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## **European Union Foreign Affairs Journal (EUFAJ)**

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# The EUFAJ Blog



- between our issues, for topical announcements and new publications:

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With contributions on e.g. Scotland or Catalonia as new EU Member States?, Human Rights in Azerbaijan, Armenia and the Eurasian Customs/Economic Union, the Eurasian Union, its currency plans, Vladimir Putin, the future of Ukraine, Ukraine's Maidan events, Istanbul's Gezi Park, the language policies in the EU, the UN decolonialisation policy, Africa, the Caribbean, our university cooperation, our new books and their authors etc.

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## Editorial

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Dear readers,

*EUFAJ has a spinoff - a quarterly entitled "Eurasian Economic Union Observer". The EEU, with Russia and four other states around, is a creation by the Russian president. It is also perceived as one step in the direction of an ideology of an empire which is definitely nationalist, and has been created as a "counterpart to the European Union". In the EU, nobody would be against a regional economic integration, and what is good for the South Pacific, Africa and the Caribbean world, can be good for Russia and the surrounding states, too. So we have decided to publish an observer paper on the Eurasian Economic Union, where also original texts will be offered to readers in English language. Its editor is Ofelya Sargsyan M.A., speaking not only Shakespeare's language but also her native Armenian and Russian. The first issue (1/2015) can be found, for free download, on [www.eufaj.eu](http://www.eufaj.eu).*

*Besides this, we had an interesting success with an old proposal. We dared to remind of a proposal discussed in some of the preparation talks of the Maastricht Treaty 1990: a European Intelligence service. This exists meanwhile, as INTCEN (Intelligence Centre) under the EEAS (European diplomatic service), but it has not very many coordination functions and is not very much regarded by the EU Member States. However, it should now coordinate the gathering of information about terrorists which strike anywhere in the EU and go from one country to the other just ad libitum. This should be upgraded, e.g. with a parliamentary control by the European Parliament, and it should be possible also without changes of the Lisbon Treaty, as not all EU Member States would have to take part in the beginning. See our blog with details: <https://libertasblogs.wordpress.com/2016/01/17/the-eu-should-establish-a-real-intelligence-service/>*

With best regards,



Hans-Jürgen Zahorka.

## *New Member of the Editorial Advisory Board*

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*Welcome to Ioseb Kelenjeridze (see the picture) from Tbilisi/Georgia. He is now a member of the Editorial Advisory Board - a Ph.D. in law, with a background also as a LL.M. at the University of Grenoble/France.*

*Speaking French very well, it is no miracle that he was one of the confidence lawyers working for the French Embassy in Georgia. Later, he had leading positions in the Ministry of the Diaspora, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and in the Ministry of Education and Science of Georgia. He left the*

*public service to work in the university sphere, where he is now professor and Dean of the Faculty of Law, Humanities and Social Science of the European University in Tbilisi. "Sosso", as his friends call him, is a person who says what he thinks, and he thinks before he speaks. He is an outspoken expert in human rights where so far he has regularly attended summer meetings in the International Centre for Human Rights in Strasbourg/France.*

# European Union - China Relations

## A Report of the European Parliament

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*In November 2015, the European Parliament adopted a comprehensive Report on EU - China relations. Its Rapporteur Bastiaan (Bas) Belder is a Dutch politician and Member of the European Parliament with the Reformed Political Party (SGP), part of the European Conservatives and Reformists Group, and he sits on the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs. He has a Higher Degree in the History of Eastern Europe from Utrecht University in the Netherlands. He is a substitute for the Committee on International Trade and the Committee on Budgets. Besides, he is chairman of the Delegation for the relations between the*

*European Parliament and Israel.*

*He prepared the report on the EU-China relations for the Plenary session of the European Parliament, 02.12.2015. See under:*

*<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A8-2015-0350&language=EN>*



**Noting that 2015 marks the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of diplomatic relations between the EU and China, the report acknowledges the pivotal prerequisite of the EU-China Strategic Partnership for the relations between the EU and China as well as for figuring out common responses to the current international challenges.**

### **EU-China Strategic Partnership and Cooperation**

In his report, Belder states that the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary of diplomatic relations between the EU and China is a stimulation to reinforce the Strategic Partnership, and advance the continuing talks for a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement grounded on trust, transparency and respect for human rights. It underlines the necessity for the EU Member States (MS) to **speak with one voice to the Chinese Government**, especially given Beijing's current restructuring of the global governance system. In line with this, the MS

- seek a strong EU partnership with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) but regret the absence of intensive organisation at EU level on several Member States' membership of the AIIB;**

- highlight the need of trade and investment policy, as the most noticeable sphere to deploy maximum influence in the strategic relations with China;
- point on the freshly settled partnership between China and Central and Eastern European countries, also known as the 16+1 group, which involves several EU Member States, but note that it should not split the EU or decline its stance towards China and should also cover human rights issues.

The EU MS urge the European External Action Service (EEAS, European diplomatic service) and the Commission to present an **annual report** to the Parliament on the development of EU-China relations. As such, the EEAS was recommended to confirm that human rights are essential in relations and dialogue with China.



Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China (PRC)

The report also acknowledges the significance of the **Bilateral Investment Agreement (BIT)** between the EU and China which is currently under discourse. Meanwhile, it urged a complete **sustainable development** chapter to be incorporated in the BIT, which ensures obligatory guarantees in relation to ILO **basic labour standards** and basic **Multilateral Environmental Agreements**. Whereas approving of the fact that over the last decades a substantial number of Chinese citizens have been elevated from extreme poverty due to significant economic progress, MS also express their concern that these economic enhancements often result in environmental problems and notable inequalities.

MS also voice that the EU Ombudsman in her draft recommendation approved in March 2015 condemned the lack of a human rights impact evaluation regarding the **Investor-State Dispute Settlement mechanism** in the talks for a trade and investment arrangement with Vietnam. Members considered that this sets a central model for the negotiations for the EU-China Bilateral Investment Agreement.

### Internal situation

The EP noted that China's **human rights record continued to be a source of serious concern**. It conversed the assumption of a number of suppressive regulations, among them being the draft Foreign NGO Management Law, and a new draft law on cybersecurity. Members called on the

European Council, the EEAS and the Commission to continue to complain forcefully to the Chinese authorities against these highly controversial measures.

They expressed concern at the recent political and civil unrest in Hong Kong, and called on China to abide by its obligations to the people of Hong Kong to preserve their rights and freedoms.

**External situation:** the European Parliament noted that since its launch President Xi's 'Chinese Dream' of national rejuvenation foresees a more proactive role for China in the world. It encouraged the VP/HR (the EU's "foreign minister") to **explore the possibilities of developing a common approach to China with the US** wherever this would contribute to advance EU interests. It noted the priority given by President Xi's presidency to the relationship with the US, given his proposal for a 'new type of major power relationship' between China, the US and other regional actors. Members favoured a **more constructive approach to a new world order** which China should help construe and integrate, one founded on the universal values of human rights, democracy and human security. Members called on the **EU to be more active in Asia**, and to cooperate with China, the US and other regional actors for more stability in the region.

Members went on to discuss the **expansion of the Chinese navy**, calling for a balanced attitude, to avoid worries on the part of China's neighbours and more tension in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and to guarantee Europe's crucial interest in freedom of navigation on the seas. They called on the VP/HR to identify the risks to peace and security in the region as well as globally should armed conflict arise in the **East and South China Seas**, in line with the priorities set forth in the European Maritime Security Strategy, what risks this would entail for the freedom and safety of navigation in the region, and what risks exist there to specific European interests.

The Chinese Government was urged to use all its levers of influence to ensure **stability in the Korean peninsula** and to induce North Korea to return to credible denuclearisation talks.



Great Hall of the People, Beijing, PRC

**Human rights situation:** Members noted the recent worsening of the situation of human rights in China started in 2013 and has intensified an already existing crackdown over the population. They were concerned that in the official Chinese view, the **universality of human rights is questioned on grounds of cultural differences**, and that this has led to lack of understanding



and distrust in EU-China relations. They called, therefore, on the Chinese leadership to reconsider and to **respect the universality of human rights** and on the EU institutions to work together with the Chinese authorities in their dialogues in order to advance respect for universality.

Beijing, PRC

Members want on to state their concern that **China is currently the world's largest executioner** and continues to impose the **death penalty** in secret on thousands of people annually. They were also deeply concerned that the Chinese government is continuing its **hardline policies against the Tibetan people**, especially by rejecting the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way Approach' which seeks neither independence nor separation but a genuine autonomy within the framework of the Chinese Constitution. They called for the Chinese government to re-enter into a dialogue with Tibetan representatives.

**Cross-strait relations:** Members advocated negotiating a **bilateral investment agreement between the EU and Taiwan**, given that Taiwan was, at regional level, the best gateway to China for EU businesses and that numerous states – including China – have concluded such (de facto) agreements with Taiwan. Whilst commending the acceptance by the Chinese government of Taiwan's participation in some UN organisations (WHO, ICAO), the committee expressed its concern at the Chinese government's reaffirmation of the **2005 Anti-Secession Law** that allows for the use of military means in the case of a declaration of independence by Taiwan. It felt that a gradual demilitarisation of the region would further facilitate the rapprochement of the parties, emphasising that **all cross-strait disputes should be settled by peaceful means** on the basis of international law.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>European Parliament, Legislative Observatory  
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1414540&t=d&l=en>

# Books in International Politics and Economy



**Ofelya Sargsyan & Hans-Jürgen Zahorka: Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE): Idea, History, Challenges (with documents) - LIBERTAS Paper 81, Rangendingen (Germany), December 2015, 112 p.; Print version: ISBN 978-3-946119-73-9 (15,00 EUR); eBook/PDF: 4,99 EUR.**

**Ofelya Sargsyan: Selected EU Foreign Policy Areas and Instruments - LIBERTAS Paper 80, Rangendingen (Germany), July 2015. 148 p.; e-book: ISBN 978-3-946119-02-0 (4,49 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-946119-00-5 (15,00 EUR).**

**Sergey Metelev (Ed.): IV. Manyakinskie Readings: Contemporary Challenges and National Security - Past, Present, Future. Dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of the Victory and the End of World War II. / IV Маньякинские Чтения: «Проблемы и Обеспечение Национальной Безопасности: Прошлое, Настоящее, Будущее» (Посвящается 70-летию победы и 70-летию окончания Второй Мировой Войны) (in Russian language) - Omsk / Rangendingen, April 2011; 612 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-937642-54-7 (25,00 EUR).**

**Sourajit Aiyer: Flying with the Winged Elephant - Niche Opportunities for Global Businesses that May Emerge in India - LIBERTAS Paper 79, Rangendingen (Germany), October 2014, 104 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-14-2 (9,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-54-3 (15,00 EUR).**

**Ofelya Sargsyan: Pleading For Armenia's Accession To The European Union - Rangendingen (Germany), March 2014, 228 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-04-3 (9,99 EUR). Print version/Paperback: ISBN 978-3-937642-50-5 (19,99 EUR).**

**Gohar Yeranyan: Acemoglu's Model and the Reality - Dynamics of Economic and Political Power in the Former Soviet Union Countries - LIBERTAS Paper 78, Rangendingen (Germany), October 2013, 48 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-13-5 (4,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-46-8 (15,00 EUR).**

**Morsal Rahiq: Zur Funktion von Rating-Agenturen. Die Marktmacht der „Großen Drei“– Ihre Fehler in der Vergangenheit und eine europäische Lösung (in German language) - LIBERTAS Paper 73, Rangendingen, Januar 2013, 65 Seiten; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-12-8 (9,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-26-0 (15,00 EUR).**

**Gulnaz Baiturova: Local Traditions in Kyrgyzstan and the Rule of Law - LIBERTAS Paper 77, Rangendingen (Germany), July 2013, 81 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-10-4 (9,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-43-7 (15,00 EUR).**

**Erick Behar Villegas / Thomas Schwartz (Hrsg.): Interkulturelles Management im deutsch-französischen Umfeld - Theoretische und empirische Beiträge (in German language). Mit Beiträgen von: Benjamin Ammon, Andreas Fischl, Fabienne Gloger, Sarah Gräbel, Bruno Hartig, Mai Tram Ho, Denis Jeanson, Efflam Jestin, Léo Maksud, Florian Schnitzler, Miriam Schumacher, Thomas Schwartz, Erick Behar Villegas - Rangendingen, Oktober 2012, 406 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-07-4 (14,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-17-8 (29,80 EUR).**

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# More books about international politics, conflicts and economy



**Didem Ekinci: Russia and the Balkans after the Cold War - LIBERTAS Paper 76, Rangendingen, May 2013, 110 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-09-8 (9,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-40-6 (15,00 EUR).**

**Anna S. Gevorgyan: Landlocked States – Economic and Transit Problems, International Law and the Case of Armenia - Libertas Paper 75, Rangendingen, January 2013, 62 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-11-1 (9,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-32-1 (15,00 EUR).**

**Sergei E. Metelev: Aspects of Russian Society - A Siberian Economic Point of View: Essays on Demographic Development, Migration, Regions, Corruption, Europe - Rangendingen 2012; 86 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-937642-31-4, (9,51 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-18-5, (15,00 EUR).**

**Zhidas Daskalovski and Marija Risteska (Editors): The Macedonian Question: 20 Years of Political Struggle into European Integration Structures - Rangendingen 2012; 94 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-937642-22-2 (9,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-23-9 (15,00 EUR).**

**Monika Mochtarova: Verschiebung der Machtbalancen und die indonesische Haltung zum Westen. Das Beispiel der Literaturzeitschrift „Horison“ als Spiegelbild der Gesellschaft (1966-1996) – Ein Beitrag zum europäisch-islamischen Dialog und zur Etablierten- und Außenseitertheorie von Norbert Elias (in German language) - Rangendingen 2011, 274 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-15-9, (9,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-20-8 (58,00 EUR).**

**Franziska Wender, André Moll: Qualitätsmanagement für den Mittelstand – Das Excellence-Modell der European Foundation for Quality Management (EFQM) (in German language) - Rangendingen 2009; 147 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-19-7 (14,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-07-9 (24,95 EUR).**

**Wolfgang Köhler: Bretonisch und Französisch im Süd-Finistère – Ein facettenreicher Sprachkonflikt (in German language) - Rangendingen 2009, 218 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-03-6 (14,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-09-3 (40,00 EUR).**

**Terry, Patrick: US-Iran Relations in International Law since 1979: Hostages, Oil Platforms, Nuclear Weapons and the Use of Force.- Libertas Paper 70; Rangendingen 2009; 87 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-23-4 (9,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-08-6 (15,00 EUR).**

**Dea Elibegova (ed.): Georgian Minorities - Roma, Qists, Assyrians, Ezids. With contributions by Dea Elibegova, Meqa Khangoshvili, Sergey Osipov, Eka Bitkash, Dimitri Pirbari - Libertas Paper 72; Rangendingen 2009; 56 pages; eBook: ISBN 978-3-946119-21-0 (9,99 EUR). Print version: ISBN 978-3-937642-10-9 (15,00 EUR).**

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# *The Asia-Pacific Region and the European Union*

## *A Factsheet for the European Parliament*

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*The European Parliament, from time to time, issues so-called Fact Sheets for Members and the parliamentary staff. In the case of third countries, they cover regions and single countries. Here is one of these Fact Sheets which can be read by M.E.P's also in a short break, on the Asia-Pacific region. It summarizes the relations between the European Union and the respective region. Of course not all countries can be covered on a few pages, but accents have to be set. This short paper has been elaborated by Roberto Bendini, Fernando Garcés de los Fayos, Manuel Manrique Gil and Laurence Vandewalle, in 12/2015.*

**The Asia-Pacific region is home to four of the EU's strategic partners (China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea), to several of the world's fastest-growing economies, to emerging global powers and to two thirds of the world's poor. The region's dynamic societies and markets offer enormous opportunities — as well as colossal challenges - for the EU. The EU interacts with the region on a bilateral basis, through regional organisations and forums and within the G20. Parliamentary relations with Asian countries take place at three levels: bilaterally, between European Parliament delegations and the national parliaments; regionally, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Inter-parliamentary Assembly (AIPA); and through the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), with the Asia-Europe Parliamentary Partnership (ASEP). The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries covered by Parliament's ACP Delegation include 15 Pacific nations.**

### **Legal Basis**

- Title V (EU external action) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU);
- Titles I-III and V (common commercial policy; development cooperation and humanitarian aid; international agreements) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

### **Evolving Policies**

The speed of the changes taking place in Asia and the region's political and economic diversity - including both mature democracies and autocratic regimes, and both developed and developing countries - means that the EU must constantly adjust its policies. Owing to mushrooming and often mutually competing regional networks, the EU is working to identify the most efficient cooperation channels and assert its presence. Development cooperation remains an important component of the relationship.

## **South Asia**

The EU, which encourages regional integration, supports the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), whose eight member countries are Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Europe is the South Asian countries' premier trading partner and a major export market. Development cooperation between the EU and the countries of South Asia covers financial and technical aid as well as economic cooperation. Priorities include regional stability, poverty alleviation, human rights, sustainable development and labour rights.

## **India**

Since 1994, relations between the EU and India have been governed by a cooperation agreement covering political, trade and economic cooperation. In 2004, the EU upgraded its relationship with India to a strategic partnership. In the last five years, bilateral trade has doubled and investments have grown tenfold. The negotiations for a free trade agreement (FTA) launched in 2007 could resume in 2016, but several key issues have yet to be resolved. The EU's current financial framework, covering the 2014-2020 period, has phased out EU bilateral development assistance for emerging economies, including India. Despite India's remarkable economic growth, nearly 30 % of its population lives in poverty. The last EU-India summit was held in February 2012. Plans for a summit were postponed on account of the case of two Italian marines, Massimiliano Latorre and Salvatore Girone, who have been awaiting trial since 2012 for shooting two Indian fishermen. Parliament resolutions have addressed human rights issues, in particular violence against women, and the case of the two Italian marines.

## **Pakistan**

The first EU-Pakistan comprehensive agreement was signed in 1976. The legal basis for the relationship is the 2004 Cooperation Agreement. One of the EU's key objectives is to support the country's democratic institutions. In 2012, the five-year EU-Pakistan Engagement Plan came into force. While the plan is not a legal instrument replacing the existing cooperation agreement, it provides a framework for developing and upgrading bilateral political relations in respect of six strategic issues: political cooperation, security, governance, human rights, migration, trade and energy. At Pakistan's request, the EU sent Election Observation Missions (EOM) to the most recent general elections. Pakistani education activist Malala Yousafzai was awarded Parliament's 2013 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought. Parliament resolutions have addressed the Peshawar school massacre (2015), blasphemy laws (2014), cases of persecution (2014) and Pakistan's regional role and political relations with the EU (2014).

## **Afghanistan**

On 29 September 2014, Afghanistan completed its first democratic transition of power with the swearing-in of Ashraf Ghani as president. The outcome of the presidential elections had caused a serious institutional crisis, and the president's political rival, Abdullah Abdullah, was made government CEO. Lengthy negotiations delayed the formation of a full cabinet. The International Security Assistance Force withdrew on 31 December 2014, but 13 000 US and NATO troops remain, at least until the end of 2015. The Taliban – and, more recently, Islamic State – pose a continuous security challenge. The risk still looms that Afghanistan will become a 'failed state'. Greater regional cooperation would be an important driver of national and regional stability.

After the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, the EU opened a delegation in Kabul; the ambassador is also the EU Special Representative. The Council adopted a new EU Afghanistan strategy in June 2014 and issued conclusions in October 2014 welcoming the government of national unity and reiterating the Union's long-term commitment. The current EU budget allocates EUR 1.4 billion for Afghanistan during the 2014-2020 period, with a focus on agriculture, rural development, health, the rule of law, policing, democratisation and accountability. Some 20 % of the funds are reserved for 'incentive payments' tied to reforms. Parliament's resolution of 13 June 2013 asked that an EU-Afghanistan Cooperation Agreement for Partnership and Development be concluded as soon as possible.

## **East Asia**

### **People's Republic of China**

In 1994 the EU resumed relations with China - which had been suspended after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989 - with a new framework for a political dialogue. However, the EU's arms embargo, imposed after the events of 1989, remains in place. China's rise as a global power and the growing economic interdependence between the two partners are reflected in the strategic partnership established by the EU in 2003. China also considers the EU to be a 'strategic partner', although China has several dozen of these. Annual summits, held alternately in Brussels and Beijing, set guidelines for the rapidly evolving relationship. Political dialogue also involves regular ministerial meetings and more than 60 sector-specific dialogues. A human rights dialogue is held biannually, although it has failed to produce perceptible results. China firmly opposes any outside 'interference' in internal affairs related to human rights issues. The EU and China are the world's two largest trading partners. China is the EU's second-largest trading partner after the USA. The EU is, however, dissatisfied with China's protectionist measures, while Beijing criticises the EU's refusal to grant the country 'market economy' status. Since September 2012, when China and the EU agreed to start negotiations for a bilateral

investment agreement, five rounds of negotiations have taken place, the last in March 2015. Parliament's Delegation for relations with the People's Republic of China holds working sessions with counterparts from the National People's Congress twice a year. In resolutions, Parliament has evoked China's responsibility as an international actor (regarding Syria, North Korea and maritime disputes) and human rights and fundamental freedoms (including arbitrary detention, labour camps, the death penalty, freedom of expression, forced abortions and repressive policies in Tibet and Xinjiang). Parliament has also supported Chinese citizens' calls for effective political reforms<sup>2</sup>.

### **Republic of China (Taiwan)**

The EU adheres to a 'one China' policy and does not recognise Taiwan as a sovereign state; however, it has developed a close relationship with Taiwan in a number of sectors. Parliament has supported possible negotiations on an EU-Taiwan economic cooperation agreement and has encouraged closer bilateral cooperation in the areas of trade, research, culture, education and environmental protection<sup>3</sup>.

### **Japan and South Korea**

EU relations with Japan and with South Korea have evolved similarly, though along different timelines. Relations are based on shared values — human rights, democracy and the rule of law - and growing trade and investment ties. Both countries are strategic partners of the EU - Japan since 2003, South Korea since 2010.

The three partners' societies face parallel challenges, including ageing populations, challenging interactions with China and Russia, and safety on the high seas. Negotiations on an EU-Japan FTA were officially launched on 25 March 2013. Parliament supports close relations with Japan and has endorsed the launch of an FTA. However, Parliament is also insisting on conditions designed to ensure that both partners benefit equally from the deal and that negotiations will be stopped if Japan does not deliver on its commitments to reduce technical trade barriers.

South Korea's strengthening democratic values and civil society, and its rapid development of a market economy, have fostered close political and economic links with the EU. Relations with the Republic of Korea also involve an increasing level of economic and commercial integration.

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<sup>2</sup> Resolution of 14 March 2013 on EU-China relations, [P7\\_TA\(2013\)0097](#), <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2013-97>

<sup>3</sup> Resolution of 12 September 2012 on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy, OJ C 353 E, 3.12.2013, p. 77, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&language=EN&reference=P7-TA-2012-334>

The EU and the Republic of Korea share the goal of denuclearising the Korean peninsula and securing stability throughout northeast Asia.

## **North Korea**

The EU has no representation in North Korea, and bilateral relations are limited. There are currently no bilateral political or commercial treaties in force. Moreover, excluding humanitarian assistance, the EU's development cooperation is subject to political considerations, UN sanctions and other constraints. Parliament has adopted several resolutions condemning Pyongyang for its nuclear and missile programmes and has expressed great concern about the deteriorating human rights situation in the country.

## **South-East Asia**

### **Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)**

ASEAN, established in 1967, has evolved into an organisation with significant regional economic and political clout. Now comprising 10 countries (founding members Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, together with Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and Burma/Myanmar), ASEAN has been an international legal entity since the entry into force of the ASEAN Charter on 1 January 2009. It follows a strict policy of non-interference in its members' domestic affairs. The EU and ASEAN member countries pursue Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs). The PCA with Indonesia entered into force in 2014. Negotiations with the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have been completed. The PCA with Thailand will not be ratified until a democratic government is in place. Negotiations are ongoing with Malaysia and Brunei. The EU is ASEAN's second-largest partner, while ASEAN is the EU's third-largest partner outside Europe.

Negotiations for a region-to-region FTA between the EU and ASEAN, which started in 2007, have now stalled. The EU has instead pursued trade negotiations with individual ASEAN members; an FTA (including an additional investment chapter) with Singapore was concluded in 2014 and has been referred to the European Court of Justice; negotiations with Malaysia have paused, while those with Vietnam were concluded on 2 December 2014. Negotiations with Thailand, launched in 2013, were put on hold following the May 2014 military coup. Parliament is an observer in the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA).

## **Indonesia**

Indonesia, the third-largest democracy in the world and the largest Muslim-majority country, is a key partner for the EU. Preparatory talks for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement were launched in 2012. Indonesia is the first country in the region to have signed – in 2013 – a Voluntary Partnership Agreement on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade with the EU. Parliament resolutions have addressed human rights issues; in particular, a resolution of July 2011 condemned attacks on religious minorities.

## **Burma/Myanmar**

While there is no EU framework agreement with Myanmar owing to years of EU sanctions, the country's ongoing democratic transition process led the EU to suspend all sanctions except its arms embargo. The Union has also re-engaged politically and economically, including by reinstating trade preferences in 2013 and launching negotiations for an investment agreement in 2014. In its resolutions, Parliament has addressed concerns about the human rights situation, and particularly ethnic violence. Myanmar is one of Parliament's priority countries for comprehensive democracy support. Parliament participated in the Election Observation Mission for the 2015 general elections, and concluded that the poll was well organised.

## **The Pacific**

### **Australia and New Zealand**

The EU, Australia and New Zealand are like-minded partners with common values and interests. In addition to strong trade relations, the partners' similar outlooks have allowed them to develop close governmental and private-sector contacts on issues such as climate change, world trade, security and development, technological research and human rights. Parliament has one delegation for relations with the two countries.

### **Other Pacific countries**

EU relations with the 15 Pacific countries in the Africa-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group are focused on development cooperation, fisheries and climate change. As regards the issue of climate change, the EU and Pacific small-island developing states support the establishment of an ambitious global agreement. In 2015, the EU suggested that negotiations on an Economic Partnership Agreement with the region be paused for three years, until a review of the management of Pacific fisheries resources has been completed.

# *How to Work for EU Foreign Policy Goals in the UN*

## *European Parliament Resolution on the EU Role within the United Nations*

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**Taking into account the growing unstable security environment, the promotion of the EU stance as international actor becomes more and more essential. That being said, a resolution of 24.11.2015 adopted in the European Parliament proposed an EU seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) as well as called the two permanent EU Member States, the UK and France, to promote "common EU positions" on the UNSC.**

As such, first part of the resolution presents the Union's legal personality, its goals and global strengths, while the second part discusses the Union's presence and performance within the United Nations as well as proposes future developments for the EU within the UN.

The report<sup>4</sup> highlights that the **EU is a committed partner in the UN, yet with a limited status**. It states that the two share the fundamental principles, identified in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Functional multilateralism is a basic value in the EU's External policies. In this vein, as the only international organization where all sovereign states in the world are represented, the UN is a key platform upgrading this objective.

Together with its Member States (MS), the EU is the largest financial contributor to the UN, and through its Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, the Union is intensively engaged in promoting global peace and security under the UN umbrellas. Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) goes that the EU shall 'promote multilateral solutions', specifically under the auspices of the UN, and perform 'in respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law'.

The Lisbon Treaty granted the EU a legal personality status and the EU took over the rights and status of the European Community in the UN. Furthermore, in May in 2011, **the UN General Assembly (UNGA) provided the EU an enhanced role in participation rights**, enabling the EU representatives to present common EU positions, speak as well as distribute EU communications as official documents. The resolution also stresses that the European Parliament carefully observes the EU-UN partnership and assesses EU's financial and political contribution to the UN. Furthermore, the EP has intensive direct relations with the UN, itself.

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<sup>4</sup> European Parliament, (2015/2104(INI)) <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2015-0403&format=XML&language=EN>

In line with the above mentioned, **a Security Council seat for the EU remains a 'long-term goal'**. The resolution acknowledges that the EP has continually called for an enhanced EU position in the UN, e.g. recommendation to the Council of 2 April 2014 on the 69<sup>th</sup> session of the United Nations General Assembly<sup>5</sup>, the resolution of 11 May 2011 on the EU as a global actor: its role in multilateral organisations<sup>6</sup>, the study published in March 2015 by the European Parliament's Directorate-General for External Policies, Wanda Troszczyńska-Van Genderen, 'Reforming the United Nations: State of Play, Ways Forward', etc.

Considering the conflict in eastern Ukraine, the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and the rise of the ISIS terrorist organisation, the Libyan crisis and the terrorist threat in Africa (in particular in the Sahel, Libya and the Horn of Africa) as grim international threats, the report urges the EU to uphold both its own and its MS role and influence within the UN so as to meet its foreign policy objectives. To the point, an EU seat in the UNSC is deemed as a longstanding goal.

**The EU's High Representative is called to investigate common EU positions on the issues related to the UNSC and safeguard that the EU MS on the UNSC (France and the UK are permanent members, while Spain is currently a non-permanent member) defend common EU positions. The report also urges the UNSC to revise the 'opaque' selection process for the position of UN Secretary-General<sup>7</sup>.**

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<sup>5</sup> Texts adopted, P7\_TA(2014)0259

<sup>6</sup> OJ C 377 E, 7.12.2012, p. 66.

<sup>7</sup>European Parliament,

[http://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiyrdH566vKAhUr1XIKHcjFCMIQFggiMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.europarl.europa.eu%2FRegData%2Fetudes%2FATAG%2F2015%2F571336%2FEPRS\\_ATA\(2015\)571336\\_EN.pdf&usg=AFQjCNERbgUCumfc2\\_n7dLhqblaTM8N-5w&sig2=hOG0r9ul6UWfDvCOBUn-9A](http://www.google.de/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwiyrdH566vKAhUr1XIKHcjFCMIQFggiMAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.europarl.europa.eu%2FRegData%2Fetudes%2FATAG%2F2015%2F571336%2FEPRS_ATA(2015)571336_EN.pdf&usg=AFQjCNERbgUCumfc2_n7dLhqblaTM8N-5w&sig2=hOG0r9ul6UWfDvCOBUn-9A)

# *What Lessons the EU Can Learn from Denmark's Relations with Greenland and the Faroe Islands*

## *Or: Secession on the State and Supra-State Level: The Brexit and Other Cases.*

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### **Matthias Major**



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Globalization and, especially in Europe, *Europeanization* lead to the assumption that the model of the nation-state is outdated and does not give the needed answers in a changing world. This assumption has to be questioned or, at least, modified.

First of all, it can be stated that the model of the nation-state is not outdated but increasing in its attractiveness as a form of a territorial and social organization. The proof is that nowadays there are more states in the world than ever. The latest newcomers on the international level are South-Sudan, East-Timor or the partially recognized state of Kosovo. Furthermore, there are also several movements aimed at creating new nation-states. The interesting point is that these tendencies are clearly visible in developed democratic OECD countries. Prominent cases have recently been Catalonia, Scotland, Flanders, the Basque Country and despite the visibility on the political agenda, the support for sovereignty has not significantly lowered - Québec.

Second, as the model of a nation-state is not in crisis, Globalization and interdependence as well as Europeanization have had a crucial impact on the state. It has changed and transformed by

delegating such competences to supranational structures, e.g. the EU and NATO, which were historically a sovereignty matter of the state (Leibfried, et. al. 2005, p. 17).

In the European context, especially the EU is the expression of this transformation of Statehood. Furthermore, transforming Statehood, the EU is shaped in its characteristic in a reciprocal relation. Secession however does not only affect states with plurinational realities, such as Spain, the United Kingdom (UK), Belgium or Canada. It has also historically affected the EU and is currently debated as a political topic in the UK, known as *Brexit*. The rise of EU-sceptical parties all over Europe might give new impulses to this trend but finally show an expression of dissatisfaction with the current status of the EU like Britain (Glencross, 2015, p. 315; Leconte, 2010, p. 246). Secession tendencies exist hence both on the state and supra-state level.

Historically, there were secessions from the European Community (EC). Algeria lost its membership status in 1962 when it gained independence from France after a cruel war. When Denmark entered the EC in 1973, the Faroe Islands did not, although they belong to Denmark. It was a referendum over the EEC membership that turned out negative (Murray, 2012, p. 140). Differences on fishery policy were the main reasons that motivated this highly on fishery depending nation to vote against the EEC membership. Denmark entered the EEC without the Faroe Islands but with Greenland, where the negative outcome on the membership was outnumbered by Danish vote (Alfredsson, 1983, p. 292). However, Greenland held its own referendum in 1985, where the majority voted to leave the EEC voluntarily. Denmark found itself within a dilemma: as on the one hand, it defended the idea of the EEC (the population in Denmark voted in its majority clearly in favor of an EEC membership), on the other hand, it had to defend the Greenlandic democratic mandate and speak as the voice of Greenland. After negotiations, led by Denmark as the Greenlandic voice, Greenland left the EEC in 1985. The question on the EEC/EU membership in the Faroe Islands, Greenland and Great Britain has been and will be decided democratically. The Faroe Islands did not even enter and Greenland was the first territory to secede legally and democratically from the European Community (Suksi, 1993, p. 209).



Faroe Islands



Greenland

Great Britain goes one step further: it might be the first independent and fully sovereign state, which decides in its majority to secede. On the one hand, the case of the *Brexit* is significantly different from the Faroe Islands and Greenland, as both are not fully sovereign and independent states. Secessions on the supranational level with a democratic mandate have occurred and were put into practice. The Faroe Islands decided, like fully independent and sovereign state Norway, not to enter. Greenland now could be an example to make the *Brexit* happen, as it did so in 1985. The question should be: if Greenland, a non-sovereign territory, could decide democratically whether to stay or not, how should it be denied to the United Kingdom, a fully sovereign and independent country? As in the referendum in 1984 only a matter of the Greenlandic demos was considered, it will be now a matter to the British demos. In other words, Greenland and the Faroe Islands have acted in these question as if they were fully sovereign and independent subjects and succeeded in expressing their democratic decision. Hence, it seems the fully independent and sovereign state of Great Britain can't be denied then to ask its sovereignty over the EU membership, if this was granted to not fully sovereign and independence territories.

### **No Solidarity of the Faroe Islands Regarding Russia?**

*The Faroe Islands try since several years to come always a bit closer to the EU. Upon a Written Question by Richard Corbett (S & D / British Labour) in the European Parliament, EU Commissioner Malmström replied on behalf of the EU Commission on 03 December 2015: Richard Corbett is one of the M.E.P's with the most "European" reputation, very pragmatic and several times voted to be one of the most influential deputies; he was also for several years advisor to the Council President Herman Van Rompuy. His question was simple: Have the Faroe Islands continued to export products to Russia that fall under the EU embargo, and has the Commission or the Danish Government taken this up with the Faroese authorities?*

*Commissioner Malmström's reply: "The Faroe Islands, which are autonomous in their trade policy, have distanced themselves from the restrictive measures adopted by the EU and likeminded partners towards Russia and have not been targeted by Russia's partial food import ban in force since August 2014.*

*In view of the need to ensure the unity of the international community and to uphold the rule of law on trade matters, the EU has called on countries not affected by the Russian import ban to refrain from supporting or encouraging exports of products affected by the ban. However, there are indications that Faroese exports to Russia, in particular of salmon, increased significantly after the introduction of the import ban.*

*During the Joint Committee meeting of the Free Trade Agreement EU — Faroe Islands which took place in May 2015, in Torshavn, the Commission expressed regret that the apparent increased Faroese trade with Russia in recent months did not reflect an appropriate level of solidarity with the situation faced by the EU in its relations with Russia. The representatives of the Faroe Islands described the information coming from the press as inadequate and offered to provide the Commission with factual information on Faroese trade relations with Russia, which has however not been received so far.* (EUF AJ)

However, there is a crux: in the question of sovereignty, there doesn't exist one British demos, but several *demos* (Tierney, 2015, p. 10). The Scottish Independence Referendum 2014 and the agreements on Northern Ireland are the clearest expressions of Westminster's awareness of the social, political and national realities, which are clearly plurinational. In case the British, as a whole, vote in their majority to leave the EU and Scotland in its majority in favor to stay, the question of sovereignty in Scotland will be probably back on the agenda - and so will be the future of an independent Scotland (Schnapper, 2015, p. 7). The reason is that once, the Scottish demos was recognized by Britain, when even the outcome was unclear, with what logic should it be denied this time? Nevertheless, it also has to do with the state's democratic understanding and respect to the existence of several *demoi*, displayed in plurinational realities.

Denmark, as a state, has starting to realize these different political and social realities latest with the emergence of the idea of the modern nationhood in the 19th century. After the loss of Schleswig-Holstein, decentralization and delegating competences to Iceland and the Faroe Islands continued. Denmark knew the state could not be held together by force as it tried with Schleswig-Holstein and failed completely. It also could not by force or imposition turn all people with a growing Icelandic and Faroese national consciousness into "good Danes", but rather accept realities and try to find accommodation for them, by delegating them competences (Hálfðanarson, 2011, p. 285). The creation of the Personal Union - in fact a pre-modern nation-state model - was the outcome to make concessions to Icelandic political expression of independence, a weakly linked union of two equally sovereign states (Lemkin, 2008, p. 164).

In 1944 after a referendum Iceland declared unilaterally and, according to the Act of Union Treaty, legally its secession as the Personal Union, from the Icelandic point of view, did not have any more sense to be kept alive. Denmark could and did not prevent this, as it was not only a legal but also democratic mandate with a vast majority support. The Faroe Islands followed the Icelandic example by unilaterally convoking a referendum, where a slight majority voted in favor of independence. Denmark however, did not accept the outcome (Stepan, et al., p. 220). The political outcome of full independence was denied but the Danish authorities realized that keeping the status quo was no longer possible. In other words, Denmark once again rationally acknowledged social, national and political realities within the state. The outcome was negotiating the Home Rule agreement between Faroese and Danish authorities, where within years, most competences were handed over to Faroese authorities except defense policy, monetary policy and foreign relations (Jensen, et al., 2015, p. 4). The act came into action in 1948. As in the Icelandic case, from a legal point, there was no basis for the Faroe Islands to convoke a referendum, and even if a slight majority voted in favor of full independence, it was not as clear as in Iceland. However, Denmark did not interpret it as a *legal*, but rather as a *political issue* that required also a *political solution*. The legal basis for the temporal political solution was given by the Act of Home Rule in 1948.

One can say this is in fact not a state-centric, but a democratic view on issues, when a demos or various *demos* have demands that might challenge the legitimation of the state or, in case of the *Brexit*, the legitimation of the European Union (Craig, 2015, p. 416). Moreover, not the *demos* but the state or the supra state structure has to legitimate itself. Legitimation comes in democracies usually by approval of the demos or *demos* and reflects itself within e.g. elections. When Denmark realized, the legitimacy of the state did not exist anymore, on one side it accepted Iceland, on the other side did not do the same in the case of Faroe Islands two years later. However, negotiating Home Rule has tried to reestablish the state legitimacy. Greenland was converted into a formal county of Denmark as on the one hand Denmark wanted to bypass the role of being a state with colonial possessions, on the other hand maintain Greenland under its authority (Hviid, 2015, p. 15; Kjærgaard, 2015, p. 118). It also experienced a proper national awareness around one hundred years later than the Faroe Islands, which was expressed in the emergence of parties supporting sovereignty and full independence (Graugaard, 2014, p. 14).

