborcza.biz/biznes/1,101562,7413736,Bialorus_walczy_z_Rosja_o_tania_rope__Czy_nie_ucierpia.html

20. Eastern Partnership Summit http://www.eu2009.cz/event/1/3553/ (retrieved: 12.02.2010)
21. Eberhardt, Piotr: Polacy na Białorusi. Liczebność i rozmieszczenie ludności polskiej według ostatnich spisów powszechnych (retrieved: 13.12.2009) http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/index.php?id=pwko01
22. Экспортеры воздуха в Европу, 12.10.2009 http://nmnby.eu/pub/0910/12m.html (retrieved: 6.01.2010)
23. Finlandization, http://www.yourdictionary.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary (retrieved: 10.11.2009)

24. Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg 1.2.1995 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/157.htm (retrieved: 20.11.2009)

25. Gawin, Tadeusz (2009): Polskość na Białorusi (retrieved: 15.12.2009) http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/index.php?id=pwko92

26. GR-EDS(2000)41 revised, Situation in Belarus, Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 1441 (2000) (retrieved: 7.01.2010) https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=359151&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=DBDCF2&BackColorIntranet=FDC864&BackColorLogged=FDC864
27. Grott, Bogumił (2007): Polskość na Białorusi. Perspektywy przetrwania. (retrieved: 25.12.2009) http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/index.php?id=pwko110
28. Grządziel, Małgorzata: Stosunki Polsko-Białoruskie (retrieved: 10.12.2009) http://www.wosna5.pl/stosunki_polsko_bialoruskie
29. Ignatik, Kiril (2008): Ukraine and Belarus: a Comprehensive Political Policy of Isolationism (retrieved: 26.12.2009) http://n-europe.eu/content/?p=4250
30. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16.12.1966 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm (retrieved: 9.1.2010)

31. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21.12.1965, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cerd.htm#art5 (retrieved: 9.1.2010)
32. Korchemkin Mikhail: East European Gas Analysis, , December 30, 2006, (retrieved: 27.12.2009) http://www.eegas.com
33. Канцэпцыя развіцьця грамадзянскай супольнасці Беларусі, 16.7.2009 (retrieved: 19.01.2010) http://nmnby.eu/pub/0907/06m.html
34. Law of the Republic of Belarus, No. 1926-XII of November 11, 1992 (retrieved: 28.12.2009) http://www.regione.taa.it/biblioteca/minoranze/Bielorussia2.pdf 17.12.2009
35. Member States of the United Nations (retrieved: 14.11.2009) http://www.un.org/en/members/index.shtml

36. Neighbours of Visegrad and EU: Eastern Partnership, 7.10.2009 (retrieved: 29.12.2009) http://www.visegrad.info/enp---eastern-dimension/factsheet/neighbours-of-visegrad-and-eu-eastern-partnership-.html
37. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights – Elections. Belarus. (retrieved: 16.12.2009) http://www.osce.org/odihr-elections/14353.html
38. On State Policy of the Republic of Belarus in the Sphere of Interethnic Relations Specifics of the Developments Around the «Union of Poles in Belarus» http://www.belarusembassy.org/ (retrieved: 16.12.2009)
39. OSCE Annual Report 2005 (retrieved: 12.01.2010) http://www.osce.org/publications/sg/2006/04/18784_589_en.pdf

40. OSZE-Beobachter kritisieren Ablauf der Parlamentswahl http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,581151,00.html (retrieved: 22.01.2010)
41. Poczobut, Andrzej (2006): Situation of organizations uniting the Polish minority in Belarus: the past, the present and the outlook. (retrieved: 14.12.2009) http://powiatkolobrzeg.home.pl/ngo/DOKUMENTY/POCZOBUT_EN.PDF
42. President Lukashenko in quotes, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3881341.stm (retrieved: 20.01.2009)
43. Programm Update. Regional Representation for Belarus, Russia, Ukraine and Moldova, Appeal No. MAA67003 (retrieved: 17.12.2009) http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/LSGZ-7WVGXR-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf
44. Prosecution (definition) (retrieved: 29.10.2009) http://library.thinkquest.org/05aug/01412/lite/terminology/index.html
45. Rapporteur Says UN Sends 'Wrong' Message To Belarus, 19.06.2007, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077201.html (retrieved: 17.12.2009)
46. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/RES/60/251 (retrieved: 20.12.2009 http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/Themen/Menschenrechte/MR-Rat-Res60-251.pdf)
47. Resolution on bi-annual evaluation of the EU-Belarus dialogue http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/FindByProcnum.do?lang=en&procnum=RSP/2009/2567 16.1.2010 (retrieved: 6.01.2010)
48. Rettman, Andrew (2009): EU assigns funds and staff to Eastern Partnership. (retrieved: 27.12.2009) http://euobserver.com/9/27824
49. Rzeczpospolita 23.01.2010: Jak obroniono Dom Polski (retrieved: 26.01.2010) http://www.bialorus.pl/index.php?Rozdzial=Wiadomosci&&wiecej=15757
50. Statement of the Polish Ministry of the Foreign Affairs, 28.07.2005 http://www.msz.gov.pl/STATEMENT,OF,THE,POLISH,MINISTRY,OF,FOREIGN,AFFAIRS,,July,28th,,,2005,283.html (retrieved: 16.12.2009)
51. The Being Had Times; News from Belarus and Eastern Europe, (retrieved: 5.1.2010) http://bhtimes.blogspot.com/2008/10/belarus-and-global-economic-crisis-eu.html
52. The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (retrieved: 3.12.2009) http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/HTML/148.htm
53. The European Convention on Human Rights (retrieved: 2.12.2009) http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR50.html#Convention
54. The Framework Convention on National Minorities (retrieved: 4.12.2009) http://www.coe.int/t/e/human_rights/minorities/2._framework_convention_(monitoring)/1._texts/FCNM_Texts_en.asp
55. The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of National Minorities in Public Life (OSCE), http://www.minorityrights.org/3178/normative-instruments/the-lund-recommendations-on-the-effective-participation-of-national-minorities-in-public-life-osce.html (retrieved: 23.11.2009)
56. The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Belarus http://www.idee.org/Belarus_severin%20report%202007_unhrc.pdf (retrieved: 11.01.2010)
57. Traktat między Rzeczpospolitą Polską a Republiką Białoruś o dobrym sąsiedztwie i przyjaznej współpracy, Warszawa, 23 czerwca 1992, http://www.wspolnota-polska.org.pl/index.php?id=st7 (retrieved: 20.12.2009)
58. Usov, Pawel (2009): *Illusion of Two-Sided Geo-policy of Belarus. In: Bell BelarusInfo Letter, no. 1-2 (1), January 2009, pp. 1-4;* http://www.eesc.lt/failai/Bell_1st%20issue.pdf (retrieved 6.1.2010)
59. Umowa między Rządem Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej a Rządem Republiki Białoruś o ochronie grobów i miejsc pamięci ofiar wojen i represji, Brzesc, 21 stycznia 1995, http://lex.pl/serwis/du/1997/0185.htm (retrieved: 21.12.2009)
60. UN Official Says Belarus Not Making Progress On Rights, 12.6.2007 http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1077092.html (retrieved: 18.12.2009)
61. Weißrussland errichtet erstes Atomkraftwerk, 15.1.2008; (retrieved: 2.1.2010) http://www.tagesspiegel.de/weltspiegel/Kernkraft-Weissrussland;art1117,2456615
62. "What the European Union could bring to Belarus", Non-paper, (retrieved: 18.1.2010) http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/belarus/intro/non_paper_1106.pdf
63. Vanyashkin, Mikhail (2003); Belarus: Media Watchdog Bitten http://www.ceeol.com/aspx/issuedetails.aspx?issueid=be549725-de00-11d7-91f3-0000b4a60532&articleId=be549727-de00-11d7-91f3-0000b4a60532 (retrieved: 21.12.2009)
64. Vileita, Vadzim (2009): Journalists and human rights defenders: difficulties of mutual understanding http://humanrightshouse.org/Articles/12502.html (retrieved: 22.12.2009)

65. 925 международных и более 17 000 национальных наблюдателей будут контролировать ход выборов в Белоруссии, 27.09.2008 (retrieved: 22.01.2010) http://www.regnum.ru/news/1061121.html%2022.1.2010
66. http://www.ncpi.gov.by/minjust/ (retrieved: 15.12.2009)
67. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5371.htm 31.12.2010 (retrieved: 5.1.2010)
68. http://szczesniak.pl/1551 4.1.2010
69. http://belstat.gov.by/homep/ru/perepic/p6.php (retrieved: 19.12.2009)
70. http://www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_243.htm (retrieved: 27.12.2009)
71. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/index_en.htm (retrieved: 27.12.2009)
72. http://www.tripatlas.com/Prometheism (retrieved: 27.12.2009)
73. http://allaboutall.info/article/Prometheism (retrieved: 27.12.2009)
74. http://humanrightshouse.org (retrieved: 21.12.2009)
75. http://www.osce.org/hcnm/ (retrieved: 13.1.2010)
76. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/minority/forum.htm (retrieved: 15.01.2010)
77. http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/default_en.asp (retrieved: 11.01.2010)
78. http://www.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/by/index.html (retrieved: 13.01.2010)
79. http://www.bankzakonov.com/ (retrieved: 17.11.2009)
80. http://www.ngo.by (retrieved: 13.01.2010)
81. http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/adoptedtext/ta09/eres1671.htm (retrieved: 3.01.2010)
82. http://belstat.gov.by/homep/en/indicators/main1.php (retrieved: 18.01.2010)
83. "Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo Belarusi gotovitsya k' vostochnomu partnerstvu", 23.04.2009 (retrieved: 19.01.2010) http://neurope.eu/article/2009/04/23/grazhdanskoe_obshchestvo_belarusi_gotovitsya_k_%C2%ABvostochnomu_partnerstvu%C2%BB