Given the post-colonial context and the former experiences, Denmark here also introduced Home Rule in Greenland as an effect of taking into account the Greenlandic *demos*. The abstention of the Faroe Islands and the exit of Greenland from the EEC has already been discussed. While the Danish core state voted in favor, it acknowledged not only the existence of both the Greenlandic and the Faroese *demos*, but also defended it within the EEC, although the Danish core was in favor of the European Integration. Much has happened since then. Greenland and the Faroe Islands have stayed outside the EU as the basis on finding enough common interests to rethink that integration for both has been missing. Home Rule was extended in the Faroe Islands in 2005 and in Greenland in 2009, where the sovereignty of soil was even delegated to Greenlandic authorities. Furthermore, the support for independence has not significantly diminished but maintains at a stable level which has been throughout the decade - around 40%—50%.

What can the EU learn from the relations between Greenland, the Faroe Islands and Denmark on one and the possible *Brexit* on the other hand? First of all, a community which declares itself democratic should highlight the democratic feature and not hide itself behind treaties, which are, at the end of the day, legal basis to legitimate the construct. The danger of a juridification of political issue is given and increases the danger of not being able to find political solutions, as the legal basis might critically limit possibilities (von Westphalen, 2001, p. 382).

If the Lisbon Treaty does not foresee a *Brexit* or any other kind of a secession by a member state, it doesn't mean that this issue does not exist. The same can and has to be said for member states, who themselves face with secessionist movements and try to blend out or invalidate them by hiding behind constitutions that talk about the indivisibility of the state. At this point, this means that the state puts more emphasize on the existence of the state than on carrying out democracy. A state cannot just impose its legitimacy by law, treaties or constitutions but it has to take into account demands of different *demos*, if they exist. This means that if in Catalonia, the Basque Country, Flanders, or Scotland, the state is not represented anymore democratically and has no

mandate by the *demos* (a clear majority of pro-secession/independence parties for example), the existence of such different *demos* is confirmed. The same can be said at the EU member state level and EU-skepticism. Once there exists a democratic mandate to leave the EU, a denial would be highly undemocratic and would totally go against the EU's own preached values. The case of Great Britain shows it even more clearly, as the EU is composed by its member states and one European *demos* does not exist but nation-states are supposed to be the expression of *one* demos, which finds its voice in one nation (Ginsberg, 2010, p. 186). As 'nation' and 'state' are taken as quasi synonyms - what is the case on the European level as *one* European demos doesn't exist and the member states are in theory the representatives of the *demos* - the nation-state is not consequent to apply the same logic on its own state level and denies the demos what it expects from the EU to be natural.

Obviously, also this is not true as we can clearly see in the secessionist movements in Europe - in Catalonia, Scotland, the Basque Country, etc. Let's have a look on Great Britain, as it serves both as a possibility of an EU member-state exit and the nation-state with the existence of different stateless nations, who are themselves *demos* within the state, i.e. Scotland. We can clearly see here a coherency: British authorities claim to exit the EU if the democratic mandate of the British demos is given. Also, they realized and recognized the existence of a Scottish demos apart from the British demos and granted itself the right to decide over their future, just as Great Britain claims on the supranational level. This means that both, the EU on the supranational level and the state on the state level have to seek legitimation, not by imposing through a constitution or a treaty, but by a democratic mandate. However, the coherency will be challenged again in case Britain as a whole will vote for the *Brexit* but Scotland won't, which is quiet possible (Gözkaman, 2015, p. 42). Here, Scotland could demand another referendum on partial EU membership or even for full independence and sovereignty as a majority does not want to leave the EU. If the Scottish demos was recognized once, why, and with which logic, should it be denied recognition a second time?

This was also the case when Denmark did not only recognize Iceland as a proper and equal political subject within the state in 1917, but also granted the right of secession, being aware of the political secessionist movements there on one side (Arnason, 2006, p. 29). On the other side, Denmark realized that the state as a whole could not be legitimized by law, constitution and imposition but would have to be legitimated equally by the *demos* of Iceland.

When in 1946 the Faroe Islands followed Iceland's example, the unity of the state was imposed but its legitimacy as a unit not eternally fixed in a constitution as Denmark knew from the past that this wouldn't make sense. Negotiating Home Rule with the Faroe Islands and later Greenland sought legitimation of the state by finding accommodation of both different *demos* within the state. Home Rule and its expansion into self-rule in Greenland and the Faroe Islands were simply answers to growing democratic demands and a strategy to legitimate the state under the Danish authority. However, Denmark acknowledged within the last two decades - especially

through the self-rule agreement with Greenland and the government Program of Denmark from June 2015 - more than ever before, that an exit option exists (Heininen, 2014, 16; Venstre, 2015, p. 34).

Taking into account that in Greenland and the Faroe Islands independence parties play a crucial role as political actors, no juridification would hinder independence of both territories if a democratic mandate of one *demos* or both *demoi* exists. Danish authorities declared via the government program and via the legal document of the Self-Rule Act 2009 that legal secession would not only be possible but would even be supported (Venstre, 2015, p. 34).

The door for Greenland and the Faroe Islands to establish own constitutions was opened, however, the Danish government expressed its *wish*, that these constitutions remain within the state (Venstre, 2015, p. 34). Denmark realized that it has the duty to legitimate the state and not to expect legitimation *per se* by declaring the state indivisible as Spain does for instance. This, as already stated, values the pure existence of the state higher than the possible democratic will of its *demoi*. In other words, the state itself and that the fact that it exists is by far more important than democracy.

The EU has not included in its treaty the indivisibility of the EU as it is not a state but rather a supra-state construct *sui generis*. The Lisbon Treaty as a legal document doesn't know hence indivisibility but also doesn't know secession. However, political solutions are possible in this case as there are in fact no clear expressions of an exit. A *Brexit* would be a novelty on the member state level, especially since integration and *Europeanization* have advanced since Lisbon. However, it shall be remembered that the unilateral secession of Greenland from the EEC in 1985 was also not foreseen *per se* but possible. The reason was exactly not hiding behind juridification, but creating political will to carry out the decision of the Greenlandic *demos*. Furthermore, Denmark has tried to find accommodation by granting Home- and Self-Rule, the acknowledgment of political, social and national realities by fully respecting Greenland and the political expression of its *demos*, and even juridically legalized secession. The EU, hence, cannot impose membership over the UK but must legitimize itself again (Lane 2013, p. 83).

Denmark found Home- and Self-Rule agreements and the opt-out possibility. The EU should try to find out, why there is strong EU skepticism in the UK and more growing EU-skepticism in France, Austria, Sweden and other. Legitimacy has to be granted and not imposed on the different *demoi*, whether it is the British or the Greenlandic and, as mentioned, the state has to do the same on the state level, taking into account the different *demos* which nowadays express themselves in stateless nations.

***Regarding the withdrawal from the EU, Article 50 Lisbon Treaty (TEU), says:***

*1. Any Member State may decide to withdraw from the Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements.*

*2. A Member State which decides to withdraw shall notify the European Council of its intention. In the light of the guidelines provided by the European Council, the Union shall negotiate and conclude an agreement with that State, setting out the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union. That agreement shall be negotiated in accordance with Article 218(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It shall be concluded on behalf of the Union by the Council, acting by a qualified majority, after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.*

*3. The Treaties shall cease to apply to the State in question from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement or, failing that, two years after the notification referred to in paragraph 2, unless the European Council, in agreement with the Member State concerned, unanimously decides to extend this period.*

*4. For the purposes of paragraphs 2 and 3, the member of the European Council or of the Council representing the withdrawing Member State shall not participate in the discussions of the European Council or Council or in decisions concerning it.*

*A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(b) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.*

*5. If a State which has withdrawn from the Union asks to rejoin, its request shall be subject to the procedure referred to in Article 49.*

It can be concluded that on the first sight, the relations between Denmark, the Faroe Islands and Greenland might have nothing in common with the question of the EU and the possible *Brexit*. In fact, they have a lot in common as the same conflict appears: the legitimacy of the EU - back in 1985 in Greenland and nowadays in Great Britain - and the answers on this political issue. If the answer is that there apparently is no legal basis for a *Brexit*, because Lisbon does not know any secession of a member state, it is in fact on one side a confession of failure of its own legitimacy once there is a democratic mandate to decide over it (Lane, 2013, p. 83). On the other side, it is also the downgrade of democracy as a core value and the imposition of the EU in order to seek legitimacy by hiding behind treaties, which do not know secession as an instrument. The answer can also be political and possible, as the case of Greenland and its secession from the EU shows. In fact, Greenland was a special case and not a member state. Yet the EEC didn't know unilateral decided secession of territory, member state or a partial territory, either (Lane, 2013, p. 80).

When Denmark declared that the democratic will of the Faroe Islands and Greenland was to be treated as different *demoi*, it bravely faced its political, national and social realities, a step which several European states with plurinational realities still deny. Instead, they try to somehow endure the conflicts. This is evidence of incapacity for a democratic state, where there should be communication instead of ignorance, democratic conviction instead of imposition, recognition of plurinational realities instead of hiding behind legal documents that do not know such realities.

Denmark has found strategies that try to find democratic legitimacy and so should the EU regarding Britain (and other countries). Secession is not a phenomenon but rather the common rule and tendency, given that there are more independent states than ever before on this earth and even in Europe itself. This means that, as stated at the beginning, not the idea of creating a state is in crisis, but the idea that every state created on earth has one *demos*, expressed by its state-nation. The Westphalian state-model as a nation-state is indeed in crisis and outdated in a democratic community if one states that each state stands for one *demos* (Welikala, 2015, pp. 115-116). Plurinationality is a social, political and national reality and secession is the outcome of not feeling accommodated enough in this state by one or many nation or, in other terms, one *demos* or many *demoi*. It is somehow contradictory that secession seems to be a taboo while it is just a common tendency and reflects a democratic deficit when thinking about the state as an organization of cohabitation of people. Iceland seceded and it was not the end of the world for Denmark. The model just could not convince anymore and the common state project failed. Now, it's once again Denmark's duty to provide a model that can accommodate the Faroe Islands and Greenland within the state and, by doing so, seek legitimacy. On the supranational level, the referendum in Great Britain will show if the EU is able to provide a model for the UK *demos*, which convinces it to remain within the EU (and so has the UK state towards the Scottish *demos* also in the future). Otherwise, a legitimation of the EU is not given any more if the referendum proves it.

No law in any democratic society should be above democracy and the respect of a specific *demos* or various *demoi*, whether they are within one or many states. This doesn't mean a legal vacuum, but rather a supra-state structure, like the EU, or a state which gives a legal way and priority to democracy, whether within democratic states, such as Spain, Belgium or the UK or the EU, as a whole. In short, a constitution should serve for the people and not the people to the constitution.

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# *Does Russia Have an Imperialistic Foreign and Security Policy? – A Discourse on Empires*

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## **Tsoghik Khachatryan**



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*The current paper is based on her MA thesis at Flensburg University, Germany, 2015.*

## **Abstract**

Russian foreign and security policy in Putin's reign was qualified mainly as imperialistic, aiming at the revival of the country's great power standing. In this background, any attempt of integration in the post-Soviet area notably the West viewed through the lens of the resurgence of Soviet Union. In the wake of Putin's announcement on creating a Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus in 2011 and later annexation of Ukraine's Crimea in 2014 gave a new impetus to these rumors.

The paper deals with the Russian possible imperialistic foreign and security policy. Trying to identify whether, why and how it is applicable, the study examines the country's neo-imperialistic activity anchored on the legacy of its imperial past.

## **List of abbreviations**

AA	Association Agreement
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPC	Caspian Pipeline Consortium

CSF	Civil Society Forum
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CoE	Council of Europe
CU	Custom Union
DCFTA	Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area
EaP	Eastern Partnership
EEU	Eurasian Economic Union
EEU MS	Eurasian Economic Union Member State
ENP	European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI	European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
EU	European Union
EU MS	European Union Member State
IMF	International Monetary Fund
MNPP	Medzamor Nuclear Power Plant
MS	Member States
NA	National Assembly
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NK	Nagorno Karabakh
NRC	NATO--Russia Council
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
RA	Republic of Armenia
RQ	Research Question
SES	Single Economic Space
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization

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## Introduction

It seems the history is repeated and comes to prove publicly declared thesis that “each new is well forgotten old”. (Dis)integration circular is eternal in the post-Soviet soil, as we can witness. After World War the Second when Western powers agreed to give freedom to their former colonies in Asia and Africa and when in 1991 Soviet Union ceased to exist it seemed that the page of empires was irreversibly closed. However, it only seemed.

In general, approaches concerning the revival of new empire on the CIS soil are divided mostly into two groups: those who believe in the resurrection of empire, and those who are sure that it is no more the case. For example, Dmitri Trenin in his book “Post-imperium: A Eurasian story” argues: “Russian Federation is not an empire...”<sup>8</sup> Alternatively, “The days of the Russian Empire are gone; Russia has entered a post-imperial world”<sup>9</sup>. To back his thesis, Trenin gives several arguments. The first of which is the assertion that “Russia is no longer synonymous with Eurasia...” and “Russian leaders define their country as a “great power.” Alternatively, “Russia’s interests in the neighborhood are real, but a privileged zone in that area is a chimera”<sup>10</sup> and interests in region, in Trenin’s opinion are about “soft” domination, not “hard” control”<sup>11</sup>. According to him, the difference between the two is that empire cares for its subjects, whereas

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<sup>8</sup>Trenin, D. (2011). Post-imperium: A Eurasian story. Carnegie Endowment. P. 81.  
<http://carnegieendowment.org/pdf/book/post-imperium.pdf>

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 200

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 37

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 81

great power pursues “self-interests”<sup>12</sup>. In his another book “The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border between Geopolitics and Globalization” Dmitri Trenin stated that though Russia all over the history had experienced failures, which were accompanied by loss of territory, but sooner dealt with difficulties and recovered losses and became bigger and mightier. At the same time the author doubts, whether the factors of rebirth in the past would appear in the future<sup>13</sup>. Contrary to Trenin’s position, Van Herpen, in his book, with the telling title “Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism”, states that Russia “is both a post-imperium state and a pre-imperium state”. In support of his thesis, Van Herpen focused primarily on regional integration initiatives in the so-called “near abroad,” which the author views as attempts to assert influence, which is a sound sign of re-imperialization<sup>14</sup>.

In recent years, myriad acts demonstrated by Russia elicited fears in international community led to accusations that Russia attempt to “revive the Soviet empire” or imperialistic aspirations in general. To start with domestic policy discourses, various articles and speeches of Putin and public figures should be recalled. Representatives of Russian Nationalist political groups declare: “Yes, we do want an empire!” A. Dugin, who is also considered as the ideological provider of Putin, states: “The rejection of imperialistic functions is equal to the death of the Russian nation as a historical reality.” According to Trenin, eagle, the symbol of the new Russia, resembles the one of the imperial one and not the “democratic” eagle, is a sign of willingness to return back to the imperialist Russia.<sup>15</sup> In his speeches and articles, V. Putin stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20<sup>th</sup> century”<sup>16</sup>.

Celebrating the important days of former Soviet Union, Soviet national anthem with new words deemed to be considered as a nostalgia and attempt to bring the Soviet times back. “Year of Culture” organized in 2014 emphasize the unique identity and exceptionalism of the new Russia<sup>17</sup>. Another ground to accuse Putin in imperialistic aspirations is the fact that there are many coincidences between his policy and Eurasianism, “an ideology of empire”<sup>18</sup>. To the list

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<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 86

<sup>13</sup> Trenin, D. (2002). The end of Eurasia: Russia on the border between geopolitics and globalization. Carnegie Endowment. P. 87. <http://josefdarski.pl/uploads/zalacznik/7134/dmitritrenin-theendofeurasiarussiaontheborderbetweengeopoliticsandglobalization2002.pdf>

<sup>14</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp.5-8. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>15</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006). Russian Foreign Policy towards Ukraine: a Case of New Imperialism? In International Young Researchers Conference, Miami University, pp. 2-3. <http://www.cas.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/KropatchevaFinal.pdf>

<sup>16</sup> Putin deplores of collapse of USSR, BBC News, 25.04.2005. Accessed 16.07.2014, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm>

<sup>17</sup> Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, kremlin.ru, 12.12.2013. Accessed 16.07.2014, <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6402>; Galeotti, M. & Bowen, S. A. (2014, April 21). Putin’s empire of the mind. How Russia’s president morphed from realist to ideology and what he will do next. Accessed 16.07.2014, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/04/21/putins-empire-of-the-mind/>

<sup>18</sup> Laruelle, M. (2008). Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire. Washington, DC: W. Wilson Center Press.

Beissinger's account for the persistence of the empire with regards to Russia as a practical category in the Eurasian politics must be added<sup>19</sup>.

Initiated new integration project called Eurasian Economic Union caused a new wave of discourse and accusations concerning the revival of Soviet Union accompanied with warnings that they will do everything to thwart the venture. To the point, in 2012 Hilary Clinton characterized the Eurasian Union as "a move to re-Sovietize the region", adding worriedly: "We know what the goal is and we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or prevent it"<sup>20</sup>. Contrary to the declarations about the resurgence of neo-empire or pessimistic claims on "meltdown of Eurasia"<sup>21</sup> or "end of Eurasia", the initiator of the project, participants and various official representatives of the Russian Federation (RF) had unequivocally heralded many times that there is no intention way back to collapsed Soviet Union. They are looking forward and envisioned that the Eurasian Union would become a value-based powerful supranational body.<sup>22</sup>

In general, the notion "empire" or "imperialism" generates controversial feelings. On the one side, it is used to praise and authorize the country, on the other side, to condemn it for practicing domination in the weaker countries. Apparently, in the era where the sovereign state is the principal unit of international relations, labeling any state's behavior as imperial deemed at disregarding it on the international arena.<sup>23</sup> In light of this, the current research paper studies Russian neo-imperialistic foreign and security policy and its implications in Russia's "near abroad". The author of this paper argues that Russia is aiming to build an Empire, through reasserting itself as a great power with "privileged areas of influence" but not because it dreams of past days, rather it fears of dismantlement. The vivid manifestation of which is fear of colored revolutions, as well as NATO's and EU's enlargement in its near abroad.

### **The purpose and the main problem of this paper**

The selection of the topic is more than authentic, at least, after the annexation of Ukraine's Crimea in 2014, on the eve of signing Association Agreements with the European Union.

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<sup>19</sup> Beissinger, M. R. (2008). The persistence of empire in Eurasia. NewsNet: News of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 48(1), p. 2.

<http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/beissinger.AAASSpresidentialaddress.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> Henley, J. (2014). A brief primer on Vladimir Putin's Eurasian dream. The guardian. Accessed 13.05.2014.

<http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/feb/18/brief-primer-vladimir-putin-eurasian-union-trade>

<sup>21</sup> Tsygankov, A. P. (2012). The heartland no more: Russia's weakness and Eurasia's meltdown. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 3(1), pp. 1-9. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1879366511000224/1-s2.0-S1879366511000224-main.pdf?\\_tid=60e27272-c2fd-11e3-8162-00000aacb35f&acdnat=1397388105\\_51abcfe3a11a00eeb1eeaf2755b945ac](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1879366511000224/1-s2.0-S1879366511000224-main.pdf?_tid=60e27272-c2fd-11e3-8162-00000aacb35f&acdnat=1397388105_51abcfe3a11a00eeb1eeaf2755b945ac)

<sup>22</sup> Vladimir, P. (2011, October 3). A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making. Izvestia, accessed 05.10.2014. <http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3->

<sup>23</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006). Russian Foreign Policy towards Ukraine: a Case of New Imperialism? In International Young Researchers Conference, Hayhurst Center, Miami University, Oxford, OH, p. 2. <http://www.cas.miamioh.edu/hayhurstcenter/KropatchevaFinal.pdf>

Aftermath the 2008 Georgian war, when its breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were recognized by Russia as independent states, the annexation of the Crimea was a vivid manifestation of Russia's imperial expansionism. To keep its role as a global player Russia needs to keep being integrated with prestigious international organizations, such as G8, United Nations Security Council, and CSTO. In order to escape from dismantlement, in line with above-mentioned organizations Russia needs to initiate new integration projects such as Eurasian Economic Union and strengthen the existing ones such as CSTO and keep the neighborhood in his orbit by using political, economic and security cards.

Hence, the hypothesis of this research is a Russian Empire is back under the guise of great power with an exclusive right to "sphere of influence" in the former Soviet Union. In order to prove or reject the thesis, the paper is to address the following research questions (RQ): 1. What is the definition of empire? 2. Which are the main postulates of Russian foreign and security policy? 3. Which are the main determinants of Russian neo-imperialism?

## **Methodology**

The present study will make a use of both quantitative and qualitative methods of analysis, in order to identify Russian imperialistic policy towards Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The quantitative method comprises secondary data based on the undertaken analyzes such as statistics, surveys and polls that seek to shed light on the Russian attitudes and perceptions towards former Soviet States and vice versa. As for the latter, i.e. qualitative method, the study refers to relevant policy documents, legal acts and newspaper articles.

Thus, along with the secondary sources, this research will also be based on primary data, such as legal documents, speeches, interviews, scientific journals, books, etc. The usage of such various methods by the author can be justified by the fact that the problems, set for research, are complex and multifold.

## **The Structure of the paper**

The study consists of the introductory part, main body and conclusion, references and abbreviations among others. The main body consists of four core parts.

The first and the second parts introduce the phenomena of "Empire" and "Eurasianism" as well as provides an overview of the main principles of those theories. The author describes them as multifaceted theories, over which until now there is not unified approach and they are inclined to take changes over time under specific circumstances. In the research are briefly defined the concepts of Empire and Eurasianism, their different forms, over-time evolutions and current policy debates and discussions. As for Eurasianism, the main concentration is on the Russian vision of the concept, its primary characteristics, evolution, and differentiation.

The third part of the theses presents the main postulates of Russian foreign and security policy proclaimed in core official documents and statements, its current course, implication, reflections.

The fourth part addresses the political, economic and military means of policy practice of official documents' key provisions in order to reach the primary goals aiming at sustaining its great power status in the region and forcing out other interested parties such as USA and EU among others. In the political dimension, the research examines Russian policy regarding separatism, Russian minorities abroad and the relationship between Russian and respective states' elites. In the military field are discussed how military means, in this case the Common Security and Treaty Organization (CSTO) and military bases, are used to fulfill imperialistic policy of expansionism in order to maintain access to important military and strategic locations and gain new territories, at the same time to securing Russia's borders. Finally, in the economic dimension research investigates Russian energy policy and aims of the Eurasian integration project.

In the end, a detailed conclusion, addressing the research questions.

## **1. Discourse on Empires**

### ***1.1 Theories of Empire***

There are many prototypes of empires, which have been unique in their essence and have influenced the historical path of other imperial formations.<sup>24</sup> Students classify empires into Roman and classical types; the latter also being known as colonial ones. The Roman-like empires are polities expanding over an immense territory, encompassing previously independent units of multi-ethnic communities. Empire is being governed by both local elites and using pre-existing structures exerting direct and indirect power. As Gary Marks described it, "Empires have a flexible, mosaic quality. They encompass but do not homogenize populations with diverse histories, languages, and religions, and they adopt a mix of strategies to impose their rule".<sup>25</sup>

Classical (colonial) empires (empires in 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries), with technological and cultural superiority specific to them, were advanced European states, exerting direct and indirect<sup>26</sup> power and authority over a colonial periphery.<sup>27</sup> Modern or colonial empires were concerned with the key dilemma - how on the one hand to hold together polities of vast territory, population, and,

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<sup>24</sup>Gerasimov, I., Glebov, S., Kusber, J., Mogilner, M., Semyonov, A. (2009). New imperial history and the Challenges of Empire, p. 5.

[https://www.academia.edu/3989561/New\\_Imperial\\_History\\_and\\_the\\_Challenges\\_of\\_Empire](https://www.academia.edu/3989561/New_Imperial_History_and_the_Challenges_of_Empire)

<sup>25</sup> Marks, G. (2012). Europe and Its Empires: From Rome to the European Union\*.JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(1), p.1. [http://www.falw.vu/~mlg/papers/marks\\_2012\\_europe%20and%20its%20empires.pdf](http://www.falw.vu/~mlg/papers/marks_2012_europe%20and%20its%20empires.pdf)

<sup>26</sup> Large parts of any colonial empires in Asia and Africa were ruled indirectly, through the local elites. (See Ferguson, N. (2004). Hegemony of Empire. Foreign Affairs, 82(4), p. 4.

[http://scholar.google.de/scholar?cluster=14197787446167380893&hl=en&as\\_sdt=0,5&scioldt=0,5](http://scholar.google.de/scholar?cluster=14197787446167380893&hl=en&as_sdt=0,5&scioldt=0,5)

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 7.

therefore, power, and on the other hand, to satisfy demands of nationalism, democracy and economic dynamics.<sup>28</sup> This period is characterized by the direct territorial acquisition as well as the expansion of economic interests.<sup>29</sup> There is also the third type of empire called hybrid, encompassing elements from either type described above. By 1914, The Russian Empire, the second largest one, had been a hybrid, sharing characteristics of both types of empires. Though Christian Russia was certainly culturally closer to Christian Europe and since the eighteenth century its elite had been westernized, it had difficulties to be recognized as Empire by its contemporaries. The matter was that Western colonial empires considered it as a backward state, not akin to their administrative, cultural and religious systems.<sup>30</sup> The Uniqueness of Russian Empire was also in the fact that it had gradually been transformed into a single state, encompassing the whole territory of the former empire.<sup>31</sup>

In contrast, the Soviet Union, being a post-imperial form of power, from its inception, eschewed application of the term empire to state. However, due to its imperial behavior eventually gained a widespread imperial reputation.<sup>32</sup> A distinguishing feature of the Soviet Union was the fact that it was seeking to extend its influence and control in a world through such norms as sovereignty and self-determination, for the most part without practicing territorial expansion, which is the permanent and supreme aim of empire politics.<sup>33</sup> Hence, this aspect gives way to everlasting debates on how to classify the Soviet Union.<sup>34</sup>

## ***1.2 The characteristics of “Empire” per se***

The etymology of the word “empire” derives from the Latin word “imperium,” meaning a “legitimate authority or power” over an enormous territory, containing formerly independent diverse communities.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Lieven, D. (1999). Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 34 (2), 165. <http://ebooks.z0ro.com/ebooks/Articles/Dilemmas%20of%20Empire%20Lieven.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006, October). Russian Foreign Policy towards Ukraine: a Case of New Imperialism? In International Young Researchers Conference, Hayighurst Center, Miami University, Oxford, OH, p. 4. <http://www.cas.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/KropatchevaFinal.pdf>

<sup>30</sup> Lieven, D. (1999). Dilemmas of Empire 1850-1918. Power, Territory, Identity. *Journal of Contemporary History*, 34 (2), 163. <http://ebooks.z0ro.com/ebooks/Articles/Dilemmas%20of%20Empire%20Lieven.pdf>

<sup>31</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006, October). Russian Foreign Policy towards Ukraine: a Case of New Imperialism? In International Young Researchers Conference, Hayighurst Center, Miami University, Oxford, OH, p. 4. <http://www.cas.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/KropatchevaFinal.pdf>

<sup>32</sup> Beissinger, M. R. (2008). The persistence of empire in Eurasia. *NewsNet: News of the Amerixcan Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies*, 48(1), p. 1. <http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/beissinger.AAASpresidentialaddress.pdf>

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p. 4.

<sup>34</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006, October). Russian Foreign Policy towards Ukraine: a Case of New Imperialism? In International Young Researchers Conference, Hayighurst Center, Miami University, Oxford, OH, p. 4. <http://www.cas.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/KropatchevaFinal.pdf>

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. p. 3.

Michael Doyle defines empire as “a relationship, formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of another political society”<sup>36</sup>. This form of domination is achieved by indirect rule exercised by the elites of the conquered peripheries. The fundamental feature of imperial rule presumes no direct intervention into the internal and external policies of subjugated peripheries by the center while exerting “final authority... over the vital political decisions” of the periphery. According to Stephen Howe, “an empire is a large, composite, multi-ethnic or multinational political unit, usually created by conquest, and divided between a dominant center and subordinate, sometimes far distant, peripheries.”<sup>37</sup> Beissinger describes empire “as a large-scale system of alien domination.”<sup>38</sup> Michael Mann terms Empire as a state of “a differentiated set of institutions and personnel, embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a center to a cover territorially demarcated area, over which it claims a monopoly of binding and permanent rule-making, backed up by physical violence”.<sup>39</sup>

Related definitions of the empire, usually overlapping, attempted to combine core qualities of the empire, focusing on such elements as size, diversity, hierarchy, heterogeneity, conquest, alienation. However, research has shown that scholars do not unequivocally share the criteria, mentioned above. For instance, speaking about empire, the first connotation is related to its scale. It depends on a certain historical context. It would be misleading to consider “scale” as an absolute quantitative threshold for imperial polities. If the size had been the critical determinant, the history would not have experienced city-state empires, such as Carthage, Athens. As for diversity, it is of a limited value in defining empire, simply because all pre-nation states in history, bigger than city-states, tended to be heterogeneous in terms of language, religion, and other cultural characteristics. On the other hand, scholars agree that pivotal components in defining empire are core-periphery dichotomy and the ability to employ “final authority ... over the vital political decisions” of the periphery that work well both for pre-modern and modern empires.<sup>40</sup> However, the shortcomings of the theories proves that neither of them defines the set of primary determinants, characterizing an empire.

### ***1.3 Theories of imperialism***

Classical theories of imperialism explain the pursuit of imperialism by emphasizing one or more independent variables, such as economic, security, ideational, geopolitical. Given the fundamental determinants of political theories of imperialism, three main streams are identified:

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<sup>36</sup> Doyle, M. (1986). *Empires*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. P. 45.

<sup>37</sup> Scheidel, W. (2006). *Republics between hegemony and empire: How ancient city-states built empires and the USA doesn't (anymore)*. Stanford University, p. 3. <https://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/020601.pdf>

<sup>38</sup> Beissinger, M. R. (2008). *The persistence of empire in Eurasia*. *NewsNet: News of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies*, 48(1), p.4.

<http://www.princeton.edu/~mbeissin/beissinger.AAASSpresidentialaddress.pdf>

<sup>39</sup> Scheidel, W. (2006). *Republics between hegemony and empire: How ancient city-states built empires and the USA doesn't (anymore)*. Stanford University, p. 2. <https://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/020601.pdf>

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 3-4.

metrocentric theory (Hobson, Lenin), pericentric theory (John Gallagher, Ronald Robinson) and systemic theory (Benjamin Cohen, A.J.P. Taylor).

Metrocentric theory focuses on the motives of metropole that “push” states to pursue imperialism. Core nations pursue an expansionist foreign policy and initiate relations with peripheral nations in order to exploit them economically. Hobson argued: “British imperialism resulted from pressure from domestic special interests of finance”, and Lenin stated, that “imperialism is the final monopoly stage of capitalism”<sup>41</sup>.

Pericentric theory emphasized the conditions of peripheral nations; the “pull” factors determine the incentives for states to pursue empire. According to this theory, core nations dominated peripheral ones due to the profitable collaboration of outer elite with the core powers or unstable political conditions, which necessitate states to practice formal imperialism. Finally, systemic theories of imperialism highlight disparity of power politics, which ultimately results in an empire.<sup>42</sup>

There have been different motives for imperial expansion. Various theories emphasize different determinants as a primary variable of imperial expansion: economic, security, ideational, geopolitical. Interpretation of economic imperialism is the pursuit of economic interests of core nations through opening new markets in order to control economies of “colonial” nations, enlargement of investment opportunities, increasing access to human and natural resources of peripheral nations and coping with economic instabilities. A second group of variables of imperial expansion is connected with security argument. Proponents of this argument stated, that core nations strive to secure their security through maintaining military bases or other strategic structures on the soil of peripheral states. The control of communication lines, territorial expansion in order to obtain buffer states or “natural” frontiers is other tools for security imperialism, which are functional instruments in case of international competition. Here, expansion is a virtual means of defense. Paradox is that “security dilemma” in International Relations is one of the main causes of international conflict. Thirdly, “ideational” or “civilizational” arguments of imperial expansion were another justification of imperialist policies for different rulers, which present their expansion as a way of liberation through bringing civilization and high level of life. Finally, geopolitics is another rationale for imperialism. According to geo-politicians its size, location, and territories under its control condition power and prestige of respective state in international arena.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> Gent, S. (2009). Military Occupation and Intervention. Paper for the 67<sup>th</sup> Annual National Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, p 5. [http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p362047\\_index.html](http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p362047_index.html)

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. p. 5.

<sup>43</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006, October). Russian Foreign Policy towards Ukraine: a Case of New Imperialism? In International Young Researchers Conference, Hayighurst Center, Miami University, Oxford, OH, pp. 4-5. <http://www.cas.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/KropatchevaFinal.pdf>

### *1.4 Merging empire with great power*

In order to understand imperial formations, it is also necessary to overview great power discourses. Yet, what is the definition of the concept of “Great Power”? Since the set of countries is known as Great Powers, there is not an exhausted list of capabilities, requirements to be met by respective states in order to be recognized as “great”. Accordingly, existing lists of great powers at any given time is based on consensus or “inter-coder agreement” achieved among scholars.<sup>44</sup> Hence, power is conceived as a complex amalgam of various factors, among which neither is determinant variable.

Theorists of international relation have made attempts to define the term. For example, for Martin Wight, major power<sup>45</sup> comprises many tangible components, such as population, strategic position/geography, economic resources and industrial production and less tangible ones as administrative and financial efficiency, education and technological skill, and moral cohesion. Quincy Wright and Martin Wight define dominant/great power in terms of capability confidently fighting a war against any power or allies of states.<sup>46</sup>

By Von Ranke’s definition great power is the state that by virtue of its economic and military might preserves mutually recognized zone of interests where has right to monitor (droit de regard) endued by other great powers. These powers are members of various committees where they decide themselves to take responsibility and intervene even in something that does not directly concern them.<sup>47</sup> To Ranke, sphere of interests, relatively superior military and economic strength are a very crucial element of greatness and prestige.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Danilovic, V. (2002). When the stakes are high. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, p.26.

<https://www.press.umich.edu/pdf/0472112872-ch2.pdf>; see also Rynn, J. (2001). The Power to Create Wealth: A systems-based theory of the rise and decline of the Great Powers in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The City University of New York, pp. 2-3.

<http://economieconstruction.org/sites/economieconstruction.com/static/JonRynn/FirstChapterDissertation.pdf>

<sup>45</sup> Different scholars use different terms for great power notion, such as “great power”, “major power” or “first-rate power”, so in the reading the author will use all mentioned terms interchangeably. (See Danilovic, V. (2002). When the stakes are high. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 27-28.

[http://www.press.umich.edu/16953/when\\_the\\_stakes\\_are\\_high/?s=look\\_inside](http://www.press.umich.edu/16953/when_the_stakes_are_high/?s=look_inside); Neumann, I. B. (2007). When did Russia become a Great Power? Realist, Constructivist and Post-Structuralist Answers. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association 48<sup>th</sup> Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA, p. 2. [http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p179679\\_index.html](http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p179679_index.html), Waltz, K. N. (1993). The emerging structure of international politics. International security, 18(2), p. 45.

<http://ir.rochelleterman.com/sites/default/files/Waltz%201993.pdf>

<sup>46</sup> Rynn, J. (2001). The Power to Create Wealth: A systems-based theory of the rise and decline of the Great Powers in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Political Science, The City University of New York, pp. 5-6; 12.

<http://economieconstruction.org/sites/economieconstruction.com/static/JonRynn/FirstChapterDissertation.pdf>

<sup>47</sup> Neumann, I. B. (2007). When did Russia become a Great Power? Realist, Constructivist and Post-Structuralist Answers. Paper for the 48<sup>th</sup> Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Hilton Chicago, Chicago, IL, USA, p. 2. [http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p179679\\_index.html](http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p179679_index.html)

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p. 6.

According to Hans Morgenthau, great power depends as much on material power, as on developed infrastructures, possession of trucks, ships, airplanes, tanks, equipment, weapons of all kinds, geography, military leadership and industrial capacity. Referring to material power, he considers that the competition among nations for power ultimately is a competition for the production of more developed armaments of war.<sup>49</sup>

Thus, Morgenthau states that industrial power leads to military power, which is the base for national power as far as each nation's ultimate goal is to ensure its territorial integrity and security.

When making parallels between empire and great power notions, one could see similarities between these two concepts. In both cases, a state attempts to assert formal or informal control over a foreign territory. Both require the presence of military power to extract resources and defend their interests, territorial integrity, and security. They both employ their power over the peripheral states or zones of influence in economic, ideational, geopolitical dimensions. In both cases, expansionist policy exists and in both cases, the status, prescribed by a respective state, requires acceptance by others. Hence, today's empire is not what it used to be.

With the rise of international norms of sovereignty and self-determination, the politics of culture and historical memory play a significant role in the empire-making. Even though, the essential attributes of empire rest upon a division of states into the exploiter and the exploited, the former being "core" or "metropole" nations or great powers, and the latter embracing all "peripheral" and colonial nations. Hence, in the following study, the "empire" is associated with "interventionist great power"<sup>50</sup> (metropole), exerting influence through economic, security, political tools on states considered as their "zones of influence" (periphery), sometimes even followed with direct intervention and, their interventionist foreign policy over the weaker states' domestic and foreign policies is interpreted through the prism of "new" imperialism<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>49</sup> Rynn, J. (2001). The Power to Create Wealth: A systems-based theory of the rise and decline of the Great Powers in the 20th century. Political Science, The City University of New York, pp. 25-26.

<http://economicreconstruction.org/sites/economicreconstruction.com/static/JonRynn/FirstChapterDissertation.pdf>;  
<http://economicreconstruction.org/JonRynn>

<sup>50</sup> "Interventionist great powers" phrase is taken from Scheidel, W., (2004). Republics between hegemony and empire: How ancient city-states built empires and the USA doesn't (anymore). Stanford University, p. 11.  
<https://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/020601.pdf>

<sup>51</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006, October). Russian Foreign Policy towards Ukraine: a Case of New Imperialism?. In International Young Researchers Conference, Hayighurst Center, Miami University, Oxford, OH, pp. 4-5.  
<http://www.cas.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/Kropatchevainal.pdf>.

*“The state that controls the Pivot Area, the so-called Heartland, which includes most of Russia and Central Asia, will dominate not only in geographic Eurasia, but throughout the world.”<sup>52</sup>*

*Halford Mackinder*

## 2. Eurasianism

### 2.1 The concept “Eurasia”

The term Eurasia is a debatable and deceptive notion in the time and space and has no enhanced consistent connotation in terms of meanings, implications, and ramifications<sup>53</sup>. However, the first connotation is related to the geography that is the vast territory encompassing Europe and Asia. This huge territory, which David Cristian divided into “Inner Eurasia” and “Outer Eurasia”,<sup>54</sup> over the history was dominated by empires: Roman, Byzantine, Kievan Rus, Mongol, Moscovite, Russian Empire and Soviet Union<sup>55</sup>. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the term “Eurasia” was chosen as a convenient alternate to refer to the space of “post-Soviet area”<sup>56</sup>.