Secondary literature

1. Baumgärtner, Isolde (2008): Förderprogram Belarus. Dortmund. Internationales Bildungs- und Begegnungswerk
2. Bloed, Arie (Ed.) (1993): The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Analysis and Basic Documents, 1972-1993. Utrecht: Springer
3. BIIM: Monitoring Report on Developments in Belarus, March 2009-October 2009. German Marshall Fund
4. BIIM: Monitoring Report on Developments in Belarus, October 2009-March 2010. German Marshall Fund
5. Chernov, Viktor (2008): Tretii sektor v Belarusi, www.nmnby.eu/pub/0801/31m.html (retrieved: 5.01.2010)
6. Conzelmann, Thomas (2003): Neofunktionalismus In: Schiedler, Siegfried; Spindler, Manuela (Eds.) Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen, Opladen: UTB: 141-161
7. Forbrig, Joerg (2009): Belarus (not published yet)
8. Titarenko, Larissa, G. (1998): Globalization, Nationalism and Ethnic Relations in Belarus. In: Williams, Christopher; Sfikas, Thanasis, D. (Edts.) (1999): Ethnicity and Nationalism in Russia, the CIS and the Baltic States. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd: 150-183
9. http://www.wosna5.pl/stosunki_polsko_bialoruskie (retrieved: 18.01.2010)

Revue Défense Nationale

Lancée en 1939 par le Comité d'études de défense nationale, la Revue Défense Nationale assure depuis lors la diffusion d'idées nouvelles sur les grandes questions nationales et internationales qu'elle aborde sous l'angle de la sécurité et de la défense. Son indépendance éditoriale lui permet de participer activement au renouvellement du débat stratégique français et à sa promotion en Europe et dans le monde (www.defnat.com).

Abonnement (11 numéros) - **France : 90 € - UE : 120 € - Autre : 130 €**

(tarifs valables jusqu'au 1er mars 2010)

PAPIER OU NUMÉRIQUE (*VIA INTERNET*)

Paiement en ligne (www.defnat.com)

PUBLICATION DU COMITÉ D'ÉTUDES DE DÉFENSE NATIONALE

BP 8607, 75325 Paris cedex 07 - Tél. : 01 44 42 38 23

Serbia: Between Integration and Interaction

By Arta Seiti

The author who lives in Paris/France holds a Master postgraduate degree from the Department of Studies of Contemporary Society at Paris 3 - Sorbonne Nouvelle. A PhD student at the Laboratory of Anthropology of institutions and social organizations (LAIOS) at EHESS, and research associate since 2001 at the Geostrategy Center, she has conducted several works and studies on the subject of the Western Balkans. This article is a slightly updated version of a contribution published in French in "Revue de Défense Nationale" (RDN), June 2010.

International diplomacy in the Western Balkans, in place since the NATO bombing in 1999, seems to have led to the communities receding into themselves and focusing on their narrow national interests. Moreover it seems to have provoked the people of Serbia and Kosovo into a state of legal paralysis, with national demands that appear to lead to a stalemate. Raymond Aron noted that "diplomacy too often slips into fanaticism. It divides states into good and bad, peaceful and warlike, it imagines a final peace defined by the punishment of the former and the triumph of the latter ... The first duty - politically but also morally - is to see politics among nations as it is, so that each State legitimately concerned about its interests is not entirely blind to the interests of the other [1]".

In this regard, the thrust of the international community before the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, 17 February 2008, was to propose peace around a consensus and make it the top priority to maintain stability in the region, while seeking to define a geopolitical stance with regards to minority groups. However, the basis of the consensus sought by the international players does not include a specific reference to human history and culture of the peoples concerned, and the weight of shared history which tends to increase the resentment of the two national communities. Thus, in the Western Balkans, conflict tends to exacerbate the sensitivities of the people and touches strongly on their emotions and political identities. However, the desired consensus should result from the unanimity of Western players in recognizing Kosovo's

independence while meeting fairly the universal principles of international law, specifically required by the Russians and the Serbs themselves.

The theme of the conviction generally accepted by the international community is one of reconciliation and integration of Serbia as well as the Western Balkans within the European Union whilst preserving national identities, as well as the cultural and economic needs of all stakeholders. The future therefore lies in the declination of the two key concepts of integration and interaction. The first could promote as a first step, a regional dynamic of Serbia in the western Balkans and facilitate subsequent rapprochement with the European Union. Through the concept of interaction would be defined the role that Serbia can play in international relations and also in the region after the fragmentation of the former Yugoslavia into smaller states.

Serbia is of pivotal geo-strategic importance for South Eastern Europe

The democratic changes at the end of the year 2000 set out a new geopolitical and geostrategic position for Serbia.

Serbia, which borders Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, Montenegro and Kosovo, is a strategic pivot in Southeast Europe and an important hub via the sea route of Monte Negro to Europe.

The stabilization of the region depends on a normalization of relations with Serbia, where the acutely urgent issues of conflict resolution and integration are faced today. Member of the Program of Cooperation in Europe, South East (South-East European Cooperation Process - SEECP), founded in 1996, it is also part of the Regional Cooperation Council established in February 2008 on the basis of the Stability Pact. It joined at the same time, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Free Trade Agreement of Central and Eastern Europe. A step forward was made with the signing of Serbia and the European Union of the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) in April 2008 and the formalization of the Interim Agreement with the European Union in December 2009. Internationally, Serbia is a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since 2000, the OSCE since 2000, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) since 2001, the Council of Europe since 2003. It is part of the Partnership for Peace since the NATO Summit in Riga in 2006 and it also became an observer member of the International Organization of Francophones (OIF) since 2006.

Economic integration

The questions that now need to worry Serbia are the internal and regional dynamics of the country: how to carry out the process of democratization and European integration through regional cooperation?

Its main suppliers are Russia (14.3%), Germany (11.8%), Italy (9.8%), China (7.3%), France (3.1% - 9th place in 2007) [2], exports rise relatively homogeneously in terms of capital goods and intermediate goods. In addition, Italy and Bosnia-Herzegovina are the main customers of Serbia. However, it is found, according to a classification of 2007 [3], the former Yugoslav

republics (Macedonia, Bosnia, Croatia, Slovenia) receive 26% of Serbian exports, a figure significantly higher than that of Italy and Germany.

However, a Balkan economic identity exists thanks to Slovenian and Croatian products exported in the region, as well as the import-export trade between Serbia, Montenegro and Slovenia (the Serbian company Delta Holding is such a case). Also, European players should take into account this common economic profile of the Balkans.

In a regional context, the project Corridor X, the major axis linking Central Europe to Greece and Turkey through the Balkans, is a key issue for Serbia. The recent support of the World Bank made concrete by a loan of 388 million dollars to Serbia to carry out the work on this Corridor, demonstrates that this program is critical to stimulate the connecting infrastructure network of road and rail to other European countries. With good cooperation with the neighboring countries, this project will also boost growth by creating jobs and in particular for Kosovo where 50% of the population is under 20 years of age.

At present, although the resentment persists between Serbs and Kosovars over the reconstruction and European integration of the Western Balkans, the EU has implemented since December 2009 a Common Economic Protocol (the lifting of visas following the application of the Schengen Agreement) for Serbia, FYROM and Montenegro, this project should also include Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2010.

Factors of instability and strategic development

The Kosovo issue

Kosovo's independence was recognized by 71 countries including the United States and major European Union countries except Spain, Cyprus, Greece, Romania and Slovakia. Serbia and Kosovo Serbs strongly oppose this proclamation which they consider illegal. The Serbian government asks this question in a legal framework. With the backing of the UN General Assembly, it was put before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague, which made its decision during the year 2010. Moreover, Serbian President Boris Tadic indicated "the unilateral independence of Kosovo", in terms of winners and losers, without a compromise being found could provide a solution for Serbia.

The Serbian government also opted for negotiations between Serbs and Kosovars and designed the Kosovo-Serbian model following the model of the two Germanys, Hong Kong and Ireland invariably supporting the territorial integrity of Serbia. "Serbia does not want to be placed in front of a fait accompli" said the Serbian president during his speech in 2009 at the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI) in Paris.

The fact that recognition of Kosovo by Serbia as an independent state is no longer a prerequisite for the integration of Serbia into the European Union seems to be a sensible approach in relation

to the necessary easing of opposition by ethnic Serb-Kosovars. This decision allows a break in the stalemate of the European strategy in the region that has existed since the 90s.

Despite this, the question of northern Kosovo remains frozen and bilateral issues between Serbia and Kosovo foundered on the question of borders.

At this stage it would seem that the international community strongly urges Kosovars to enter into negotiations despite everything taking place, which seems inevitable anyway. After the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, 17 February 2008, Mitrovica clarifies these territorial problems; the river Ibar defines the city limits, inhabited by Serbs in the north and south by the Albanians.

For now, there is no question of dividing the region of Northern Mitrovica and re-attaching it to Serbia because the geopolitical scenario of a redefinition of borders would cause a chain reaction such as the exchange of territories with Albanians living in southern Serbia not to mention the Albanians of FYROM, Montenegro and Albania itself.

If there is a consensus to launch negotiations, a blur remains about the objective. One thing is certain: a policy clearly defining the objective.

In this case, multi-ethnicity, advocated by the Ahtisaari plan, seems impossible. The creation of a House of Europe (EULEX) in North Mitrovica and the existence of an office of UNMIK (the strategy of Pieter Feith calls for its closure) as well as the presence of KFOR troops are the signs of shared sovereignty in Northern Mitrovica and throughout Kosovo.

The institutional autonomy (municipal) of North Mitrovica would achieve a balance in the short term. The EU plan calls for the creation of a new municipality of North Mitrovica in addition to the three other Serbian municipalities of Zvecan, Leposavic and Zubin Potok, which would operate under the jurisdiction of the Government of Kosovo in order to reduce the parallel structures of North. The deployment of EULEX in this area would ensure the maintenance of the rule of law (courts, police and customs).

It is still too early to know whether the model envisaged by the EU - rejected by the Serbs and the Russians – will last. Will they accept the status quo in North Mitrovica while awaiting the outcome of negotiations and the decision of the ICJ?

Alternatively, would it be wise to consider the more collaborative model of autonomy coming out of Belgrade and Pristina without the intervention of external factors? And ultimately, what will the eventual new order do to resolve territorial issues?

It should be noted particularly that the division of tasks between international organizations such as EULEX, UNMIK, KFOR and the ICO (International Civilian Office) in Kosovo complicates the cohesion of decisions regarding the status of Kosovo for Mitrovica (the UN resolution 1244 is still in force). This not only creates a perpetual struggle between Serbian and Kosovar institutions, but also with Russia, which has rejected the "new strategy" for the North (2010) proposed by Pieter Feith (Special Representative of the Union EU in Kosovo and head of the International Civilian Office) and Kosovo institutions.

Interaction: synergy and consolidation of reports of international actors

The American presence is particularly important in Kosovo, because of the unwavering support that the United States has given to its independence.

The last visit in 2009 of U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, on tour in the Balkans, sealed the reconciliation between the U.S. and Serbia. Ten years after the NATO bombing, Washington announced that it wanted to "build a new healthy relationship" with Belgrade. To achieve this, the U.S. Vice President said that "the U.S. does not expect that Serbia will recognize Kosovo and that such recognition was not a precondition for bilateral relations or support from the U.S. for the integration of Serbia into the EU".

"Serbia has a constructive role of primary importance in Southeast Europe," Biden reiterated and expressed his full support for the participation of Serbian soldiers in UN peacekeeping missions. As for NATO, Serbia has no plans to join the Atlantic organization, "because of sponsorship by the NATO Kosovo security forces" [4], although Euro-Atlantic aspirations have been heard recently from the Serbian government.

The Russian resurgence

The ties between Russia and Serbia are very old. If the phenomenon of the opening of the Russian market in Serbia is new, it must be remembered that Moscow was one of the few supporters of the country during the period of Milosevic.

Despite this political support, while maintaining a clear hostility on the independence of Kosovo, Moscow has recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which has alarmed Serbia, because this recognition went against the speech given by Moscow on respect for international law to refute the independence of Kosovo. Bilateral agreements signed with Serbia, in particular at the Russia-Serbian summit and the historic visit of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on the 20 October 2009 - a day which coincided with the anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade by the Red Army – allowed the strengthening of the strategic partnership between Russia and Serbia, which should help generate nearly one billion euros.

Relations between Russia and Serbia are expanding into the field of energy: it should be remembered that Gazprom signed a major agreement with the Serbian national oil company NIS concerning the South Stream project.

This joint project of Gazprom and Eni, will provide by 2016 Russian gas to southern Europe (Balkans, Greece, Italy, Hungary, Austria) through pipelines under the Black Sea to the Adriatic Sea, bypassing Ukraine, with whom Russia has financial and political disputes. This project competes in fact with the proposed Nabucco pipeline project backed by the United States and the European Union.

To ensure its success, the Russian gas company, Gazprom has signed several documents on the implementation of this project with Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian energy companies and an annex to the memorandum of understanding with Italy's Eni, which for-sees a doubling of the transport capacity of the maritime sector of the South Stream pipeline, carrying 31 to 63 billion cubic meters of gas annually. The project cost is estimated at 8.6 billion euros.

Conclusion

The Western Balkans and especially Serbia should set themselves realistic and pragmatic goals as regional actors: they possess economic and geopolitical advantages within the new European dynamics. It might be appropriate to develop an economic policy around common interests (the various energy agreements between Russia and Serbia), so that other Western Balkan countries can benefit from this energy source.

These agreements could eventually allow Serbia to be a useful interface in rebalancing the relationships between Russia, the EU and the United States. A re-modeling of these relationships is also emerging in the Western Balkans in particular after the accession of Albania and Croatia to NATO.

Russia, through the security area, raised at the EU summit in Stockholm in November 2009, by its energy policy and a strong commitment to cooperation with NATO, is becoming a major player in the development of a strategy in the Western Balkans.

What we see appearing on the horizon, despite a very difficult past, is an axis made up of Russia – EU - Turkey pursuing an economic pathway which strengthens the synergy for the Western Balkans and would permit the reduction of geopolitical divisions and legal asymmetries which still reign in the region.

Biographical remarks:

[1] Raymond Aron, Peace and war between nations, Calmann-Lévy, 1962
[2] Source from the website of French MAE
[3] The Official Guide diplomatic, economic and cultural development of Serbia, GUIDIPLO, edited for Diplomatic Publications 2007
[4] Interview with Renaud Girard taken to Boris Tadic, published in Le Figaro, May 27, 2009

Europe – A Vehicle Against Cultural Barriers?

By Nebojsa Vujkovic[28]

At the very beginning of these lines we consider it useful to provide explanation of some notions that are key for this topic – notions widely used in literature and the media, but whose core meanings are not thoroughly considered by the consumers. Namely, what is culture?

Culture means spirituality and nobility. Culture originates from the cults performed in the vicinity of temples, its origins are sacred and religious. Culture is symbolic and it presents spiritual priority in society. Social goals are subordinate to cultural goals and are realized within culture rather than in the economic, financial or political spheres. Thus, the worth of a society is measured by the quality of its culture. Culture is defined by its longevity and continuity, the older a culture is the more important and more beautiful it is. The crucial battle between eternity and death is fought within culture, it defies destructive powers of time and yet endeavours to preserve the ancient and, if possible, construct new sanctums. Culture strives for resurrection.

Certainly, there is also the material culture of the so called Western Civilization which has been elevated to a formidable level by the many talented and venturous Europeans and European emigrants. And what is civilization? Civilization means civility. It is easy to notice from the two above mentioned terms – culture and civilization – that the notion of culture stands above the notion of civilization in their hierarchical order; being civil is only a step towards spirituality. In the era of globalization, a major part of civilization aspires for the above mentioned material culture of the West supported by the easy access to information. Finally, what is globalization? Globalization is defined as a global dynamic planetary process of the growing institutional connectivity and interdependence of regions, states, cultures and economies, which is facilitated by the development of information, communication and transportation technologies, by markets and capital.

Considering the questioning title of the essay – overcoming of the cultural barriers in the EU, a challenge or a dream? – it may seem as a newly posed question i.e. a contemporary one, but it is

[28] The author lives in Belgrade/Serbia where he belongs to those who would like to bring this country rather today than tomorrow into a real Euro-Atlantic Integration – under an adequate political and economic leadership. He acquires an MBA degree at Frankfurt/Oder University and works at present in Belgrade in the culture business, namely in the book distribution sector. "The way to become a philosopher in Serbia is very short" is a quotation from him.

simultaneously an ancient and a current one. Namely, it is an old European riddle[29] which makes every individual who is at all informed to contemplate the undisputed fact that some of the momentous questions are left without unambiguous answers; some riddles are left without final clues. History has proved innumerable times that it has its own regularities and secret plan, which are beyond logical reasoning, aspirations and striving of human kind. It could be one of the reasons why sayings such as "one's way to hell is paved with their good intentions", or "strange are the ways of God", and alike are used. Chronos – the ancient primordial God of the fourth dimension - i.e. the time – is a phenomenon that does not allow everything to take place at the same time making mankind unable to solve some of the mysteries for millennia. A very humorous poet has once said that 'the history is a science that studies future'. It is worth considering how many times the history has ridiculed the significant projects of the world civilization and the major upheavals, leaving to the future generations some completely unexpected results and making them start from the beginning with a vague vision of the future. The cradle of Europe, ancient Greece, has bequeathed its mythology in which a European – Sysiphus - is condemned to everlasting ascension and descent.

A positive ancient mythical example of overcoming of cultural and political differences and finding similarities that meet the common interest can certainly be found in the friendship of Ionian Theseus and Dorian Hercules. However, a negative example of overcoming cultural barriers between city states is found in the friendship of the same Athenian king Theseus and Pirithous, king of the Lapiths. Theseus had established a free communication route between the Peloponnese and Athica; had enabled the Athenians to live in a legally regulated state and had magnificent buildings to be built, but, because of his friendship with Pirithous (first – the wedding celebration when the drunken Centaurs assaulted the bride and the guests, which showed that they were uncivilized and impolite; then the rudeness with which Pirithous addressed the Gods) made Theseus petrify and descend to the lower world, losing the throne of Athens and the most beautiful woman Helen (the one that was soon a cause for war between the West alliance of the Greek city states and the East alliance of the Trojans).

The forefathers of Europeans, the ancient Greeks, left us a myth of Argonauts and the story about the Black Sea, which they had called the 'Forbidding Sea', the savage and militant people who had lived on the shores of this sea and to the west, alongside today's river Danube, as well the south to the Peloponnese. Some of the extracts of the myth about the Argonauts undoubtedly resemble the Western European's perception of South East Europe, which they have had for centuries.