Today’s Russian Federation, which is situated on the pivotal geographical position of “Inner Eurasia”, considers itself as the heir of the former empires, thereby emphasizing its messianic origin. On the one hand, presenting itself as the inheritor of Roman and Byzantine empires, Russia underlines the idea of “Moscow, the Third Rome”, which predestined Russia’s rule in the world<sup>57</sup>. On the other hand, considering itself as the successor of Genghis Khan, Russia

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<sup>52</sup> Papava, V. (2013). The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of "Central Caucasus-Asia". *Russian Politics and Law*, 51(6), p. 53.

[http://www.papava.info/publications/V\\_Papava\\_Eurasianism\\_and\\_Caucaso\\_Asia.pdf](http://www.papava.info/publications/V_Papava_Eurasianism_and_Caucaso_Asia.pdf)

<sup>53</sup> Mostafa, G. (2013). The concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and its implications. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 4(2), p. 160. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?\\_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029\\_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b)

<sup>54</sup> According to Christian “Inner Eurasia” constitutes of the lands of former Soviet Union including Mongolia and Xinjiang, the most western Autonomous Region of China. “Outer Eurasia” encompasses Europe, the Mediterranean basin, Southwest Asia, the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and China. (See Christian, D. (1994). Inner Eurasia as a unit of world history. *Journal of World History*, 5(2), pp. 175, 179.

<http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20078598?uid=2134&uid=390456471&uid=3737864&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=390456461&uid=60&purchase-type=both&accessType=none&sid=21106551927943&showMyJstorPss=false&seq=4&showAccess=false>

<sup>55</sup> Christian, D. (1994). Inner Eurasia as a unit of world history. *Journal of World History*, 5(2), p. 176. <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20078598?uid=2134&uid=390456471&uid=3737864&uid=2&uid=70&uid=3&uid=390456461&uid=60&purchase-type=both&accessType=none&sid=21106551927943&showMyJstorPss=false&seq=4&showAccess=false>

<sup>56</sup> Gleason, A. (2010). Eurasia: What is it? Is it? *Journal of Eurasian studies*, 1(1), p. 26. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1879366509000037/1-s2.0-S1879366509000037-main.pdf?\\_tid=501a0b98-d3ed-11e3-90a2-00000aab0f6c&acdnat=1399250375\\_853555e7c9100953f41a98710da1c075](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1879366509000037/1-s2.0-S1879366509000037-main.pdf?_tid=501a0b98-d3ed-11e3-90a2-00000aab0f6c&acdnat=1399250375_853555e7c9100953f41a98710da1c075)

<sup>57</sup> Marshall, T. P. (1997). “Moscow, the Third Rome” the origins and transformations of a pivotal moment. Harvard University, p. i. <http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceer/1997-811-25-Poe.pdf>

preserves the right to dominate the vast pivotal territory of Eurasia, formerly united under the Mongol Empire<sup>58</sup>.

The idea of “Third Rome” was coined in the sixteenth century by Russian Monk Filofei. Initially, the idea was not popular among Russian political elite. In political thought, it gained momentum in the nineteenth century. Calling itself “Third Rome”, Russia ascribes the main characteristics of Rome and Constantinople, known as the “Second Rome”. Those main determinants of Rome and Constantinople are the empire without end, expansionism, messianism and world domination.<sup>59</sup> Interestingly, aforementioned ideological elements can be found in the Eurasian concept, “ideology of empire”, in Marlene Laruelle’s phrase. In the Russian political domain, a number of very different Eurasian perceptions and postulates are speculated among scholars, practitioners, politicians.<sup>60</sup> To simplify the common aspects of the concept defined by Eurasianists, which are very often combined and mixed in the academic literature<sup>61</sup>, the following constellation of perceptions will be interpreted. Thus, Eurasianism is an idea of cultural dialog between Russian-Slavic and the nomadic ones; the definition of the super ethnic collectivity; ideological and political movement of the 1920s-30s; an idea of regional integration in the Eurasian territory; ideology supporting establishment of the Russian World Empire.<sup>62</sup> The term “Eurasian” was invented in the 19th century “to refer to children of mixed European-Asian couples”.<sup>63</sup> Later it developed to emphasize two main dimensions of Eurasian thought: geographical and politico-philosophical-ideological.<sup>64</sup>

Russian-Eurasian ideology was formed over the course of the Russian-Eurasian historiography between 9th and 21st centuries and has the following phases of evolution. The furthest stage is

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<sup>58</sup> Slawomir, M. (2002). Russian Eurasianism: Historiography and Ideology. *Studies in East European Thought*, 54 (1/2), p. 112. <http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/20099785?uid=3737864&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21106553796243>

<sup>59</sup> Marshall, T. P. (1997). “Moscow, the Third Rome” the origins and transformations of a pivotal moment. Harvard University, p. i-2. <http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/nceer/1997-811-25-Poe.pdf>

<sup>60</sup> Mostafa, G. (2013). The concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and its implications. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 4(2), p. 161. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?\\_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029\\_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b)

<sup>61</sup> Vinokurov, E. & Libman, A. (2012). Eurasia and Eurasian Integration: Beyond the Post-Soviet Borders. Published in: EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook No. 2012 (2012). pp. 83-84. [http://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49182/1/MPRA\\_paper\\_49182.pdf](http://mpira.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49182/1/MPRA_paper_49182.pdf)

<sup>62</sup> Mostafa, G. (2013). The concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and its implications. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 4(2), p. 162. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?\\_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029\\_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b)

<sup>63</sup> Vinokurov, E., & Libman, A. (2012). Eurasian integration: Challenges of transcontinental regionalism. Palgrave Macmillan. (The scope of Eurasian Integration). P. 16. [http://books.google.de/books?hl=en&lr=&id=-0Vb4PyBfQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=The+Concept+of+Eurasian+Integration,+vinokurov&ots=IPBeu0jF-J&sig=mlFbGoYk6gxN2N\\_L7bK9Z6LM-s8#v=onepage&q=The%20Concept%20of%20Eurasian%20Integration%2C%20vinokurov&f=false](http://books.google.de/books?hl=en&lr=&id=-0Vb4PyBfQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=The+Concept+of+Eurasian+Integration,+vinokurov&ots=IPBeu0jF-J&sig=mlFbGoYk6gxN2N_L7bK9Z6LM-s8#v=onepage&q=The%20Concept%20of%20Eurasian%20Integration%2C%20vinokurov&f=false)

<sup>64</sup> Sevim, T. V. (2013). Eurasian Union: A Utopia, a Dream or a Coming Reality? *Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics*, 6 (12), p. 46. <http://www.ejbe.org/EJBE2013Vol06No12p043-SEVIM.pdf>

“Kievan Rus”, from 882 until 1283, which is not admitted by classical Eurasianists unequivocally as a period connected to Eurasianism and is interpreted dualistically. Vernadsky considered that it had core Eurasian aspect, whereas most of the other Eurasianists perceive it as “exterior European element to the Eurasian history”.<sup>65</sup> The following span is called “Mongolian”, lasted from 13th until 15th centuries. The Mongolian period is known as a precursor of single Eurasian statehood, cultural, ethnic, and religious tolerance.<sup>66</sup>

Precisely “ideocratia” was the prevailed power and main characteristics of this period.<sup>67</sup> The next “Moscowi” period encompasses timeframe between 15<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries.<sup>68</sup> It is characterized as a period when the Western element has been eradicated from Russian culture and was determined a unique mission of the Russian- Eurasian civilizational community.<sup>69</sup> The fourth period is an “imperial” one, from 18<sup>th</sup> until the beginning of 20<sup>th</sup> centuries<sup>70</sup>, which is typified as a symbol of Europeanism and loss of national homogeneity.<sup>71</sup> The fifth is “classic Eurasian” phase, dated back from 1920 until 1988 and known as a broad multidisciplinary concept. The last stage is “Neo-Eurasian”, emerged in 1990s, characterized as a flexible concept adapting to the new political needs and having an influence on Russia’s foreign policy.<sup>72</sup>

## 2.2 Classical Eurasianism

It was already mentioned, that the Russian-Eurasian ideology<sup>73</sup> sprang in the 1920s, aftermath of the collapse of the Russian Empire. The founders of the movement were well-known members of

<sup>65</sup> Marlene Laruelle, The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solution for the Post Soviet Space. P. 6; Haggman, B. (2011). From Minsk To Vladivostok -- Is it an East Slavic Civilization? Comparative Civilizations Review, 64, p. 70.

<https://journals.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR/article/viewFile/12930/12794>

<sup>66</sup> Lushnikov, O. (2008). Predposilki, Formorovanie i rasvitie evrasijskoi idei: Istorija i sovremennost [Background, formation and development of the Eurasian idea: Past and present]. P. 12. <http://v4.udsu.ru/files/1230004249.pdf>

<sup>67</sup> Marlene Laruelle, The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solituion for the Post Soviet Space. P. 7.

<sup>68</sup> Lushnikov, O. (2008). Predposilki, Formorovanie i rasvitie evrasijskoi idei: Istorija i sovremennost [Background, formation and development of the Eurasian idea: Past and present]. P. 12. <http://v4.udsu.ru/files/1230004249.pdf>

<sup>69</sup> Marlene Laruelle, The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solituion for the Post Soviet Space. P. 13.

<sup>70</sup> Lushnikov, O. (2008). Predposilki, Formorovanie i rasvitie evrasijskoi idei: Istorija i sovremennost [Background, formation and development of the Eurasian idea: Past and present]. P. 12. <http://v4.udsu.ru/files/1230004249.pdf>

<sup>71</sup> Marlene Laruelle, The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solituion for the Post Soviet Space. P. 9.

<sup>72</sup> Lushnikov, O. (2008). Predposilki, Formorovanie i rasvitie evrasijskoi idei: Istorija i sovremennost [Background, formation and development of the Eurasian idea: Past and present]. P. 12. <http://v4.udsu.ru/files/1230004249.pdf>

<sup>73</sup> Apart from the Russian Eurasia or Eurasianism, there are also other forms of Eurasianism including Kazakhstani, Turkish, etc. (More on these topic see Mostafa, G. (2013). The concept of ‘Eurasia’: Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and its implications. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 4(2), pp. 160-170. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?\\_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029\\_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b); Papava, V. (2013). The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of " Central Caucaso-Asia". Russian Politics and Law, 51(6), pp. 45-86. [http://www.papava.info/publications/V\\_Papava\\_Eurasianism\\_and\\_Caucaso\\_Asia.pdf](http://www.papava.info/publications/V_Papava_Eurasianism_and_Caucaso_Asia.pdf); Laruelle, M. (2004). The two

the Russian intelligentsia and intellectual circles, who were forced to exile after the October Revolution: Prince Nikolai Troubetskoi (1890-1938), historian George Vernadskii (1887-1973), lawyer Nikolay Alekseyev, Lev Karsavin (1882-1952), Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), Petr Suvchinsky (1892-1985).<sup>74</sup> Classical Eurasianists characterize October Revolution as a victory over the imposed European culture by the Russian people and opening of new perspectives for the individualization of Eurasia.<sup>75</sup> However, post-revolutionary Russia faced an identity crisis and hardships in maintaining the territorial integrity of Russia in the scope of the former empire and in this respect rise of Eurasian ideology was more than proper.<sup>76</sup> One of the core postulates of classical Eurasianism is the existence of civilizations.<sup>77</sup> The matter was that the October Revolution overlapped with the end of the First World War and the inception of the decolonization epoch of Europe<sup>78</sup>. In the emerged political situation, the Russian pan-Eurasian nationalists were worried about the possible implications of the Wilsonian principles<sup>79</sup> of national sovereignty and self-determination<sup>80</sup>. They feared of the rise of regional identities (pan-Islamism, pan-Turkism, pan-Asianism and so on), which could lead to the disintegration of the former imperial-Eurasian common space, hereby, put into a circulation the pan-Eurasian ideology<sup>81</sup>.

The new Eurasian philosophical thought prepared totally new premises and conceptual ground to address the political reality<sup>82</sup>, though sometimes in marginalized and self-defeating manner by restricting the Russian element and weakening its dominant position<sup>83</sup>. They claimed that the

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faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian nationalism. *Nationalities Papers*, 32(1), 115-136).

<sup>74</sup> Haggman, B. (2011). From Minsk To Vladivostok -- Is it an East Slavic Civilization?. *Comparative Civilizations Review*, Spring 2011, 64, pp. 67-68. <https://journals.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR/article/viewFile/12930/12794>

<sup>75</sup> Matern, F. (2007). The discourse of civilization in the works of Russia's New Eurasianists: Lev Gumilev and Alexander Panarin. *YCISS Post-Communist Studies Programme Research Paper Series*, 2, p. 7. <http://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10315/1375/YCI0043.pdf?sequence=1>

<sup>76</sup> Bassin, M. (2003). Classical Eurasianism and the geopolitics of Russian identity. *Ab imperio*, 2, p. 6. [http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK\\_BASSIN\\_CLASSICAL\\_EURASIANISM\\_AND\\_THE\\_GEOPOLITICS\\_OF\\_RUSSIAN\\_IDENTITY.pdf](http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK_BASSIN_CLASSICAL_EURASIANISM_AND_THE_GEOPOLITICS_OF_RUSSIAN_IDENTITY.pdf)

<sup>77</sup> Laruelle, M. (2004). The two faces of contemporary Eurasianism: an imperial version of Russian nationalism. *Nationalities Papers*, 32(1), p. 116.

<sup>78</sup> Matern, F. (2007). The discourse of civilization in the works of Russia's New Eurasianists: Lev Gumilev and Alexander Panarin, p. 1. <http://yorkspace.library.yorku.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10315/1375/YCI0043.pdf?sequence=1>

<sup>79</sup> Defining element of Wilsonianism is the conviction that a leading priority of U.S. foreign policy should be the promotion of democratic government the world around—"national self-determination". *Encyclopedia of new American Nation*. <http://www.americanforeignrelations.com/O-W/Wilsonianism.html>

<sup>80</sup> Bassin, M. (2003). Classical Eurasianism and the geopolitics of Russian identity. *Ab imperio*, 2, pp.8-10. [http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK\\_BASSIN\\_CLASSICAL\\_EURASIANISM\\_AND\\_THE\\_GEOPOLITICS\\_OF\\_RUSSIAN\\_IDENTITY.pdf](http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK_BASSIN_CLASSICAL_EURASIANISM_AND_THE_GEOPOLITICS_OF_RUSSIAN_IDENTITY.pdf)

<sup>81</sup> Shnirelman, V. (2009). To make a bridge: Eurasian discourse in the post-Soviet world. *Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 27(2), p. 68. <http://scholarworks.dlib.indiana.edu/journals/index.php/aeer/article/viewFile/169/262>

<sup>82</sup> Haggman, B. (2011). From Minsk To Vladivostok -- Is it an East Slavic Civilization?. *Comparative Civilizations Review*, Spring 2011, 64, pp. 67-68. <https://journals.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR/article/viewFile/12930/12794>

<sup>83</sup> Bassin, M. (2003). Classical Eurasianism and the geopolitics of Russian identity. *Ab imperio*, 2, p. 6.

Russian imperial domination was no longer a past phenomenon and the Russians are one of the Eurasia's multi-cultural "ethnographic" diversity, hence, have no legal right to the conventional hegemonic position within the larger geographical-political area of Eurasia. This statement tends to wipe the tracks of imperialism and the connection to the Europe accordingly<sup>84</sup> as well as to create a new identity for the peoples living in the post-imperial soil. The new identity should be based not only on anthropological or racial criteria but on cultural as well, suggesting a Eurasian identity instead of the imperial Russian, hence, creating Eurasian civilization and ethos, as a result of and substitute to the pluralism of the ethnic groups<sup>85</sup>. They claim that territory, nearly matching with the former Russian and Soviet empires, encompasses the Slavic and East-Turanian cultural zones and by virtue of its anthropological-racial considerations is dominantly Eurasian, also due to the Turkic blood<sup>86</sup>. In a nutshell, they tried to justify the existence of multi-ethnic state claiming that peoples of former Russian Empire living over the centuries together share core characteristics to set the basis of political entity<sup>87</sup>.

Respectively, they created the ideology of Pan-Eurasian nationalism, which is a single but multi-ethnic Eurasian nation and the ethnic fundament of the Eurasian nation statehood, grounded primarily on the conciseness of brotherhood contrary to the consciousness of belonging to any other group. This approach was virtually and vitally necessary to keep the territory away from falling into pieces<sup>88</sup>.

Underlining Russia's non-belonging to Europe, they go further, claiming that geographically Russia occupied an immense region between the European and Asian continents. Consequently, it "objectively" formed quite a new entity on its own, called Eurasia, geographically stretching from "the Danube estuary to the Lena River basin of Siberia"<sup>89</sup>.

According to Halford Mackinder, Euro-Asia is the pivot region of world's politics, where Mongol empire was replaced by Russian, endowing it with the central strategic position in the world.<sup>90</sup> They strived to present Eurasia as an indivisible entity, ascribing to it characters of a nation-state based on its physical-geographical configurations so as to avoid its further

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[http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK\\_BASSIN\\_CLASSICAL\\_EURASIANISM\\_AND\\_THE\\_GEOPOLITICS\\_OF\\_RUSSIAN\\_IDENTITY.pdf](http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK_BASSIN_CLASSICAL_EURASIANISM_AND_THE_GEOPOLITICS_OF_RUSSIAN_IDENTITY.pdf)

<sup>84</sup>Ibid. p. 3.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. pp.8-9.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid. pp. 2-3.

<sup>87</sup> Sevim, T. V. (2013). Eurasian Union: A Utopia, a Dream or a Coming Reality? Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, 6 (12), p. 46. <http://www.ejbe.org/EJBE2013Vol06No12p043-SEVIM.pdf>

<sup>88</sup> Bassin, M. (2003). Classical Eurasianism and the geopolitics of Russian identity. *Ab imperio*, 2, pp.8-10.

[http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK\\_BASSIN\\_CLASSICAL\\_EURASIANISM\\_AND\\_THE\\_GEOPOLITICS\\_OF\\_RUSSIAN\\_IDENTITY.pdf](http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK_BASSIN_CLASSICAL_EURASIANISM_AND_THE_GEOPOLITICS_OF_RUSSIAN_IDENTITY.pdf)

<sup>89</sup> Haggman, B. (2011). From Minsk To Vladivostok -- Is it an East Slavic Civilization?. *Comparative Civilizations Review*, Spring 2011, Issue 64, p. 68. <https://journals.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR/article/viewFile/12930/12794>

<sup>90</sup> Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The geographical pivot of history. *The Geographical Journal*, 23(4), 435-436.

[http://www.nuevageopolitica.com/resources/Textos\\_Geopolitica/MacKinder,%20The%20Geographical%20Pivot%20of%20History.pdf](http://www.nuevageopolitica.com/resources/Textos_Geopolitica/MacKinder,%20The%20Geographical%20Pivot%20of%20History.pdf)

fragmentation. They supported the idea of Eurasia-nation-state, by positing natural-geographical teleology of the Eurasian continent<sup>91</sup>. To the point, Trubetskoi's stated: "By its very nature Eurasia is historically destined to comprise a single state entity."<sup>92</sup> Hence, physical configuration and natural milieu of this landmass oblige to create a natural geopolitical entity with solid political, cultural, and economic unity<sup>93</sup>.

Comprehensively taken, Trubetskoi can be cited: "[T]here is no return to the situation in which Russians were the sole owner of the state territory, and, clearly, no other people can play such a role. Consequently, the national substratum of the state formerly known as the Russian Empire and as the USSR can only be the totality of peoples inhabiting that state, taken as peculiar multiethnic nation and as such possessed of its own nationalism. We call that nation Eurasian, its territory Eurasia, and its nationalism Eurasianism"<sup>94</sup>. The new approach was merely based on ethno-cultural and geographical concepts and identified Russia as a third world, belonging neither to the West nor to Asia,<sup>95</sup> nor even genuinely to the Slavic world<sup>96</sup>, but with a straightforward anti-western outlook<sup>97</sup>.

In order to ascribe Russia a belonging to the Messianic origin, Eurasianist consider it as the successor of Chingiz Khan's empire, which is considered to be the prototype of the first Eurasian geopolitical entity<sup>98</sup>, as well as the Roman and Byzantine Empires, later transformed into the Muscovite Empire<sup>99</sup>. Likewise, it bears the double nature of the West and the East and serves as a bridge to connect these two cultures. They created a myth of Moscow as the Third Rome, based on the religious, geographic and territorial affiliations inherited from the former

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<sup>91</sup> Haggman, B. (2011). From Minsk To Vladivostok -- Is it an East Slavic Civilization?. Comparative Civilizations Review, Spring 2011, Issue 64, p. 68. <https://journals.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR/article/viewFile/12930/12794>

<sup>92</sup>Bassin, M. (2003). Classical Eurasianism and the geopolitics of Russian identity. Ab imperio, 2, pp. 1-3 [http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK\\_BASSIN\\_CLASSICAL\\_EURASIANISM\\_AND\\_THE\\_GEOPOLITICS\\_OF\\_RUSSIAN\\_IDENTITY.pdf](http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK_BASSIN_CLASSICAL_EURASIANISM_AND_THE_GEOPOLITICS_OF_RUSSIAN_IDENTITY.pdf)

<sup>93</sup>Ibid. pp. 3-5.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid. pp. 9-10.

<sup>95</sup> Laruelle, M., The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solution for the Post Soviet Space. P. 2. <http://www.units.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/publications/documents/Laruelle.pdf>

<sup>96</sup> Haggman, B. (2011). From Minsk To Vladivostok -- Is it an East Slavic Civilization?. Comparative Civilizations Review, Spring 2011, Issue 64, p. 68. <https://journals.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR/article/viewFile/12930/12794>

<sup>97</sup>Bassin, M. (2008). Eurasianism „Classical“ and „Neo“: Lines of Continuity. Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context, p. 284. [http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17\\_ses/14bassin.pdf](http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17_ses/14bassin.pdf)

<sup>98</sup> Bassin, M. (2003). Classical Eurasianism and the geopolitics of Russian identity. Ab imperio, 2, p. 5. [http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK\\_BASSIN\\_CLASSICAL\\_EURASIANISM\\_AND\\_THE\\_GEOPOLITICS\\_OF\\_RUSSIAN\\_IDENTITY.pdf](http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK_BASSIN_CLASSICAL_EURASIANISM_AND_THE_GEOPOLITICS_OF_RUSSIAN_IDENTITY.pdf)

<sup>99</sup> Haggman, B. (2011). From Minsk To Vladivostok -- Is it an East Slavic Civilization?. Comparative Civilizations Review, Spring 2011, Issue 64, p. 68. <https://journals.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/CCR/article/viewFile/12930/12794>

empires<sup>100</sup>. To be a successor of Genghis Khan's Mongol empire means not only to be an heir of Messianic origin, but to attribute autocratic, if not totalitarian character to Eurasianism<sup>101</sup>.

Researchers considered the anti-Western inclination of Eurasianism to be disputable and paradoxical. Foremost, it is controversial to use term "Eurasianism" in order to depict an anti-Western attitude when the term itself is Eurocentric<sup>102</sup>. On the one hand, Eurasianists reject the Western civilization and identity, on the other hand all prominent Eurasianists lived in Europe (Germany, France, and Great Britain) and at the same time partook in the political life of their motherland, by passing the novelties of the Western political thoughts, such as "the third way", "the conservative revolution". Another sign of the western intellectual colonization in Eurasian thought is the Russian ambition to establish and develop a concept of Eurasian Statehood and its hegemony in the Orient.<sup>103</sup>

Hence, one can state that the notion of Eurasianism emerged in the critical span and saved the Russian geographical, ethnical, and cultural integrity and identity from being divided into Asian and European parts. It presented Russia as a nation-state with a unique civilization<sup>104</sup>. The most important outcome of the classical Eurasianism is that while outwardly denying the Empire, they, actually, helped to create the Soviet Empire while for them Russia "can only be a Eurasian power or a great power, that is, an empire or no power at all"<sup>105</sup>.

### 2.3 Neo-Eurasianism

Neo-Eurasianism emerged in the 1980s and 1990s as a political opposition to the ruling political élites' pro-American policy. It gained considerable weight especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union and in the years following the break-up, when the Russian intellectual and political elite faced the dilemma again, concerning Russia's national identity and originality and territorial

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<sup>100</sup> Laruelle, M., The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solution for the Post Soviet Space, pp. 8-9.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., p 1.

<sup>102</sup> Vinokurov, E., & Libman, A. (2012). Eurasian integration: Challenges of transcontinental regionalism. Palgrave Macmillan. (The scope of Eurasian Integration, ch. 2). P. 23. [http://books.google.de/books?hl=en&lr=&id=--0Vb4PyBfQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=The+Concept+of+Eurasian+Integration,+vinokurov&ots=IPBeu0jF-J&sig=mlFbGoYk6gxN2N\\_L7bK9Z6LM-s8#v=onepage&q=The%20Concept%20of%20Eurasian%20Integration%2C%20vinokurov&f=false](http://books.google.de/books?hl=en&lr=&id=--0Vb4PyBfQC&oi=fnd&pg=PP2&dq=The+Concept+of+Eurasian+Integration,+vinokurov&ots=IPBeu0jF-J&sig=mlFbGoYk6gxN2N_L7bK9Z6LM-s8#v=onepage&q=The%20Concept%20of%20Eurasian%20Integration%2C%20vinokurov&f=false)

<sup>103</sup> Laruelle, M., The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solution for the Post Soviet Space, p. 2; Bassin, M. (2003). Classical Eurasianism and the geopolitics of Russian identity. *Ab imperio*, 2, p. 10.

[http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK\\_BASSIN\\_CLASSICAL\\_EURASIANISM\\_AND\\_THE\\_GEOPOLITICS\\_OF\\_RUSSIAN\\_IDENTITY.pdf](http://www.cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK_BASSIN_CLASSICAL_EURASIANISM_AND_THE_GEOPOLITICS_OF_RUSSIAN_IDENTITY.pdf)

<sup>104</sup> Mostafa, G. (2013). The concept of 'Eurasia': Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and its implications. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 4(2), p. 162. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?\\_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029\\_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b)

<sup>105</sup> Papava, V. (2013). The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of "Central Caucaso-Asia". *Russian Politics and Law*, 51(6), p. 52. [http://www.papava.info/publications/V\\_Papava\\_Eurasianism\\_and\\_Caucaso\\_Asia.pdf](http://www.papava.info/publications/V_Papava_Eurasianism_and_Caucaso_Asia.pdf)

integrity. This gap came to fill in reemerged Neo-Eurasian movement, which currently has become a worldview.<sup>106</sup> Celebrities of Neo-Eurasianism are theorists Lev Gumilev (1912-1992), Alexander S. Panarin (1940-2003), Alexander G. Dugin (1962)<sup>107</sup>, practitioner Yevgenii Primakov, Igor Panarin<sup>108</sup>. Neo-Eurasianism's main goal is the exodus of the American influence from Eurasia. Unlike the Western realists, who consider the nation state to be the key unit in the international politics, the neo-Eurasianists generated the idea of the "Eurasian Empire", while the communists dream about the resurrection of the "Soviet Empire" and the nationalists about Greater Russia. Yet, their uniting argument is that Russia should become an important player in the international politics and this in a form of Empire.<sup>109</sup>

Andrei P. Tsygankov argued that the prevailing unified opinion, that the anti-western inclinations and ambitions regarding the imperial restoration are the cornerstones of neo-Eurasianists were wrong and misleading. To justify aforementioned, he distinguishes five schools<sup>110</sup> of Neo-Eurasianism in Russian geopolitical thinking: westernizers, stabilizers, geoeconomists, expansionists, and civilisationist.<sup>111</sup> From the westernizers' viewpoint, Russia is a European country, and only in cooperation with western countries can it address the political and economic challenges in Eurasia. Its destiny is to adopt a liberal democracy in the region, instead of trying to unify it. They are sure that Russia can overcome its regional economic and security problems only in partnership and integration with western multinational institutions, at the same time keeping bilateral relationship with its Asian neighbors.<sup>112</sup> Hence, the Westernizers advocate the creation of a powerful European State rather than a great power or empire, which is manifested in the claim that Russia should leave its geopolitical ambitions in Eurasia.

Geo-economists have a critical geographical thinking. Their key approach is prioritizing the role of the geo-economics over geopolitical factors. They share the Eurasianists approach in terms of identity, emanated from the blend of various economic and cultural impacts. They regard that the

<sup>106</sup> Yasmann, V. (1993). Red religion: an ideology of neo-Messianic Russian fundamentalism. *Demo kratizatsiya The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, 1(2), p. 36.

[https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/01-02\\_yasmann.pdf](https://www.gwu.edu/~ieresgwu/assets/docs/demokratizatsiya%20archive/01-02_yasmann.pdf)

<sup>107</sup> Laruelle, M., The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solution for the Post Soviet Space. P.3.

<sup>108</sup> Erşen, E., (2004). "Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's "Multipolarism" in Russia's foreign policy", *Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies*, 4, p. 137. [http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV\\_2004.pdf](http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV_2004.pdf)

<sup>109</sup> Ibid. p. 132.

<sup>110</sup> Nartov distinguishes three core Neo-Eurasianist categories in Russia; the extreme rightist expansionists; proponents of an entity based on culture, language, folklore, Slavic-Turkic alliance, advocates of "empire" grounded on the "continental space with the focus on economic integration by a special type of statehood based on diversity and freedom of language, culture and ethnicity". (Mostafa, G. (2013). The concept of 'Eurasia': Kazakhstan's Eurasian policy and its implications. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 4(2), p. 162. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?\\_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029\\_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651300016X/1-s2.0-S187936651300016X-main.pdf?_tid=6457ba2a-c33e-11e3-9fcf-00000aacb35e&acdnat=1397416029_2a549ba606904f02dcfa4ae85410939b))

<sup>111</sup> Tsygankov, A. P. (2003). Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia's geopolitical thinking after the Soviet break-up. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 36(1), p. 106.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. pp. 106-107.

world is interdependent, though economically West-centered and culturally pluralistic, and for the country or state opportunities are as important as threats and dangers. For them, Russia's security, first of all, depends on its economic prosperity and social development, rather than on addressing the political and security issues. Due to its favorable, geography, Russia has great opportunities to spur trans-regional developments, and bring political order and harmony in the region by successful solutions to the geo-economic problems. Geo-economists suggest that Russia should secure Eurasia's stability through building a "communication bridge" through the development of transportation routes, connecting Eurasia's southern, western, and eastern fringes, and crossing the Russian and former Soviet states' territory. They support Russia's Western integration but not at the expense of its Asian and former Soviet partners.<sup>113</sup> Hence, the proponents of geo-economic branch consider Russia as a regional player with pro-Western inclinations and they are apparently against expansion.

The next group of the philosophical thinkers is stabilizers. They consider that Russia can reach security in Eurasia through stabilization and for that it needs to retain the status of a great player and not importantly become an empire. The preservation of the role of a stabilizer in the region is to be completed by balancing politico-military policies and various state-organized geo-economic ventures. Russia should fulfill a multi-vector foreign policy, without giving preferences either to the West or to the East. The policy should focus on the country's own national interests, taking into account its geographic opportunities. At the same time, accepting Eurasia's distinction from the West, they do not see foe in and a threat from the West. The advocates of this stream support Russia's interests in terms of controlling the post-Soviet space, but merely by formal or political means and share the postulates of balance of power politics in Eurasia.<sup>114</sup>

The last two groups of philosophical thinking, the expansionists and civilizationists, politically adhere to the conservative approach. They both view Russia as a culturally anti-Western state, namely anti-Atlantic. Expansionists view the United States, Atlanticism, and free trade as a main threat to Russian security.<sup>115</sup>

As for the civilizationists, they observe the empire as a stable territory within the post-Soviet space and yearn for the restoration of the erstwhile nuclear and economic superpower. They argue that the security goal of Russia is not only in constant expansion but in attainment of self-sufficiency and leading to a reasonable politico-economic policy. The Expansionists covet to

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid. pp. 107-108.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. pp.108-109.

<sup>115</sup> Papava, V. (2013). The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of "Central Caucaso-Asia". Russian Politics and Law, 51(6), p. 62.

[http://www.papava.info/publications/V\\_Papava\\_Eurasianism\\_and\\_Caucaso\\_Asia.pdf](http://www.papava.info/publications/V_Papava_Eurasianism_and_Caucaso_Asia.pdf)

build a bloc of continental ally powers, such as Europe, Germany, Iran, China, and Japan<sup>116</sup> against the representatives of the aquatic powers as the United States and Great Britain. In the same vein, the civilizationists are suspicious on building close relations with neighbors.<sup>117</sup>

The Expansionists' viewpoint, strategy and political orientation are well described and presented by A. Dugin. Essentially, it is a global project of creating a Eurasian New World Order in contrary to the America-led new World Order after the end of the Cold War, in this manner rearranging the geopolitical chessboard and setting up a new multi-polar geopolitical order in the entire world.

In accordance with this model, a pole for new multi-polar world would be not the traditional states, but new integrational civilizational formations, called “big spaces” joined in four “geo-economic belts” or “zones”: Euro-Africa, Asia-Pacific, America, and Eurasia. To per Dugin’s vision, these “big spaces” are supranational regional type entities, which in the Eurasian New World Order will replace the sovereign states.<sup>118</sup>

These four “geo-economic belts” are the fundament of the Eurasian New Polycentric World order, which is essentially the thesis of Neo-Eurasianism, through which Dugin plans to secure the primary goal of Neo-Eurasianism, explicitly to abolish threat of American globalization.<sup>119</sup> This new geopolitical construction will be completed through an alliance of three of the macro-regions against the North American superpower. Dugin considers that opposition to the American imperialism is everyone’s universal concern since Eurasia pretends to become a universal project, representing virtually the entire world.<sup>120</sup>

To sum up, analyzing the above-mentioned strategies and development perspectives of neo-Eurasian schools one could conclude, that in general they could be classified as imperialist and none-imperialist.

However, both are concerned with Russia’s security and development issues and suggest different approaches to achieve them.

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<sup>116</sup> In the context of war between sea and land powers, H. Mackinder considered Japan, Britain, Canada, the United States, South Africa, Australia as sea power (Mackinder, H. J. (1904). The geographical pivot of history. The Geographical Journal, 23(4), p. 433.

[http://www.nuevageopolitica.com/resources/Textos\\_Geopolitica/MacKinder,%20The%20Geographical%20Pivot%20of%20History.pdf](http://www.nuevageopolitica.com/resources/Textos_Geopolitica/MacKinder,%20The%20Geographical%20Pivot%20of%20History.pdf).

<sup>117</sup> Tsygankov, A. P. (2003). Mastering space in Eurasia: Russia’s geopolitical thinking after the Soviet break-up. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 36(1), pp. 109-110.

<sup>118</sup> Alexander D. (2002, August 20). Evraziiskii vzglyad [Eurasian view (outlook)]. Accessed 20.05.2014 <http://evrazia.info/print/162>

<sup>119</sup> Alexander D. (2005). Evraziiskii vzglyad na Belarus [European view on Belarus]. Accessed 15.05.2014, <http://evrazia.info/article/2617>

<sup>120</sup> Bassin, M. (2008). Eurasianism „Classical” and „Neo”: Lines of Continuity. Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context, pp. 292-294. [http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17\\_ses/14bassin.pdf](http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17_ses/14bassin.pdf)

## 2.4 Commonalities and divergences

Eurasianism emphasizes Russia's geopolitical and cultural originality and distinctiveness both from the West and Asia.<sup>121</sup> As intellectual and political movements, both Classical and Neo Eurasianism emerged in the period when in the Eurasian continent disintegration processes were taking place and geopolitical situation was unstable, such as the 1917 October Revolution and the breakup of the Russian Empire and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union in 1991. Hence, Eurasianism was born as an integration ideology to keep Russia as a multinational empire though refusing the ideology of the empire itself.<sup>122</sup>

Both the classical and neo-Eurasianisms proclaimed that Eurasia is itself a single civilization, embracing divergent ethos, living in the Eurasia landscape. This unique civilization, called Eurasian or Russian-Eurasian, is an outcome of peoples' coexistence and interference, hence, shared historical experience, conditioned by social, political, and cultural influences both from the West and from the East. Both classical and neo-Eurasianists declared Eurasianism as an anti-western ideology. Lastly, classical and neo-Eurasianism were established to respond to the external developments and find solutions for the emerged inter-political situation,<sup>123</sup> in all variations ensuring political continuity either for the Russian Empire or for the Soviet Union, or for Russia-Eurasia. Hence, both movements shared the vision of setting up a geopolitically unified Eurasia in the form of an Empire.<sup>124</sup>

There are also ideological and geographical differences between classical and neo-Eurasianism. In the ideological consideration, classical Eurasians see the Eurasian distinct civilizational zone based solely on geographical demarcations - exclusively within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire and the peoples living outside this zone consider aliens.<sup>125</sup>

In this regards, Neo-Eurasian Eurasia encompasses not only cultural and geographical zones of the former Russian Empire and former Soviet territory, which largely occupy the same space, but

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<sup>121</sup> Laruelle, M., The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solution for the Post Soviet Space. P. 2. <http://www.units.miamioh.edu/havighurstcenter/publications/documents/Laruelle.pdf>

<sup>122</sup> According to Shlapentokh, "Eurasianism is a reaction to Pan-Turkism". Given the emerging pan-Turkic nation-building movement, whose goal was to liberalize the Turks from Russia's hegemony, the Eurasianists reformulated the basic terms of pan-Turkism, underscoring the Turks' and Eastern Slavs' civilizations' shared history, presenting Genghis Khan as the integrator of whole Russian-Eurasia. The Russian Eurasianists privatize the ideology of Turanism in order to save their territorial integrity of the Russian Empire. (See Shlapentokh, D. (2007). Russia between East and West: Scholarly Debates on Eurasianism, pp. 40; 56. [http://books.google.de/books?id=EnsHyxPZfOIC&pg=PA52&lpg=PA52&dq=Pan-Eurasian+Nationalism&source=bl&ots=FCmy\\_VxNUJ&sig=-xa6wru6ACTqjYM3axFfPFuz8D4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=OyJRU5SMBILkswbkj4CoDA&ved=0CD0Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Pan-Eurasian%20Nationalism&f=false](http://books.google.de/books?id=EnsHyxPZfOIC&pg=PA52&lpg=PA52&dq=Pan-Eurasian+Nationalism&source=bl&ots=FCmy_VxNUJ&sig=-xa6wru6ACTqjYM3axFfPFuz8D4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=OyJRU5SMBILkswbkj4CoDA&ved=0CD0Q6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Pan-Eurasian%20Nationalism&f=false))

<sup>123</sup> Bassin, M. (2008). Eurasianism „Classical“ and „Neo“: Lines of Continuity. Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context, pp. 283-284. [http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17\\_ses/14bassin.pdf](http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17_ses/14bassin.pdf)

<sup>124</sup> Ibid. p. 285.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid. p. 286.

also political and ideological dimensions beyond the above mentioned geographical considerations. To this point, Dugin considers that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century the destiny of Eurasianism is to help the world and deliver the necessary shared ground to oppose to the unipolar world, created by the “Atlanticists”, hence, to fight against the USAa and create a multi-polar world in contrary to the former bipolar and current unipolar worlds.<sup>126</sup> According to Laruelle, Eurasianism founded a unique way of rethinking the identity discourse, which before the 1920s was either to accept or reject the West<sup>127</sup>.

In geographical respects, the significance of the classical Eurasianism is its unique consideration of geographical contours of Eurasia as a unitary “geographical individual” correspond, owing to its four internal “landscapes” of tundra, taiga, steppe, and desert elaborated by Savitski. Over the centuries with little derogations these natural zones conditioned the political, national, and cultural character of Russia-Eurasia. Their understanding of Eurasia’s geographical configurations is constant and loyal to the boundaries of the Russian Statehood.<sup>128</sup>

From the Neo-Eurasianist perspective, Eurasian zone assumes (re)integration within the post-Soviet space, determination of close strategic cooperation between the countries on the Asian mainland, foremost with Iran and India, with Pakistan and Turkey with some reservations. For Dugin, China is a special case.<sup>129</sup> Hence, Dugin’s Eurasia geographically embracing Russia-Eurasia of classical Eurasians stretching beyond the demarcations of Imperial Russian, Soviet, or post-Soviet space no longer matches to the civilizational zone.<sup>130</sup>

The next difference between the classical Eurasianists and neo-Eurasianists is the conception of the West, as already mentioned. While both have an anti-western outlook, geographically these “two Wests” differ. For the classical ones, the West is Western Europe or European West, primarily the leading countries - France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Austro-Hungary, thereby remaining devoted to the tradition of imperial Russian nationalism. Russia-Eurasia imputed itself notions such as spirituality, tolerance, and social collectivity in contradiction to the Western European individuality, materialism, and colonialism. For them, Western Europe and Russia Eurasia will never meet, as far as Eurasia is being created as a practical alternative to Western Europe. Their ultimate goal was to ensure its alienation as scrupulous as possible from Europe.<sup>131</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Alexander D. (2002, August 20). *Evrasiiskii vzglyad* [Eurasian view (outlook)]. Accessed 20.05.2014, <http://evrazia.info/print/162>

<sup>127</sup> Laruelle, M., *The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solution for the Post Soviet Space*. P. 14.

<sup>128</sup> Bassin, M. (2008). *Eurasianism „Classical“ and „Neo“: Lines of Continuity.Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context*, p. 287 [http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17\\_ses/14bassin.pdf](http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17_ses/14bassin.pdf)

<sup>129</sup> Alexander D. (2002). *Evrasiiskii vzglyad* [Eurasian view]. Accessed 20.05.2014, <http://evrazia.info/print/162>

<sup>130</sup> Bassin, M. (2008). *Eurasianism „Classical“ and „Neo“: Lines of Continuity.Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context*, p. 287 [http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17\\_ses/14bassin.pdf](http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17_ses/14bassin.pdf)

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 288-289.

Despite differences, sometimes even radical, either version have the most significant commonality, that Russia is a great power and that its greatness is geopolitical in nature.

According to the neo-Eurasianists, specifically Dugin, current challenges for Russia-Eurasia are entirely different from those in 1920s. The West for them is the United States, the leader of the unipolar world, which is antagonist to Eurasia<sup>132</sup>. Furthermore, Dugin's attitude toward Europe is somehow forgiving, which is manifested in the following statements: "Europe should be understood... Simply historical inertia and active actions of Atlantic ultraliberal pro-American lobby did not allow Europeans clearly realize the state of affairs and truly turn to".<sup>133</sup> Hence, for Europe's anti-Eurasian stance Dugin was blaming Atlantists.

Dugin's next avowal stresses the importance of Europe and suggests reconciliation with it. He suggested ensuring Europe's comprehension not by going to Europe rather by explaining the Eurasian philosophy and geopolitical policy and convincing them that they are right.<sup>134</sup> Russian Eurasian historiography tried to present Russia as an arena of formation of world history and unique civilization, bearer of universality, heir of the empires of the Orient, of Byzantium, of the Mongol and of Oriental Christianity,<sup>135</sup> at the same time paving the way for new Empire, which will be legitimized due to its imperial heritage.

In the post-imperial period Russian intellectuals and practitioners used the Eurasian ideology to save the Russian territory within the former imperial boundaries, then Soviet, and post-Soviet Eurasianists employ the ideology to consolidate Russian power within former Soviet territories. Currently, Eurasianism is topical as never before. In the wake of color revolutions and Arab Spring, Russia faces threat to its territorial integrity, once again<sup>136</sup>.

Hence, it is again the time to refer to imperial policy and enhance its influence and hegemony in the bordering areas and beyond.

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<sup>132</sup> Bassin, M. (2008). Eurasianism „Classical“ and „Neo“: Lines of Continuity. *Beyond the Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context*, p. 290. [http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17\\_ses/14bassin.pdf](http://133.50.171.227/coe21/publish/no17_ses/14bassin.pdf)

<sup>133</sup> Alexander D. (2002). *Evrasiiskii vzglyad* [Eurasian view]. Accessed 20.05.2014. <http://evrazia.info/print/162>

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Laruelle, M., *The Eurasianist ideology and the Eurasian history: Empire as the natural solution for the Post Soviet Space*. P. 14.

<sup>136</sup> This approach shares also Vladimir Papava among others, However, I came to the same conclusion before I read his works. (Papava, V. (2013). *The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of "Central Caucasus-Asia"*. *Russian Politics and Law*, 51(6), p. 61.

[http://www.papava.info/publications/V\\_Papava\\_Eurasianism\\_and\\_Caucaso\\_Asia.pdf](http://www.papava.info/publications/V_Papava_Eurasianism_and_Caucaso_Asia.pdf))

### 3. Main readings of Russian foreign and security policy

#### 3.1 *Russia's Western policy*

Russia's foreign and security policy is based on three main pillars: National Security Strategy or Concept of the Russian Federation (RF) until 2020<sup>137</sup> (1992<sup>138</sup>, 2000<sup>139</sup>), Foreign Policy Concept (2000<sup>140</sup>, 2008<sup>141</sup>, 2013<sup>142</sup>) and Russia's Military Doctrine (1993<sup>143</sup>, 2000,<sup>144</sup> 2010<sup>145</sup>).

Above-mentioned documents are a comprehensive and detailed description of basic provisions, priorities, goals, and objectives of the foreign and security policy of the Russian Federation, representing a combination of continuity and change of foreign and security policy priorities. Alongside with the policy documents various speeches and articles produced by the Russian presidents (Putin and Medvedev) will be recalled to get the whole pallet of the main objectives of the Russian Federation to be reached through domestic and foreign and security policies. Comparative analysis of above-mentioned documents uncovers following image concerned with the goals of Russian policy. The most important entries in the documents dealt with Russia's international standing as a superpower, juxtaposed with rejection of Western security structures centered on NATO, regarding it as a "threat to the provision of international security"<sup>146</sup> and shifting Russia's security arrangements from West to East and imperial policy hints within the shared neighbourhood with Europe, namely towards the CIS countries.

Above all, in all the security documents, the protection of Russia's independence, national interests, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security are the state's main objectives, with the

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<sup>137</sup> Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation (RF) until 2020. Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2009, No.537. Accessed 03.03.2013.

<http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020>

<sup>138</sup> Law on security, N 2446-I. Accessed 03.03.2013, <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/20.html>

<sup>139</sup> National Security Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by Presidential Decree No. 24 of 10 January 2000. Accessed 03.03.2013. <http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/36aba64ac09f737fc32575d9002bbf31!OpenDocument>

<sup>140</sup> The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation on June 28, 2000. Accessed 03.03.2013, <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>

<sup>141</sup> Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by the President of Russian Federation, 12.07.2008, Accessed 03.03.2013, <http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>

<sup>142</sup> Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Approved by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin on 12 February 2013, Accessed 03.08.2013, [http://www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D)

<sup>143</sup> The Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. 1993. <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>

<sup>144</sup> The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2000. Accessed 03.08.2013, [http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000\\_05/dc3ma00?print](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00?print)

<sup>145</sup> The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2010. Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010. Accessed 03.08.2013, [http://www.sras.org/military\\_doctrine\\_russian\\_federation\\_2010](http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010)

<sup>146</sup> Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation (RF) until 2020. Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2009, No.537, Accessed 03.08.2013, <http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020>

growth of the national economy, being of a high priority. Russia acknowledges that economic development, accelerated innovation as well as science and technology fostering are the prerequisites for its great power standing and its national security, formulated as “Security through Development”. Economic growth in terms of security is as important as military one, aiming to rise and become one of the world’s five most productive economies in terms of GDP<sup>147</sup>, a highly ambitious, while still not achieved goal, with Russia remaining the eighth.<sup>148</sup>

The next core policy priority common in the security documents is the recovery of a great power status, lost in the 1990s, that being capable to influence the international developments and “promoting world peace, security, and stability”. In order to stress Russia’s great power standing and to underline its independent foreign and security policy course from the West, Russia intensified relations with so-called “pariah” states such as North Korea and Cuba and deepened political, economic and military ties with China, India and Iran. Another manifestation of great power assertiveness were large-scale domestic military drills conducted in 2006, 2008. Military parade of 8,000 troops, vehicles, and aircraft held on Moscow’s Red Square for Victory Day on 9 May 2008, in which the emphasis was laid on nuclear weapons, was another attempt to indicate its greatness.<sup>149</sup> Continuing its actions demonstrating Russia as an independent and even indispensable global player, in 2011, Russia with China opposed implementation of UN sanctions on Syria under the excuse of the “responsibility to protect”.<sup>150</sup> Lastly, The Russian - Georgian conflict in 2008 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea are sound policy actions manifesting these views.

In terms of Western security construction, strategic documents consider US and NATO as primary threats to international security and Russian national interests proper. After the Cold War, when Russia was looking to the West for security reasons, a range of events forced Russia to change its policy dimensions. To start with, deployment of US missile defense shield close to Russia’s frontiers, namely in the Eastern Europe (in Poland and the Czech Republic), is to be mentioned<sup>151</sup>. In reply to USA deployment of USA missile defense shield Russia emphasized modernization of its strategic nuclear deterrent in order to underline its position as a superpower and maintaining nuclear parity with the USA, at the same time proposing reduction in the

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<sup>147</sup> Schröder, H. (2009). Russia’s national security strategy to 2020. Russian analytical digest, 62(09), pp. 8-10.  
<http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-62.pdf>

<sup>148</sup> The World Bank data. Accessed 15.06.2014, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf>

<sup>149</sup> De Haas, M. (2010). Russia’s foreign security policy in the 21st century, Putin, Medvedev and beyond. Contemporary security studies. New York: Routledge. pp. 77; 108.

<sup>150</sup> European Parliament, Key aspects of Russia’s current foreign and security policy, 2012, Directorate-general-for external policies, Policy Department, p. 11.  
[http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing\\_note/join/2012/491446/EXPO-AFET\\_SP\(2012\)491446\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2012/491446/EXPO-AFET_SP(2012)491446_EN.pdf)

<sup>151</sup> De Haas, M. (2010). Russia’s foreign security policy in the 21st century. New York: Routledge, pp. 6-7; 31.

number of nuclear weapons<sup>152</sup>. In a nutshell, Russia views US through the old Cold War lens full of distrust and suspicion<sup>153</sup>. Regarding NATO, it is to be mentioned adoption of its new Strategic Concept in 2000, encompassing unilateral and dominating policies empowering latter with the right to maintain international security in Euro-Atlantic region, area out of established geographic boundaries, is in line with Russia's perceived security threats<sup>154</sup>.

The next concern was the revival of NATO's enlargement practice, which threatens with the creation of new "Berlin Wall in Europe"<sup>155</sup>. NATO expansion, concerning which in 1990s was guaranteed to the USSR<sup>156</sup> never unfold it again, resurrected incorporating Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary bringing NATO closer to Russia's doors. In line with security threats, air intervention in former Yugoslavia, disregarding Security Council and international law, Russia perceived as such an attempt ignoring its security interests<sup>157</sup>. Hence, Russia believes that current European NATO-centric security architecture is outdated and hazard to international peace and suggested to modify it by creating a new pan-European security system, where the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is perceived as "an important instrument for building an equitable and indivisible system"<sup>158</sup>. This pro-active behavior west assessed ambiguously. On the one hand, proposal for a dialogue to smooth constraints between Russia and the West is to be welcomed, on the other hand, it was conceived as an attempt to diminish or even to absorb NATO and gradually weaken U.S. influence and its relations with the West<sup>159</sup>.

Non-compliance with international arms control agreements represents another security threat for two reasons. The USA unilaterally canceled the Ant-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002 and the NATO rejected to sign the Adapted Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty of 1999, which caused Russia to suspend this treaty in December 2007.<sup>160</sup>

A vital aspect in security dimension is energy. The energy gained considerable importance in Russia's security strategy due to its use as a strategic asset and power instrument and ability to

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<sup>152</sup> De Haas, M. (2009). Medvedev's security policy: A provisional assessment. Russian analytical digest, 62(09), p. 4-5. <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-62.pdf>

<sup>153</sup> Snow, M. D. (2012), Cases in American Foreign Policy, Longman, pp. 14-15.

[http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip\\_us\\_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205208452.pdf](http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip_us_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205208452.pdf)

<sup>154</sup> De Haas, M. (2010). Russia's foreign security policy in the 21st century. New York: Routledge, pp. 6-7; 31.

<sup>155</sup> Erşen, E., (2004). "Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's "Multipolarism" in Russia's foreign policy", Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, 4, p. 149. [http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV\\_2004.pdf](http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV_2004.pdf)

<sup>156</sup> Maybe NATO's actions in this respect are derived from the fact that such entity as USSR does not exist legally anymore, though Russia is the successor State.

<sup>157</sup> Bugajski, J. (2010). Russia's pragmatic reimperialization. Caucasian Review of International Affairs, 4(1), [http://www.marshallarmyrotc.org/documents/Done\\_Russias\\_Pragmatic\\_Reimperialization\\_Janusz\\_Bugajski1.pdf](http://www.marshallarmyrotc.org/documents/Done_Russias_Pragmatic_Reimperialization_Janusz_Bugajski1.pdf)

<sup>158</sup> De Haas, M. (2010). Russia's foreign security policy in the 21st century. New York: Routledge, p. 133.

<sup>159</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006). Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism. Journal of Eurasian Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, p. 34. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?\\_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aabb0f6b&acdnat=1405946225\\_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aabb0f6b&acdnat=1405946225_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161)

<sup>160</sup> De Haas, M. (2009). Medvedev's security policy: A provisional assessment. Russian analytical digest, 62(09), p. 4-5. <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-62.pdf>

produce high revenues. Energy resources as a power instrument and strategic asset, on the one hand increase Russia's international weight and on the other hand present a security threat, since other actors with scarce energy resources might forcefully try to gain control of assets held by energy rich states, such as Russia, which ultimately could cause armed conflicts.<sup>161</sup>

Another constant, which will reinforce Russia's superpower status and minimize not only national but global threat derived from unipolar<sup>162</sup> USA-dominated world order, is the principle of multi-polarity, as the foundation of international politics and global peace according to Russian perceptions<sup>163</sup>. Central to the principle of multi-polarity is the attempt to reinvigorate Russia's great power and prestige holding in era of Concert of Europe, when the Russian Empire was part of the classic European balance of power<sup>164</sup>, period of mutual respect<sup>165</sup>. Moscow's claimed multi-polarity, which is no longer consistent with the European philosophy, present Russia as a producer of norms and no longer just a consumer of European norms<sup>166</sup>. By calls for multi-polarity, multilateralism is used as the instrument to sustain and manage a competitive view of the world, which is another continuity in policy-related documents, prioritizing the role of UN and its Security Council, where Russia has the right to veto.<sup>167</sup>

### 3.2 Russia's CIS policy

At the regional level, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is the priority area of action for Russia and defined as "a priority area of Russia's privileged interests"<sup>168</sup>. This approach actually is the contemporary interpretation of "sphere of influence" legacy from times of empires, where interests of one empire were accepted as supreme by other powers. The problem with this designation is that the major power may use its status as a carte blanche to interfere in the affairs of states within its sphere, as the Russians did, over American objection, in 2008 in Georgia<sup>169</sup> or as USA did in case of Iraq invasion in 2003. Russia even striving to divide

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<sup>161</sup> De Haas, M. (2010). Russia's foreign security policy in the 21st century. New York: Routledge, p. 24.

<sup>162</sup> More on unipolar inclinations in US foreign policy and actions see Erşen, E., (2004). Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's "Multipolarism" in Russia's foreign policy, Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, 4, p. 150.  
[http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV\\_2004.pdf](http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV_2004.pdf)

<sup>163</sup> Ruiz González, J., F. (2013). The foreign policy concept of the Russian Federation: A comparative study. (DIEEEM06-2013). P. 20. [http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs\\_marco/2013/DIEEEM06-2013\\_Rusia\\_ConceptoPoliticaExterior\\_FRuizGlez\\_ENGLISH.pdf](http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_marco/2013/DIEEEM06-2013_Rusia_ConceptoPoliticaExterior_FRuizGlez_ENGLISH.pdf)

<sup>164</sup> Snow, M. D. (2012), Cases in American Foreign Policy, Longman, p. 6.  
[http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip\\_us\\_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205208452.pdf](http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip_us_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205208452.pdf)

<sup>165</sup> Voskresenskiy, M. (2014, October 25), Vladimir Putin meets with members of Valdai discussion club. Transcript of the final plenary session. Accessed 11.11.2014. [http://valdaiclub.com/valdai\\_club/73300.html](http://valdaiclub.com/valdai_club/73300.html)

<sup>166</sup> Gomart, T. (2010). Europe in Russian foreign policy: important but no longer pivotal. Russia. NEI. Visions, 50.

<sup>167</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006, October). Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism. Journal of Eurasian Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp. 33; 37. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?\\_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aabb0f6b&acdnat=1405946225\\_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aabb0f6b&acdnat=1405946225_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161)

<sup>168</sup> Ibid. p. 33.

<sup>169</sup> Snow, M. D. (2012), Cases in American Foreign Policy, Longman, p. 21.  
[http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip\\_us\\_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205208452.pdf](http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip_us_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205208452.pdf)

the world map into the “spheres of interest” (read influence), where “to seek resolutions to existing problems and regulate crisis situations on a regional basis, “without the participation of non-regional powers”<sup>170</sup>.

The statement “without the participation of non-regional powers” reminds one Monroe Doctrine,<sup>171</sup> in the sense that Russian has destined to expand its influence over CIS space. As key instruments for maintaining stability and ensuring security in the CIS<sup>172</sup>, documents stress four regional institutions to be strengthened: the CIS per se, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC)<sup>173</sup>.

Through various regional integration initiatives and organizations Russia seeks “to ensure political loyalty of these new states to Moscow, a privileged position for Russian business interests, and the predominant influence of Russian culture”<sup>174</sup>, which Russian side formulated as “good neighborly relations”, a condition under which Moscow is ready to recognize the independence and territorial integrity of post-Soviet states<sup>175</sup>.

Provisions related to defense of Russian-speaking communities abroad especially in the post-Soviet area are another conceptual framework for Russian domination in CIS. According to them Russia is the defender of its compatriots and citizens abroad and the guarantor of their rights, even by military force to this end.<sup>176</sup> Many analysts consider this policy concept as means to

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<sup>170</sup> Strategy of the National Security of the Russian Federation (RF) until 2020. Approved by the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, May 12<sup>th</sup>, 2009, No.537. Approved by the President of Russian Federation, N12.05.2009. <http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020>;

<sup>171</sup> The Monroe Doctrine, proposed by US President James Monroe in 1823, warned that further attempt at colonization in the Americas by any of the European powers would be perceived by the United States as an act of aggression and would provoke an American military response. This Doctrine sought to enact the popular American belief of the time in Manifest Destiny, which held that the United States of America was destined by divine right to expand its rule across North and South America. (See. Pryce, P. (2013). Putin’s Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism? Romanian Journal of European affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1, p.33)

<sup>172</sup> De Haas, M. (2009). Medvedev’s security policy: A provisional assessment. russian analytical digest, 62(09), p. 2. <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-62.pdf>

<sup>173</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006, October). Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism. Journal of Eurasian Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, p. 33. [http://ac.elsa-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?\\_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1405946225\\_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161](http://ac.elsa-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1405946225_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161);

<sup>174</sup> Trenin, D. (2010). Russian foreign policy: modernization or marginalization? Russia after the Global Economic Crisis. Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, New Economic School, Moscow. P. 189. [http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters\\_preview/4976/09iie4976.pdf](http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/4976/09iie4976.pdf)

<sup>175</sup> Menkiszak, M. (2014). The Putin doctrine: The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. Centre for Eastern Studies. 131. p. 4. [http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary\\_131.pdf](http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_131.pdf)

<sup>176</sup> The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2010. Approved by Russian Federation Presidential Edict on 5 February 2010, § III, point 20. [http://www.sras.org/military\\_doctrine\\_russian\\_federation\\_2010](http://www.sras.org/military_doctrine_russian_federation_2010); The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. Approved by Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation on June 28, 2000, § 4. <http://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm>

legalize its intervention in CIS countries' domestic affairs under the guise to defend its citizens (intervention in Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2013).

Hence, all researchers unanimously label Russia's policy in the CIS soil as imperial and dominating that is limited sovereignty for the CIS countries. Given states are allowed to lead a relatively free domestic policy, but the final say is Russia's. As for the foreign and security policy of respective states, it should not contradict to Russia's interests. Yet, the CIS is a means to achieve its main goal that is great power standing.

### ***3.3 Primary postulates shared by Russian policy documents and Eurasianism***

There are many speculations on which kind of foreign and security policy Russia leads, starting from cooperative-integrationist to rivalry-isolationist. However, it is impossible not to notice that main principles and goals of Russian foreign and security policy are in line with principle ideas of Eurasianism described in this paper. The manifestation of influence of Eurasianism in the related policy documents and in speeches of the Russian elite are following primary principles.

To begin with, the great power standing is to be recalled. Elite of Russian Federation understood that in order to keep status and authority along with a vast territory, significant population and, military might, economic and technological developments are important variables. Next consent to Eurasianism is prioritizing CIS per se and initiating other integration projects such as forthcoming Eurasian Economic Union, to be functional in January 2015, which will be discussed in the part dedicated to economic means of imperialism. According to Eurasianism, Russia, due to its geographical position destined to become Eurasian empire encompassing states in CIS area<sup>177</sup>.

Next characteristic of Eurasianism instrumentalized in Russian policy consensus is "Compatriots Policy", known as Karaganov doctrine. It stated that "Russian Federation should position itself as the defender of ethnic Russian minority rights throughout the former Soviet republics, asserting its influence wherever ethnic Russians and Russian passport holders are subjected to perceived discrimination by the authorities of the state in question"<sup>178</sup>.

Creation of multi-polar world order is another shared characteristic. To this respect, neo-Eurasianist thinker Dugin's words are to be recalled that "Eurasianism [...] is a multi-polar world envisaging the balanced concrete system of the poles and powers, the number of which must be more than one"<sup>179</sup>.

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<sup>177</sup> Erşen, E., (2004). Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's "Multipolarism" in Russia's foreign policy, Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, 4, p. 164. [http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV\\_2004.pdf](http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV_2004.pdf)

<sup>178</sup> Pryce, P. (2013). Putin's Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism? Romanian Journal of European affairs, Vol. 13, No. 1, p.33. [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2233842](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233842)

<sup>179</sup> Erşen, E., (2004). Neo-Eurasianism and Putin's "Multipolarism" in Russia's foreign policy, Turkish Review of Eurasian Studies, 4, p. 143. [http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV\\_2004.pdf](http://www.pu.virmk.ru/arhiv/2014/01/OBIV_2004.pdf)

Another step on the way of building multi-polar world order are Russia's attempts to form a bloc with countries dissatisfied with American increasing domination such as China, India, and Japan. The obvious shift to the East in the policy documents is another feature of Eurasian ideology manifested in Russian policy. Like Eurasianism, Russian foreign and security policy is not anti-Western as well. While overtly disregarding US and NATO, it keeps on cooperation with them in selected fields and with Europe either.

Russia's foreign and security policy coincides with the expansionist views of contemporary Eurasianists as well, which was reflected by Russian aggressive actions in Georgia in 2008, later in Ukraine in 2014 with the outcome of territorial occupation and opened neo-imperial era in Russian politics. Researchers interpreted Russia's interventions attempt to either restore Soviet Union or reset its influence in the CIS.<sup>180</sup>

Another shared commonality between Eurasianism and foreign and security policy is the attempt to minimize or, if possible, eliminate US influence in the CIS. However, main provisions of legal documents seem laying claim to act as a new independent player with its acknowledged spheres of interest.

#### **4. Tools of Russian imperialism**

##### ***4.1 Political means of imperialism***

On the political area Russia tried to encourage governments or leaders that are inclined to Russia or "punish" those leading Western policy course<sup>181</sup>, use international organizations, mainly its right to veto to impede policies or decisions made without taking into consideration Russia's interests, regional structures in order to keep weaker states under its political, economic and military influence, Russian minorities<sup>182</sup> living in near abroad as a core means to intervene in the particular countries internal policies not complying with Russia's interests<sup>183</sup>.

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<sup>180</sup> Papava, V. (2013). The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of "Central Caucaso-Asia". Russian Politics and Law, 51(6), pp. 54-55.

[http://www.papava.info/publications/V\\_Papava\\_Eurasianism\\_and\\_Caucaso\\_Asia.pdf](http://www.papava.info/publications/V_Papava_Eurasianism_and_Caucaso_Asia.pdf)

<sup>181</sup> Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. Problems of Post-Communism, 55(6), p. 5.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>182</sup> There is a well know statement by Vladimir Putin on Russian minorities living near abroad. In 2005 he claimed that breakup of Soviet Union was a great catastrophe in the sense that millions of Russians found themselves out of Motherland borders. Since then Russian minorities live in Estonia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Georgia and Belarusia. Worth mentioning that in this statement Putin's translation of "Russian minorities" is ethnic Russians. After Georgian war the connotation of word phrase included other interpretations such as co-speakers, and passport-holders. (Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional UL papers, 1. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>)

<sup>183</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional ULpapers, 1.

The first tool to be mentioned is Russia's political ties accommodating autocratic leaders of the CIS countries since their independence. Colour Revolutions and upheavals that burst across the CIS space in 2003-2005, especially the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in late 2004, the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 and the upheavals and fierce government attack in Uzbekistan in May 2005 strengthened this tendency<sup>184</sup>.

Russia viewed color revolutions mainly as an attempt to eliminate the Russian influence and a tool to install pro-Western political leadership aimed at expanding western dominance in the CIS under the guise of democracy promotion<sup>185</sup>. The Russian leadership realized that this rapid sequence of unrests might creep in Russia and other CIS states so took internal and external measures to forestall them. In the wake of the color revolutions, Russian government strengthened the ties with the autocratic leadership of the CIS countries leading pro-Russian policies by providing security assistance and economic concessions, and using "stick" policy by imposing economic embargoes, such as banning imports, manipulating energy supplies against those inclined to the West<sup>186</sup>.

As a representative case of tight cooperation with the autocratic regimes for the entire CIS space, Uzbekistan's case is to be mentioned. Putin supported Uzbek president Islam Karimov, after the tragic events in Andijan, lauding him for succeeding in bringing the situation to a natural course, contrary to criticism from the EU and US<sup>187</sup>. As a response to Western criticism, hinting "serious diplomatic consequences", Karimov insisted on withdrawal of American military troops from Khanabad airfield, based there to combat Afghan extremism, required the removal of Western officials and NGO representatives, accusing them in an attempt to destabilize situation in Uzbekistan and harm its reputation. In its turn Russia accused US in "fomenting instability to further its own imperialist aims" and to assure mutual security between Russia and Uzbekistan

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<http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>.

<sup>184</sup> Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(6), p. 5.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>185</sup> While assessing the outbreak of the Color Revolutions to a large extent in geopolitical terms Russian leadership acknowledged the role of domestic factors, such as poverty, corruption, rising levels of income inequality, etc. (Wilson, J. L. (2009). Coloured revolutions: The view from Moscow and Beijing. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 25(2-3), pp. 1-2. [http://www.ceelbas.ac.uk/workshops/Jeanne\\_Wilson\\_paper.pdf](http://www.ceelbas.ac.uk/workshops/Jeanne_Wilson_paper.pdf) )

<sup>186</sup> Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(6), p. 5.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>187</sup> More on Russian support of the authoritarian regimes see Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. (Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(6), pp. 6-9.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

they signed an accord committing them to help each other in eliminating threat to both countries' security and to use military facilities to fight against the threats of both regimes<sup>188</sup>.

Another important political tool for Russia to keep CIS countries in its political orbit is principle of defending Russian minorities (Russian Passport holders, ethnic Russians, Russian speakers) in near abroad including military force, which is embodied also in foreign and security policy documents as one of the most important goals<sup>189</sup>. Moreover, to authorize and legitimize Russia's future invasions in neighboring countries in case of internal conflicts under the excuse "to protect" Russian authorities released number of legal acts, favoring president "sending troops to fight outside the country's borders in defense of Russia's interests"<sup>190</sup>. Interestingly, this principle is applicable only concerning the Russian compatriots living in the CIS territory while those living in Europe, US and Israel are seen just as connecting links<sup>191</sup>.

Hence, there are sizable number of Russian citizens living in Kazakhstan (29.9%), Latvia (29.2%), Estonia (25.6%) and Ukraine (17.3%). The number of Russian citizens grew in ex-Soviet countries due to the accepting Russian citizenship in line with emigration. Russia always took the opportunity in international forums, especially OCSE meetings to promote minority issues and blame respective countries for violating them. Hence, seizing the defense of Russian minorities Russia tries to intervene in countries internal affairs, though sometimes unsuccessful.<sup>192</sup>

Case in point is Russian-Georgian war in 2008. The first confrontation between Russia and Georgia took place in 1990, when latter tried to suppress separatists in regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Contradictions between Russia and Georgia revived from 2004, since Saakashvili took the office, and escalated when Georgia's NATO membership became topical in 2008. The Georgian attack on South Ossetian city of Tskhinvali Russia used as a pretext for intervention into Georgian territory proper. Russia qualified Georgian military actions in Tskhinvali as "an act of aggression towards Russian peacekeepers" at the same time declared "Georgia had committed genocide on Russian citizens there". The five-day Russian-Georgian war was over by the dismemberment of Georgia. Parties agreed to six-point ceasefire plan mediated by France, which actually favored Moscow to expand its control over Georgia and create a "buffer zone" de

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<sup>188</sup> Weinstein, A. (2007). Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization. Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel., 8, p. 175. <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/13-Weinstein.pdf>

<sup>189</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional ULpapers, 1, p. 12. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>.

<sup>190</sup> Bugajski, J. (2010). Georgian Lessons: Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe. CSIS, p. 24. [http://csis.org/files/publication/102110\\_Bugajski\\_GeorgianLessons.WEB.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/102110_Bugajski_GeorgianLessons.WEB.pdf)

<sup>191</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional ULpapers, 1, p. 12. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>.

<sup>192</sup> A failed case of interference by Russia using Russian minorities was the case in Estonia, when government ordered to dismantle the statue symbolizing liberation of Estonia from fascism in 1944 by the Soviet. Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional UL papers, 1, pp. 12-13. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>.

facto accepting the partition of the country.<sup>193</sup> After the war, as two separatist regions of Georgia were detached, Georgian president Saakashvili voiced, that the country would leave the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), blaming the organization for being incapable “to prevent this tragedy from happening”<sup>194</sup>. As a response to Georgia’s withdrawal, on August 26, 2008, Russian government formally recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states<sup>195</sup> transforming its “peacekeeping” forces into permanent military bases exercising control over the borders<sup>196</sup>. Despite the statements of official Moscow, that the intervention in Georgia was „self-defense“, further arrangements in the Russian legal sphere, such as the constitutional amendment, empowering the president “to send troops into action abroad to protect Russian citizens” prompted the Russian incursion in Georgia being illegal<sup>197</sup>.

Russian military intervention in Georgia did not remain without response from the West, but proved to be largely ineffective. Sanctions, including G-8 members claims on Russia’s membership suspension, postponements of negotiations on Russia’s WTO membership, NATO military exercises with Russian forces and NATO-Russia Council (NRC) high-level meetings to an uncertain period, Russian authorities viewed as sheer deviation from the course. Aftermath, in a very short period all key Western states restore connections with Russia, regarding it “too important a country to be isolated, that sanctions would be ineffective, and that Moscow’s estrangement would be counterproductive and fuel further hostility”.<sup>198</sup>

Moreover, NATO member France sold Mistral assault ship to Russia, when the latter acknowledged its weaknesses revealed after the war and decided to address the drawback by enriching its naval arsenal with French Mistral assault ships. Interestingly, NATO not only did not hinder the bargain, but also announced that Russia is neither a threat to NATO nor for its allies without taking into consideration Baltic nations’ and Georgia’s claims to refrain from the deal<sup>199</sup>. In this sense, NATO’s attitude is at least naïve given events in the past. To start with Russia’s contempt for cease-fire agreement and its commitments are to be recalled. Second, Russia’s legal amendments, allowing the president to conduct military intervention and deploy

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<sup>193</sup> Bugajski, J. (2010). Georgian Lessons: Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe. CSIS, p. 100. [http://csis.org/files/publication/102110\\_Bugajski\\_GeorgianLessons.WEB.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/102110_Bugajski_GeorgianLessons.WEB.pdf)

<sup>194</sup> O'Rourke, B. (2009, August 18). Georgia finalizes withdrawal from CIS. Radio free Europe, Radio Liberty, accessed 09.11.2014, [http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia\\_Finalizes-Withdrawal\\_From\\_CIS/1802284.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Finalizes-Withdrawal_From_CIS/1802284.html)

<sup>195</sup> More on Russian support of the authoritarian regimes see Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. Problems of Post-Communism, 55(6), pp. 6-9. <http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>196</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional ULpapers, 1, p. 17. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>

<sup>197</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional ULpapers, 1, p. 17. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>

<sup>198</sup> Bugajski, J. (2010). Georgian lessons, Conflicting Russian and Western Interests in the Wider Europe. Center for strategic and international studies, 1. [http://csis.org/files/publication/102110\\_Bugajski\\_GeorgianLessons.WEB.pdf](http://csis.org/files/publication/102110_Bugajski_GeorgianLessons.WEB.pdf)

<sup>199</sup> Cohen, A. & Hamilton, E. R. (2011). The Russian Military and Georgian War: Lessons and Implications. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), p. 86. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdf/files/PUB1069.pdf>

military forces on the other states' soil without the approval of Parliament.<sup>200</sup> Actually, the logic and content of Russian legal amendments is in line with the one of NATO's, according which NATO is empowered to exercise outside its borders.

Though Russia won the war with Georgia, it has negative effects on it as well. First, Russia did not succeed to overthrow Saakashvili, who became more determined in its choice concerning NATO membership. Russia lost its credibility not only in West as a "champion of peace and compromise" but also in the CIS as the guarantor of security. Worthwhile mentioning that even Russia's closest allies in the CSTO and SCO have not recognized these regions as independent states until now.<sup>201</sup> The same scriptwriter was put into practice in Ukraine, resulting annexation of the Crimea to Russia.

#### ***4.1.1 International organizations<sup>202</sup>***

The most important organization mentioned in the foreign and security documents is the UN, which Russia believes is the main guardian of the international law, and where Russia is one of the five permanent members of the Security Council (SC) with a right to veto. Russia uses its veto power to support the governments friendly to her, such as Iran and Syria. Russia, following the principle, that military actions planed by member states must have SC members' consent, impeded giving a UN mandate to the NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 and the US-led invasion of Iraq, while the invasion of Afghanistan got it.<sup>203</sup> The next valuable international grouping for Russia is G-8 forum<sup>204</sup> - an informal institution, with no binding decisions. It embraces world eight highly industrialized states called for exercising collective leadership in the world. Participation in G-8 forum is largely a matter of prestige for Russia and a stage to promote its vision of multi-polarity and creation of a new global financial system with a new supranational reserve currency. Predictably, this proposal did not gain a support, because many states have large reserves in dollars. As far as Russia has not full membership it does not participate in economic discussions of the club and its membership can be easily circumvented or terminated as it happened in the wake of war with Georgia in 2008 and over annexations of

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<sup>200</sup> Cohen, A. & Hamilton, E. R. (2011). The Russian Military and Georgian War: Lessons and Implications. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), p. 87. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1069.pdf>

<sup>201</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional ULpapers, 1, p. 12. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>.

<sup>202</sup> Are chosen those organisations where Russia has a veto power or ability to change.

<sup>203</sup> More on Russia's actions in UN framework see Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional ULpapers, 1, p. 4. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>.

<sup>204</sup> The Group of Eight (G8) refers to the group of world eight leading industrial states, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United States, Canada, and Russia, that hold an annual meeting to foster consensus on global issues like economic growth and crisis management, global security, energy, and terrorism. More on the topic see Council on Foreign relations. <http://www.cfr.org/international-organizations-and-alliances/group-eight-g8-industrialized-nations/p10647>.

Crimea in 2013<sup>205</sup>.<sup>206</sup> The next multilateral institution with Russia's participation is Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) functioning on consensus principle and embracing the USA, Canada, European states and all the CIS countries. In response to OSCE's critiques on Russian actions in Chechnya and Georgia, it claimed that organization should focus on fighting terrorism instead. Besides, Russia put forward an idea to create a New European Treaty, which will encompass all UN principle provisions granted with legally binding character and later aiming to replace NATO.<sup>207</sup>

Further international organization with Russian membership is Council of Europe (CoE), including all European states except Belarus. United States are not member as well. Russian leaders use the organization to promote minority rights issues mainly against Latvia and Estonia, free movement across the borders and as a counterweight to EU attempts of trying to create its own legal space without Russia. Though institution has criticized Russia on its conduct in democracy and human rights, it did not result Russia's membership termination, if not taking into account cases of suspension such as in the case of war in Chechnya.<sup>208</sup>

Hence, by engaging in so many different international organizations and groupings Russia meets several main determinants of great power. Through its involvement in multilateral institutions in fact Russia gained prestige and recognition and maintained its great power status thus fulfilling one of its core policy principles, that is creating multi-polar world in practice, though some of its proposals such as adoption of new European security system has little chance to become reality.<sup>209</sup>

#### ***4.2 Economic (energy) means of imperialism***

Discourse on Empires highlights economy as one of main determinants of imperial power. At the same time central to the Russian foreign and security policy is resurgence of great power and prestige mainly through economic development, where energy has a unique place as an imperial "weapon". To this point it is necessary to cite Amineh and Houweling's statement: "Oil and gas are not only commodities traded on international markets. Control over territory and its resources are strategic assets."<sup>210</sup> It is not secret, that Russia is richly endowed with mineral and energy resources. The latter have provided the basis for considerable Russian economic revival. Russia has emerged in the twenty-first century as the world's second largest exporter of petroleum and

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<sup>205</sup> Waterfield, B. & Dominiczak P. (2014, November 3). G8 suspends Russia for annexation of Crimea. The Telegraph, UK, accessed: 03.11.2014. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/10720297/G8-suspends-Russia-for-annexation-of-Crimea.html>

<sup>206</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional ULpapers, 1, pp. 4-5. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid. pp. 5-6.

<sup>208</sup> Ibid. p. 7.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid. p. 8.