Contemporary European integrations present only a small part of the colossal globalization process. Globalization is a constant and inevitable process which started approximately 3.500 years ago when the Vedic–Arian tribes who had lived in the North of Europe started to invade from the North West, and conquered the already internally disintegrated matriarchies in the Euro

[29] It is also a global riddle. The German sociologist Max Weber can here be quoted, who made a distinction on the west ascetic activism and the east contemplative mysticism at the global level. However, the question remains: is it possible, and if it is, in what ways and with which results to overcome these differences.

Asian region (from South East Europe, over the Middle East, to the Indian subcontinent). It may have been the necessity (and not the idea of a mission) that made these tribes to impose the cult of masculinity on the cult of maternity. Thanks to this primeval blending of various ethnic groups, the Sanskrit language and a group of Indo-European languages were formed (most European languages belong to this group, and a language presents the main bridge between cultures). The sacred collection of hymns – Rigveda - and today's caste system in some countries in the Far East are testimonies of the ancient cultural and political interdependence of the world.

When Alexander the Great reached with his army the river Beas in Punjab, he could not dream that the process of Hellenisation (from South East Europe, over the Middle East, to the Indian subcontinent) would be most evident and accomplished in linguistics, for his empire started to disintegrate soon after his death. Alexander the Great and his army were not able to accomplish the mission they had previously set to do – to expand, in such short time. For the peoples and tribes of the East (regardless of the fact that they had joined the alliance voluntarily or that they had been conquered) culturally and politically stayed unchanged; democracy did not prevail in satrapies; and very few people were very dedicated to philosophy, arts and science.

Concurrently with the demise of Alexander the Great's empire the Roman republic came to the European and World stage (the post-kingdom and pre-empire phase) and finally laid a foundation for the cultural, legal and political systems of Europe that we are familiar with today. Ancient heritage presents an inexhaustible source of inspiration for every European citizen. Being a European primarily means being thoroughly informed about the ancient culture.

Jesus Christ was born, lived, taught and suffered during the Roman Empire. The Christian era has started with his birth, and Europeans spread Christianity worldwide, especially after the discovery of America. More precisely, the European culture became definitely Ancient Christian from the fourth century AD onwards.

The Roman Emperor Constantine the Great[30] in 313 AD proclaimed the Edict of Milan and legalized Christian worship[31]. In 330 AD Constantine declared the New Rome on the Bosphorus (future Constantinople, or Istanbul) the new administrative and political centre of the Empire. It was the Roman emperor Theodosius the Great [32] who in 392 AD proclaimed Christianity as a de facto state religion. After his death in 395 AD the Empire divided into the East and the West. This division of the Roman Empire deepened, apart from the geopolitical, the ethical-aesthetic and the religious dogmatic divergence, which in 731 AD already seemed insurmountable and in 1054 AD it culminated in the rift in the Christian Church. In time it turned out that the western Christian *Filioque* had a great influence not only on the formation of authentic European apocalyptic vision (with universal message) but on the European art, science and philosophy.

[30] Born in Naissus, today's Niš in the Republic of Serbia
[31] In the first centuries Christianity was considered a sect of Judaism and a superstition cult
[32] He was proclaimed Roman emperor in 379 AD in Sirmium, today's Sremska Mitrovica in the Republic of Serbia (the province of Vojvodina)

After the Christian schism there was a decisive defeat of the Greek Byzantine Empire from the Seljuks in the Asia Minor (the battle of Manzikert) in 1071 AD. The year of 1453 AD was the year of the definitive disappearance of the Eastern Roman Empire and the spread of the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, it was in the South West of Europe (Pyrenees Peninsula) that from the 8th to the 15th century, precisely to 1492 AD, i.e. the year when America was discovered, the process of merging Roman Catholicism, Amjad Islam and Sephardic Judaism took place. In conclusion, Islam emerged in the South West and South East Europe. Besides continuous migrations and warfare throughout the continent, in the East and Central Europe the Huns (4th and the 5th century) and the Mongols (13th and 14th century) as the newly arrived tribes and ethnic groups assimilated into the local population because of the lack of cultural and political stability. Mongol and Ottoman empires contributed to further alienation of ethical-political spheres, and later to a separation in cultural-political sphere to the West (cultivated) and the East (uncultivated) Europe because further cultural transformations in particularly important periods of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment primarily manifested themselves in the West and Central Europe. Finally, after the Old Greek, Latin, Spanish and French, in the last two centuries the English language emerged as a new lingua franca under the influence of the British, and most recently the American domination in the world. It could be true to say that Friedrich Nietzsche considered most profoundly and managed finally to understand the cultural fragmentation of the European continent, thus explaining the Apollonian and Dionysian principles[33] where the first one symbolizes individualist West (ordered and defined), and the latter collectivistic East (fatalistic and uncontrolled)[34].

Different cultures conceive the notions of sublimation, truthfulness, righteousness, humanity or respect in different ways, so through years of differentiation many traditions were established (i.e. diverse systems of values). Thus, the following question seems appropriate: Is the formation of a unique European cultural-political community under the circumstances – twenty seven member countries (with the possibility to expand the Union), twenty three official languages and many more cultural patterns – a Utopia or a feasible monumental project?

Nevertheless, cultural boundaries are susceptible to dialectics, as all other things, as Hegel taught us. Contemporary processes within EU are not the first, nor are the last attempt to overcome those ethical-aesthetic differences of the European (German reformatory) North and (Latin Roman Catholic) South, the West (Ancient Christian) and the East (Eastern Christian-Islamic-Hanefitic), indigenous and immigrant peoples.

Still, Europe had never had a real chance (until the formation of the EU) to become truly united i.e. to become institutionally and culturally completed as a whole. Secular and predominantly

[33] Friedrich Nietzsche 'The Birth of Tragedy'
[34] Russian philosopher Vladimir Karlovich Kantor in his paper 'The Carnival and Malevolence' presented at an international conference in Dresden in November 1996 commented on the Dostoyevski's novel 'The Possessed' in which the writer foretold the approaching era of bolshevism and cunningly noticed how a comedian Petar Stepanovič Verhovenski, unlike Shakespearean's comedians who present common sense thinking, disseminates in people's minds absurdity and destruction.

agnostic EU is possibly the most ordered region in the history of mankind. In any case, this does not mean that there are no obstacles on its way to successful Union and cultural merging. The history repeats itself and that undeniable fact can lead one into pessimism, so as the fact that the average age of European citizens is on the constant rise. The environment is endangered and the care about it has already become a matter of general culture. Furthermore, the crisis in culture is evident to the very few, because the consumers of culture do not feel the crisis; majority of them have still to be subjected to the culture and its strict schooling; they still have to adopt it and search its ways. Economic categories have penetrated too deeply into culture.

All this has made culture to turn into civilization: it is cheap, widely available, of lower quality, without style, in a word it has become subculture. However, a more just system than a democratic one has never been present in the history. But democracy has shown that it is much better in dividing cultural values than in shaping them. An ambiguous attitude to culture is ever more dominant, the level of quality is decreasing slowly and unnoticeably. Hyperproduction reigns, so one has to be very assiduous and has to do a lot of research in order to be able to find something authentic and precious in the wealth of information and artefacts. On the other hand, information, telecommunication and transportation dynamism have enabled to a greater number of people an easy access to information, which in itself has had a positive impact on the disappearance of prejudices and the widening of horizons. The possibility to make choices has never been greater: it is upon people to choose, as has always been, and to find inspiration using their free will.

Finally, one part of culture's character is hierarchical. This means that within the EU some will have to take roles of the teachers rather than disciples, without any false modesty, scepticism or arrogance, while the others will have to take roles of disciples rather than teachers, without any signs of vanity, ignorance or pseudo local-patriotism. If cultural workers and the population of the EU understand their roles correctly, the overcoming of cultural differences will become a challenge. Otherwise, it will be an unattainable dream. One way or the other Europeans are faced with this obligation, and whether they like it or not they have to act in order to overcome cultural barriers that have been imposed by the circumstances and the time. Indeed, everybody could become spiritually and soulfully richer; they could cherish their own values and respect and adopt the ones of the others; they could learn a foreign language (by learning foreign languages they could find jobs or study throughout the EU, people could trade, travel, promote cultural manifestations, etc.). It is very likely that in the case of well-meaning clashes of cultures, a fruitful process of synthesis and creation of a new, transnational, authentic European culture will begin.

Will the EU institutions with their cultural policies succeed in this remains to be seen. But on the individual level as well. European culture cannot live forever on the spiritual capital that it has inherited from the past. European cultures need new juices of life, which can spring up as a result of intermingled existing diversities and result in the creation of a unique European cultural community. I dare say that an unfavourable outcome could be caused only by a sudden and particularly unfortunate turn at the world or regional political stage, which would emphasize the

differences, tighten relationships and provoke irreconciliation. Still, it seems likely that the dream of many European geniuses from the past will come true and that a recognizable pan-European cultural community will arise on the classical foundations.

Finally, educated Europeans have always considered European eminents[35] to be their own. Educated Europeans think accordingly today, so there is the need to disperse this pan-European reasoning through institutional programmes and media, to make it become an ideal of majority and to crystallize it into a powerful feeling of all Europeans, which will result in the creation of a homogenous regional community with a striking cultural identity (intertwined with various cultural patterns). It is just the same if this noble endeavour will turn out to be an epochal result or a utopia – Europeans must try anyway.