<sup>210</sup> İşeri, E. (2009). The US Grand strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First century. Geopolitics, 14(1), p. 37. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650040802578658#tabModule>

as the world's leading supplier of natural gas. According to 2009 figures, Russia exports almost five million barrels of oil per day (bbl/day), ranking it behind only Saudi Arabia as a world supplier. The overwhelming importance of oil and gas to the economy is demonstrated by Shleifer and Treisman's observation that "hydrocarbons fund about one-third of the Russian government's budget."<sup>211</sup>

Russia's energy strategy in the CIS is aiming at building ultimate energy empire by exploiting imperial energy policy including acquisition of shares in strategic energy assets and control over gas-distribution systems of CIS countries, construction of new export routs to EU aiming at enhancing Russia's control over and hampering the birth of any alternative pipeline exporting gas from CIS to Europe bypassing Gazprom's channels, coupled with various maneuvers including supply interruption, coercive pricing policies, "debt-for-shares" deals or take-over of infrastructure and companies, price hikes or decrease.<sup>212</sup>

Russia has used its energy power most often against the CIS states, which have remained accustomed to low prices since the Soviet times, while their industries are mostly very energy-consuming. According to a Swedish study, Russia used energy (oil and gas) as a lever against the CIS states on 55 occasions in 1991-2006, most of them being supply cuts. In most cases, political motives were involved, e.g. to influence elections and punish "bad" behaviour.<sup>213</sup>

Hence, in this effect is notable to discuss Ukrainian energy crises originated at the end of 2005 when the old agreement was expired and agreement was not reached over new one because Ukraine was not agreed to pay increase price for gas shipments amounting to \$77/TCM. Russia decided to play energy card and in January 1, 2006 curtailed gas supply to Ukraine causing gas cutoffs to European countries, who receive about 80% of their gas shipment from Moscow through Ukraine. This practice in brinkmanship gave its results and Ukraine was coerced to pay increased new gas price amounting \$95/TCM. Since 2006, Russia increased gas prices from \$50/TCM in 2004 to \$77/TCM in 2005, \$95 in 2006, \$130 in 2007, and \$160 in 2008. In 2009 Russia again shutdown gas shipments to Ukraine as a punishment to Ukraine's backing of Georgia related to the Russian-Georgian war in 2008. Finally, through energy sanctions Russia forced Ukraine to pay for Russian gas "European prices", that is \$257/TCM from 2010 onward. Hence, from 2005-2010 Russia raised gas price for Ukraine from \$50 to \$257/TCM. Parallel to

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<sup>211</sup> Snow, M. D. (2012), Cases in American Foreign Policy, Longman, p. 11

[http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip\\_us\\_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205208452.pdf](http://www.pearsonhighered.com/assets/hip/us/hip_us_pearsonhighered/samplechapter/0205208452.pdf)

<sup>212</sup> Lin, C. Y. (2009). The Prince of Roshl: Russian Energy Imperialism and the Emerging Eurasian Military Alliance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Institute fur Strategie-Politik-Sicherheits-und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW) Berlin/ETH Zurich, 3, p. 2.

[http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Russian\\_Energy\\_Imperialism.pdf](http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Russian_Energy_Imperialism.pdf)

<sup>213</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev'. Occasional ULpapers, 1, p. 21.

<http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>

price hikes, Russia started to demand payoffs for past gas debts, more control over key industries and especially over Ukrainian gas pipelines<sup>214</sup>.

With regards to a stake acquisition in the strategic energy assets, the Russian state-owned Gazprom has made an ample progress. Russia obtained 50% of the Ukrainian distribution company Naftohaz for its RosUkrEnergo, operating on behalf of Gazprom by disrupting gas supply for four days in the early 2006 as a response to the Ukrainian government resistance to price hikes.<sup>215</sup> Through “debt-for-shares” deals, Russian oil companies seized six Ukrainian refineries and since then Russian companies do 90% of the refining<sup>216</sup>. Price-hike-tactic was implied in case of obtaining Belarusian Beltransgaz as well, main gas transmission network, by taking over the companies 100 percent stakes<sup>217</sup>. These deals strengthened Russia’s control of the Ukrainian and Belarusian gas industry and intended to expand its presence there in coming years if prices rise.

Next victim of Russian imperial energy policy utilized through control of large shares in energy assets and gas-distribution system is Armenia. To this point, Gazprom’s arrangements in Armenia were more advantageous for Russia under the tactic “debt-for-shares”. From 2006 to 2007 Gazprom increased its share in Armenia’s state-owned natural gas company ArmRosGazprom from 45 percent to 80 in return for deferring immense price increases for Armenian customers until 2009<sup>218</sup>. Furthermore, in 2013 Gazprom made its “deal of the century” by purchasing from Armenian government the last 20% of its stakes in ArmRosGazprom’s capital in order to pay off the part of debt for 2012, accumulated following reduction of gas prices for the population, amounting totally 300 million dollar at that moment<sup>219</sup>. As a result

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<sup>214</sup> Newnham, R. E. (2013). Pipeline politics: Russian energy sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian elections. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 4(2), pp. 118-119. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1879366513000110/1-s2.0-S1879366513000110-main.pdf?\\_tid=48eb1e96-894d-11e4-b555-00000aacb35f&acdnat=1419192755\\_ca7a2e8860d018eaf45fa5c4ddae34a3](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1879366513000110/1-s2.0-S1879366513000110-main.pdf?_tid=48eb1e96-894d-11e4-b555-00000aacb35f&acdnat=1419192755_ca7a2e8860d018eaf45fa5c4ddae34a3)

<sup>215</sup> Kramer, M., (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(6), p. 10.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>216</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006). Russian Foreign Policy towards Ukraine: a Case of New Imperialism? In *International Young Researchers Conference*, Hayighurst Center, Miami University, Oxford, OH, October, p. 7.

<http://www.cas.miamioh.edu/hayighurstcenter/KropatchevaFinal.pdf>

<sup>217</sup> Sevim, T. V. (2013). Eurasian Union: A Utopia, a Dream or a Coming Reality? *Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics*, 6 (12), p. 56. <http://www.ejbe.org/EJBE2013Vol06No12p043-SEVIM.pdf>

<sup>218</sup> Kramer, M., (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(6), p. 11.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>219</sup> Interesting aspect here is not only the bargain itself, but also the fact of price hikes. As a matter of a fact, the gas prices have increased since 2010, but the representatives of the government price hikes in 2012 kept in secret due to political considerations. The thing is, that in 2012 should parliamentary elections and in 2013 presidential should be conducted. (Lystsev, M., Gazprom increases its stake in ArmRosGazprom to 100%, ITAR-TASS, accessed 03.12.2014, <http://itar-tass.com/en/economy/717612>; Զատիկյան, Ա., Փազի թանկացումը եղել է գաղտնի և անօրինական (Zatikyan, A., Illegal and Covert increase of gas price), Civilnet, 05.12.2013, accessed 03.12.2014. <http://civilnet.am/2013/12/05/%D5%A3%D5%A1%D5%A6%D5%AB->

Russian company Gazprom obtained control not only over Armenia's gas industry but has also acquired Armenia's share in the Iran-Armenian gas pipeline, limiting Armenia's ability to diversify its energy resources and gas supplies to Armenian consumers<sup>220</sup>, thus strengthening its commercial position on the western side of the Caspian Sea and obtaining levers over gas shipments to Europe from Iran<sup>221</sup>. In 2005 Russia's RAO-UES bought Armenian electricity distribution system and became the country's single electricity supplier. It possesses also Razdan Thermal Power Plant in Armenia.<sup>222</sup> In order to ensure further expansion of Gazprom's control over, and preclude the CIS originated natural gas transmission to European countries through alternative pipelines bypassing Gazprom's channels, Russia initiated South and North Stream ventures, alternative pipelines envisaged to transport Russian gas to Europe bypassing Belarus and Ukraine, the traditional transit territories for Russian gas shipment to Europe, because they used their advantageous position and demanded high transit fees and illegally drained off gas without paying.<sup>223</sup>

An alternative network transporting Russian gas to Europe called South Stream was agreed between Gazprom and Italian energy company Eni. Initially was planned to build a 900-kilometer pipeline with amount €12.8 billion, transporting Russian natural gas under the Black Sea through Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary, Slovenia and Austria<sup>224</sup>. Though Russia argued that the aim of the project was to build an alternative transmission route "to reduce the risk of disruption to the supply of Russian gas to Europe because of disputes between Moscow and Kiev, as happened in 2006 and 2009. Analysts think that venture was initiated to cement its influence in southern and Eastern Europe. Manifestation of which was Russian proposal to entitle Gazprom with exceptional right to dispose pipeline at full capacity, which was rejected by The European Commission, viewing the claim as a violation of European competition rules, namely third energy package, which "limits how much of a pipeline a company can own if it also controls its contents"<sup>225</sup>. Lacking not only the willingness to comply with EU competition law requirements

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[%D5%A9%D5%A1%D5%B6%D5%AF%D5%A1%D6%81%D5%B8%D6%82%D5%B4%D5%A8-%D5%A5%D5%B2%D5%A5%D5%AC-%D5%A7-%D5%A3%D5%A1%D5%B2%D5%BF%D5%B6%D5%AB-%D6%87-%D5%A1%D5%B6%D6%85%D6%80%D5%AB%D5%B6/](http://asbarez.com/110189/russia-pressured-armenia-over-iran-gas-says-official/)

<sup>220</sup> Russia pressured Armenia over Iran Gas, Says Official, Asbarez.com, 21.05.2013, accessed 05.12.2014,

<http://asbarez.com/110189/russia-pressured-armenia-over-iran-gas-says-official/>

<sup>221</sup> Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. Problems of Post-Communism, 55(6), p. 11.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>222</sup> Kiss, A. (2013). Russia and the South Caucasus: Managing Contradictions. EURASIAN CHALLENGES PARTNERSHIPS WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER ISSUES OF THE POST-SOVIET AREA, pp. 52-53

[http://www.fakprojekt.hu/docs/EE-4-kotet\\_ch2.pdf](http://www.fakprojekt.hu/docs/EE-4-kotet_ch2.pdf)

<sup>223</sup> Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. Problems of Post-Communism, 55(6), p. 11.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>224</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>225</sup> Adrian Croft and Barbara Lewis, EU's Juncker says South Stream Pipeline can still be build, REUTERS, 04.12.2014, accessed 06.12.2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/04/us-russia-europe-pipeline-eu-idUSKCN0JI18720141204?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews>

and translating them as obstacle on the way of the project realization, but also financial resources, in the wake of Western economic sanctions, related to Russian conduct in the Eastern Ukraine, and given decrease in oil prices, on 1 December 2014 Russian president announced about abandoning the venture during a state visit to Turkey. One should point that European Union itself forced Bulgaria to terminate the project due to violation of European legislation. Brussels replied that in the light of Europe's efforts to diversify energy sources and import routes South Stream was just an alternative transmission gas web, bypassing Ukraine and did not supported the policy of energy diversification of the region. Officials in European Union stated that the actual failure of the project once again highlighted the urgent need of diversifying both energy resources and transmission network. Federica Mogherini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, heralded: "The decision that was taken, announced by Russia yesterday, tells us that it is urgent not only and not so much to diversify the routes, but also the sources of energy for the European Union"<sup>226</sup>.

As for North Stream pipeline, worth mentioning, that it is transporting Russian gas through Baltic Sea to Germany since 2011<sup>227</sup>. North Stream was set up not only as an alternative distribution pipeline shipping natural gas to Europe not crossing unreliable deemed territories of Ukraine and Belarus, but also a response to EU-American led Nabucco<sup>228</sup> pipeline project. Nabucco was planned in 2002 and its importance was elevated since 2006, after Russian-Ukrainian disputes resulting gas halts in Europe in 2006. Venture aimed to find ways to diversify and ensure secure energy supply to Europe in line with diversifying export routes<sup>229</sup>.

Another reflection of Putin's energy policy trying to cease the attempts of building gas export channels bypassing Russian controlled distribution networks is establishment of control over gas shipments from Central Asian countries. To this effect, Russia arranged initiatives locking Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan into the Gazprom network aiming at making Russia if not the sole but the main distributor of Central Asian gas through Russia to Europe. Hence, to bring gas to the doors of Russia from Turkmenistan through Kazakhstan Gazprom in 2007 constructed 510-kilometer long Caspian pipeline. To transform Uzbek gas to Russia was

<sup>226</sup> South Stream Pullout of Russia hits Eastern Europe hardest, EURONEWS, 02.12.2014, accessed 06.12.2014, <http://www.euronews.com/2014/12/02/south-stream-pullout-by-russia-hits-eastern-europe-hardest/>

<sup>227</sup> Whist, B. S., (2008). Nord Stream: Not Just a Pipeline. Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 30(4), 79. <http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/FNI-R1508.pdf>

<sup>228</sup> Nabucco project, initiated by EU and USA, was aiming at undercutting European energy dependence on Russian natural gas by exporting gas from Caspian Sea to EU not crossing the Russia's territory. It was planned to build a gas corridor shipping the Caspian gas from Azerbaijan through Georgia and Turkey to the Bulgarian borders and then across Romania and Hungarian to Austria. However, being initiated in 2002 it was canceled in 2013 by Azerbaijan, the country agreeing to be the supplier in the beginning (Clara Weiss, European Union's Nabucco pipeline project aborted, World Socialist Web Site, 13.07.2013, accessed 7.12.2014, <http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/07/13/nabu-j13.html>)

<sup>229</sup> Lin, C. Y. (2009). The Prince of Rosh: Russian Energy Imperialism and the Emerging Eurasian Military Alliance of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Institute für Strategie-Politik-Sicherheits-und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW) Berlin/ETH Zurich, 3, pp. 4-5. [http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Russian\\_Energy\\_Imperialism.pdf](http://www.voltairenet.org/IMG/pdf/Russian_Energy_Imperialism.pdf).

renovated Soviet-era distribution system known as the Central Asia–Center (CAC) network. In addition, Russia allured by agreeing to buy the product at “European prices” as of 2009 depriving them from having economically viable alternative pipelines of gas supply. Interesting factor here is that these initiatives ensure mega supplies of gas which in fact limited the possibility of directing it to any other alternative pipeline, such as Nabucco or Trans-Caspian Pipeline (TCP) running from Turkmenistan under the Caspian Sea through Georgia and Azerbaijan to Turkey, because “there will not be sufficient gas to flow” according to Russia’s energy minister Viktor Khristenko.<sup>230</sup>

Next aspect of Russian imperialistic energy police is oil resources of Caspian basin. As in case of gas, in regards with oil Russia strives to monopolize shipment routs stemming from Caspian basin too. Until 1999, Russia possessed solely not only the transmission link of Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline but rail shipment road from the region as well. However, the picture changed when pipeline became operational and later in 2006 Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipelines, the main component of East-West energy corridor, they all bypassing Russian territory. These energy routs were means not only to secure energy transportation and diversify energy resources for the West, but they challenged Russia’s energy hegemony in the Caspian region and aimed at isolating Russia<sup>231</sup>.

The above-mentioned pipelines shipped the crude oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan through Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey to European Union Countries<sup>232</sup>. To stop this proses, which Russia perceived as a treat to its national security, it went on expanding its existing pipeline around the Caspian basin. To this end, Russia planned to expand Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). It was initiated in 1996 and became operational in 2001. The pipeline transmits the oil from oilfield of Kazakhstan’s Tengiz to the Black Sea oil reservoirs at Russian Novorossiysk. The CPC was initiated in 1996 and became operational in 2001 with the base capacity 28 million tons per year. However in 2011 it was planned to increase its capacity to 68 million tons of oil per year, scheduled to be finished in 2015<sup>233</sup>. Russian ventures concerning the CIS states in the Caspian basin in regards with oil reserves and transmission routes have several goals. First of all, it tries to show the West that Russia is a global player in the region by keeping Kazakhstan under its political orbit. And through CPC Russia aims to lessen the amount of oil necessary to be

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<sup>230</sup> Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(6), pp. 11-12.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>231</sup> İşeri, E. (2009). The US Grand strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. *Geopolitics*, 14(1), pp. 39-40. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650040802578658#tabModule>

<sup>232</sup> British Petroleum official webpage, Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, 18.01.2015  
[http://www.bp.com/en\\_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html](http://www.bp.com/en_az/caspian/operationsprojects/pipelines/BTC.html).

<sup>233</sup> Lukoil oil Company, accessed 17.01.2015. <https://lukoil-overseas.com/projects/kazakhstan/6985.php>.

shipped through Ukrainian Odessa-Brody pipeline intended to transform Caspian oil from Kazakhstan<sup>234</sup>.

In this context, is significant also Russian-Abkhazian landmark military accord on Alliance and Strategic Partnership signed between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the president of Georgia's secessionist region of Abkhazia, Raul Khajimba on November 24. According to the terms of Treaty Russia is becoming the protector of the border between Abkhazia and Georgia. Hence, consolidating Abkhazia de facto into Russia's military and customs space gives it ample possibility to keep control over Georgia at the same time reducing EU's drive seeking energy diverse resources and distribution routs.<sup>235</sup> Hence, Russia is gradually and steadily has consolidated its dominance, in some cases monopoly over CIS states energy sphere trying to build an empire through exploitation and expansion. Russia, via Gazprom, successfully secured its dominant position in the CIS as main producer and distributor of natural gas through acquiring significant shares in transmission networks and in national energy companies.<sup>236</sup> Actually, Above-mentioned cases are sound examples of energy imperialism that is using natural resources for political reasons. This situation to some extend is challenged by China aiming to meet its energy supply shortages.

#### ***4.2.1 Eurasian Economic Union***

A number of attempts to (re)unite the former Soviet Union countries have been constantly undertaken since the collapse of the Union. In these endeavours multiple agreements were adopted and high-level meetings were held by the CIS. Yet, no significant results came into existence, with the initiatives having volatile institutional structures, open windows for exemptions, intergovernmental character and non-binding effect, signifying the weak enthusiasm and commitment of the member states<sup>237</sup>. Hence, the CIS proved to be inefficient and incompetent to be grown into a highly integrated economic body, with functioning supranational infrastructures and potential to form a competent political entity within its scope. The alternative was seen in the manifestation of the Eurasian Union (CU)<sup>238</sup>.

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<sup>234</sup> İşeri, E. (2009). The US Grand strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First century. *Geopolitics*, 14(1), p. 40. <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14650040802578658#tabModule>

<sup>235</sup> Harding, L. & agencies (2014, November 25). Georgia Angered by Russia-Abkhazia military agreement, *The Guardian*, accessed 09.12.2014. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/25/georgia-russia-abkhazia-military-agreement-putin>

<sup>236</sup> Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(6), p. 13. <http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>237</sup> Kasčiūnas, L. & Šukytė, D. (2013). Creation of the Eurasian Union and Its Implications for the European Neighbourhood Policy. *Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review*, (29), pp. 63-64. <http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2013-29/2013-29%20Kasciunas.pdf>

<sup>238</sup> Vilpišauskas, R., Ališauskas, R., Kasčiūnas, L., et. al. (2012) *Eurasian Union: a Challenge for the European Union and Eastern Partnership Countries*, Public Institution Eastern Europe Studies Centre, Vilnius, p. 5.

The creation of Eurasian Union declared Vladimir Putin in his article titled “A new integration project for Eurasia – A future that is born today”, where he called it “an open project” and invited into the “Eurasian Club” all willing countries, especially former Soviet states.<sup>239</sup> The set-up of the forthcoming Eurasian Union shows that foremost it intends to meet a kind of Russia’s imperialistic ambitions and integrate at least the CIS countries (in the ideal version wholly, if not some of them) and adopt structurally the European Union like, yet, but functionally a Russian-dominated body. Of course, the structural as well as functional analogies of the forthcoming entity with the Former Soviet Union is not worded by the initiator of the project, contrary, he states that the Soviet Union is already in the past.<sup>240</sup> Enhancing the attractiveness of the Union, Putin mentioned in the article that the experience of European Union will be taken into consideration and mentioned such shared values as democracy, freedom and market economy.<sup>241</sup>

The roots of Eurasian Union were launched in January 1995, with the ratification of the first agreements on the establishment of Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan<sup>242</sup>. Afterwards, in 1996 Kyrgyzstan acceded the union and in 1997 Tajikistan followed the suit<sup>243</sup>. In 1999 the above mentioned five countries ratified the Treaty on the Customs Union and the Single Economic Space. A year later, in 2000, the countries founded the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC), actually, the core of a new political formation Eurasian Union, to which Uzbekistan acceded in 2006<sup>244</sup> but at the end of 2008 withdrew its membership preferring bilateral trade agreements to the economic institution. Other countries like Moldova, Ukraine and Armenia were satisfied with having observer status<sup>245</sup>. Hereby, the process of executing a Common Economic Space was launched. As such, the integration evolved, with the adoption of the Treaty on the Establishment of the Common Customs Territory and Formation of the Customs Union between Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were

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<http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/news/id459/Eurasian%20Union-a%20Challenge%20for%20the%20European%20Union%20and%20Eastern%20Partnership%20Countries.pdf>

<sup>239</sup> Khachatryan, Ts. (2014). The Commonwealth of Independent States in Sequence of the Former USSR: A Tool for the Formation of the Eurasian Union? *European Union Foreign Affairs Journal*, 1, pp.49-50. Accessed 25.05.2014, <http://www.eufaj.eu/>

<sup>240</sup> Halbach, U. (2012). Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian union: A new integration project for CIS region. *Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik*, p. 1. Accessed 25.05.2014. [http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C01\\_hlb.pdf](http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2012C01_hlb.pdf)

<sup>241</sup> Vladimir, P. (2011, October 3). A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making. *Izvestia*. Accessed 05.10.2014. <http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3->

<sup>242</sup> Valovaya, T. (2012). Eurasian Economic Integration: Origins, Patterns, and Outlooks, *EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook*, MPRA Paper No. 49179, p. 45. [http://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49179/1/MPRA\\_paper\\_49179.pdf](http://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49179/1/MPRA_paper_49179.pdf)

<sup>243</sup> Dragneva, R., & Wolczuk, K. (2012). Russia, the Eurasian Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, stagnation or rivalry? *Chatham House*. pp. 2-13. [http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp\\_dragnevawolczuk.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp_dragnevawolczuk.pdf)

<sup>244</sup> Hoffmann, K. (2012). Eurasian Union—a New Name for an Old Integration Idea, *Russian Analytical Digest*, 112, UK, Birmingham, p.2. <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-112.pdf>

<sup>245</sup> Sevim, T. V. (2013). Eurasian Union: A Utopia, a Dream or a Coming Reality? *Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics*, 6 (12), p. 50. <http://www.ejbe.org/EJBE2013Vol06No12p043-SEVIM.pdf>

enabled to join, once they were ready, the treaty being signed in 2007 and put into effect on January 1, 2010<sup>246</sup>.

On October 4, 2011, then Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin stated in an interview to Izvestia that starting from January 1, 2012 “Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan” would be in force and the launch of the Customs Union and Common Economic Space would serve as a stepping stone for the establishment of a deeper integration union, i.e. the Eurasian Union which will come into force in January 2015<sup>247</sup>. Putin endeavors to establish a union “that could constitute not just a trade bloc but a new political and security entity”<sup>248</sup>. It is necessary to note, that the first years of functioning of Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan has already revealed the discrepancies between states caused mainly by ignoring their different interests<sup>249</sup>. Until the formation of the Customs Union of Eurasian Union, analysts consider the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEc) formed on October 10, 2000, the real integrative force in the post-Soviet space representing the highest level of integration in the new century.<sup>250</sup>

As mentioned, members of EurAsEc (Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan) in 2007 formed the fully fledged Customs Union, leading to a single market and adoption of a single currency. The institutional framework of it is similar to the infrastructures practiced in other customs union. The Interstate Council incorporates the Expert Council of the Customs Union which, similar to the Interstate Council, has five specialists in the spheres of law and international commerce from each of MSs. It is worth noting that the CU is ruled by the following the vote ratio: 57 for Russia, 21.5 for Belarus and Kazakhstan, each. It seeks to ensure that the legally binding regulations of the Customs Union Commission (CUC), meet the CU standards and policies<sup>251</sup>. Additionally, noteworthy is that started from January 1, 2012, the Eurasian Court was put into action, to investigate the disputes between the MSs of the Customs Union and the Common Economic

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<sup>246</sup> Eurasian Economic Commission, Eurasian Economic, Integration: Facts and Figures, 2013, p. 7,

[http://eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/broshura26Body\\_ENGL\\_final2013\\_2.pdf](http://eurasiancommission.org/ru/Documents/broshura26Body_ENGL_final2013_2.pdf)

<sup>247</sup> Vladimir, P. (2011, October 3). A New Integration Project for Eurasia: The Future in the Making. Izvestia, accessed 05.10.2014. <http://www.russianmission.eu/en/news/article-prime-minister-vladimir-putin-new-integration-project-eurasia-future-making-izvestia-3->

<sup>248</sup> Popescu, N. (2013), The Moscow riots, Russian nationalism and the Eurasian Union. European Union Institute for Security Studies, pp. 1-4. [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief\\_42\\_Russian\\_nationalism.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_42_Russian_nationalism.pdf)

<sup>249</sup> Papava, V. (2013). The Eurasianism of Russian Anti-Westernism and the Concept of "Central Caucaso-Asia". Russian Politics and Law, 51(6), pp. 57-58.

[http://www.papava.info/publications/V\\_Papava\\_Eurasianism\\_and\\_Caucaso\\_Asia.pdf](http://www.papava.info/publications/V_Papava_Eurasianism_and_Caucaso_Asia.pdf)

<sup>250</sup> Yesdauletova, A., & Yesdauletov, A. (2014). The Eurasian Union: Dynamics And Difficulties Of The Post-Soviet Integration; 18(68/63), 1, p. 4. [http://www.kirj.ee/public/trames\\_pdf/2014/issue\\_1/Trames-2014-1-3-17.pdf](http://www.kirj.ee/public/trames_pdf/2014/issue_1/Trames-2014-1-3-17.pdf)

<sup>251</sup> Krotov, I. (2010). Customs Union between the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Community, World Customs Journal, 5(2), pp.129-132. <http://www.worldcustomsjournal.org/media/wcj/-2011/2/Krotov.pdf>

Space as well as between the private companies and corporations from these countries. The verdicts of the courts are also binding<sup>252</sup>.

#### ***4.2.2 Eurasian Union versus European Union***

When investigating the enthusiasm and purposes that drives Russia for the Eurasian integration and the establishment of already functioning Eurasian Union, it becomes evident that the reasons for that are multifold and complex<sup>253</sup>. To begin with, Russia's competitive predisposition towards the EU with regard to the former Soviet Union countries is to be highlighted. The Eurasian project is in line with Russia's aspiration to counterbalance the EU's attractiveness as well as influence with regard to the countries which Russia considers fall in its sphere of influence. Another objective can be Russia's endeavor to ensure its role in Central Asia and counterbalance as well as restrict the economic domination that is passing from Moscow<sup>254</sup> because of the Chinese presence and dominance in the countries concerned, especially in the field of energy<sup>255</sup>. Additionally, it should be noted that Russia's endeavor for the integration is also related to the Russia's imperial past<sup>256</sup> and the Russian perception that in case of ensuring its power in the region Russia can also raise its role on international level<sup>257</sup>. Furthermore, the EEC serves as a tool for Putin to demonstrate Russia as a global independent political power<sup>258</sup>. All above-mentioned rationales pointed out that the real reason behind the formation of Eurasian Union is mainly geopolitical, rather than economic, which is manifested in Medvedev's statements among others. During the meeting in Kremlin with Russian pensioners and World War Two veterans, in his address then President Medvedev said: Yes, we are all different but we have common values and a desire to live in a single big state, "Medvedev said"<sup>259</sup>.

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<sup>252</sup> Chufirin, G. (2012). A Difficult Road to Eurasian Economic Integration, Russian Analytical Digest (112), Moscow, p.2. <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-112.pdf>

<sup>253</sup> Saari, S. (2011), Putin's Eurasian Union Initiative: Are the premises of Russia's post-Soviet policy changing? Swedish Institute of International Affairs, (9), p.3. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/65793.pdf>

<sup>254</sup> Adomeit, H. (2012), Putin's Eurasian Union: Russia's Integration Project and Policies on Post-Soviet Space, Black Sea Trust for Regional Cooperation, 4, pp. 3-5. [http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/NeighbourhoodPolicyPaper\(04\).pdf](http://www.khas.edu.tr/cms/cies/dosyalar/files/NeighbourhoodPolicyPaper(04).pdf)

<sup>255</sup> Mankoff, J. (2013), Eurasian Integration: The Next Stage, Central Asia, Policy Brief, (13), pp. 2-6. <http://origin.library.constantcontact.com/download/get/file/1110347635144-129/Policy+Brief+13,+December+2013.pdf>

<sup>256</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). Putin's war: The rise of Russia's new Imperialism. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 251. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>257</sup> Wiśniewska, I. (2013). Eurasian integration Russia's attempt at the economic unification of the post-Soviet area. Center for Eastern Studies, (44), Warsaw, pp. 26-28. [http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace\\_44\\_eurasian-integration\\_net.pdf](http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_44_eurasian-integration_net.pdf)

<sup>258</sup> Kempe, I. (2013). The Eurasian Union and the European Union Redefining their Neighborhood: The Case of the South Caucasus. Caucasus Analytical Digest, (51-52), Berlin, pp. 3-4. <http://www.laender-analysen.de/cad/pdf/CAD-51-52.pdf>

<sup>259</sup> Bryanski, G. (2011, November 17). "Putin, Medvedev Praise Values of Soviet Union". Reuters, accessed 18.11.2014. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/11/17/idINIndia-60590820111117>

Having these issues at stake, Russia feels comfortable to apply to the so-called “stick and carrots” tactic on the way of persuading the countries to join the CU<sup>260</sup>. The situation is more than talking in respect of the post-Soviet Union states, currently involved in the EU-launched Eastern Partnership Initiative<sup>261</sup>. Here, Russia deploys both “soft” (in the form of preferential gas prices, labor opportunities) and “hard” (Ukrainian case of military intervention) power. With the launch of the Eastern Partnership, which proposed deeper integration with the EU, Moscow’s ambition to form an alternative integration model increased.

As mentioned, in order to enhance attractiveness of newly born project Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), its institutional framework was designed on EU model. EEU’s principal institutions are: Supreme Eurasian Economic Council (hereinafter - the Supreme Council), Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (hereinafter - the Intergovernmental Council), Eurasian Economic Commission (hereinafter - the Commission, EEC), Court of the Eurasian Economic Union (hereinafter - the Court of the Union)<sup>262</sup>. The Supreme Council, comprised by the Presidents of the EEU’s MSs, resembles the European Council, despite the fact that the decisions of the European Council are de jure non-binding<sup>263</sup>. Intergovernmental Council consists of Prime Ministers of EEU MS and could be similar to the Council of European Union<sup>264</sup>. Next institution is Eurasian Economic Commission, corresponding to EU’s European Commission. Each EEU MS is represented in the Commission by 2 ministers<sup>265</sup>. The Commission is composed by the Council and the College (The Board) of the EEU<sup>266</sup>.

The EU seeks to reform the political, economic as well as the social systems of the neighboring countries in compliance with the structures practiced in its EU MSs. It proposed the ratification of deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA) which would ensure the removal of non-

<sup>260</sup> Delcour, L., & Wolczuk, K. (2013). Beyond the Vilnius Summit: challenges for deeper EU integration with Eastern Europe. European Policy Centre Policy Brief, 31, pp. 2-4. Retrieved from [http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub\\_3889\\_beyond\\_the\\_vilnius\\_summit.pdf](http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_3889_beyond_the_vilnius_summit.pdf)

<sup>261</sup> Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, Brussels, Belgium, 8435/09 (Presse 78); 07.05.2009. [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern\\_partnership/documents/prague\\_summit\\_declaration\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf)

<sup>262</sup> Dogovor o Evraziiskom ekonomicheskom sojuze [Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union]. Article 8.1. Adopted on 29.05.2014, came into force 01.01.2015. <https://docs.eaeunion.org/ru-ru/Pages/DisplayDocument.aspx?s=bef9c798-3978-42f3-9ef2-d0fb3d53b75f&w=632c7868-4ee2-4b21-bc64-1995328e6ef3&l=540294ae-c3c9-4511-9bf8-aaf5d6e0d169&EntityID=3610>

<sup>263</sup> Kaveshnikov, N. (2011). Developing the Institutional Structure of the Eurasian Economic Community, Institutions of Regional Integration, EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook 2011, pp. 106-108. [http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/docs/n4\\_2011\\_12.pdf](http://www.eabr.org/general/upload/docs/n4_2011_12.pdf)

<sup>264</sup> Popescu, N. (2014). Eurasian Union: The real, the imaginary and the likely. European Union institute for security studies. Chaillot Paper 132, p. 9. [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/CP\\_132.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/CP_132.pdf)

<sup>265</sup> Ibid.

<sup>266</sup> Dogovor o Evraziiskom ekonomicheskom sojuze [Treaty on Eurasian Economic Union]. Article 8.1. Adopted on 29.05.2014, came into force 01.01.2015. <https://docs.eaeunion.org/ru-ru/Pages/DisplayDocument.aspx?s=bef9c798-3978-42f3-9ef2-d0fb3d53b75f&w=632c7868-4ee2-4b21-bc64-1995328e6ef3&l=540294ae-c3c9-4511-9bf8-aaf5d6e0d169&EntityID=3610>

tariff barriers, liberalization of service sector, abolishment of the protectionist measure as well as beneficial conditions for foreign direct investments (FDI). In response, the EU expected these countries to approximate their system to that of the EU<sup>267</sup>. In particular, via EaP program EU seeks to upgrade political association, deepen economic integration, by supporting the partner countries' (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova) political and socio-economic reforms, approximate their legislations in compliance with the EU as well as ensure stability and security, contribute to conflict resolution and support social cohesion and regional cooperation. Firstly, it presupposed the establishment of the Association Agreements (AA). Secondly, economic integration into the EU was on the agenda. The EaP promised a formation of DCFTA. Additionally, Comprehensive Institution-Building (CIB) Programs were developed to reform partner-countries' administrative capacity. The next offer was the provision of mobility of citizens and the visa liberalization.<sup>268</sup>

On the other hand, the standards posed by the Eurasian CU are much lower. This implies that while the EU calls for the approximation towards higher and liberalized standards, the CU does not require cardinal changes or transformations for high quality standards and systems. Furthermore, Russia applies to informal tools (business-politics related issues, shared culture, and oligarchic structures.) to bring together the former soviet states. It converges the economic integration with the energy sector integration - due to the proposed privileged prices for energy, credits, as well as entry to its internal market; Russia can get dominance over crucial economic areas of its MS, hereby strengthening its position among the EaP countries. The Eurasian Union may also face problems not characteristic of the EU. One of them is that there is to be an identical approach by the Eurasian Union MSs towards the cooperation in international organizations. Unlike, this system, the EU enables interdependent relations. One more problematic aspect is the decision-making procedures<sup>269</sup>. Currently decision making in Eurasian Economic Commission is based on principle of unanimity, which, according to many analysts, was introduced in order to allure Ukraine. However, As far as they lost Ukraine, there is a risk to go back to principle of the majority voting with Russia, having 57% of the votes and Kazakhstan and Belarus 21.5% each. This means that jointly with one country Russia can ratify the

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<sup>267</sup> Kasčiūnas, L., & Šukytė, D. (2013). Creation Of The Eurasian Union And Its Implications For The European Neighbourhood Policy. Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, (29), pp. 65-79 <http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2013-29/2013-29%20Kasciunas.pdf>

<sup>268</sup> Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit Prague, Brussels, Belgium, 8435/09 (Presse 78); 07.05.2009. [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern\\_partnership/documents/prague\\_summit\\_declaration\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/eastern_partnership/documents/prague_summit_declaration_en.pdf)

<sup>269</sup> Kasčiūnas, L., & Šukytė, D. (2013). Creation of the Eurasian Union and Its Implications for the European Neighbourhood Policy. Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, (29), pp. 65-79. <http://www.lfpr.lt/uploads/File/2013-29/2013-29%20Kasciunas.pdf>

resolutions favorable to it. This structure could give way to buying and selling votes for any project.<sup>270</sup>

On this background, interesting is to observe the incentives behind the countries that show interest to join the Russian led Customs Union which became fully-functional Eurasia Economic Union on January 1 2015.

#### ***4.2.3 The impetus for the Eurasian integration***

The rationale for Belarus to be integrated into the Eurasian integration project is multifold. To begin with the low adjustment costs for the entry to the CU is to be mentioned. Besides, Belarus gets crude oil and gas from Russia at cheaper prices. Additionally, Russia is the key market for Belarusian exports. One more incentive is that Lukashenko uses the integration as counteract to the western sanctions over his regime<sup>271</sup>.

Additionally, notable is that Belarus expressed willingness to enter the CU understanding that it would get no tangible subsidies from Russia in case it rejects the initiative<sup>272</sup>. On the contrary, Moscow made it clear that in case of pursuing integration with Russia, Belarus can receive rewards in the form of the cheap gas prices and crude oil as well as favorable conditions for the Belarusian goods in the Russian market<sup>273</sup>. For instance, in the middle of year 2011, it was announced that Belarus would get \$3-3.5 billion from the EurAsEc<sup>274</sup>. Additionally, in 2011 Belarus and Russia agreed upon cheaper gas prices for the period of 2012-2014<sup>275</sup>. Belarus should pay 164\$ per 1000 cubic meter for Russian gas whereas average price for Europeans was 400\$.<sup>276</sup> While Alexander Lukashenko seems to be lingering for the former Soviet Union, yet,

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<sup>270</sup> Popescu, N. (2014). Eurasian Union: The real, the imaginary and the likely. European Union institute for security studies. Chaillot Paper 132, p. 11. [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/CP\\_132.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/CP_132.pdf)

<sup>271</sup> Vilpišauskas, R., Ališauskas, R., Kasčiūnas, L., et. al. (2012) Eurasian Union: a Challenge for the European Union and Eastern Partnership Countries, Public Institution Eastern Europe Studies Centre, Vilnius, pp. 22-25. <http://www.eesc.lt/uploads/news/id459/Eurasian%20Union-a%20Challenge%20for%20the%20European%20Union%20and%20Eastern%20Partnership%20Countries.pdf>

<sup>271</sup> Valovaya, T. (2012). Eurasian Economic Integration: Origins, Patterns, and Outlooks, EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook, MPRA Paper No. 49179, p. 45. [http://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49179/1/MPRA\\_paper\\_49179.pdf](http://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49179/1/MPRA_paper_49179.pdf)

<sup>272</sup> Jarábik, B., Pikulik, A. and Yelisseyu, A. (2013). Belarus and the Eurasian Union: incremental integration. FRIDE Policy Brief N° 159, pp. 2-5. [http://fride.org/download/PB\\_159\\_Belarus\\_and\\_the\\_Eurasian\\_Union.pdf](http://fride.org/download/PB_159_Belarus_and_the_Eurasian_Union.pdf)

<sup>273</sup> SEVIM, T. V. (2013). Eurasian Union: A Utopia, a Dream or a Coming Reality? Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, 6 (12), pp. 55-56. <http://www.ejbe.org/EJBE2013Vol06No12p043-SEVIM.pdf>

<sup>274</sup> Ria Novosti, Belarus to Get \$3 bln Loan From EurAsEC – Premier, 19.05.2011. Accessed 12.16.2014. <http://en.rian.ru/business/20110519/164117956.html>

<sup>275</sup> Supinsky, Sergei, Lukashenko says Beltransgaz sale to Gazprom 'very profitable', Ria Novosti, 23, 12. 2011. Accessed 12.16.2014. <http://en.rian.ru/world/20111223/170444388.html>

<sup>276</sup> Sevim, T. V. (2013). Eurasian Union: A Utopia, a Dream or a Coming Reality? Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, 6 (12), p. 56. <http://www.ejbe.org/EJBE2013Vol06No12p043-SEVIM.pdf>

the accession to the Eurasian Economic Union was more a way out than the best option. The economic stance rather than the will of the country drove it to the CES in 2012<sup>277</sup>.

Going on with eastern European countries and discussing Ukraine, it is to be noted that Ukraine has always been a key country in Russian integration ventures, which has to assure the initiative's success and push the integration process<sup>278</sup>. To put precisely, Ukraine is the country without which Russia sees no integration project and Ukraine's role is decisive in his ventures with regards to its success. Here Dugin's words come to mind "The battle for the integration of the post-Soviet space is a battle for Kiev"<sup>279</sup>. Except being the locomotive for Eurasian integration project Ukraine, in line with Belarus had also civilizational meaning for Putin's project. In its ideal version the identity of Eurasian Union should have been based on a civilization bearing "a common church, a common spiritual source, and a common destiny"<sup>280</sup>.

Ironically, Ukraine has never shared Russia's approaches and always avoided to become full-fledged member of any Russian led integration project and the case of Eurasian Customs Union is not an exception. Despite Russia's pressures Ukraine announced (in 2010) that is not planning to join the CU and preferred to be an observer country. The matter was that Ukraine was negotiating an Association Agreement with EU and was to sign it on 28-19 November, 2013 in Vilnius, Lithuania. However, Russia allured Ukraine with \$15 billion loans and discounts in gas import and Ukraine's president at the time Viktor Yanukovych stepped back. Aftermath, EU stated that Ukraine's choice is incompatible with its desire to form a free trade zone with EU.<sup>281</sup> On the other hand in case of CU membership "Moscow allegedly offered at least \$5 billion of aid and a significant discount on the price of natural gas, which Ukraine buys from Russia"<sup>282</sup>. However, notwithstanding the Ukraine's significance for Russia in its integration endeavors, the Crimea referendum of March 16, 2014 and its accession to Russia, has made the Ukraine's entry to the Eurasian Union highly improbable<sup>283</sup>. Later on, in Brussels, on 27 June 2014, Georgia and

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<sup>277</sup> Atilgan, C., Baumann, G., Brakel, A., Crawford, C., Devcic, J. & Helms, A. (2014). The Eurasian Union: An Integration Project Under the Microscope, KAS International Reports, p.36. [http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas\\_36785-544-2-30.pdf?140207134233](http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_36785-544-2-30.pdf?140207134233)

<sup>278</sup> Moshes, A. (2013). Will Ukraine Join (and Save) the Eurasian Customs Union? PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, (247), pp. 1-2. <http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/will-ukraine-join-and-save-eurasian-customs-union>

<sup>279</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). Putin's war: The rise of Russia's new Imperialism. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 244. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>280</sup> Menkiszak, M. (2014). The Putin doctrine: The formation of a conceptual framework for Russian dominance in the post-Soviet area. OSW Commentary 131, p.2. [http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary\\_131.pdf](http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/commentary_131.pdf)

<sup>281</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). Putin's war: The rise of Russia's new Imperialism. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp.211-212. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>282</sup> Lucas, E. (2013, December 7). No Secret Deal on Ukraine joining Moscow-led Customs Union. Accessed 27.03.2014. <http://rt.com/news/russia-ukraine-secret-deal-879/>

<sup>283</sup> Vysotskaya, A. G. V. (2014). Ukraine's Revolution: A Challenge to Russia's Eurasian Integration Project. Analysis, Eurasia Review. Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS) Viewpoints, 2-4.

Moldova signed Association Agreement coupled with DCFTAs, while Ukraine, signed only the DCFTA.<sup>284</sup>

Coming down with the Central Asian countries and discussing Kazakhstan, it is to be mentioned that Eurasian initiative has had a key recognition for Kazakhstan<sup>285</sup>, with the economic benefits being in the heart of the process. In 2009 the President of the country, Nazarbayev, highlighted the growth of the market and foreign investments due to the implementation of the CU. The abolishment of customs tariffs in Russia and Belarus provides potential for the Kazakhstani producers enabling more competitive prices. Besides, it facilitates the transportation of Kazakhstani oil and gas<sup>286</sup>.

On the whole, it should be mentioned that the interactions and cooperation fields between the countries are quite dynamic, with both of them countries having quite analogous economic and political systems as well as similar perceptions of the challenges and opportunities of the current structures of the international relations and geopolitics. One of the concerns, the two countries share, is China whose economic expansion is a source of concern for both of them. The Eurasian Union can also have a strategic meaning for Astana. Additionally, it can insure the security of the country from the Afghan quagmire. Moreover, the initiative can also be a counterweight to the Western influence<sup>287</sup>. Yet, Astana also has certain fears regarding Russia's dominance. For example, Russian Gazprom using Euraisn Union can enlarge itself absorbing Kazakhstan's state-owned energy company KazMunayGas as happened in Beltransgaz<sup>288</sup> and ArmRusGazart cases.

With regard to Kyrgyzstan, it is to be mentioned that while it is of marginal significance in terms of the integration, it is another source of confirmation Russian influence. This economically weak country has expressed interest to join the union, yet, again, fearing that can be dominated by Russia<sup>289</sup>. As Kyrgyzstan is a WTO MS, the inclusion into the customs union will bring tariff raises<sup>290</sup>. Additionally experts show concerns that the country will indeed be dominate by Russia

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<sup>284</sup> Rettman, A. (2014, June 27). Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine cement EU ties. Accessed 18.01.2015. <https://euobserver.com/foreign/124792>

<sup>285</sup> Vinokurov, E., & Libman, A. (2012). Eurasia and Eurasian integration: Beyond the post-Soviet borders, EDB Eurasian Integration Yearbook, MPRA Paper No. 49179, pp. 86-87. [http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49179/1/MPRA\\_paper\\_49179.pdf](http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/49179/1/MPRA_paper_49179.pdf)

<sup>286</sup> Kassenova, N. (2012). Kazakhstan and Eurasian Economic Integration: quick start, mixed results and uncertain future. Russie. NEI. Vision, Droits exclusivement réservés – Ifri, Paris, 14, pp. 13-19. [http://www.consultingnewsline.fr/Info/Vie%20du%20Conseil/Federal/Russian%/IFRI\\_ifrikassenovakazandeurasianintegrationengnov2012%5B1%5D.pdf](http://www.consultingnewsline.fr/Info/Vie%20du%20Conseil/Federal/Russian%/IFRI_ifrikassenovakazandeurasianintegrationengnov2012%5B1%5D.pdf)

<sup>287</sup> Vielmini, F. (2013), The Challenges of Eurasian Integration for Kazakhstan, ISPI Analysis, (151), pp. 2-4. [http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/Analysis\\_151\\_2013.pdf](http://www.ispionline.it/it/documents/Analysis_151_2013.pdf)

<sup>288</sup> Sevim, T. V. (2013). Eurasian Union: A Utopia, a Dream or a Coming Reality? Eurasian Journal of Business and Economics, 6 (12), p. 56. <http://www.ejbe.org/EJBE2013Vol06No12p043-SEVIM.pdf>

<sup>289</sup> Wiśniewska, I. (2013), Eurasian integration Russia's attempt at the economic unification of the post-Soviet area. Center for Eastern Studies, (44), WARSAW, pp. 30-31. [http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace\\_44\\_eurasian-integration\\_net.pdf](http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/prace_44_eurasian-integration_net.pdf)

<sup>290</sup> Marat, Erica, Kyrgyzstan Joins Russian-backed Customs Union, 14.04.2011, accessed 13.05.2014,

and Kazakhstan<sup>291</sup>. Representatives of civil society in country are opposing to joining Customs Union announcing that its accession will limit Kyrgyzstan's "political and economic independence"<sup>292</sup>. However, the country seemed to have no other option but joining the Union as Russia and Kazakhstan were raising the customs tariff. Additionally, labor migration to Russia has played its role<sup>293</sup>.

As for the EaP countries, interesting is the Armenian case. While the country was included in the EaP of the EU<sup>294</sup> and was to pre-sign Association Agreement, including the DCFTA with the EU in November 2013<sup>295</sup>, in September, 2013, President Sargsyan declared that the country would join the Custom Union as well as participate in the establishment of the Eurasian Union. The decision was the result of the Russian threats over the gas prices, restriction of the Armenian labor migration to Russia or blocking their money transactions via Russian Banks, Russia's arms sale to Azerbaijan<sup>296</sup>. Other measures employed by Russia to force Armenia to accede to Customs Union included bans Armenian exports to Russia, unleashing armed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, rejecting security guarantees and back opposition in regime change<sup>297</sup>.

However, as a result of this opportunism, the country loses the possibility to enter larger European markets<sup>298</sup>. Additionally, as Armenian political analyst Richard Giragosian acknowledges, only the oligarchs will benefit from the CU because the CU will impose no changes for them and they will keep acting with the same regulations<sup>299</sup>. In general, with the

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[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=37792&no\\_cache=1#.VNFzyNKG-08](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=37792&no_cache=1#.VNFzyNKG-08)

<sup>291</sup> BBC News, Kyrgyzstan's dilemma over Russian-led customs union, 20.01.2014, accessed 13.05.2014.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-25718770>

<sup>292</sup> Kyrgyz groups protest against Customs Union. European forum for democracy and solidarity, 06.05.2014,

Accessed 20.12.2014. [http://www.europeanforum.net/news/1927/kyrgyz\\_groups\\_protest\\_against\\_customs\\_union](http://www.europeanforum.net/news/1927/kyrgyz_groups_protest_against_customs_union)

<sup>293</sup> Standish, Reid, The Illusion of Choice: Kyrgyzstan and the Customs Union, 29.01.2014. Accessed 13.05.2014,

<http://registan.net/2014/01/29/the-illusion-of-choice-kyrgyzstan-and-the-customs-union/>

<sup>294</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, Armenia National Indicative Programme 2007-2010, Brussels, Belgium, accessed 13.05.2014.

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi\\_csp\\_nip\\_armenia\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_csp_nip_armenia_en.pdf)

<sup>295</sup> European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: Working towards a Stronger Partnership, JOIN (2013) 4 final, Brussels, Belgium, 20.03.2013, accessed 13.05.2014.

[http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2013\\_enp\\_pack/2013\\_comm\\_conjoint\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2013_enp_pack/2013_comm_conjoint_en.pdf).

<sup>296</sup> Paul, Amanda, Armenia's Bombshell. euobserver.com, 09.09.2013, accessed 13.05.2014.

<http://blogs.euobserver.com/paul/2013/09/09/armenias-bombshell/>.

<sup>297</sup> Grigoryan, A. (2014). Armenia: Joining under the gun. Central Asia-Caucasus institute. Silk road studies program, A joint transatlantic research and policy institute, p. 106. Accessed 20.12.2014.

<http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/8-1409GrandStrategy-Armenia.pdf>

<sup>298</sup> Ghukasyan, Seda, interview with Richard Giragosian, «Մարտային միությանն անցնելը Սարգսյանի ամենալուրջ սխալն է...», (EN-the membership to the CU is Sargsyan's gravest mistake...), Galatv.am, 04.09.2013, accessed 13.05.2014. [http://www.galatv.am/news/view/richard-kirakosyan\\_0409.html](http://www.galatv.am/news/view/richard-kirakosyan_0409.html)

<sup>299</sup> Sargsyan, A. (2013, September 5). Richard Giragosian, "Hajastany veratsvum e putinyan Rusastani poqrik struk-petutzan" [Richard Giragosian "Armenia becomes a small slave-state of Putin's Russia]. 168.am. Accessed 06. 01. 2015. . <http://168.am/2013/09/05/271583.html>

accession to the CU, Armenia endangers its European future<sup>300</sup>. As Ananicz foresees, it will lead to even bigger subordination of Armenia's domestic and foreign policy to Russia. Moreover, the country can even experience degradation from the political and economic reforms that it has reached with the cooperation of the EU<sup>301</sup>. From the economic perspective, Armenia is joining Customs union with higher tariffs which will result tariff hikes. Currently Armenia is negotiating a list of 900 products of utmost importance for Armenia, in order to set a transition phase for gradual increase of tariffs of these goods<sup>302</sup>. However, experts are skeptic because of the expected increase in prices and uncertain perspectives. They consider that after joining the Customs Union prices for basic products wheat, potatoes, cooking oil, sugar may rise by up to 15 percent<sup>303</sup>.

According to practitioners expansion of Eurasian Union should not restrict itself with conquering former Soviet Union's borders. It should enlarge and encompass "Finland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Mongolia, Vietnam and Bulgaria, as well as Cuba and Venezuela", despite the fact that these two countries are not situated both in Asia and Europe. Or, under the Eurasian Union's umbrella should be united peoples and citizens.<sup>304</sup>

#### ***4.2.4 Discontents of Eurasian integration***

Despite above-mentioned incentives, soon after the announcement of establishment of Eurasian Union, its "founding fathers" gradually put forward concerns about existing common risks and threats of Eurasian integration. First to note is the loose of sovereignty. Presidents of Belarus and Kazakhstan in various occasions have mentioned that they will leave the Union if the agreements are not kept and there is a treat to their independence.<sup>305</sup> Armenian Deputy Foreign Minister Shavarsh Kocharyan excluded Armenia's joining the Customs Union because it will limit

<sup>300</sup> Peter, L. (2013, September 5). Armenia rift over trade deal fuels EU-Russia tension. BBC News Europe. Accessed 06. 01. 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-23975951>

<sup>301</sup> Ananicz, S. (2013, September 4). Armenia Turns away from the EU. Center for Eastern Studies, OSW, Warsaw, Poland, Accessed 06. 01. 2015. <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/eastweek/2013-09-04/armenia-turns-away-eu>

<sup>302</sup> MM-in mianaluc heto Hayastani hamar ksahmanvi maqsaturqeri ancumayin pul [For Armenia will be imposed a transition period of taxation after joining Customs Union]. MediaMall.am 29.03.2014 Accessed 20.12.2014. <http://topnews.mediamall.am/?id=73494>

<sup>303</sup> Grigoryan, A. (2014). Armenia: Joining under the gun. Central Asia-Caucasus institute. Silk road studies program, A joint transatlantic research and policy institute. 102-104. Accessed 20.12.2014. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/8-1409GrandStrategy-Armenia.pdf>

<sup>304</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). Putin's war: The rise of Russia's new Imperialism. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 257-258. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>305</sup> Satubaldina, A. & Kuymina, T. (2014, August 27). Kazakhstan may leave EEU if its interests are infringed: Nayarbaev. Tengri News. Accessed 20.12.2014. [http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics\\_sub/Kazakhstan-may-leave-EEU-if-its-interests-are-infringed-255722/](http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-may-leave-EEU-if-its-interests-are-infringed-255722/); Belarus says could leave Russia-led Union if agreements not kept. (2015, January 29). Reuters. Accessed 10.03.2015. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/01/29/belarus-lukashenko-eurasian-idINL6N0V81WT20150129>

country's sovereignty, however later augmented its own statement and interpreted that he meant limitations "in terms of customs policy"<sup>306</sup>.

Another limitation worth to be mentioned is trade deficit due to reduction of export and increase in import<sup>307</sup>. In this effect, the value of Armenian exported products to the EU market composed of \$511.6 million in 2012 while the amount of exports to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus were \$289.8 million; in the first six months of 2013 goods worth \$250.6 million were exported to the EU while the share of the Customs Union was \$149.6 million<sup>308</sup>.

Other main obstacles for union's complete functioning are high tariff barriers, which resulted high amount of exceptions hindering tariff unification, restricting free trade and price hikes. Eurasian Union's tariff policy is grounded on mainly Russian tariffs, which are the highest ones among the member countries. In relations to Armenia the number of goods requiring gradual tariff hike is 900, for Kazakhstan 400-600 being overcome only next year<sup>309</sup>. Another obstacle connected with tariff hikes is the potential breach of WTO commitments by its member states which are also the members of the Eurasian Union<sup>310</sup>.

Next problem is connected with speculations related to Armenian security. In this effect a very natural question is to be answered: if it is economic union as it is being stated by all parties, how can it assure Armenia's security? Moreover, Eurasian Economic Union cannot be the security guarantor of any member state, unless its founding states selling offensive arms to Armenia's enemy. Armenia's security cannot guarantee even CSTO, as we will see furthermore, which is considered to protect its member states from external threats<sup>311</sup>.

The last but by no means the least risk for Eurasian Union are its gloomy perspectives in the sense of benefits the member countries have or will have. The matter is that semi-developed countries are gathered into one block threatening to keep all the economies backward, among

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<sup>306</sup> All states joining customs Union to some extent lose their sovereign rights-De, 19.09.2013, accessed 20.12.2014. <http://news.am/eng/news/172007.html>

<sup>307</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). Putin's war: The rise of Russia's new Imperialism. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 247. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>308</sup> Grigoryan, A. (2014). Armenia: Joining under the gun. Central Asia-Caucasus institute. Silk road studies program, A joint transatlantic research and policy institute. P. 100.

<http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/8-1409GrandStrategy-Armenia.pdf>

<sup>309</sup> MM-in mianaluc heto Hayastani hamar ksahmanven maqsaturqeri ancumayin pul [After joining Customs Union transition period for tariffs will be applied for Armenia] 29.03.2014. MediaMall.am, accessed 20.12.2014.

<http://topnews.mediamall.am/?id=73494>; Daly, C. K. J. (2014, October 14). Armenia's role in the Eurasian Economic Union. Silk Road Reporters. Accessed 28.12.2014.

<http://www.silkroadreporters.com/2014/10/17/armenias-role-eurasian-economic-union/>

<sup>310</sup> Popescu, N. (2014). Eurasian Union: The real, the imaginary and the likely. European Union institute for security studies. Chaillot Paper 132, pp. 12-13. [http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/CP\\_132.pdf](http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/CP_132.pdf)

<sup>311</sup> Almasian, M. (2014, December 3). Why Armenia chose the Eurasian Economic Union. The Armenite, accessed 28.12.2014. <http://thearmenite.com/2014/12/armenia-chose-eurasian-economic-union/>.

them also Russia's<sup>312</sup>. This concern becomes even more realistic by possible membership of two break away regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, manifestation of which are recently signed agreements between these two countries and Russia<sup>313</sup>.

To sum up, Eurasian Union is a project of ultimate necessity for Russia, which should help it to recreate its erstwhile greatness and absorb all malfunctioning integration structures on the CIS soil via membership of their member states: CIS itself, Russia-Belarus Union State, EurAsEc, and Customs Union of the CIS. The first step has already taken and Federal Law on termination of EurAsEc's activities is signed by Putin. Though as a ground for termination is mentioned achieved organization's aims and objectives, that is establishment of Eurasian Economic Union, it is obvious that its existence would be senseless because of all its members' membership of new Eurasian Union.<sup>314</sup>

#### ***4.3 Military (security) means of imperialism***

The previous section has considered economic and energy arguments in respect to Russian "new imperialism." Next aspect of Russian new imperialism has military and security dimension, one of main prerequisites of Great power standing. After the collapse of Soviet Union it was important for Russia to maintain control over strategic military bases, materials and communication lines as well as "natural" frontiers in the post-soviet space. Russia has always considered the CIS space as periphery, something like "buffer zone" guaranteeing the security of the "core". In this line, NATO's possible enlargement to the Russia's area of privileged interests raised its caution and eagerness to keep its bases in the CIS by all means, while withdrawal would be seen as a blow to Russian national interests vis-a-vis NATO.<sup>315</sup>

Hence, to keep Russian military bases in the CIS have multifold reasons. In this regard to ensure local government's loyalty to Russia is to be recalled. Next motivation is to remind the West and NATO about Russia's presence in the CIS<sup>316</sup>. Another aim of Russian ground forces in the CIS space is to ensure selective intervention in internal political matters of the respective countries

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<sup>312</sup> Aslund, A. (2013, September 10). Push for Customs Union turns friends to foes. The Moscow Times, accessed 28.12.2014. <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/push-for-customs-union-turns-friends-to-foes/485789.html>

<sup>313</sup> New Treaties bring Abkhazia, South Ossetia even closer to Russia. 2014, November 21. Nationalia, accessed 10.03.2015. <http://www.nationalia.info/en/news/2018>

<sup>314</sup> Law ratifying EurAsEC termination agreement. 04.02.2015, accessed 10.03.2015.

<http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23559>; Khachatryan, Ts. (2014). The Commonwealth of Independent States in Sequence of the Former USSR: A Tool for the Formation of the Eurasian Union? European Union Foreign Affairs Journal, 1, 47-54. Accessed 25.05.2014. <http://www.eufaj.eu/>

<sup>315</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006, October). Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 3(1), pp. 12-13. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?\\_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aabb0f6b&acdnat=1405946225\\_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aabb0f6b&acdnat=1405946225_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161)

<sup>316</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional UL papers, 1, p. 14. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>

having western policy orientation, namely by backing separatist sentiment in respective countries or stationing peacekeeping troops on the borders, as well by military activities<sup>317</sup>.

#### ***4.3.1 Military bases, peace-keeping and military activities***

According to great power discourse one of the main determinants of great power standing was and still is countries military might. After the demise of Soviet Union Russia maintained its status as a military power in terms of nuclear weapons.

In the framework of CIS nations, such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, agreed on handover the strategic nuclear arsenal to Russia, took commitment in non-proliferation in return to considerable economic, and defense concessions, thereby securing unilateral control over the Soviet nuclear legacy. Another constituent part of military might is conventional military forces, majority of which after the dissolution appeared to be stationed on the territories of sovereign states, notably Baltic states, Belarus, Ukraine, and the Caucasus<sup>318</sup>, except for Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan<sup>319</sup>, and which is covered next.

Conventional arsenal, constituent of military might, scattered on different soils in the CIS space encompassing ground, naval and air military bases. It was important for Russia to maintain control over strategic military bases, materials and communication lines as well as “natural” frontiers in the post-soviet space in order to keep the region under its influence and dictate strategy strengthening its position there. Military means were used not only to fulfill imperialistic policy of expansionism in order to maintain access to important military and strategic locations and gain new territories on the one hand, but to ensure Russia’s security on the other hand. Russia has always considered the CIS space as periphery, something like “buffer zone” guaranteeing the security of the “core”. In this line, NATO’s possible enlargement to the Russia’s area of privileged interests raised its caution and eagerness to keep its bases in the CIS by all means, while withdrawal would be seen as a blow to Russian national interests vis-a-vis NATO<sup>320</sup>. Moreover, Russia’s appeal to military means on a number of occasions was/is an attempt to show the West that in the CIS there is no place for intervention of external forces<sup>321</sup>.

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<sup>317</sup> Ibid. pp. 14-17.

<sup>318</sup> Weinstein, A. (2007). Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization. Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel., 8, p. 168. <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/13-Weinstein.pdf>.

<sup>319</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional UL papers, 1, p. 14. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>

<sup>320</sup> Kropatcheva, E. (2006). Russian foreign policy in the realm of European security through the lens of neoclassical realism. Journal of Eurasian Studies, 3. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?\\_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1405946225\\_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S187936651100025X/1-s2.0-S187936651100025X-main.pdf?_tid=4db17062-10d3-11e4-989a-00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1405946225_3f259e6f62f0b1e219380efa0105e161)

<sup>321</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia’s Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. Occasional UL papers, 1, p. 14. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>

Russian Military installations on the CIS soil are arranged on various terms and with different regulations for the Russian forces. For instance, Armenia covers half of the costs of Russian troops located on its soil while Kazakhstan earns high revenues from renting the important bases and military testing grounds on its territory. While Belarus covers all costs of the troops, Russia did not extend the lease on Gabala radar base in Azerbaijan<sup>322</sup> when the latter raised the rent price from \$7 million to \$300 million per year claiming that newly built Armavir radar station performed the same functions. Worthwhile to mention, that despite the fact that most CIS countries have adopted tense regulations for Russian service personnel, cases of rule infringement remain largely unpunished. Cases in point are violation of Georgian airspace since 2003 until Georgian-Russian war broke in August 2008<sup>323</sup>, the death of two children caused by the shell explosion on the land owned by Russian 102 military base in Armenia<sup>324</sup> and the massacre of a Armenian family of six in Gyumri among others<sup>325</sup>.

In Eastern Europe the most important military installation for Russia is its naval base located in Crimea's Sevastopol, Ukraine, enabling Russian fleet with dominating military position not only in the Black Sea but also beyond the region including Middle East and Mediterranean basin especially vis-a-vis NATO<sup>326</sup>. In accordance to Russian-Ukrainian "big" agreement of 1997, Russian naval troops could be stationed in Ukraine until 2017 with a possible five years extension. As Russian military presence in Ukraine was interpreted as undermining country's sovereignty and independence, Ukrainian pro-western officials were interested in Russia's withdrawal. In its turn, Russia was doing everything to prolong the lease on the territory, thus hindering Ukraine's close cooperation with NATO and maintaining as well as enhancing Russia's potential and rights in the Black and Azov Seas. Russia-Ukraine relations strained in 2008 concerning NATO discussions on Ukrainian membership, resulting protests in Sevastopol chiefly composed by the naval personnel.<sup>327</sup>

However, enmity ended, when, after new elections presidential office took Russian champion Yanukovych. Between parties was signed a landmark agreement (the Kharkov agreement)

<sup>322</sup> Abasov Sh. (2012, July 25). Azerbaijan: signs point to Russia's departure from Gabala radar Base, EURASIANET.org, accessed 20.01.2015. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/65706>

<sup>323</sup> Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(6), p. 14. <http://dialogueurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>324</sup> Ioannisyann, D. (2014, October 30). Vahramaberd gyughy, mahacats erekhanery ev RD zinvorakannery [Vahramaberd village, dead children and Russian military officials]. Hetq, Yerevan, accessed 08.11.2014. <http://hetq.am/arm/news/57118/vahramaberd-gyuxy-mahacats-erekhanery-ev-rd-zinvorakannery.html>

<sup>325</sup> Six-month-old-boy wounded in Armenia massacre dies, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, 19.01.2015, accessed 20.01.2015. <http://www.rferl.org/content/serviozha-avetisian-gyumri-masacre-death-protest-russia/26801880.html>

<sup>326</sup> Newnham, R. E. (2013). Pipeline politics: Russian energy sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian elections. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 4(2), p. 118. [http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1879366513000110/1-s2.0-S1879366513000110-main.pdf?\\_tid=48eb1e96-894d-11e4-b555-00000aacb35f&acdnat=1419192755\\_ca7a2e8860d018eaf45fa5c4ddae34a3](http://ac.els-cdn.com/S1879366513000110/1-s2.0-S1879366513000110-main.pdf?_tid=48eb1e96-894d-11e4-b555-00000aacb35f&acdnat=1419192755_ca7a2e8860d018eaf45fa5c4ddae34a3)

<sup>327</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. *Occasional UL papers*, 1, p. 14. <http://www.ui.se/upl/files/43601.pdf>

allowing Russian to lease naval base with 25 years (until 2042) with an additional five year renewal option, in exchange for 30 percent drop on the gas price for next ten years at the time amounting \$257 per thousand cubic meters (TCM)<sup>328</sup>.

With regard to Moldova, troops in Transnistria separatist enclave are to be recalled. Actually, secessionist movement against Moldovan government started in 1991 was backed by Russia. Russia interfered and in 1992 was signed a peace agreement, which lead the conflict to impasse, transferring it into a frozen conflict. Since then, Moldovan government is trying to get the troops out of country<sup>329</sup>.

However, despite the promises given in 1999, Russian government retreated from its commitments on withdrawal and stated that Russian forces will stay in Transdnistria as peacekeepers until final solution on its status is found. To this point, Russia disregarded also calls from the EU and the OSCE. Like Ukraine, the main reason for maintaining the base is to complicate Moldova's aspirations for NATO/EU membership and keep it under Russia's pressure.<sup>330</sup>

Concerning Belarus, in response to NATO plans to locate US antiballistic missile base in Poland, in 2008 Russia expanded its air defense base there.<sup>331</sup>

In South Caucasus, Russia has bases in Armenia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian military base in Armenia, according to renewed agreement will stay in Gyumri until 2044, with an automatic 5-year lease extension, despite the fact that according to the former contract the lease should end in 2015 causing total dismantlement of base.<sup>332</sup>

It is customary to believe that Armenia completely relies on Russia in terms of security, because of territorial conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh region<sup>333</sup> and facing resumption of military attacks from Azerbaijan any moment. However, this statement is at least arguable, if not totally deniable, because Armenia has never requested CSTO to intervene despite numerous

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<sup>328</sup> Newnham, R. E. (2013). Pipeline politics: Russian energy sanctions and the 2010 Ukrainian elections. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 4(2), pp. 118; 120-121.

<sup>329</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. *Occasional UL papers*, 1.

<sup>330</sup> Kramer, M. (2008). Russian policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: recent trends and future prospects. *Problems of Post-Communism*, 55(6), p. 8.

<http://dialogueeurope.org/uploads/File/resources/Russian%20policy%20toward%20the%20CIS.pdf>

<sup>331</sup> Oldberg, I. (2010). Russia's Great Power Strategy under Putin and Medvedev. *Occasional UL papers*, 1

<sup>332</sup> Cohen, A. & Hamilton, E. R. (2011). The Russian Military and Georgian War: Lessons and Implications. *Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)*, p. 79. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1069.pdf>

<sup>333</sup> Confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh dated back to 1988, when the predominantly ethnic Armenian population of Karabakh launched its independence movement and demanded unification with motherland. This political movement escalated and turned into a full-fledged ethnic conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1992, immediately after the Soviet breakup. Armistice was signed in 1994 and Nagorno-Karabakh with seven other occupied districts came under Armenian control (see Sargsyan, A. H. (2013, May 13). Nagorno-Karabakh: Obstacles to negotiated settlements. *Stratfor Global Intelligence*, accessed 14.11.2014. <http://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/nagorno-karabakh-obstacles-negotiated-settlement> ).

cases of ceasefire violations from Azeri side. The most *significant* case to the point is [military incident](#) on November 12, 2014 near a cease-fire line, when Azeris shot down Armenian military Mi-24 helicopter carrying out a training flight, causing death of all three crewmembers<sup>334</sup>. Armenia officially responded, that the incident will cause Azerbaijan “painful consequences”<sup>335</sup> but did not raised need for CSTO intervention. In its turn CSTO just blamed Azerbaijan in increasing the risk of conflict escalation<sup>336</sup>.

Nor Armenia agrees to deploy Russian peacekeeping forces on the frontline. With this regard, Armenian Defence Minister stated that “there is no need to appeal to the CSTO for help in connection with the shelling of Armenian territory by Azerbaijan, while Armed Forces of the Republic of Armenia and the Defense Army of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic are “combat-ready” and in control of the situation at the Line of Contact”<sup>337</sup>. Russian president uses each case of escalation in the border, exclusively provoked by Azeris, to “offer” Armenian side peacekeeping service, and Azerbaijan to join Russian led collective security Treaty organization<sup>338</sup> and newly functioning Eurasian Economic Union as many political analysts believe in. Yet, the credibility can be heavily criticized given wars in Georgia and Ukraine on the one hand and the four million dollars-worth arms sale to Azerbaijan on the other<sup>339</sup>. Refusal has also strategic meaning for Armenia. According to Armenian analysts, Armenia will lose its current favorable position if peacekeepers will be deployed, because deal will be according to Russia-Azerbaijan “agreement”.<sup>340</sup>

Another sound case of using Nagorno-Karabakh unsettled conflict and military bases as tools of pressure is Armenian choice to join Russian backed Customs Union, transformed into Eurasian Economic Union on January 1 2015, instead of signing Association Agreement with European Union scheduled on 28-29 November 2013 in Vilnius.<sup>341</sup> Analyzing the statement made by pro-

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<sup>334</sup> Kucera, J. (2014, November 13). After Azerbaijan Shoots Down Helicopter, How Will Armenia Respond? Accessed 15.11.2014. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70916>

<sup>335</sup> Azerbaijan Downs Helicopter on Karabakh Frontline, 12.11.2014 accessed 15.11.2014. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70881>

<sup>336</sup> Kucera, J. (2014, November 13). After Azerbaijan Shoots Down Helicopter, How Will Armenia Respond? Accessed 15.11.2014. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/70916>

<sup>337</sup> Hayrumyan, N. (2014, July 2). CSTO and Karabakh conflict: Armenia says no need to appeal for defense pact of allies despite border situation. ArmeniaNow, accessed 15.11.2014.

[http://www.armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/55719/armenia\\_csto\\_eurasian\\_union\\_conference\\_yerevan](http://www.armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/55719/armenia_csto_eurasian_union_conference_yerevan)

<sup>338</sup> Amid Karabakh tensions, both Armenia and Azerbaijan view Russia uneasily, Radio free Europe, Radio Liberty, 13.08.2014, accessed 14.11.2014. <http://www.rferl.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan-armenia-wary-russia/26528994.html>

<sup>339</sup> Zahorka, H. J. (2014, August 6). EU peacekeepers for Nagorno-Kharabakh. Armenian European Magazine “Days”, Prague, accessed 12.11.2014. <http://orer.eu/en/english-eu-peacekeepers-for-nagorno-karabakh/>

<sup>340</sup> Hayrumyan, N. (2014, July 2). CSTO and Karabakh conflict: Armenia says no need to appeal for defense pact of allies despite border situation. ArmeniaNow, accessed 15.11.2014.

[http://www.armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/55719/armenia\\_csto\\_eurasian\\_union\\_conference\\_yerevan](http://www.armenianow.com/commentary/analysis/55719/armenia_csto_eurasian_union_conference_yerevan)

<sup>341</sup> Shirinyan, A. and Ralchev, S. (2013). U-turns and Ways Forward: Armenia, the EU and Russia beyond Vilnius. Institute for regional and international studies, Armenia and Sofia, pp. 1-13. <http://iris-bg.org/files/iris-shirinyan&ralchev-Armenia-EU-Russia-Beyond-Vilnius-nov13.pdf>

Russian editorial of daily “Nezavisimaya gazeta” on 12 August 2014, concerning Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution one could conclude that Russia intended to make it everlasting by stationing peacekeepers along with Conflict Line. “A final resolution of this matter could last indefinitely. But this is not fatal. History is full of conflicts that were not resolved over the course of decades and even centuries. The Karabakh conflict is relatively young -- it is 'only' 20 years old”, is said in the statement.<sup>342</sup> Hence, being Armenia’s security guarantor, Russian troops have never intervened in the real conflict<sup>343</sup>. Nor is Russia interested in ultimate settlement of conflict,<sup>344</sup> which is equal to weakening or even losing its positions in the South Caucasus.

Coming to South Ossetia, after Georgian war Russia transformed its peacekeeping stations in South Ossetia into a permanent military bases and in subsequent years increased their number to five involving Abkhazia as well by deploying a state-of-the-art S- 300 (SA-20 Favorit) long range air defense system. Though, Russian officials announced that stationing the air defence system aims “to prevent violation of Abkhaz and South Ossetian airspace and to destroy any aircraft intruding into their airspace no matter what their purpose might be”, the fact was self-evident, that is to keep the South Caucasus strategic air base under Russian control together with the air force deployment and S-300 base in Armenia. To this regard western response was somehow supportive and sounds like an acknowledgment of Russia’s interests in the region, qualifying the move as “not necessarily” a new development. Yet, the actions were antithetical to the points of 2008 ceasefire agreement, urging parties “to withdraw troops to pre-war positions and restore the *status quo ante bellum*.”<sup>345</sup>

#### 4.3.2 Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)

Except from fostering its military presence on the CIS area through military bases, Russia strived to consolidate military cooperation under its aegis and present Moscow as a pole of power and influence in region. Doing so it will maintain pro-Russian regimes and punish westward inclined states and limit, if possible, totally neutralize, penetration of external actors into its backyard.

<sup>342</sup> Amid Karabakh tensions, both Armenia and Azerbaijan view Russia uneasily, Radio free Europe, Radio Liberty, 13.08.2014, accessed 14.11.2014. <http://www.rferl.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan-armenia-wary-russia/26528994.html>

<sup>343</sup> Kiss, A. (2014). Russian view on South Caucasus: a teetering policy of pragmatism. Cultural relations quarterly view, pp. 16-17. [http://culturalrelations.org/Review/CRQR\\_01\\_01/CRQR\\_01\\_01\\_Annamaria-Kiss\\_Russian-view-on-South-Caucasus--A-teetering-policy-of-pragmatism.pdf](http://culturalrelations.org/Review/CRQR_01_01/CRQR_01_01_Annamaria-Kiss_Russian-view-on-South-Caucasus--A-teetering-policy-of-pragmatism.pdf)

<sup>344</sup> Karabakh tensions, both Armenia and Azerbaijan view Russia uneasily, Radio free Europe, Radio Liberty, 13.08.2014, accessed 14.11.2014. <http://www.rferl.org/content/nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan-armenia-wary-russia/26528994.html>

<sup>345</sup> Cohen, A. and Hamilton, E. R. (2011). The Russian Military and Georgian War: Lessons and Implications. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI), p. 89. <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1069.pdf>

Hence, Russia initiated another policy tool, Collective Security Treaty, which later became Collective Security Treaty Organization, named a mini Warsaw Pact by Van Herpen<sup>346</sup>.

As was already mentioned, in order to manage security policy and address security issues in the region Russia initiated Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a tool for paving a way for its military expansion in the CIS territory.

The predecessor of CSTO was Collective Security Treaty originally signed in 1992 in Tashkent (known also as Tashkent Treaty) embracing nine post-Soviet states: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as a defense aliens. In 1999 Azerbaijan,<sup>347</sup> Uzbekistan<sup>348</sup> and Georgia rejected to prolong the Treaty and left the organization considering it practically weak and invalid, serving only as a tool to quell anti-regime public unrests. Failure to secure Tajik-Afghan border under the Collective Security Treaty, ultimately achieved on the terms of Russian-Tajik bilateral agreement, is brilliant manifestation of Treaty's functional incapability. Azerbaijan, rejected to extend the Treaty for another five years, being dissatisfied with the results of Russia's conflict mediation between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Georgia, looking forward to joining western security club followed suit and withdrew from the organization claiming that 'National border troops can guard state frontiers of Georgia as reliably as Russian colleagues.' Uzbekistan left the Treaty accusing Russia of using Afghan threat to force countries to join the treaty and therefore further its influence in the region.<sup>349</sup>

The rebirth of organization as the CSTO was in 2002 with participation of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia,<sup>350</sup> which was internationally recognized in 2003 by registration of its statute in the UN secretariat. It is believed that the CSTO is formed based on NATO experience, while its initial focus was securing member states from external military aggression,<sup>351</sup> and likewise is governed by political and military establishments. The former is composed of Council of Ministers of Defence (CMD), as in the CIS; the Council of Ministers for Foreign Affairs; and the Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils, and the latter is the Joint Headquarters. Collective Security Council (CSC) consisting of the heads of state of member countries leads the entire organization, while CSTO Secretary-General conducts management. Though, being inspired by the NATO's experience, CSTO is not as popular as the

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<sup>346</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). *Putin's war: The rise of Russia's new Imperialism*. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 216. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>347</sup> Azerbaijan, Georgia and Belarus joined the Treaty in 1993. (Weinstein, A. (2007). *Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization*. Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel., 8, p. 171. <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/13-Weinstein.pdf>)

<sup>348</sup> Later Uzbekistan again joined the organization in 2005 and withdrew in 2012.

<sup>349</sup> Weinstein, A. (2007). *Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization*. Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel., 8, p. 171. <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/13-Weinstein.pdf>.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid. pp. 168-169.