[35] Homer, Phidias, Aristotle, Ovid, Seneca, St. Augustine, Dante, Michelangelo, Gil Vicente, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Milton, Newton, Joyce, Voltaire, Baudelaire, Erasmus von Rotterdam, Rembrandt, A. Sax, G. Geefs, Swedenborg, Strindberg, Bohr, Copernicus, Zamarovsky, Mendel, Liszt, Mozart, Wittgenstein, Goethe, Beethoven, Duerer, El Greco, Eliade, Ionesco, Andrić, Milanković, Tesla and many others

U.S. Migration Experience – Historical and Philosophical Aspects

By Igor Metelev

Igor Metelev, Omsk/Russian Federation, is a Candidate of Economics, Head of Logistics Department at the Omsk Institute (affiliate) of the Russian State University of Trade and Economics (RGTEU). He also holds a postgraduate degree of a Ph.D. from the Philosophy Department, RGTEU (Moscow). In this article he examines the US immigration policy – does it have possible consequences on the Russian one? In the next issue of EUFAJ, he will publish an article on "Migration and the European Policy of Multiculturalism – A Russian View".

This article deals with the historical trends of assimilation of migrants in democratic America, revealing the prospects of migration in modern conditions.

In the philosophical sense the social source of human life is communication with other people (including the tone of voice, gestures, facial expressions, manners, ideas, the nature of political, religious, educational and economic institutions). The American social philosopher and sociologist Ch.-H. Cooley emphasizes that, on this basis a universal ability to learn and understand other people is formed. However, the focus is on the life experience in which specific social and human qualities are developed. Thus, demographic changes in America's history at the beginning of XXth century show that the number of social strata reduces fertility due to a "taste of idleness", the growth of social ambition and desire for self-development. On this basis, there were fears of more rapid increase of immigrant families compared with the indigenous population, as well as the fact that the black population could overtake whites in numbers because of high mortality among the latter.

"Others go – as Ch-H. Cooley says - further in their gloomy forecast and saw terrible yellow peril in fecundity of eastern peoples, and they may soon put an end to white race world domination and white civilization" [1 , p. 18]. Of course, such questions arise, for example, because of the enormous differences between the Japanese and the Americans. But some of them

- such as a language, religion, moral standards - have an explicit social character and can be changed under the influence of education. Others - the body proportions, the color and the shape of the eyes – are inherited and not subject to education, but they are not significant [1, p.21]. But in the end, according to Ch-H.Cooley, the sociability transforms personal views, sympathy and understanding which represent aspects of society. Social “I” includes a number of other "I"s when the quality of public conscience is developed into the ability to solve social problems, generate ideas about "the right and the wrong" in the direction of the humanistic nature of human existence.

Ch-H. Cooley explains the phenomenon of assimilation of citizens of other nationalities on the universal democratic basis. "The Road" of the social research should not be parallel to the flow of "natural inheritance, but there is always the possibility to connect to another flow. For example, an American family adopts a Chinese baby and brought it home to America, the baby’s natural history is rooted in China (the physical appearance, the mentality). But the "social history" has to be related to a new country (the surrounding people, manners, ideas, and American political and educational institutions, excluding only the difference (if any exists) between the innate ability to learn and the abilities of other American children. "The Chinese language and the American way will meet in his life,"- Ch-H. Cooley sums up [1, p.13].

Today in the migration experience one should see a social load: history of invasion, politics, culture, economic transformation. But the development of migration shows the continuity of consistency, collectivist forms of activity, it gives rise to the integral and discrete factual reality. Contemporary forms of sociality are turning into the elements of the migration space and transform it by joint activities of people.

This means that specific systems of migration forces should be included in the internal organization of the society, not only be present in the industrial and technical subsystems, but also maintain social, political and civil institutions. Today, migration flows have become singular subspaces of the integration, when the combinations of actions and behavior are transformed into the composition of joint activities.

The historical experience of America, although it has the strict sense of immigration as an "invasion" of different ethnic groups in the concrete social environment for permanent residence, contains much that is instructive. Above all, this is the "phenomenon of the revolution" in a specific mode of actions and skills, it is analyzed by an American scholar Everett C. Hughes. When a certain group is entering the U.S. labor market it may be discriminated. In an attempt to upgrade to newer, higher levels, the representatives of the group may meet with discrimination again. But reaching the generally accepted level of performance, they become "discriminators" themselves in relation to new arrivals, and ambivalent discriminators - along with past experience of their preaching the social doctrine of "equal opportunities" and practicing it [2, p.74]. This form of internal migration inequality appears to be highly effective for the socio-political integration of migrant groups in the social system.

The historical experience of the United States shows that the stages of industrial urbanization, when mortality more or less neutralizes the increase in population in major cities

due to fertility, their population increases due to migration from rural to urban. Largely migratory flows consist of rural residents who visit their relatives having settled earlier. The predominance of this type of migration contributes to the city "tribal regional" and "national enclaves". As a consequence, Charles Tilly emphasizes, a macro-migration phenomenon exists: in the middle of the XXth century Chicago was proud to be one of the largest "Polish" and "German" cities, not to mention the significant clusters of the Czechs, Greeks, Italians and representatives of other ethnic groups [3, p.130, 131].

While these processes are universal, there is a historical and anthropological side, which explains a number of significant difficulties. Antithesis of the "ontology of the city" and "ontology of the settler" finds a conflict with urban civilization: a "latter-day" group of people, as outsiders, did not get along and destroyed the city as a cultural institution in an inability to live in it, to adapt to its forms and norms . The modern Russian philosopher Ivan T. Kasavin said that life in a particular area cultivates knowledge and skills in relation to segment areas involved in social practice and it is opposite to the "encyclopedicism" of eternal wanderers and travelers" [4, p.75, 79].

In terms of social anthropology one can make the assumption that "people traveling" do not look for a house as a refuge. In turn, the residents were in their houses, but reside in the city. According to the Spanish philosopher H. Ortega y Gasset, the city is archihouse, "it is to overcome human's home, it is the creation of a new structure, the more abstract and complex than a family". H. Ortega y Gasset associates this phenomenon with the advent of the republic, which is formed not from men and women, but from "fellow citizens". This is a new dimension, not reducible to adaptive responses, the search for protection from external environment, it is suggested to "human beings" ("those who previously were simply human beings and put all their energy in a new"). "In this way, there is a city - H. Ortega y Gasset emphasizes - and it is becoming a state." [5, p.136]

In our view, these conflicts hinder the necessary entry of migrants into a new territorial environment that is historically caused by ethnic neighborhoods and even the ghetto. Again H. Ortega y Gasset: the concept of "city - the state" allows to capture the specifics of a state beginning. The development of a "state" as a power demonstrates, that historical forces have come into balance and they constrain each other. On the one hand, the government, according to H. Ortega y Gasset, is "the coexistence which is steady, organized, static." On the other hand, the equilibrium state does not exclude "the dynamics with help of which the state is born and lasts." "The creation of a state, as H. Ortega y Gasset emphasizes, is the result of efforts made by its creators, it is the outcome of a long struggle." Actually, the government is preceded by "state-building, and it is something that is the source and guarantee of the movement." And, finally, a radical conclusion: "The state is the overcoming of any natural community. It is a mestizo and a polyglot. [5, p. 136, 137]

As it is pointed out by R. Apressyan, with respect to the moral atmosphere of contemporary Russia and the situation with migrants, public morals or social ethics should be matched with human rights, registration rules of citizens, restrictions on the use of some expressions. The moral is supposed to support law systems, which regulate activities in specific

areas of life. The most important is "morality in action", its specifications for a realistic assessment of moral practice. Ultimately, social ethics contributes to an atmosphere of public benefit, solidarity and reconciliation, though there are different modes of behavior, and there are different standards and styles of life [6, p.5].

The phenomenon of human obedience as unjustly inflicted grief, and insults, and the resulting sense of "endure insult" includes annoying cases (a clear reality in relation to migrant workers does not always mean righteousness of comments made, damage to human dignity causing a nasty syndrome of "being offended"). Thus, the degree of demonstration of the national-ethnic nature may be different, but immersion into individuality and personal sphere reveals universal content. Psychological picture of mental movements, emotional and cultural reactions, the nature of lifestyle are marked by unique internal content. At the same time continued mistrust and hostility live in the consciousness of a migrant. Moreover, this type of consciousness is extremely stable, being tied with deep-rooted habits, moral environment, the world of spiritual sympathy. But the social and ethical preferences could be reoriented according to the situation. And the current "economic realism", the phenomenon of "a man by the name of money" can solve any problems. In any case the attracted objective knowledge about the contemporary reality absorbs contradiction of human contemplation.

The socialization of migrants (as *migratio*) is performed in the forms of adaptive behavior, appropriate expectations (the opposite model is simply not possible). But historical experience of America shows that many ethnic groups have focused on certain things and conditions of occupation, industries. However, the latter did not correspond to types of work, which they did at home. But the principles of American management creates the conditions for efficient generation of techniques and styles of work from people who have lost their traditional conditions and rules of conduct. It is just a demonstration of the positive elements of work which attracts attention for its effectiveness and productivity.

First of all, the standardization of work, which involves people fulfilling different functions, plays a great role these days. This allows migrants to communicate their experience and themselves from one city to another. The predominance of this type of migration contributes to the natural regional and national enclaves, including in the forms of urban settlement. How does it reveal in modern Russia? First of all, there is no certainty as to the nature of style and content of the production process, especially the labor of new ethnic groups. In comparison with the immigration experience in settling of America, stylistic experience of migrant workers is generally perceived as negative, if not as threatening events (especially in view of their semi-legal existence). Historical exception is the work of the first foreign professionals in the 1970 – 1980s in the Soviet Union in an innovation of production or after-the-war local use of foreign experts on the air-missile factories and a number of special construction sites.