<sup>351</sup> Weitz, R. (2014). *The Collective Security Treaty Organization: Past Struggles and Future Prospects*. Russian analytical digest, 152, p. 2 <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-152.pdf>

former in military cooperation, given the fact that NATO shares the main lines of military cooperation in the post-soviet soil.<sup>352</sup>

Since its formation, CSTO assured readiness to invest resources to address terrorism, religious extremism, narcotics production, smuggling, misuse of information technologies and to cooperate in peacekeeping and other areas<sup>353</sup>. To fight effectively against the terrorism was established Collective Rapid Deployment Forces (CRDF) in 2009. In order to strengthen CSTO military potential in the region and ensure security operations several military bases were deployed in the member states territory such as Anti-Terror Center (ATC) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the airbase at Kant in Kyrgyzstan, and the Russian 201<sup>st</sup> Motor Rifle Division at Kulyab in Tajikistan.<sup>354</sup> Ukraine crises created a new ground to strengthen and expand CSTO bases in the CIS, by arranging airbases in Armenia and Kyrgyzstan and establishing an airbase for fighter jets in eastern Belarus in 2016, as a response to U.S. actions in stationing air assets in the Baltics<sup>355</sup>.

In order to consolidating CSTO Collective air defense system is created. Another, tool for consolidating the CSTO is military–technical cooperation based on deliveries of weaponry and military equipment at Russian internal prices. However, this principle was applied only to deliveries for units ascribed to collective rapid deployment forces, but Russia uses this tool in its relations with its CIS partners as well. In order to meet its goal in the field of combating illegal drug trafficking, was set up Coordinating Council on Psycho-tropic and Narcotic Substances Circulation Control and a working group on Afghanistan in 2005.<sup>356</sup>

However, above-mentioned undertakings and fields of cooperation does not guarantee deep integration within the grouping. In 2012, Uzbekistan, whose position according to Van Herpen

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<sup>352</sup> Bailes, A. J., Baranovsky, V. & Dunay P. (2007). Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: Vol. 4. Regional security cooperation in the former Soviet area. SIPRI Yearbook (2007), pp. 174-175.

<http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2007/files/SIPRIYB0704.pdf>

<sup>353</sup> Tsygankov, A. P. (2006). If not by tanks, then by banks? The role of soft power in Putin's foreign policy. Europe-Asia Studies, 58(7), pp. 1082-1083.

[http://www.kantiana.ru/eu4u/Summer\\_school\\_2013/f%20not%20by%20tanls,%20then%20by%20banks%20The%20role%20of%20soft%20power%20in%20Putins%20foreign%20policy.pdf](http://www.kantiana.ru/eu4u/Summer_school_2013/f%20not%20by%20tanls,%20then%20by%20banks%20The%20role%20of%20soft%20power%20in%20Putins%20foreign%20policy.pdf)

<sup>354</sup> Frost, A. (2000). The Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and Russia's Strategic Goals in Central Asia.

Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program (CACI-SRSP), The China & Eurasia Forum Quarterly, 7(3), 83-102. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=110229>

<sup>355</sup> Bodner, M. (2014, October 23). With Ukraine Revitalizing NATO, Russia Dusts off its own security Alliance, The Moscow Times, accessed 18.11.2014. <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-s-csto-stumbles-on-regional-conflicts-in-drive-to-rival-nato/509986.html>

<sup>356</sup> Bailes, A. J., Baranovsky, V. & Dunay P. (2007). Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: Vol. 4. Regional security cooperation in the former Soviet area. SIPRI Yearbook (2007), pp. 176-177.

<http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2007/files/SIPRIYB0704.pdf>

“stands in the way of making this organization a working military and political alliance”<sup>357</sup>, suspended its membership in the CSTO, though, on December 20, 2011 with other member states signed a Law on ratification Protocol on the Location of Military Installations in Collective Security Treaty Organization Member Countries, according to which in order to host military infrastructure of non-member states it would be necessary to get the consent of the CSTO entitling each member with veto right.<sup>358</sup> Uzbekistan’s withdrawal was instigated by several reasons. First reason to be mentioned is Russia’s attempts to set up Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) within the CSTO, the aim of which was to intervene in intra-state crises with or without UN mandate. Uzbekistan rejected not only to mandate RRF to interfere in intra-state disputes, while originally it was developed to react to external threats, rather any deployment should be based on consent of each member offering each state a right to veto, hence the ability to forestall any member states invasion under the CSTO flag.<sup>359</sup> Next is majority rule decision making mechanism instead of consensus.<sup>360</sup>

Next case is Kyrgyz crisis, when CSTO did not hurry to “protect its compatriots or citizens”. The CSTO failed to intervene in June 2010, to back the Kyrgyz president Kurmanbek Bakiyev during the unrest or stayed death to appeals of interim Kyrgyz government to station CSTO units in order to crush inter-ethnic violence between Uzbek and Kyrgyz groups in the south of Kyrgyzstan. The CSTO Secretary-General Bordyuzha explained organization’s non-intervention by restrictions in CSTO Charter, notably heralding that there is no obligation to interfere in member state’s internal conflicts.<sup>361</sup> Analysts consider, that Kyrgyz crises exposed deep division and distrust towards Organization’s and Russia’s real intentions and forced member states to rethink on Russia’s further initiatives.

<sup>357</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). Putin’s war: The rise of Russia’s new Imperialism. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 219. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>358</sup> Document caused opposing opinions among observers concerning the motivation of signatories. First group translated the event as another step against America’s rising influence in the CA, through publicly declared its aim was addressing issues from Afghanistan, and underlining that first of all CA states were in need of such regulation. It is so to say indirect rejection of America’s expected proposal on regional anti-drug proposal, among others, in which notably Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were interested from the beginning. Next group stated that it actually puts an end to states’ multi-vector policy seeking to balance Russia’s influence by cooperating with other major powers. As a matter of fact, this law is nothing more than an extra tool in the hand of Russia, to set member states foreign and security policies vis-à-vis the NATO. Worth mentioning, that the Protocol should yet be ratified by National Parliaments of MS (Law ratifying protocol on the Location of Military Installations in CSTO member states, 14.11.2012, accessed 18.11.2014. <http://eng.kremlin.ru/acts/4633>; Kucera, J.(2011, December 20) CSTO to decide on Future Central Asian Military Bases; skeptical of U.S. Drug help. EURASIANET.org, accessed 18.11.2014. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/64739>; Sodiqov, A. (2012, January 16). CSTO agreement on foreign bases frustrates Tajikistan’s ambitions. Eurasia Daily Monitor, 9 (10), The Jamestown foundation. Accessed 20.11.2014. [http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews%5Btt\\_news%5D=38889](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38889) )

<sup>359</sup> Allison, R. (2013). Russia, the West, and military intervention. Oxford University Press, p. 144.

<sup>360</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). Putin’s war: The rise of Russia’s new Imperialism. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield, p. 219. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>361</sup> Bodner, M. (2014, October 23). With Ukraine Revitalizing NATO, Russia Dusts off its own security Alliance, The Moscow Times, accessed 18.11.2014. <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-s-csto-stumbles-on-regional-conflicts-in-drive-to-rival-nato/509986.html>

To get international recognition for the CSTO and to put equation mark between CSTO and NATO Russia invested a lot of time and efforts. To reach its goal, Russia suggested to discuss problems of post-Soviet geopolitical area and Afghanistan in joint CSTO-NATO format. However, these ventures failed to meet NATO's enthusiastic reaction, not only given Russia's relations with the West, as well as the fact that the CSTO is perceived both as a tool in the hands of Moscow, and as a means of strengthening the loyal regimes in member states.<sup>362</sup> NATO's recognition would entitle Russia to speak on behalf of member states and in fact acknowledge the Russia's sole right to its claimed sphere of influence<sup>363</sup>.

If Russia did not succeed with NATO then efforts towards UN were justified. The UN and CSTO signed an accord on cooperation in countering terrorism, transnational crime (including illegal arms trafficking), and in settling conflicts. Despite the fact that this agreement is important for UN in various aspects, the breakthrough is that CSTO earned recognition as a regional player outside the CIS. According to the new treaty, UN-CSTO will enlarge their cooperation "taking into account the respective spheres of competence and procedures of either organization."<sup>364</sup> To show its weight on the international stage Serbia and Afghanistan are granted observer status.<sup>365</sup>

Since CSTO founding Russia has pursued two main goals. First to be mentioned is to make CSTO as an effective tool of securing its influence and promoting imperialistic policy in the CIS under the guise of collective security provider or guarantor at the same time achieving its final goal in region, that is become a regional hegemon. To this point, Russia's military bases are to be recalled. Next are the principles of preventing CSTO member countries from joining any other military alliance and forbidding to install foreign bases in member states, simultaneously limiting or neutralizing U.S. or NATO presence in its Eurasian region of its responsibility. How it may be fulfilled in real politics, is matter of time. Furthermore, under the mandate of CSTO Rapid Reaction Force Russia assures its possible intervention in respective countries' internal affairs by providing military support for elites in order to suppress protests or interfering in intra-state crises<sup>366</sup>. Finally, UN-CSTO pact is self-evident concerning organization's international weight. Russian led CSTO got much-awaited international recognition, a tool to legitimate its further actions in its sphere of interest and gradually supplant NATO partnership for peace program in

<sup>362</sup> Bailes, A. J., Baranovsky, V. & Dunay P. (2007). Armaments, Disarmament and International Security: Vol. 4. Regional security cooperation in the former Soviet area. SIPRI Yearbook (2007), pp. 177-178.

<http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2007/files/SIPRIYB0704.pdf>

<sup>363</sup> Blank, S. (2010, May 10). The implications of UN-CSTO cooperation. EURASIANET.org. Accessed 24.11.2014. <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61062>

<sup>364</sup> Ibid.

<sup>365</sup> Van Herpen, M. H. (2014). Putin's war: The rise of Russia's new Imperialism. Lanham, USA: Rowman & Littlefield, p.220. <http://www.willzuzak.ca/cl/putin/Herpen2014PutinsWars.pdf>

<sup>366</sup> Grigoryan, A. (2014). Armenia: Joining under the gun. Central Asia-Caucasus institute. Silk Road studies program, A joint transatlantic research and policy institute. P. 100. <http://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/publications/8-1409GrandStrategy-Armenia.pdf>

which many CSTO members are interacting, thereby violating CSTO Charter's provision on non-involvement in other military alliance<sup>367</sup>.

Though CSTO members continue their bilateral cooperation with NATO, despite the case of withdrawal of Uzbekistan and its members having different security agendas, in near future CSTO will stay the lesser of two evils for its member countries. Their eagerness to keep their regimes and to prevent west-backed colored revolutions and Arab springs in their countries is more than enough reason to prioritize the CSTO. To this effect, even delegating Russia more power is considered relative gain for members and disregards such a sensitive principle as sovereignty. Militarily, Russia is in vicinity in case of Afghan threat. To this regard: "Neighbor is better than relative that is afar" saying comes to mind. Moreover, many analysts are sure that in the wake of NATO's withdrawal from Afghanistan the CSTO will enhance its influence as the regional security guarantor and become even irreplaceable.<sup>368</sup>

Ironically, American diplomacy and military operations in recent years have played a hand in strengthening the CSTO and expanding its mandate beyond cursory matters of military cooperation. At a time when Russia displays a renewed interest in regional hegemony, US policies in Iraq and Afghanistan encourage ex-Soviet nations to cooperate with Russia on security policy. A glance at the CSTO's evolution suggests that, should current conditions persist, this organization could very well develop into a full-fledged military alliance—a postmodern Mini-Warsaw Pact that could help Russia fully realize its aspiration for leadership of the post-Soviet space.<sup>369</sup>

## Overall assessment

Comprehensive studies, analyzing the logics and reasons of empire building are timely and grow day after day. However, such sort of literature on Russian neo imperialism after annexation of Crimea and establishment of Eurasian Union has been conducted not enough. Hence, the current study tried to fill in the gap and contribute to further discussions on the topic. Taking into consideration Russia's present foreign political situation its imperial foreign and security policy is to be largely considered vs. the CIS countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity.

To fulfill the objective, the study begins with presenting discourse on empires, which aims to address the first RQ: What is the definition of empire? It was acknowledged that after the demise

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<sup>367</sup> Weitz, R. (2014). The Collective Security Treaty Organization: Past Struggles and Future Prospects. Russian analytical digest, 152, p. 3. <http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-152.pdf>

<sup>368</sup> Bodner, M. (2014, October 23). With Ukraine Revitalizing NATO, Russia Dusts off its own security Alliance, The Moscow Times, accessed 18.11.2014. <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-s-csto-stumbles-on-regional-conflicts-in-drive-to-rival-nato/509986.html>

<sup>369</sup> Weinstein, A. (2007). Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization. Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel., 8, p. 168. <http://blogs.shu.edu/diplomacy/files/archives/13-Weinstein.pdf>.

of Soviet Union many analysts hoped that empire will not be back and Russia will command itself into “normal” state building. But, as Eurasianists stated Russia can exist only as an empire. Empire construction considers myriad of necessary factors, from which neither is decisive. One signifies respective country’s military might, other highlights economic development, the third geopolitical position. Analysis made in the current study shows that empire construction is possible also by mixture of above mentioned various components of power, which are used as levers and instruments for fulfilling imperial policy. Furthermore, study introduced three major understandings of imperialism and imperial expansion, according which three main factors drive for empire building. According to metrocentric theory internal conditions of metropole push for imperial expansion, in order to obtain market, territory, resources. Contrary to metrocentric approach, pericentric theory saw imperialism as the result of internal conditions/problems of the periphery. The last systemic approach believes that imbalance of power is the main driving force for empire building. Furthermore, in the study the author reiterated that an important starting point in understanding empire notion is core-periphery relationship. Hence, to answer of the first research question (RQ) is: Empire is a great power preserving right of final say in its sphere of influence, where “Great power” is the “core” and “sphere of influence” is “periphery”.

To address the second RQ: Which are the main postulates of Russian foreign and security policy?, Russian foreign and security policy was investigated through lens of empire building and Eurasianism is uncovered as the ideological base of official policy. The research stressed that main postulates of Eurasianism are incorporated in official documents. Speaking about Eurasianism, research is mainly focused on Russian current, which by Laruelle was labeled as “an ideology of empire”. Hence, the main postulates of Russian foreign and security policy expressed in Eurasian ideas are Russia’s great power standing and prioritizing CIS per se, as a determinant means in preserving the status, where non regional powers are not welcomed. The next common characteristic is encourages integration-expansionism and envisioned mega-project of creating a Eurasian New World Order based on multi-polarity, where Russia should be one of poles. According to Russian policy makers multi-polar world order is more secure, than current unipolar world. Worth mentioning, that driving force to imply Eurasian ideology in government policy is to ensure countries territorial integrity, which is not only one of main components of empire and had already proved to be successful (1917 October Revolution and break up of Russian Empire and dissolution of Former Soviet Union in 1991), but is the driving force of Eurasianism and policy documents as well.

The third RQ asked was “Which are the main determinants of Russian neo-imperialism?” To uncover this RQ Russian practical policy was explored focusing primarily on three dimensions: political, economic and military. The research stressed that in the political dimension Russia uses its ties with elites of respective countries to achieve its goals. If just political means are not working Russia employs economic and military tools. It was acknowledged that in economic dimension Russia relies largely on its energy weapon, its transmission routes and Russia’s reintegration project of Eurasian Economic Union. Through these economic levers Russia

succeeded to keep under its control main energy transport routes to Europe and recollect some CIS states back under the Eurasian project. With military instrument Russia secured not only its military presence, but also obtained new territorial units like Ukraine's Crimea.

Hence, taking into consideration above mentioned aspects, it can be concluded that the hypothesis of the research study has found support.

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## *Is Russia Withdrawing from Rule of Law Principles?*

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Between 2013 until mid-2015, around 45.000 Russians have turned to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg (Moscow Times, 10.12.2015).



The ECHR in Strasbourg/France.

The majority of cases was decided against the Russian administration, for the protection of the Russian citizens. The ECHR can rule also against a constitution of a signatory state – which was the case e.g. in an equality and non-discrimination case against Germany where the Constitution had ruled that women cannot fight in the army, resp. not fight in combat troops. A female future helicopter pilot had this legally examined, and won finally. The German Constitution had to be modified.

So, the ECHR is a (not only constitutional) watchdog, with many judgments in favour of judicial rights of the citizens. Since the Eastern European states are subject of ECHR decisions, there is a certain tendency in favour of a liberal society, abiding to the rule of law. It is good to have international courts in Europe, and the ECHR and its EU counterpart, the Court of European Justice (CEJ) in Luxembourg have all confidence of the citizens. These courts are a guarantee of the sum of all positive legal traditions.

But now Russia has managed to adopt a new law, and this within days: The Federal Constitutional Law of 14.12.2015 № 7-FKZ: “On Amendments to the Federal Constitutional Law” – On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. The law has been initiated in the parliament on 18.11.2016 and was approved on 4.12.2015 (State Duma) resp. 9.12.2015 (Federation Council), then signed by the president on 14.12.2015. This speed says it all; only semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes can afford to whip a law through parliament that fast, without gathering any feedback by civil society (which hardly exists in Russia). The law

says that its Constitutional Court can exempt Russia of international judgments, if this judgment is against the Russian Constitution. So Russia is, again, alone.

This cannot be compared to the case of the United States who did not want their military staff responsible before an international court. The ECHR concerns civilians. Russia evidently took the Yukos case to trigger its new policy, also to save 1,9 billion EUR compensation to be paid to former Yukos shareholders. This case has to do with arbitrary use of procedural rights, as well as with the case against Michail Khodorkovsky, another example which can show very contestable Russian standards of the rule of law.

Russia should know that this new law is considered by the Rule-of-Law community of the world as being against her own interests, against foreign investment in the country which would be needed so urgently. It goes hand in hand with the laws about “foreign agents”. It is the point on the “i” which should defer all relevant decisions to a post-Putin era, as at present Russia is far away from the rule of law.

*Hans-Jürgen Zahorka*



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## *Azerbaijan: Searching for the ‘Armenian Lobby’*

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### **Arzu Geybullayeva**



*Arzu Geybullayeva is a freelance writer originally from Azerbaijan currently based in Istanbul. She received a B.A. degree in International Relations at Bilkent University, Turkey, and an M.Sc. in Global Politics at the London School of Economics. Geybullayeva began her career as a researcher at the Oxford Business Group in London. She has worked for the National Democratic Institute in Baku. While in Istanbul in 2007, she began working for the European Stability Initiative, a non-profit research and policy institute for South East Europe. In September 2008, she started her blog called Flying Carpets and Broken Pipelines. Since 2009, she has become a contributing columnist to editorials for the Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso, a think-tank based in Italy. She has been a co-director of the Imagine Center for Conflict Transformation since 2011, an organization that fosters relations between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. She is currently the managing editor of Neutral Zone, an internet platform which promotes cultural and social interaction, as well as conflict resolution among Armenians and Azerbaijanis. Since 2013, Geybullayeva has been working as a correspondent for Agos, an Armenian bilingual weekly newspaper published in Istanbul. She was included in the BBC's list of top women in 2014*

*The current article was originally published in OpenDemocracy on 8 January 2016. See under: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/arzu-geybullayeva/searching-for-armenian-lobby#>*

Conspiracies keep the people pliant and rulers fearless. In Azerbaijan, all dissidents are considered to be agents of a shadowy ‘Armenian lobby’.

Conspiracy theories are no stranger to resourceful leaders. They can consolidate political power, cultivate the image of an external enemy and reduce their responsibility for the nation's ills. And in the ex-Soviet republic of Azerbaijan, conspiracy theories help keep incumbent president Ilham Aliyev in power. According to these conspiracies, Azerbaijan has two main enemies: the Armenian lobby and the jealous west. As the former is often said to finance the latter, these two enemies become one: an omnipresent and all-powerful ‘Armenian lobby’. This powerful structure has become a commonly used weapon in the hands of the authoritarian leadership of Azerbaijan to crack down on dissent. By referring to all of its critics both at home and abroad as Armenian, pro-Armenian, and representing Armenian interests, the authorities have created a quick conspiracy formula for muzzling independent voices by labelling them as traitors.

## Keep grievances close

In Azerbaijan, Armenia wasn't always used as a political tool—at least, not as much as today. Between 1988 and 1994, the two countries fought a bitter war over the mountainous area of Nagorno Karabakh. The ceasefire that ended the conflict in 1994 failed to maintain a buffer zone.

Casualties on the front line continue to this day, and the failure to reach an agreement between the two states to this day leaves the territory administered as an unrecognised state under Armenian protection. Thousands of civilians have been displaced. Warlike rhetoric has significantly increased over the years and, these days, it is the rubber stamped government policy in both Armenia and Azerbaijan.



Grim reminders of the Karabakh war remain to this day: a minefield at Meghvardzor, Armenian-controlled Azerbaijan. (c) Onnik Krikorian / Demotix

But conditions were different following the first years of independence. There was more dialogue and exchange following the 1994 ceasefire. Journalists travelled freely while non-governmental experts spent time on joint initiatives.

Shahin Rzayev, an Azerbaijani journalist, visited Armenia and unrecognised Nagorno-Karabakh seven times between 1997 and 2007. Over the years, permission to travel to the neighbouring state got harder to obtain. 'During our first trips, our work schedule was much more open. We could freely plan our meetings, walk around Yerevan accompanied by our colleagues, and without any security. These days, every single move needs to be approved ahead of time, including 24 hour security, even to the toilets.' Such demands made trips extremely irritating, recalls Rzayev. He says changes followed the death of independent Azerbaijan's first president Heydar Aliyev. 'There was antagonism towards these trips. But the attitude was positive overall. I recall even Heydar Aliyev saying he applauded such visits and he himself received Armenian

journalists in Baku [Rzayev met Armenia's then prime minister Robert Kocharyan]. Attitudes changed after Aliyev's illness and death. People visiting Armenia were branded traitors, even on the ministerial level.'

Today one doesn't have to visit Armenia to get branded a traitor. Last year, I too was labelled a 'traitor' shortly after news of my work with the Turkish-Armenian weekly newspaper Agos was made public. I was defamed and shamed for writing critically in the enemy's paper. Death threats came shortly after.

### **...and conspiracies closer**

Listening to people like Shahin Rzayev, one could say that it was the coming to power of Ilham Aliyev in 2003 that marked the birth of conspiracy theories in Azerbaijan. Throughout Aliyev's leadership, branding someone 'Armenian' has become a common political tool—often used by government officials and state media as a sign of solidarity.

Naturally, any constructive criticism of government policies, harassment against rights advocates or crackdown on independent voices came to be seen as an act influenced solely by Azerbaijan's enemies, funded through the Armenian lobby and whose sole purpose is to dismantle the ruling powers. Just browsing through statements of MPs one sees a pattern in statements on various occasions, accusing an 'Armenian lobby' of plotting against Azerbaijan. For instance, Musa Qasimli MP claimed in 2015 that all international rights watchdogs were sponsored by or created by the 'Armenian lobby'. In response to a protest against BP's sponsorship of the Baku games by activist organisation Platform London outside the oil company's UK headquarters, Gasimli stated that 'All of these organisations are backed by an Armenian lobby, Armenian diaspora and groups which are not interested in seeing Azerbaijan's development.' Platform London's June report noted that 'the Baku 2015 Games are a celebration of a marriage between the First Family of Azerbaijan, the Aliyevs and the oil corporation BP. These are not just the Aliyev's games; they are also BP's games.' Since 1994, Azerbaijan has become one of BP's key investment markets and, so to speak, its fourth largest province.

Meanwhile, the hate continues. 'There are certain organisations across the world whose main goal is to pour dirt on developing countries like ours. These organisations include Reporters Without Borders, Human Rights Watch, Freedom House and others. They publish fake reports about Azerbaijan, all prepared on the orders of the Armenian lobby,' said Galib Salahzade, another MP, in the aftermath of a series of critical reports published on Azerbaijan's deteriorating rights record.

The US 2015 Azerbaijan Democracy Act, a bill to deny visas to Azerbaijani officials introduced in December, has been deemed yet another example of the work of the Armenian lobby. The bill was drafted and proposed in the US senate as a response to 'unprecedented attack on democracy,

human rights and civil society in Azerbaijan'. Hikmat Hajiyeu, Azerbaijan's foreign ministry spokesperson, was quick to call the draft bill the outcome of the Armenian lobby.

Similarly, Asim Mollazade, another Azerbaijani MP, accused the State Department of working with the Armenian lobby it released a report on the persecution of the family members of Azerbaijani activists. 'This report was prepared by the Armenian lobby. They are closing their eyes to what's going on in Armenia and are criticising Azerbaijan instead,' responded Mollazade.

Even Secretary of State John Kerry was labelled Armenian. Rovshan Rzayev, another MP, said, 'It is known all too well that Kerry has good connections with the Armenian lobby [citing Section 907, which bans any direct US aid to Azerbaijan]. But it would be good if Kerry re-evaluated US-Azerbaijan partnership agreements. State interests as opposed to personal interests should be a priority.'

Among other countries, the existence and presence of Armenian lobbies in the United States and France is no breaking news. For decades these groups have been pushing for the recognition of the Armenian genocide as well as a pro-Armenian position on Karabakh. The Armenian lobby slur can thus serve two purposes: maintaining the status quo in the Karabakh conflict, while undermining any tangible progress in the development of civil society in Azerbaijan, portraying all and any such NGOs as—at best—unnecessary.

### **In good company**

The few examples of the inflated significance of the 'Armenian lobby' in Azerbaijan have parallels in other authoritarian states. In Turkey, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan searches for scapegoats in wild conspiracy theories, accusing a 'parallel lobby' of plotting against Turkish statehood. In Putin's Russia, 'fifth columnists' and 'foreign agents' carry a similar if not identical connotation.

In the case of Russia, conspiracy theories rose to the fore under Putin's leadership. Serghei Golunov argues that the use of conspiracy theories isn't new and that it was particularly common during the Soviet period. 'What makes [conspiracy theories] so abundant during Putin's time,' writes Golunov, '[is] his affiliation with the security services.' Their empowerment during Putin's reign 'made it more likely that the regime would employ conspiracy theories in its rhetoric and policy.'

Golunov's account bears striking similarities with Azerbaijan. There too, preventing 'colour revolutions' and later 'Arab springs' were the main priority of the government apparatus. Just as in Russia, NGOs receiving foreign funding became targets. Activists were accused of carrying out instructions of foreign enemies, and of being funded by the Armenian lobby or directly linked to Armenian lobby. All of this had a single aim—to delegitimise Aliyev's opponents.

## The real victims

While Baku excels at using the ‘Armenian lobby’ as the main driver of all criticism of the government, it also has a habit of instrumentalising the Nagorno-Karabakh war and its consequences in a most cynical way.

A longtime observer of Azerbaijan in Brussels, who spoke to openDemocracy on condition of anonymity, says that Azerbaijani authorities do not shy away from using the Karabakh conflict as a shield. ‘Whenever there is a criticism of Azerbaijan’s human rights record, say, resolutions of the European Parliament, Azerbaijani authorities are quick to remind [the European Parliament] about the fate of the displaced Azerbaijanis from Nagorno Karabakh [and the adjacent seven territories]. So, they use it as a shield against human rights-based criticism.’

‘When there were meetings in the EP on the human rights [situation in Azerbaijan] before the Eurovision song contest, MPs from the Milli Mejlis [Azerbaijan’s National Parliament] were urgently shipped to Brussels to disrupt these meetings by constantly interrupting the speakers (among whom there were activists who are now jailed, such as Rasul Jafarov), making comments irrelevant to the subject and abusing the Nagorno Karabakh issue to sabotage the discussions.’

In the meantime, the Brussels-based observer reminds us, Baku ‘willingly ignored’ the resolutions adopted by the European Parliament ‘respecting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and the right of the IDPs to return to their homes.’



Azerbaijani scholar Arif Yunus was arrested on 5 August 2014, and on 13 August 2015 was sentenced to a 7-year imprisonment. One of the many charges against him was espionage for Armenia. On 12 November 2015, the Baku Court of Appeals granted Yunus's release at the request of his lawyers due to his deteriorating health.

A more recent resolution adopted by the European Parliament in September this year and which called for the release of all political prisoners, human rights defenders, journalists and activists, attests to the tendency noted above.

Parliament members in Azerbaijan described the resolution as ‘biased’ and accused the EP of ‘double standards’. In her statement, parliament member Leyla Abdullayeva said, ‘Azerbaijan is just like many other Muslim states suffering from double standards policy [...] we are the ones who are occupied and suffered aggression. But unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia doesn’t get any sanctions [...] looks like someone cannot stomach our country’s free and independent policy. Behind them no doubt is the Armenian lobby and the world community of Armenians. Our President also said that they are our number one enemy’.

The observer calls these accusations ‘total nonsense’, adding that ‘Azerbaijan's propaganda portrays these people [members of the parliament] as “pro-Armenian”, “Islamophobic”, and “jealous of Azerbaijan’s successes [but] none of them has any connection to the Armenian lobby.’

In fact, one of the MEPs of this information group is Ulrike Lunacek, an Austrian Green who is on the record as consistently supporting Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and demanding the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied territories. Yet Lunacek is also one of the most insulted and verbally abused, invariably in connection to her sexual orientation. This shows how much the regime’s hired guns really ‘care’ about Nagorno Karabakh.

‘The charge of Islamophobia is even more ridiculous. The pro-human rights MEPs often come from left-leaning and liberal groups. Those are the very people who advocate for multilateralism and diversity. They fight Islamophobia, not promote it. The regime’s propagandists don’t even realise how inconsistent they sound: they promote Azerbaijan as a pillar of secularism, yet at the same time use the religious factor when lashing out at their perceived enemies—by accusing them of being Islamophobes,’ comments the EU observer.

Golunov writes that, in the case of Russia, the heavy reliance on conspiracy theories succeeded thanks to the ‘regime’s overwhelming information superiority’. In Azerbaijan, while there are many critics of the government who can read between the lines, the public at large remains unaware of the real situation and often gets sucked into the very heart of the conspiratorial rhetoric. And as freedom of expression disappears, it becomes much easier for the regime to sell its argument.

What is left is only a glimpse of hope that, amid the information blockade, some will be able to see right from wrong. They may then start questioning how a supposed and shadowy ‘Armenian lobby’ became such a powerful influence in Azerbaijan in the first place.

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# *Corruption in the Western Balkans: Its Impact on Governance*

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## **Petrit Bushi**



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*The following article is a part of a research made on behalf of Balkan Institute for Financial Research in Pristina, Kosovo, [www.bifr.org](http://www.bifr.org).*

## **Abstract**

Corruption as an impediment to good governance and to economic development nowadays has developed in a very large scale, influencing all the major public fields of politics, economics, administration and judiciary. Western Balkan countries and Albania in particular could not avoid this phenomenon since the level of the informal economy has been very high and it has made possible to increase the level of corruption, despite the numerous measures taken to combat and to control it.

This study analyzes the impact of corruption on the informal economy, and the inefficiencies of the public sector for revenue collection. It studies the impact of corruption on budget as well as the unfulfilling of needs and coping measures against corruption as well as the decline of the public confidence in state institution. The vicious circle of corruption, informal economy, the reductions of formal economy, the financial inability to address public needs and the inefficient governance are the main issues analyzed in this study. It also focuses on last measures voted to combat corruption such as the efficient implementation of the monitoring systems included in the government reform.

## **Introduction**

Corruption as a phenomenon has taken a large scale, not only in developing countries or countries in transition, but also in the developed countries. Bribery and corruption are well

known to be the worst evil of a society. Therefore, the scale of the devastating effects that corruption brings globally is big. The World Bank estimates that one trillion dollars a year is paid in bribes worldwide. However, the damage goes beyond these figures - corruption leads to a perversion of economic decisions. It distorts the competitive markets, not allowing the partition of resources, and destroys the investment climate.

It is difficult to make an ultimate definition of corruption, but the necessity to fight it because of the consequences that it brings, made it necessary to take initiatives to design laws and conventions. Some of these initiatives resulted in conventions, such as the Convention of the Council of Europe, the Additional Protocol of the criminal convention, the Civil convention on corruption and the Convention against bribery of foreign public officials in international business transactions of the OECD. These conventions contain concrete measures of how to combat corruption or, at least, minimize it. Nevertheless, the biggest challenge is the lack of measuring indicators. This is why corruption is assessed much more on the perceptions a society has about its level in state institutions. The other reason of the lack of relevance of corruption measuring indicators is linked to the fact that one of the main subjects of the criminal offenses of the passive corruption are administrative officials. State administration has interest in hiding the level of corruption.

Some authors consider corruption as an ethical and moral phenomenon, whereas, legally treated, corruption is a criminal offense that must be treated legally. Nevertheless, corruption can be delimited as a misconduct of a civil servant whose aim is to obtain material or moral benefits, for himself or for his group. The aim of this benefit, as a product of crime is legalization, which is becoming more difficult, because of the measures taken to formalize the economy. In most of the formal communist countries, informal economy is very high. In Albania, an OECD reports considers the level of the informal economy reaching 50% of the global economy of Albania.

In order to explain the link between corruption and the informal economy, and through them their impact on governance, this study contains several sections. The first section explains corruption as a concept- a first delimitation, from the ethical and legal aspect- and analyzes the benefits from corruption, in particular the material benefits, as a product of crime as well as the need for transactions or other transfers of this benefit. The second section explains the inclusion of the incomes from corruption into informal economy and the impact of the growth of the informal economy from corruption, and the weakening of the conduct of public employees, a fact that affects directly on the collection of income for the public sector. The third section analyzes the impact of corruption on governance through informal economy and analyzes the vicious circle of this impact, allowing us to highlight the factors. The fourth section is a summary of the conclusions emerging from the other sections and recommendations for the measures to be taken to change these factors, prevent through governance reforms, and struck cases of corruption by prosecution and justice institutions.

## **The Perception of Corruption and Economic Growth**

Corruption increasingly extends its metastases in all areas of life, political, economic, social, becoming thus a major stumbling for economy, the functioning of the system, endangering of democracy. It must be admitted that the phenomenon of corruption has spread in all countries, in developed countries as well as in the underdeveloped countries because the consequences of corruption are very important and destructive for the democracy. This is also the reason why measures to combat corruption are growing and very often failing. Acts of corruption in different countries are different which makes it difficult to delimit corruption and as a consequence we don't have a standard to understand the occurrence and the causes of this destructive phenomenon.

In its essence, corruption is considered as misuse of an official position for personal or group profit. This understanding of corruption is general, and does not give response for the political and private corruption and does not share the concept of benefit if it is on monetary value, wealth, other personal or collective interests and collective or group interests for the person who commits an act of corruption. The fact that the term misuse of official position is used, the perception of the level of corruption focuses on the public official. In the perception of the corruption, the perceiver gives an opinion of the level of corruption, launched by some interests and factors such as the economic situation in which it is located, the opinion also created because the media, which often guide the opinions or support certain political groups at different times, these opinions that distort and their independent position.

The aim of this study is to find the relationship between the perception of corruption and the economic growth. What is their relationship? Does the perception of corruption impacts of the economic growth and how the economic decline affects governance? The answer to these questions gives us some conclusions and recommendations that we think contribute to and are a reference to consider in the implementation of the anti-corruption reforms.

In order to make an analysis of the statistical indicators and to calculate the effect that brings the perception of corruption on economic growth, I refer to the indicators of perception in several Western Balkan countries like Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Kosovo and Albania. These indicators are for the period 2003 -2013 (figure 1).




Fig. 1 Perception of corruption 2003-2013 in countries of Western Balkan




Fig. 2 Economic growth 2004-2012 in countries of Western Balkans

The purpose of the following statistical analysis is to measure the effect of the impact of perceptions of corruption on economic growth for the countries under consideration and for the period of the last decade. The data on the perception of corruption are taken by Transparency International. The points represent the perception of corruption in a given country and in a given year. Points are indexed and major points imply a perception of greater corruption at the time and place of measuring the index. Economic growth is taken from the World Bank. These data

are the percentage of the growth of the gross domestic product of a country, calculated in real terms.

It is easily justified the sense that economic growth is influenced to a large extent by the perception of the corruption in the economy and in social life in general. Among other things, it is worth mentioning that:

1. Corruption or the perception of corruption grows the costs of transactions. This makes it possible to reduce the profits and the entrepreneurs are discouraged for the profitable activities in that period and that place.
2. Corruption drops the concurrence that in the economic teaching is largely accepted as a generator of the economic performance.
3. Corruption discourages enterprises that rely on the underlying analysis and is based on accumulation of knowledge. As long as people with abilities to penetrate into the system using the indirect method of "buying skills", then entrepreneurs who intend to build activities fully supported by modern methods, competitive and transparent are discouraged.
4. Corruption causes the de legitimization of state's institutions and entrepreneurs and stakeholders turn more and more to "parallel institutions" or those considered as "afternoon institutions" that compete directly state institutions.

Statistical analysis of data on the perception of corruption and economic growth is accomplished by treating them "pooled cross-sectional". This means that for countries and years that are missing any relevant data is missing were excluded from the sample. For example, if we do not dispose date on Albania's economic growth for 2013, this year is excluded from the sample even if we possess data on corruption perception.

It is postulated that the relationship between the economic growth and the perception of corruption is in the following form:

$$Y = b + b_1X + e$$

Y = economic growth in percentage,

b = cross cutting of X with Y,

b<sub>1</sub> = marginal effect of the impact of perceptions of corruption on economic growth,

X = perception of corruption in points and,

e = error (ore what is known as residuals).

From the analysis of data obtained few have the following equation:

$$Y = 11.82 - 3.7 X + e$$

Two expected essential conclusions derive from the measuring of the above equation.

First, the dependence between the economic growth (Y) and the perception of corruption (X) is negative (oblique). This means that the growth of the perception of corruption negatively affects the economic growth. The measure of this impact is estimated to be of a considerable size (-3.7). This means that the increasing of the perception of corruption by one point, lowers the economic growth by 3.7 points. This conclusion is crucial and justifies any effort or sacrifice that countries should do to reduce corruption in their economies.

### **Informal Economy as Opportunities for Corruption**

Informal economy is defined differently in different countries. There can be found different definitions as a “non-formal economy”, “secondary economy”, “shadow economy”, “secondary economy”, “unreported economy”, “underground economy” etc. Despite the definition of the informal economy, in its content and for the effect the analysis of the informal economy as an opportunity for corruption, in this article, the informal economy includes all economic activities which generate income for themselves or for the third, hidden by the state, unrecorded or that may not be registered and therefore cannot be audited. In this article we consider the informal economy as an economy which in its content has two groups of economic activities that generate income:

1. The informal economy which includes unregistered economic activities and
2. The Shadow economy, which generates revenue from criminal activities such as drugs, smuggling, prostitution, human trafficking, vehicles trafficking, and all those criminal acts that bring general illegal benefit, that are designated as grey economy or "parallel economy".

The first part of the informal economy that includes unregistered economic activities, is directly linked to the work and duties of employees of the tax system and other structures that are tasked with the registration of these activities and their punishment in cases there are founded nonregistered economic activities. In both cases, it is related to state employees. The second part, which is the most difficult part to be controlled, and which is made more difficult in terms of free trade and economic integration throughout the world, facilitating international activities of the gray economy, is directly linked to the work of the state employees and structures that have the duty to fight crime.

Considering the economy of a country as an addition of the two parts, formal and informal, between the formal and the informal economy, it has a negative relation. Jan-Peter Olters, in his article "The informal economy in Albania, a hindrance for the economic development" in schematic form represents the connection that exist between the formal and the informal economy and bribery as part of the informal economy (Figure 3).