Today, in relation to migrant workers in Russia we should first seek the general rules of ethical and cultural behavior, which suggests, firstly, a mechanical or "memorized" morality in the form of elementary expressions of greetings, favours, verbal reactions in typical situations of communication; secondly, the stereotyped morality as a semi-automatic execution of accepted norms and patterns of behavior, cultural habits, forms of communication; finally, the conviction

of morality as the achievement of individual inner understanding of moral principles and ideals of value orientations on the level of consciousness. Such a behavior of level plan in the sense of life is matched with the world of manners as sustainable cultural attitudes due to the direct influence of the environment (the world's morals of outskirts of large cities, specific professions, ethnic backgrounds, places of residence).

In the relations between the individual migrant worker and his relevant environment there are the following options: a person completely leaves the "maternal environment", remains fully within its limits, partially digests the value of the new environment, combines them with traditional surroundings. In the latter case he may orient to the new values, but he cannot be taken in perspective of life world, a return to native soil also does not go for him "without a trace." In this case, the migrating entity is on the border of two environments (worlds), and its status can be equated to the marginal. As it is known, the nature of ethnic prejudice is in the fact that people do not realize their bias and even consider them quite natural, supported by the facts of personal relationships. They are traditionally preceded by stereotypes as a standard of semi-perception.

Consequently, we have the corresponding attitude to the migrant as a person from "outskirts" who has no place in "our" normalized society. With respect to the marginal status of the individual, American social psychologist T. Shibutani observes universal conflict: the changing society is pluralistic, and man faces "reference groups", but when pictures of the life-world are incompatible, it is difficult to determine the situation and successfully integrate the self - concept. The important fact is that the migrant in labor conflicts is criticized on both sides: the "foreman" plays very little role in the decision making of the administration, he just passes orders, monitors progress and maintains orders. This means that the employee serves to maintain the organization's values, but his own position is contradictory. It is from here R. Park's concept of "marginal man" is originated: "They are people who are on the boundary between two or more worlds, but they are not accepted by any of them as "full members". The way-out of this situation is to shape the future of their community, which will consist primarily of the representatives of future generations [7, s.490-492].

In modern Russia, separate groups of migrant workers have become "experts" in those areas in which you can use the unique qualities of the situation (a doctor of a specific orientation, a narrow specialist in a number of applied subjects, an expert of non-traditional projects, etc.). But this does not eliminate the fact that having marginal status people face problems in forming moral judgments. It is a dynamic position, when the actions appear satisfactory to the various parties (he is a resident of the Russian city in the newly declared orientation, but he does not forget about the commitment to his environment in the past). In the best, a person goes to their "own affairs" and leaves his concerns to prospective undertakings (at the same time trying to free himself from responsibility for what he did wrong).

There is the ethical-normative world view, the critical-value approach, while morality is the moment of the mass consciousness, which coexists in the social and human ideas and social and historical ideas, but it is not always the reduction of moral and legal concepts. For example, the position of "all decent is natural, but not all natural is decent" as a behavioral imperative has

a concrete understanding of vital practical senses (historical, ethnic, social, ethical, temperate), when the customs of ethnic minorities, their living manners in public places are a nuisance. In this respect, it is necessary to develop special systems of codification, modes of action that can inspire the confidence. Does this mean that migrants as a specific social group have their own morality? The necessity to observe the corporate and employment status is in contradiction with the principle of serving the man and humanity. As a whole, and in relation to contemporary migration it is wrongful to talk about work as the needs, joys of inspiration and enthusiasm. Other prescriptions of behavior and assessment of public opinion may appear with regard to production and engineering responsibilities, appearance, compliance with generally accepted "loci" (the space-time datum) of the traditional behavior, which should encourage managers to have sound regulation, develop special rules of conduct of migrant elements. Moreover, it organically combines the useful work and its moral value, although the beauty of the work is not even the good, but a particular value in developing a system of historical qualities.

Today, a new migration experience indicates, if not a "revolution", the difference, or discrepancy, of intercultural relations. But it is essential to distinguish the positions of the perception of work: I know that you're doing the right thing, I like the way you work. Besides the factors like the degree of infectiousness of interaction, involvement, dynamic exchange of information, experiences, emotional states, you should distinguish the ethics of work - internal regulation based on the activity, the rules of integrity, the aesthetic side of the external things – discipline, habits, forms of etiquette, as well as aesthetics of the internal moments - the creative content, the major key, the communicative style of relationships. As a result, a tendency of objectification is developed as a result of the increasing division of labor and specialization in various spheres of life and the culture of environment. G. Simmel suggested a grand picture of "hardening", "crystallization" of what occurs in the general culture of labor and objective spirit in relation to human needs, ultimately, the producers of culture in self-development and fulfillment of life [8,c.15].

From the standpoint of contemporary philosophical ethics essential positions of the distribution "somebody else's universal sensibility" are a positive response to the "challenge of normativity, which suggests specific recognition of "strangers" and care for them in the need to meet face to face." In particular, the social experience of migrants must be significant for people belonging to other traditions or "dissident" members of the media. On this basis, a humanistic view is developed, which is able to avoid repressive "gaps" of previous conceptions of morality. Dialogical recognition of citizens in the orientations to their inner life world, makes "self-understanding of a stranger", i.e from his point of view, in order to adequately understand and explain behavior.

Today, many countries, including the Ukraine and Russia, do not have strict migration policies. For this reason, the geography of migration is highly diverse (although it is mostly the seasonal migration of temporary unskilled jobs). In addition, high levels of migration coexist with high mortality rates and an aging population, and it forces the repatriation of compatriots from the CIS countries. In the Ukraine the forecast of the Institute of National Economic Forecasting of RAS is that the normalization of life in the Ukraine will lead to the following: the

migration will simply flow into this country. The significant conclusion was reached regarding the status of migrants in Russia: they are those who believe that they deserve a better life than they were offered in their home country. According to the Director of the Center for Demography and Ecology RAS A. Wisniewski, you should not ignore the labor migrants, but actively involve them in the life of the host country, create the conditions for maximum adaptation. [9, c.5].

In this respect, the influx of migrants to Russia meets the ambiguous and contradictory attitude that is expressed both in calling for the construction of the Great Antimigration Wall and in rhetorical questions: "Will the migration save us?", "Will there be riots in the Russian migration?" Only in some cases, it is spoken about "the civilized exchange of labor migrants in the CIS, for example on the basis of a convention [10].

In fact, the position of migrants meets the “first revolution of individuality”, which, according to the views of the famous Russian philosopher V. E. Kemerov, establishes the position of human individuals in the institutional and organizational structures as objects of manipulation as agents of solutions. In this case, the forms of self-determination of individual rights were "separated from him, turned into a scheme of external mythologized or impersonal sociality (the individual could not recognize himself, he was extremely distressed in the "deploy of his energies, aspirations, interests). The correction of the situation corresponds to the "second revolution of individuality" as the onset of personal dependence in the implementation of life when social form provides for the legitimate role and place of individuality of human qualities in the structures of sociality. By analogy, the employment of migrants is free of any initiative and subject to further influence on people [11, c.212, 213].

Apparently, the migration status and the position of citizens is averaging in the long-term growth, when extensive sociality is experiencing a crisis and puts "a detailed personality" in the key point of social organization, puts the mechanisms and automatisms of sociality under the human control.

The historical experience of migration processes in the U.S. shows their long-term controversial nature and the necessity to study the Russian migration policy.

References:

1. Ch-H. Kuli / Cooley Ch.-H., Human nature and social order. - Moscow: Idea - Press, House of intellectual books. - 2000.

2. E. Hughes / Hughes, E., Work and Leisure. American Sociology. Moscow: Progress. - 1972.

3. Charles Tilly / Charles Tilly, Forms of Urbanization. American Sociology. Moscow: Progress. - 1972.

4. I. T. Kasavin / Kasavin I.T., "A person traveling": Ontology of ways and areas: Problems of Philosophy. - 1997. - № 7

5. H. Ortega y Gasset / Ortega y Gasset J. Selected works, Publisher "The whole world." - 2000.

6. RG Apresyan / Apresyan RG: The Notion of Public Morality (The Experience of Conceptualization), Problems of Philosophy - № 7

7. T. Shibutani / Shibutani T.: Social Psychology. Rostov-on-Don – University of Phoenix. - 1998.

8. G. Simmel / Simmel G., Conflict of Modern Culture. - Petrograd: The Beginnings of Knowledge. - 1923.

9. P. Zhuravel / Zhuravel AP, Labor Migration in Ukraine, 17.08.2008, http://www.hrmonitor.ru/index.php?theme=5&pname=news&news_id=896; Will Save Us Migration?, http://www.regnum.ru/news/799660.html?

10. Will there be riots in Russia, migrants?, http://www.hrmonitor.ru/index.php?p=9&theme_id=5&pname=naws&news_id=4298; civilized exchange of labor migrants in the CIS will conclude the convention, http://www.hrmonitor.ru/index.php?theme=5&p=1&pname=news&news_id=920

11. VE Kemer / Kemer VE, Introduction to Social Philosophy, Moscow - 2001.

International Affairs

The Kremlin perspective on world events by leading Russian policymakers and commentators

International Affairs, published in English, delivers timely analysis and unique insight on foreign policy and security issues now faced by Russia and other countries of the former Soviet Union.

This internationally renowned journal, available since 1954, is the English translation of the Russian-language journal *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.



ISSN 0130-7641

The most authoritative publication available in English on Russia's international affairs and foreign policy.

The editorial board of *International Affairs* is currently headed by Sergei Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Contributors include high-ranking diplomats as well as prominent Russian political analysts from government, academic and policy institutes.

Contact us to find out about a subscription today. *International Affairs* is the preeminent source for those interested in Russia's dynamic role in foreign affairs.

Ask about access to the International Affairs Digital Archive, now available online from 1954 to present.

East View Information Services, Inc.
10601 Wayzata Boulevard
Minneapolis MN 55305 USA
info@eastview.com | www.eastview.com
tel: +1.952.252.1201 | fax: +1.952.252.1202

east view information services

Since Summer 2010: The Vatican € Coins are in Circulation

Since 2002, they have been the prey of collectors, but now the euro coins are at the disposition of tourists, customers and people who have to work in the Vatican. Their appearance is started by a 50 cent coin with the face of Pope Benedict XVI. The previous coins worth altogether 310.400 EUR with the face of former Pope John Paul II. went altogether in collectors' kits. Now euro coins are given as a change in in Vatican's gas station, the post office and a grocery store.

In order to avoid speculations on current means of payment, the monetary agreement between the EU and the Vatican from December 2009 foresaw that the Holy See should increase the number of its own coins in circulation. The City and State of Vatican should, according to this agreement, have more than 50% of its euros circulate and could also issue more than twice of the amount of euros (which was 2,3 million EUR per year). The Vatican – like e.g. every EU Member State of the Euro zone – is only allowed to produce coins, the banknotes are a matter of the European Central Bank. There is an EU-wide agreement about the number of banknotes (which have only common features) and coins to be produced. The coins are different from country to country – an interesting task for collectors.

What if one gets change, by hazard in coins from the Vatican, or from San Marino, or from Monaco? Well, at first one has to know it – which is not too easy, and then we advise not to spend it ...

This is a 2 EUR coin from the Citta del Vaticano, with the picture of Pope Benedict XVI. Most EUR users never see these coins.

African Regional Integration: EAC Countries Divided on Creating a Common Currency

Rwandans, Burundians, Ugandans Receptive; Kenyans, Tanzanians More Skeptical, Says Gallup Poll

by Bob Tortora

The East African Community's next goal after launching a common market in July 2010 -- creating a common currency by 2012 -- gets mixed support in the economic union's five partner states. Surveys by Gallup last year showed most Ugandans, Burundians, and Rwandans think a single currency is a good idea, but Tanzanians are divided, and the majority of Kenyans think it is a bad idea. The approval ratings:

Do you think to have a single currency across the EAC is a good idea or not?

Asked of adults in EAC member countries

	Good idea	Bad idea	Don't know/ Refused	GDP-PPP*
Burundi	82%	16%	2%	9.9
Uganda	77%	22%	1%	36.9
Rwanda	75%	22%	3%	3.1
Tanzania	47%	50%	2%	53.7
Kenya	33%	66%	1%	61.3

Surveys conducted from April to November 2009.
*2008 GDP-PPP in millions of international dollars

GALLUP

It is some years ago when the EAC looked for experts from the European Union to write a feasibility study on the introduction of a common currency. Maybe this failed as at first British scientists – a country which refuses to introduce the EUR – were proposed to them?

The economic union's leaders expect that swapping five different currencies and exchange rates for a single one will ultimately simplify cross-border trade in the East African Community (EAC) and encourage investment. For now, however, some financial analysts see these disparities as emerging

obstacles. According to Kenya's *Business Daily*, all EAC countries will likely experience some economic losses with the currency switch. These losses may be heavier in countries with stronger currencies and larger economies, such as Kenya, where public opinion also happens to be the most negative about the idea of a single currency.

Gallup's data also show Kenyans and Tanzanians are less likely to see their countries gaining from the EAC in general, which could explain their lack of enthusiasm for a common currency. They are also less supportive of the formation of a new country, a step that could follow the monetary union's creation.

Perhaps not surprisingly, support for a single currency is higher among those who think the EAC should become one nation. More than 9 in 10 Burundians, Rwandans, and Ugandans who say the EAC should be a single nation support the idea of a single currency. Majorities of Tanzanians and Kenyans who support the single nation idea also support the single currency idea. There is also an integration movement in Africa, although not so articulate as in the European Union, who had since decades associations like the European Movement etc.

Do you think to have a single currency across the EAC is a good idea or not?

Among those who say the EAC should be one nation

	Good idea
Burundi	97%
Rwanda	94%
Uganda	91%
Tanzania	83%
Kenya	59%

Surveys conducted April to November 2009.

GALLUP

Looking Forward

A potential downside of the EAC moving to a common currency is that each country will be unable to formulate its own monetary policy and deal with severe economic stress on its own. The Greek crisis did little to ease skeptical Tanzanians' and Kenyans' minds about a single currency. EAC Secretary General Juma Mwapachu told Reuters the bloc was hoping to learn from the crisis in the euro zone and "ensure that we do not find any of our member states falling into the kind of experience that Greece has gone into." EAC leaders seeking buy-in from their public may also do well to stress what each country may gain, rather than lose, in the exchange. Insofar, they repeat indeed the experience the Europeans made before and after 1999, the year from when Euro accounts were possible everywhere, but Euro cash was not yet at hand, what was the case only from 2002.

Survey Methods

Results are based on face-to-face interviews with 1,000 adults each in Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. All respondents were aged 15 and older, and the surveys were conducted in Burundi in July and August, in Kenya in April, in Rwanda in August, in Tanzania in November, and in Uganda in May and June 2009. For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum margin of sampling error ranges from ±3.5 percentage points in Burundi to ±4.2 percentage points in Tanzania. In addition to sampling error, question wording and practical difficulties in conducting surveys can introduce error or bias into the findings of public opinion polls.

(Gallup, LIBERTAS)

Oser l'excellence.

Un Institut innovant, de haut niveau, à dimension internationale

Implanté à Marseille, métropole euroméditerranéenne

Un corps d'intervenants éminents

Enseignants-chercheurs, chercheurs, diplomates, militaires, experts, consultants, formateurs et professionnels

Une discipline globale

La Diplomatie

Cinq spécialités d'avenir

Diplomatie culturelle et géoculturelle
Diplomatie économique, financière et commerciale
Diplomatie environnementale
Diplomatie humanitaire
Diplomatie préventive, d'urgence et de crise

Un diplôme à haute valeur ajoutée

Mastère 'DIPLOMATIES'
(Niveau Bac + 5)

Une formation d'excellence pour un métier d'excellence

Diplomate, élu, fonctionnaire local, national et international, responsable et chargé de mission en ONG, cadre supérieur en entreprise, expert international, consultant international, journaliste, etc.

ISD INSTITUT DES SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES
Établissement d'enseignement supérieur et de recherche privé

Tél. : 33 (0)7 60 60 06 07
Courriel : contact@isd-diplomaties.com
Site : www.isd-diplomaties.com

Turkey, the Balkans and the Mediterranean

Olivier Védrine, Editor of EUFAJ, lives in Paris/France. Professor at the IPAG Business School where he is Director of an MBA programme, at IÉSEG/Université Catholique de Lille, and other universities. The Lecturer of the European Commission (TEAM EUROPE France) is President of the Collège Atlantique-Oural and Associate Research Fellow at UQAM (Université de Québec à Montréal)

Since 1959, Turkey, a country that straddles Asia Minor and Europe, has expressed the wish to join the European Community, now the European Union. Turkey was officially recognised as a candidate for membership at the EU Summit in Helsinki, 10 December 1999, having an Association Agreement with the European Union since 1963.

Turkey is now awaiting the effective implementation of its accession negotiations and is in the process of accession to the EU. Since 2004, Mr. Barroso said that he was "personally" in favour of the Turkish accession "to the Union if Ankara meets the required democratic criteria" (AFP).

Since the fall of the Eastern Roman Empire, this country has always imposed itself on Europe: at the death of Suleiman II, in 1556, the borders of the Ottoman Empire extended to the north of Budapest, including Hungary, Moldova, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece and a large part of the Balkans.

What are we referring to as the Balkans? The Balkans is one of the three peninsulas of Southern Europe which form, precisely speaking, South-Eastern Europe. It is surrounded by seas on three sides: the Adriatic and the Ionian to the West, the South Aegean to the South and the Marmara and Black Sea to the East. In the North it is generally delineated by the flow of the Danube, the Sava and the Krka. This region covers an area of about 500.000 square kilometres and has a population of about 40 million inhabitants.

The name is of Turkish origin (Balkan meaning "chain of slippery rocks"), and originally referred to the chain of mountains which cross Bulgaria from East to West.

For the Turks, the Mediterranean is called "the White Sea" or "South Sea". It is the sea flanking only the south of Anatolia, so it has a limited extension: it must be distinguished (from the Turkish angle) from the Aegean and the Sea of Marmara.

The "Turkish Mediterranean" is a region with a significantly increasing population and is important for domestic and international tourism. Its rapid development is characterised by the growth of the top tourism centre of Antalya and the urban areas of Mersin, Tarsus and Ceyhan.

Whether it is tourism, population movement or trade, the Mediterranean that counts for Turkey is above all "the European Mediterranean" - Turkeys' polarisation on the European coast of the Mediterranean.

Why?

- Significant tourist inflows: the largest numbers of tourists originate from the Euro-Mediterranean countries (France, Italy).

- Significant Euro-Mediterranean Investment: France, Italy and Spain dominate the foreign direct investment.

- Euro-Mediterranean Trade: More than 60% of Turkey's foreign trade is with the European Union. It has special relationships with Italy, Germany, UK, and is developing trade with Spain. All of these economic ties with Europe have led Turkey to rediscover the Mediterranean Sea's role as a mediator with the EU, its main trading partner. These countries reappear in several Euro-Mediterranean programs.

By their location the Balkans and Turkey place Europe at the centre of the International scene. Interestingly, the current and future energy routes of this world are crossing the same regions as the Silk Road took for many centuries, making direct contact with Central Asia and the Middle East. This strategic route that passes through the Balkans and Turkey is vital for the future economic and political power of Europe.

Since the discovery of the energy rich resources of the Caspian Sea the question of their transportation to final consumers in the West has acquired a geostrategic importance.

The transportation could be done by following one of these three routes
- through Iranian ports in the Persian Gulf
- through Russia
- through the Caucasus

The Caucasus solution avoids the use of infrastructure in already highly productive areas. American and European oil companies already indicated their preference for the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Ceyhan is already the arrival port of the Kirkuk pipeline of

Northern Iraq. The new pipeline came into service in 2005 and does not pass through Azerbaijan, Georgia or Turkey. It avoids the Black Sea ports and the Tanker traffic passing Istanbul and the Straits. This is a key strategic focus.

The Balkans and Turkey are the battlefields for the determination of the energy independence of the EU: the Nabucco project versus the South Stream pipeline for example. The construction of the South Stream pipeline is a venture of Eni with Gazprom. This pipeline will pass along the bottom of the Black Sea between the coasts of Russia and Bulgaria then go towards central and Southern Europe. The commissioning of the sea section is scheduled for 2013. Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Greece have already agreed to participate in this project.

It is through energy independence that the battle for political independence is being fought.

At a time when Russia was supplying a quarter of gas requirements to the EU and the EU was enlarging to include Central and Eastern European countries, the Nabucco project was unveiled in 2004 with the singularly great ambition of guaranteeing energy independence to the EU by 2014.

The current vicissitudes of the Nabucco pipeline project, intended to by-pass Russia by linking Azerbaijan with Germany, via Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Austria are ominous.

States such as Germany and Hungary were supporting both the Nabucco project and the Russian projects (North Stream and South Stream) at the same time.

In the Balkan region, Serbia has emerged as an important new actor because it appears to have become the mainstay of Russian energy politics. For Russia, Serbia has three advantages:

- It is geographically located in the heart of South-Eastern Europe, a region that Russia wants to cross with its gas pipeline in order to deliver to European customers.
- Moscow's support for Serbia on the issue of Kosovo has allowed the Kremlin to benefit from the support of the Serbian authorities on issues like energy.
- The people and the governments of Russia and Serbia have a deep friendship based on Slav identity and Orthodoxy.

Serbia is the beneficiary of this policy as it wins both ways: on the one hand it does business with Russia and on the other hand significantly increases its geostrategic importance to the European Union. It is a good policy for facilitating Serbia's accession to the EU.

At the Energy Summit in Zagreb in 2007, Putin presented his energy policy in this region. He drew attention to the fact that in 2006, Russia supplied up to 73 billion cubic metres of natural gas to Southern and South-Eastern Europe (half of all its gas exports to Europe) along with 59 million tons of oil. He declared that Russia wanted a partnership based on the principles of "balance of interests".

Putin revealed the immense scope of this cooperation which goes from the sale of Russian gas to the improvement of the energy infrastructure in the Balkans. Russia will use this region as a transit route for Russian gas, build numerous underground gas holding tanks in Balkan countries, develop the gas network in Macedonia and extend the pipeline network to Albania, Southern Serbia and Kosovo. Furthermore it plans to participate in the privatisation and modernisation of the energy capacity of the Balkan countries, rebuild their energy infrastructure dating from the Soviet era and develop regional energy transit centres.

In conclusion, there are three areas for the European Union to work on in order to guarantee its political power and energy independence:

- Continue the process of accession of Turkey into the EU.
- Allow the Balkan countries to join the European Union rapidly.
- Establish with Russia a "shared home" or common area along the Berlin-Paris-Moscow axis.

And of course, the Nabucco Project.

Nehemia University is a new, private university in **Pogradec/Albania**, ashore Macedonian-Albanian Lake Ohrid. Since the early 1990s, Bavarian aid organisations bogged down in Albania, where they set up a group of kindergartens, elementary schools (also for underprivileged children), secondary schools, medical and rural development projects – and now also a university. The Chairman of Nehemia Foundation, Arnold Geiger, obtained in 2008 the Federal Cross of Merit from the German Ambassador, for the "construction works" – for which already old Nehemia was famous.

The University offers a **Master in European Studies,** besides Bachelor presence studies e.g. for a B.A. in Business Administration. The Master programme runs 24 months in "blended learning", with distance studies (27 course units) and homework tasks, a Project Study (1st year), a Master Thesis (2nd year), Skype conversations between students and lecturers, and four presence courses of four days and one of two weeks. A team of altogether 35 lecturers from many countries is at the disposition of the students. The Lecturers love their job – for it includes also discussions with intelligent students from countries who are in Europe or in other parts of the world. Everything can be overseen – also the group size in the presence modules, where the size of a group will be between 5 and 9 students. In the presence modules skills and debates are in focus, skills like negotiation techniques, international project management, European policy and values communication, and many topical subjects from European policymaking.

Here are some pictures of a part of the Campus (with a modern Adidas sports field) and of the panorama with the Lake Ohrid at the left and Macedonian mountains in the background. Albania is becoming interesting, aspiring for EU accession, with many young, clever people, who are eager to learn and to work with their fellow students from other countries. You need just a Bachelor degree to be able to continue your Master studies. And students can enrol **at any time.**

The Rector of Nehemia University, Prof. Dr. Alexander von Freyhold (formerly Rector of Dual University Baden-Württemberg in Mosbach/Germany), takes the time to discuss with the students personally their problems. There has been prepared a Master in European Studies, a Curriculum and online course material, which is always at the newest level, and a motivated Master in European Studies faculty is at disposition. Accreditation is envisaged in Germany, the courses are following the EU Bologna principles, and tuition fees are very competitive. Students from all over the world are welcome – as Nehemia University is small, they are individually taken care of. This is part of our familiar climate. More: www.nehemia-university.org

LIBERTAS – Europäisches Institut GmbH

www.libertas-institut.eu

Aberystwyth - Accra – Aix-en-Provence – Albstadt - Almaty - Andorra la Vella - Astana – Athens – Atlanta – Augsburg - Bad Marienberg - Bad Urach - Baia Mare – Baku – Bakuriani - Banff – Banja Luka - Bar - Beijing – Belize City – Belmopan - Beograd - Berlin – Bern – Biberach – Bilbao - Bishkek - Bitola – Bled - Böblingen – Bönnigheim – Bonn – Bregenz - Bridgetown – Brno - Bruxelles – Bucharest – Budapest – Cairo – Calgary – Cardiff - Castries – Catania – Chemnitz – Chicago – Chisinau - Chita – Clermont-Ferrand – Copenhagen – Corozal - Crailsheim – Dangriga - Dinkelsbühl – Dublin – Düsseldorf - Durban - Edmonton – Ekaterinburg - Elabuga – Erfurt - Eschborn – Essen - Feldkirch – Frankenthal - Frankfurt/Main – Frankfurt/Oder – Freiburg/Breisgau – Fort-de-France – Füssen - Gärtringen - Genève – Gibraltar – Gjakovë - Glasgow – Glauchau - Graz – Guangdong - Gudauri – Gulistan - Hamburg - Hannover – Heidelberg – Helsinki – Hongkong – Hull - Indianapolis – Innsbruck – Islamabad – Istanbul – Johannesburg – Karaganda – Kashka-Suu - Katovice – Kiev – Klaipeda - Köln – Kuala Lumpur – Küstrin-Kietz – Kutaisi - Lahore – Lahr – Lauenburg - Leipzig – Lille – Linz – Lissabon – Ljubljana – London – Los Angeles – Luxemburg – Lyon – Madrid – Manchester – Marbella – Maribor – Marseille – Meerane - Milano – Minneapolis – Минск – Miskolc – Monte Carlo – Montreal – Москва – Mostar - München – Nagold - Nancy – Nanjing – Naumburg - Neuss – Nukuz - Oberhausen – Oberkirch - Ohrid - Oslo – Osnabrück – Ottawa – Padova – Palanga - Paris – Peshawar – Pforzheim – Pfronten – Pittsburgh – Podgorica - Port Louis – Potsdam - Praha – Pretoria - Prishtinë – Quebec – Quimper – Ravensburg – Regen - Rendsburg – Reutlingen - Reutte - Riga – Roma – Rostock - Salzburg – San Francisco - Sarajevo – Satu Mare – Saulgau – Shanghai - Sindelfingen – Skopje – Slubice – Sofia – Sopot – St. Anton - St. George's – St. Helier – St. Paul - Strasbourg – Straubing - Strumica - Stuttgart – Suceava – Taipeh – Tallinn – Tashkent - Tbilisi – Tetovo - Thessaloniki – Tirana - Torino – Toulouse – Trento – Trieste – Тюмень – Ulm – Usti n/Labem – Vaduz – Valletta – Vancouver – Venezia – Villingen-Schwenningen - Vilnius – Washington D.C. - Wesseling – Wien – Wuppertal - Yerevan – Zenica - Zürich – Zwickau - **RANGENDINGEN**

Make thinking go. In European and international context, since 1992