Fig 3: Bribery as a part of informal economy

Following the above we can come to several conclusions:

1. Corruption directly affects the informal economy and that there is a positive correlation between them, the greater the corruption, so great is the informal economy.
2. The growth of the informal economy reduces income from taxes and as a consequence reduces the state revenue to the state budget which contributes to the reduction of the public services and public benefits.
3. Corruption is part of the informal economy.

This vicious circle of the influence of corruption in informal economy and, through the reduction of the formal economy, explains the negative impact of corruption on governance.

#### 4. The Impact of Corruption through Informal Economy in Governance

Corruption and the perception of corruption as a part of the informal economy affects the size of the informal sector, bringing difficulties in tax collection and incomes by reducing taxes. As a consequence, requirements are for bigger spending cuts bringing thus a low public service and inefficiency in governance.

This vicious circle of the negative impact on costs and inefficient income, undermines confidence on public institutions, putting at risk the governance system and even democracy of the country itself.




Fig.3. The vicious circle

## 5. Conclusions and Recommendations

Corruption or the perception that there is corruption increases the transaction costs. This makes it possible to reduce the profits and to discourage the entrepreneurs for the profitable activities for that period of time or for that place. Corruption reduces the competitiveness of the economic doctrine which is widely accepted as a generator of economic growth performance. Corruption discourages enterprises that rely on analysis and that have in their core the accumulation of knowledge. As long as people with abilities to penetrate into the system by using indirect methods of "buying skills", then the entrepreneurs who intend to build their activity based entirely on modern, competitive and transparent methods, are discouraged.

Corruption causes the delegitimation of the country's institutions and the entrepreneurs and stakeholders to turn towards the "parallel institutions" that compete directly the state. The perception of corruption increase is an opinion that man creates for the others, not only because it knows it or that he can measure the real corruption by himself, from its real situation at a given moment starting from a thought that I don't possess, the other who possesses must be corrupted. In this process, media play an important role also because very often corruption is present in media and dubious capital remain behind them. Very often media in former communist countries

remain behind politics and political groups who concurrence directly state contracts for infrastructure building or other aspects connected to state that compromises their independence.

Repressive policies for minimizing corruption, as long as they do not interfere with the analysis of the causes of economic and social policy as well as for the social education, are not efficient to win against this destructive phenomenon for democracy and society in general, remaining a challenge for a long time.

Changes in the substantive law, the procedural and executive structures require also the efficiency of instruments to combat them, only for cases which is initiated a criminal proceeding.

Preventive measures for the seizure of proceeds of crime and corruption as a product of the criminal activity after that the seizure through a regular court proceedings would be effective measure to influence the reduction of the level of corruption and to increase the citizens' trust in the institutions of law enforcement.

The need of an institutional international and interstate cooperation, not only in the formal plan of cooperation, a cooperation which is formally evident, but a cooperation at the operational level of information exchange, the performance of investigative procedures, and the evidence of confiscation of proceeds of crime is a necessity.

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## *The Conduct of the Constitutional Referendum in Armenia on 6 December, 2015*

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A nationwide referendum of the July 1995 adopted the Constitution of Armenia, establishing the country as a democratic, sovereign, social, and constitutional state. The constitution of the country was first amended by another nationwide referendum in 2005, setting in the country a semi-presidential governance system.

On 6 December 2015 one more nationwide referendum was held in the country to change the country to a parliamentary republic, with the amendments due to be in force during the 2017–18 electoral cycle. The referendum passed with 66.2% of the voters supporting it. The voter turnout was 50.8%, with the passing threshold for the results to be valid being 33%. The opponents of the new constitution argued that the incumbent President Serzh Sargsyan instrumentalised the constitution to preserve power after the completion of his second and last term in office. They also argue that violence, coercion and electoral fraud were deployed to guarantee the positive vote results.

This report was published by European Platform for Democratic Elections. See under:

<http://www.epde.org/en/newsreader/items/armenia-referendum-assessed-as-illegitimate-by-citizen-observers-and-epde-646.html>

Citizen Observer Initiative and the European Platform for Democratic Elections found an unprecedented number of violations on the December 6 Constitutional Referendum. The referendum campaign was marred by massive misuse of administrative resources to campaign in favor of the constitutional changes and influencing the voting and tabulation process via control of electoral administration on the territorial and local levels. Inaccuracy of voter lists remained the most crucial issue considering the confidentiality of voter participation that leaves room for later manipulations.

On the voting day, observers reported an unprecedented number of violations of the electoral law and international standards which had systemic character. Citizen observers and some of the international media reported intimidation and threats across the country. Numerous manipulations of the voter lists, violations during the voting and the vote count, as well as high number of cases of direct falsifications of results by electoral commissions influenced the final outcome of the referendum.

Due to the high number of electoral violations and crime, including intimidation of voters, falsification of protocols and numerous reports on ballot box stuffing, Citizen Observer Initiative and the European Platform for Democratic Elections believe that the Referendum results do not reflect the free will of Armenian citizens and should not be considered to be legitimate.

Citizen Observer Initiative and the EPDE observed the entire process of the preparation for the constitutional referendum. On the voting day, about 700 observers were deployed to 500 precincts in all regions of the country. The observers were accompanied by 700 journalists and EPDE experts. Their reports cover the proceedings of the entire voting day – the opening of the polling stations, the conduct of voting and the counting of votes. This information was recorded via SMS reporting and processed by the call center and analyzed by the core team based in Yerevan.

### **The referendum campaign**

The constitutional amendments and the referendum were pushed forward by the authorities very aggressively and hurriedly. No civic debate was ensured by the authorities who initiated the constitutional amendments. Immediately after approval of the draft amendments by the President of Armenia on August 21, the draft was submitted to the National Assembly and approved on October 5, 2015 without any possibility for the public comment. Instead, the entire state apparatus and the state budget employees were actively mobilized in the campaign supporting the constitutional changes.

### **Impact of the misuse of administrative resources**

In many cases, the political diversity and balance were not ensured in the electoral commissions at territorial and local levels. According to the electoral code, the city and village council members cannot be appointed as members of the territorial and precinct electoral commissions. However, there were 203 council members appointed to PECs of which 83 were appointed by the TECs and 50 were appointed by the ruling Republican Party and were removed only after a report being published by an observer organization.

Electoral Law does not provide for the possibility to vote outside the country which deprives a significant number of the citizens of Armenia of the right to take part in elections and referenda. At the same time, the authorities did not introduce an efficient verification system of voter lists despite the fact that this problem was addressed by numerous international and domestic observation missions in the past. This directly allows for manipulation of voter lists during the voting.

The authorities extensively used administrative resource during the campaign period with the campaign being led by the Prime-Minister with the involvement of The Minister of Territorial Administration and Emergency Situations, as well as all regional governors and local government.

### **The Voting Day**

The voting took place in a tense atmosphere with domestic observers being threatened and targeted by PEC members in the majority of observed polling stations. Several cases of

intimidation of the members of the Citizen Observer Initiative were reported during the entire voting day. There were about 150 cases, when the members of the PECs as well as proxies of the ruling party obstructed the work of observers, in particular when observers tried to observe the completion of voter registration in the voter lists.

Several cases of inaccuracies of voter lists were reported, i.e. dead voters still appeared on the voters list, large groups of people were registered at the same address. Obvious manipulations of the voter lists were reported, i.e. voters were unable to vote because somebody else had already voted instead of them, while others found out that somebody had voted for their absent or dead relatives.

Campaigning in favor of the constitutional changes and excessive instruction of voters in the polling stations were reported in several cases. Multiple voting was reported in 57 cases and organized transportation of voters in 20 cases. Instruction of voters in and outside of the polling stations was reported in 50 cases and violation of secrecy of vote in 51 cases. 14 cases of ballot box stuffing was also reported. In 46 cases people without authorization were identified in the polling stations. 5 cases of ballots or PEC accessories being taken out of the polling stations were observed. There were reports on vote-buying and promises of money.

The vote counting was accompanied by several procedural violations which in many cases could significantly influence the outcome of the voting. In several cases, citizen observers and international media representatives were intimidated and hindered in carrying out their monitoring activities. In some polling stations the counting process was interrupted due to obstacles allegedly initiated by PEC members. Eleven cases of falsifications of the voting results were reported, i.e. when turning off the lights at the polling station was used to shift the ballots and change the results.

### **Biased turnout**

At several polling stations where civic observers were present, the turnout noted by observers differs significantly from the official figures presented by the precinct electoral commissions. In those cases the votes in favour of the constitutional change were disproportionately higher than in the precincts with no such discrepancy.

# *Rural Development in Armenia: Significance of Non-Farm Activity - the Case of Tavush Region*

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## **Margarita Artemyan**



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*The paper is based on the Master thesis submitted to the School of Political Science and International Relations, American University of Armenia, December 2015.*

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## **Introduction**

Throughout the past decade, development discussions have focused on the importance of growing the rural economy for reducing rural poverty and the significant rural-urban divide in most developing countries. This issue has taken more importance for some transitioning economies of the former Soviet republics. Looking into specific cases, analysts and practitioners have stressed the importance of diversifying the economy of rural communities, explaining that attention should be paid to areas of growth beyond agriculture. In line with that, Csaki and Lerman (2000) argue infrastructure improvement projects, economic activities related to production, and provision of social services, among other activities, are of measurable importance to growing non-farm activity.

In the literature, there is evidence that in developing countries the overwhelming majority of rural families draw a measurable portion of household income from non-farm activities. Other references to non-farm activities include trading, agro-processing, manufacturing, and services (Wiggins and Hazell 2011).

Also, in studying rural non-farm activities, researchers should not view all non-farm activities using a single homogeneous lens, but should rather take use multiple lenses to include small and medium size businesses, trading endeavors, services, etc. The current paper defines rural non-farm activities not only as activity based works, but also employment in institutional contexts (schools, government employees, hospitals, etc.).

During the last decades, development studies have brought sufficient evidence that rural economy is not limited and restricted only to agriculture. This evidence can be explained by the fact that the number of poor families in rural communities surpasses the ability of agriculture to offer sustainable development and necessary chances in rural communities (Bezemer and Davis, 2004). In many rural villages of Tavush<sup>370</sup> Marz<sup>371</sup>, agriculture alone cannot support the livelihoods of resident households. In the literature reviewed, authors underline many factors that limit the capacity of agriculture in developing the rural economy. Such factors include the relatively low levels of investment by governments, lack of information, population growth, slow progress in the use of applicable technologies, etc. The options offered by scholars and practitioners lie in the move to non-farm activities that support livelihood and also contribute to advancements in agriculture.

### Defining Non-Farm Economy

Rural non-farm economy (**RNFE**) is defined as economic activities in rural communities that generate income from sources that are not agricultural (Lanjouw 1999; Davis and Pearce 2000; Haggblade et al. 2010; Wiggins and Hazell 2011). As mentioned earlier, RNFE may include manufacturing, mining, construction, transport, trade, agro-processing, etc. Thus, rural non-farm economies comprise a wide variety of activities, which may differ from one country to another, and also from one geographical zone to another. Scholars suggest that even within the same country the proportion and types of activities may vary among regions depending on the local

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<sup>370</sup> Tavush is a region of Armenia, located at the northeast of the country and bordered by Georgia and Azerbaijan. It has an area of 2,704 square kilometers. The capital and the largest town of is Ijevan. With a population of 128609 (about 4.3% of the whole population of Armenia), Tavush is the second least populated region in Armenia. The agricultural index of the region is low, covering only 4.8% of the overall annual agricultural product of Armenia.

<sup>371</sup> The territory of Armenia consists of ten regions (known as “marz” in Armenian) and Yerevan – the capital city, which is governed by the law on local self-government in the city of Yerevan. Public administration in the regions (marzes) is governed by the decree of the President of Armenia “On public administration in the marzes of the Republic of Armenia” and other legal acts. Marz governors exercise the regional policy of the government (Government of the Republic of Armenia, <http://www.gov.am/en/regions/>).

assets and characteristics of location, existing infrastructure, available resources, and other factors.

There are also opposite views on this topic. Some scholars argue that rural non-farm economy is neither sustainable nor supportive of economic development because of the poor quality of goods (produced by most developing countries) that do not gain global market share in time to make a difference in the economy. In the short period, rural non-farm businesses may gain market share in the low-income segments of local populations. Thus, scholars and practitioners supporting this argument in the RNFE debate do not endorse the need for government involvement in creating and stimulating non-farm employment opportunities. Furthermore, the variety of non-farm occupations that may be considered by governments is so large that any state-initiated policy booster will need to be formulated on a case-by-case basis to make an impact. Such a focused attention by government is prohibitive in small countries with limited state expertise and scarce resources. The case-by-case approach to decision making may resolve some efficiency and effectiveness issues but creates new challenges that may give way to an unequal access to public resources thereby distorting the question of *equity* of access to public resources (Lanjouw and Lanjouw 2001).

In many countries non-farm activities are diverse and divided into primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Fisher et al. (1998) define these as follows: the primary sector includes trade, manufacturing, and public services; the secondary sector includes wood, food, textile, metal products, tobacco, construction and renovation; and tertiary non-farm activities consist of education, personal services, public administration, land transport, small-scale retail trade, medical services, hotels and restaurants.

## **Key Benefits of RNFE**

### **Use of Surplus Labor**

The availability of surplus labor is an important feature for the development of the non-farm sector in rural communities. Aside from the economic significance of diversification, scholars argue that paying attention to growing the rural non-farm economy is important for using surplus labor in rural communities, albeit seasonally, thereby reducing unemployment and rural-urban migration outflows. It is to be noted, however, that in smaller rural communities, there may not exist surplus labor (except in winter months). For example, earlier studies have found that in countries with rural smallholder farms, all household members work on their family farms and may not necessarily have surplus labor to devote to non-farm activities (Foster et al. 2001). But, in large countries such as China, non-farm activities have played a crucial role in decreasing rural poverty, increasing the profits of farmers and more importantly in absorbing surplus labor (Lewis 1954).

In contrast to the above, Bardhan and Udry (1999) argue that although non-farm activities have a huge impact on rural development, they also may produce serious negative impact on agricultural productivity simply by taking away laborers away from farming onto non-farm activity. Of course, this is predicated upon the existence of surplus labor and the degree to which skilled labor exists for use in non-farm occupations. The authors claim that if in the rural market there is surplus labor and the labor market is working faultlessly, then the loss of laborers to non-farm activity may be successfully replaced by attracting new people to the agricultural labor market, thus mitigating any undesirable influence on efficiency.

The China example demonstrates how non-farm activities absorb surplus labor and advance livelihoods. Even though agriculture remains one of the main and vital ways of earning money in rural areas, non-farm revenue represents a more significant percentage of total household revenue. According to Luo et al. (2005), approximately 68% of rural families earn at least some non-farm revenue which, on the average, represents roughly 32% of household income. The average household income of those families that engage in non-farm activities is higher than those that had income only from farm activities (Luo et al. 2005; Barrett et al. 2001).

### **New Income Generation**

Developing the rural non-farm economy is also necessary for the new income it generates for rural residents, which in turn subsidizes local economic advance and improves the quality of life of rural residents (Wiggins and Hazell, 2011). Rural non-farm activities encompass a broad range of diverse activities, starting from sectors that have high levels of productivity, measurable effectiveness, and offer higher-scale salaries. The range extends to the opposite end of the continuum (Reardon 1997). The extent to which non-farm businesses develop in rural communities also varies. The size and span vary widely from small cottage industries to large corporations (Losch et al. 2010).

In a study conducted in Bangladesh by Pramanik et al. (2014), per capita family income improved but continued to fluctuate over a period of time. The author shows that average household income grew from USD 1,950 in 2010 to USD 2,281 in 2011, and per capita income increased from USD 361 in 2010 to USD 426 in 2011. According to the study the principal source of income from non-farm sources came from remittances from migrant laborers or family members living overseas, followed by services and other small businesses in various industries. Thus, non-farm income grew from 46% in 2010 to 56% in 2012. Moreover, non-farm workers received earnings mostly from non-farm activities (more than 80%).

Along the same line of disagreement, Reardon et al., discovered that in rural areas households with low income rely mainly on non-farm income derived from rural non-farm activities. But the average income in this segment of the population is very low. While, families that earn higher income from agricultural activities are also inclined to also engage in higher levels of rural non-farm activity. The author suggests that in this case low-income families have better

chances to gain access to non-farm employment as richer families accumulate more savings and create different kinds of job opportunities that are suggested to in need or low-income families. Thus, thousands of rural families raise their income above the poverty threshold (2000).

### **Improvement of Quality of Life**

Generally speaking, in smaller rural communities with low or no non-farm activity, there are no opportunities for leisurely and other community activities given the absence of interest and demand. Aside from demand issues, non-farm activity in smaller communities is restricted to a few because of the lack of equipment and inadequate infrastructure to promote such activity.

In Latin America until the development of rural non-farm employment the word rural was associated with underdevelopment. Rural non-farm employment played a crucial role in improving the quality of life through the development of the service and manufacturing industries. Engagement in manufacturing and trade, as well as in tourism and other related services developed new skills and grew household income by making non-farm employment more attractive than and preferable to farming (Berdegue et al., 2000). During 1960-70 many rural areas in Latin America showed progress in rural non-farm activities and linkages with medium-sized cities and towns via transportation services, non-agricultural trade thereby also strengthening other services.

Ryan and Walker (1990) claim that typically where non-farm activities exist, significant income is derived. The higher household income, the more is the probability that the family is engaged in non-farm employment or part-time and seasonal non-farm activity. Moreover, in a study conducted in India, these authors conclude that the share of employment in non-farm activities relative to the labor market increased from 20 to 27 percent between 1971-2 and 1981-82, whereas the share of agricultural activities fell from 60 to 53 percent. In contrast however, Basant (1993) discusses the findings from a survey study by the Gujarat Institute of Development Research, showing that the more the household income, the higher is the household members' engagement in agriculture, as well as in non-farm activities.

### **Use of Rural Comparative Advantage(s)**

Davis (2000) argues that rural areas with competitive advantages in entertainment, leisure or trade are less inclined to rely on agriculture as a catalyst of progress and development. Developing countries adopt different transformation strategies, usually relying on their comparative advantages derived from the production of specialty or distinct goods, promotion of places of interest for tourists, etc. (Davis, 2003). Moreover, businesses that operate successfully use the exclusive characteristics of their region (i.e., existing comparative advantages) to send relevant signals that boost financing from new investments in the area. This fosters the growth of non-farm activities as well as private farms thereby increasing the reasonable and operative use of monetary and social resources (Davis et al. 2000).

Mehta (2002) argues that the emphasis of state rural development strategies must be developed for boosting self-employment opportunities (including micro and small businesses) than simply creating new jobs. In that context, the role of government could be crucial in identifying specific non-farm activities for different rural areas having in mind the comparative advantages of respective community. Moreover, the author argues that in areas where there is a growing population and increasing fragmentation of land, agriculture cannot increase to the extent of creating new jobs. Thus, it is strategically preferable to focus on developing other area-specific non-farm activities that consider the comparative advantages that may exist.

## **Obstacles to RNFE**

### **Size of the Rural Population**

The diversity and size of non-farm activities are directly associated with the size and average age of the rural population where they occur. In rural areas where the population is focused on growing the agricultural sector it is difficult to create new jobs (Mehta 2002). Thus, it is necessary to shift attention to non-farm activities, which may serve as an alternative approach to increasing employment, reducing poverty and migration, and creating new job opportunities for the local labor force. The role of non-farm activities is especially significant in underdeveloped or least developed countries. In India, for example, the 1991 census revealed a decline in the percentage of those employed in agriculture compared to those working in the non-agricultural segment. Moreover, the ratio of people working in agriculture declined from 69% to 64% between 1981 and 1991 (Mehta, 2002).

### **Lack of Resources**

In many cases, very poor and disadvantaged families are unable to engage in non-farm activities because of the lack of financial resources necessary for accumulating savings to overcome barriers, as well as the absence of minimum skills for launching a business. Thus, they engage in low-income non-farm micro activities that are usually not enough to get them out of poverty (Reardon et al. 2006). It is difficult to track income from non-farm sources, partially because non-farm revenues are not documented by most countries, and because people are often reluctant to disclose information on personal income. In spite of that, there is sufficient evidence that in developing countries non-farm wages represent 35-50% of rural household income (Davis and Gaburici 1999; Greif 1997).

Summing up, Reardon et al. (1998) argue that rural non-farm activities constitute 40% of the earnings of rural households in Latin America, 42% in Africa, and 32% in Asia. In Poland, farming is the primary source of income for 40% of rural populations, while non-agricultural revenues represent 30% of rural household income (Christensen and Lacroix 1997). Manufacturing normally constitutes 20-25% of rural non-farm employment, while construction,

transport, trade and other services account for 75-80% (Wiggins and Hazell 2011; Haggblade et al. 2007). In many countries, services or production activities are consumed almost entirely in the county where the products are produced.

### **The Role of Women in RNFE**

In many countries, rural non-farm economy is of great significance to the economy, especially for women. Though men make up the larger portion of non-farm employment, women constitute between 10-40% of those working in RNFE. The role of women in rural non-farm economy is especially important when analyzing the pattern of savings and living standards of rural households. In Bangladesh, for example, women play a vital role in agriculture; they make up about half of the population and almost 46% is associated to farming (Hoque and Itohara, 2008). Considering that in such countries, the role of women includes managing the economy of the household, more significant effects are obvious.

### **Pull and Push Factors**

The importance of women is better understood by pull and push factors. Many economists consider education as one of the most important factors of women's engagement in the employment industry. Thus, the more advanced the level of education, the more is women's participation in the labor market - a pull factor (Mincer 1962; Becker 1965).

Moreover, Faridi et al. (2011) have discussed the relationship between education and women's involvement in non-farm activities. Their study suggests that those who have low levels of education are more prone to self-employment than those who are more educated. The significance of education is also discussed by Kongolo and Bamgose (2002) who note that in the rural areas of Africa the majority of women are uneducated, that is why they are more or less isolated, there is a lack of incentive, and the rate of unemployment in rural areas is comparatively higher. Thus, level of education plays a crucial role in rural residents' engagement in the local labor market (Hafeez and Ahmed 2002).

Women from low-income households are pushed into non-farm activities mainly to alleviate the economic hardships of their families. Poor families are more likely to increase their spending budget by engaging female members in non-farm activities. Kazi and Raza (1986) conclude that in most cases women engage in non-farm activities to help meet their families' basic needs, increase the household budget and also cover other family needs. In contrast to low-income families, women from richer families are less possible to be engaged in non-farm employment.

Another study by Farid et al. (2009) reveals that women in rural areas are mainly involved in household activities, including selling goods from the home base, backyard gardening, harvesting, etc. According to this study, level of education, household size, size of land owned are factors that play in women's decision-making to get involved in rural non-farm activities. Although other studies confirm that in rural areas the main source of income is from farming and

home-based micro businesses, Newman and Canagarajah (1999) show that in Uganda women's participation in non-farm employment started to grow after 1900s and when women began to work in trade related activities and food-processing. Similarly, in a study by Newman and Canagarajah (2000) in Uganda, the largest sector in which women participate is the cottage industry, mostly selling beverages and other food items. Finally, a study conducted by ECLAC (2000) shows that women's engagement in rural non-farm activity is greater than men's in 10 out of 11 countries studied.

### **Migrant Remittances as Part of RNFE**

Davis et al. posit that remittances from seasonal or temporary migration to rural areas account for income from non-farm activity and represent a significant source in most developing countries (Davis et al. 2000; Haggblade et al. 2010; Kapour 2004). Wiggins and Hazell (2008) address migrant remittances as a vital part of the rural non-farm economy. They suggest that remittances sent home by migrant workers significantly contribute to the local economy.

In South Africa, for example, remittances comprise half of almost all household income (Barret et al. 2001; Ellis 2004). Similarly, according to the Rural Income Generating Activities (RIGA 2010) database, nearly 80 percent of rural residents in Indonesia and in Malawi and 60 percent in Panama rely on remittances for their livelihood. However, in spite of being significant for the livelihood of many rural households in developing countries, it constitutes merely 5-10% of total rural income (IFAD 2010).

In Albania, where private agriculture is a dominant source of income, non-farm earnings are vital and generally involve remittances from migrant-laborers working mostly in Italy and Greece in service related activities (Pearce and Davis, 2000). The proximity of some countries (Hungary, Czech Republic, etc.) to the more developed countries of the EU allows weekly and even daily travel to work and back, whether working in the service industry or in construction. This is more in the form of wages earned from work across borders and represents a significant source of RNF revenue for rural families.

The New Economics of Labor Migration claims that increasing non-farm income may serve as a new source of savings that ultimately may reduce financial constraints and increase savings, thus raising the initial capital necessary for launching non-farm businesses, including investing in manufacturing, acquiring the related machinery, etc. (Stark and Bloom, 1985). However, generally speaking, migrant income or remittances do not necessarily go to savings and are usually consumed on household necessities. This is further exacerbated by the lack of profitable investment opportunities in rural communities.

Research by Nwajiuba (2005) concludes that even though the majority of survey respondents had refused to answer detailed questions on the remittances they received, all had agreed that remittances play a vital role in the households' living. This research reveals that approximately

20-65% of families' priority needs are met from remittances. In Nigeria, the amount of the remittance and how it is spent has great importance. One of the most broadly held opinion is that remittances are generally expended on consumption and other unimportant individual needs. This view brought forward by a number of scholars emphasizes that remittances are to some extent unessential and consequently usually misspent.

Though, the above stated negative opinion of remittances is slowly changing. A number of studies have highlighted that migrants' remittances can turn to investment assets in the home country (Galor and Stark, 1990; Dustman and Kirchkamp 2002). Many of these researchers suggest that for a number of Nigerian families, the money sent from out of the country stimulated an obvious progress of their economic and social opportunities. That in its turn fosters investment in rural non-farm sector, which appeared to advance the significance of overall investment in non-farm activities (Carling, 2004; Nwajiuba, 2005; Osili, 2007). Moreover, numerous studies carried out in Africa show that there is a positive connection between the development of rural non-farm economy, education and remittances, and the growth of RNFE (Atchoerena and Gasperini, 2003; Avila and Gasperini, 2005). The studies conducted in Ghana, Zimbabwe and Somalia revealed that families spend a large amount of obtained remittances on education and rural non-farm economy (Schoorl et al. 2000; Lindley 2005).

### **Agriculture and RNFE**

Agriculture plays a significant role in promoting and influencing the structure and scope of rural non-farm economy. The non-farm economy usually grows through programs that assist rural residents in accessing resources for acquiring agro-processing equipment and skills in delivering services and goods. Basically, the rural development process begins with the households established in a target rural community and occupied in agriculture for their own consumption. As the quantity and quality of their agricultural produce increases, limited trade begins to occur. Gradually, this increases in effectiveness and efficiency giving rise to RNFE (Haggblade et al. 2010).

It is usually argued that in those countries and areas where agriculture has developed vigorously, RNFE has also developed very quickly. Agriculture serves as a catalyst for RNFE and it is a driving force of economic growth (Haggblade et al. 2007; Christensen et al. 2010). On the other hand, slower revenue progress in agriculture may cause constraints in advancing agro-processing, weaken consumer demand, and have other negative effects. Little progress can be expected in RNFE under such situations, and poor rural families will have to seek other methods of survival, which may include migration and involvement in non-farm activities. The authors argue that agriculturally developed countries have a better chance to stimulate the development of RNFE and generate employment opportunities (Wiggins et al. 2011).

Though the success and wealth of rural areas and rural non-farm economies mainly relied on agriculture throughout the initial periods of economic growth, this connection declined because

of agriculture's portion in national economies dropped. Due to globalization and rapid urbanization new market opportunities are created for rural non-farm producers, especially for those who deal with tradable facilities and properties and for rural workforces to migrate. Thus these prospects may foster rural economic growth and in many cases the most backward areas with very little agricultural capacities will benefit the most (Haggblade et al. 2010).

## **Research Methodology and Design**

### **Hypothesis and Research Questions**

The purpose of this research is to identify and explain the emerging issues with rural development in the Republic of Armenia. Issues related to rural non-farm economy in Armenia are investigated from the standpoint of the growth strategy of the Republic and assessed for their effectiveness and alignment with the national growth strategy.

The study answers the following research questions:

- RQ1: Is there a role for Rural Non-Farm activity in the Tavush Marz?
- RQ2: What are the Rural Non-Farm activities in Tavush marz?
- RQ3: How do the non-farm activities result on rural household income?
- RQ4: What are the triggers/challenges in Rural Non-Farm development in Tavush marz?
- RQ5: Has the Republic adopted policies to help develop Rural Non-Farm Economy?

To answer these research questions, the following hypotheses will be tested:

- H<sub>1</sub>: RNF activities positively impact the social situation of households in Tavush marz.
- H<sub>0</sub>: RNF activities do not positively impact the social situation of households in Tavush marz.

By positive impact on the social situation of rural households, the research focuses on household income.

### **Research Design and Data Collection**

This is a case study that uses a mixed method to answer the above-stated research questions and test the hypothesis. The design is sequential transformative that begins with collecting and analyzing qualitative data, followed by analysis and interpretation of data collected in the quantitative phase. The analysis of the qualitative data is aimed at triangulating the information on the main trends and patterns that exist in the region. (Also, the analysis and findings from the qualitative data in the first phase are used to develop the survey questionnaire for the quantitative phase.)

In the qualitative phase, data was collected from documents and statistical data available from regional and local governments of target communities, supplemented by information gathered from in-depth interviews with heads of local governments. In this same phase, focus groups with representatives of the Tavush *marzpetaran* (Governor's office) and a group of villagers who are engaged in non-farm activities was carried out. In the quantitative phase, data was collected from the population of Tavush marz by way of surveying local residents who are engaged in rural non-farm activities to identify the most successful types of non-farm activities in the region; factors that influence the development of non-farm activities; and major constraints that stand in the way of expanding rural non-farm activity.

Before administering the survey, the questionnaire was tested with a group of 12 villagers engaged in non-farm activities, focusing on the rigor of the survey in responding to the research questions of the study. Also, the clarity of the questions was solicited from participants, which ensured that all survey respondents had a common understanding of each question in the survey instrument.

The survey questionnaire consisted of four sections, each aiming to reveal the specific characteristics of non-farm activity in Tavush marz. The first part consisted of questions aimed at getting general information about the respondents, such as gender, education, age, etc. The second section addressed questions associated with non-farm activities aiming at gathering information about respondents' engagement in the types of non-farm activity. The third section aimed at examining the financial impact of non-farm activities on household income. And lastly, the fourth section aimed at identifying the advantages of non-farm activity.



Berdavan Fortress of the 10<sup>th</sup> century, Tavush



Koghb, the largest rural community of Tavush

## Sampling Strategy

The survey used cluster random sampling to ensure the representativeness of the sample vis-a-vis the target population of Tavush *marz*. The total sample size is 383 citizens based on the calculation of sample size calculator. In the initial phase, urban and rural communities were ranked in alphabetical order and every second urban and every sixth rural community was

selected for inclusion in the survey sample. Thus, the three urban communities selected were Ijevan, Dilijan and Ayrum, and ten rural communities, including Azatamut, Aygepar, Barekamavan, Debetavan, Teghut, Khachardzan, Haghartsin, Norashen, Paravaqar, and Varagavan.



Ijevan, Armenia

Aiming at reaching the established minimum number of individuals completing the survey, the total number of questionnaires was divided by the total population of the Tavush region selected for the study. According to the official data taken from Armstat, the population of Tavush region is approximately 127.6 thousand as at January 1, 2014. Thus, dividing 383 by the size of the population, we get the fraction of 1/334. Therefore, the survey was administered as follows: Ijevan 63; Dilijan 53; Ayrum 6; Debetavan 2; Teghut 5; Khachardzan 1; Aygepar 2; Azatamut 8; Norashen 5; Paravaqar 5; Varagavan 2; Haghartsin 1.

### Focus Groups

As stated earlier, focus group discussions were conducted with heads of various departments in the Tavush regional government, as delineated below. Selection of focus group participants was made according to their involvement in rural development projects:

- Department of socio-economic and financial development
- Department of development projects and analysis

Drawing from information gathered from focus group discussions, in-depth interviews were conducted with the community leaders of the selected villages. Then focus group discussions were held with groups of villagers from each community, each group consisting of 8-10 local residents. The focus groups identified the main challenges of non-farm activity. After triangulating the results from the qualitative phase of the research, a questionnaire was developed to supplement or reinforce the findings. After testing the survey instrument with a group of

villagers, the final version was used to survey the heads of households in the villages of the sample.

## Data Analysis, Discussion and Findings

### Content Analysis

The content analysis aimed to analyze and explore the underlying meanings of the statements made by heads of local governments, the representatives of Tavush Marzpetaran and local villagers who are engaged in non-farm activities. Below is a table showing the results of the content analysis of the focus groups, as well as the interviews with the community leaders and workers of Tavush municipality. Mainly, this section showed the intensity of descriptors used to analyze text referring to non-farm activities, as articulated during the interviews and focus groups conducted in the rural and urban communities of Tavush Marz.

The interviews were coded using key descriptors derived from the literature reviewed. They are: (1) non-farm activities that exist in the region; (2) major hindrances to non-farm employment; (3) comparative advantage of specific rural area; (4) migrant remittances as a part household income; and (5) improvement of quality of life through rural non-farm activities. Each of these descriptors is broken down to subcategories and measured on a five point scale. The strength of intensity was measured using a scale of 1 to 5, where one meant that the corresponding descriptor used by the interviewer or focus group participant has no strength at all; three meant that it has neutral strength and five means that it was used to the point and by its fullest strength.

Table 1. Results of Content Analysis

N	Descriptors	Mean of interview results with the heads of urban communities	Mean of interview results with the heads of rural communities	Mean of interviews with representatives of Tavush Marzpetaran	Mean of focus groups with local villagers
1	<b>The importance of non-farm activities</b>				
	✓ Trade	4.28	3.16	4.21	3.15
	✓ Tourism	4.00	2.00	4.18	3.00
	✓ Construction	4.26	3.12	4.00	4.12
	✓ Temporary migration	3.68	4.86	3.86	4.84
	✓ Other services	4.16	3.86	4.86	3.85
2	<b>Major hindrances to non-farm employment</b>				

	✓ Financial support from government	4.38	3.11	4.12	3.00
	✓ Lack of skills/education to launch a business	4.25	4.12	4.15	4.00
3	<b>Comparative advantage of specific rural area</b>				
	✓ Horticulture	3.00	4.16	4.00	3.86
	✓ Activities like tourism and adventure sports	4.25	2.95	4.12	3.12
4	<b>Migrant remittances as a part household income</b>	3.68	4.25	3.74	4.84
5	<b>Improvement of quality of life via RNFA</b>	4.00	3.56	4.16	3.68

The content analysis of focus group revealed that in different villages of Tavush Marz communities do not have much capacity to engage in non-farm activities. The intensity mean of different non-farm activities depends on many factors such as location of rural/urban area, educational level of respective village, etc. In the majority of villages, people are more prone to engage in agriculture-related activities. It is to be noted that the heads of urban and rural communities had different opinions with respect to non-farm activities. Particularly, the head of socio-economic and financial development department, the head of development projects and analysis department and heads of Ijevan and Dilijan urban communities mentioned that in recent years, non-farm activities in general and specific non-farm activities in particular have developed. While the heads of rural communities and, particularly, focus group participants expressed concern for the future of rural communities, as there are problems related to the lack of access to adequate infrastructure, i.e., communication and transport.

The analysis of focus group results showed that the intensity mean of financial support from government is 3.00, relatively low to conclude that government support is not systematic and strong enough to develop the non-farm sector in rural villages (3.00 out of 5.00). Besides, local villagers claimed that even though they are engaged in small scale non-farm activities it is not enough to live comfortably. Though the mean intensity of focus group results showed that the government support is not sufficiently sustainable and helpful, the mean intensity from interviews with the heads of urban communities (4.38) and heads of departments of Tavush *Marzpetaran* (4.12) in regard to financial support from government suggests that in recent years there has been progress in terms of funding from government and specific interventions to support development of non-farm activities. The heads of rural villages support the position of local villagers (mean intensity is 3.11) stating that the support is too small to boost the development of non-farm activities. As to employment in specific segments of non-farm

economy and their relative importance to respective urban communities, village mayors highlighted the following: Tourism, trade, construction, temporary migration and service related jobs (See figure1 below).




Figure 1. The most developed non-farm activities in Tavush Marz according to the heads of urban and rural communities.

The heads of urban communities repeatedly mentioned that in the recent decade, rural non-farm activities, particularly tourism, trade, service related jobs, construction and temporary migration have increased in the city and the number of families that are not engaged in non-farm activities is fewer. The intensity mean of respective descriptors are 4.00, 4.28, 4.16, 4.26 and 3.68 that are high enough to conclude that these segments of non-farm activities have developed in the urban communities of Tavush Marz. However, labor migration is not as high as in the case of other non-farm activities. Survey results also showed that in Dilijan and Ijevan cities the majority of households are involved in various non-farm activities (as discussed in the next paragraph). But, the picture is rather different in rural villages where the types of non-farm activities are limited and different from those of urban communities. The importance of non-farm activities in trade, tourism, construction, and services is rated lower by rural communities — with means of 3.16, 2.00, 3.12, and 3.86 — compared to 4.28, 4.00, 4.26 and 4.16 by urban communities. These results suggest that in rural communities these types of non-farm activities are not as developed as service related jobs and labor migration, which is understandable considering the size of those communities. The reverse is true for the descriptor on temporary migration for work, mostly seasonal, where the mean intensity is 4.86 for rural communities versus 3.68 urban.

The interview with the head of Dilijan revealed that the city is developing rapidly through the growth of its financial sector primarily attributed to the move of a segment of the RA Central Bank to Dilijan. With that catalyst in development, educational facilities, health care, and tourism and construction have also developed in the city. Currently there are more than 40 resort hotels, smaller hotels, and B&Bs; but this number is increasing year after year. Moreover, closely associated with the development of the private sector in Dilijan, the service industry is gaining new momentum driven by the Central Bank presence in Dilijan, and also UWC international school and Ayb School that have created new jobs in RNFE. Through the interviews with the department heads of socio-economic and financial development projects as well as development analysis, it was revealed that the most dominant type of rural non-farm occupation in both Ijevan and Dilijan communities is labor-migration. The value of descriptor on migrant remittances as a part household income is higher than average (intensity mean in 3.74), which suggests that in both rural and urban communities migrant remittances constitute the dominant part of household income.




Figure 2. Migrant remittances as a part of household income

Whereas the mean of the intensity of RNFE from migrant employment is 4.86 for rural and 3.68 for urban communities, the focus groups articulated that in most rural villages migrant remittances constitute a vital source of income (intensity mean is 4.84). In most families, there is at least one household member who migrates for seasonal work. The findings from the analysis of interviews with the heads of rural communities on migration patterns presents a similar picture (intensity mean is 4.25). Of the nine rural communities, six mayors stated that seasonal migration is the major contributor to rural household budgets, thereby confirming that in most families one member migrates to work in construction in the Russian Federation or in other former Soviet Republics. The other two heads of the rural communities expressed neutrality on this issue underlining, however, that agriculture alone would not be enough to live comfortably.

As to the comparative advantage of any specific rural community under study, the interviews with the heads of the departments of Tavush Marzpetaran disclosed that the mountain villages of the region have area-specific comparative advantages and better chances for expanding several small scale productions of dried fruits initiatives. Moreover they stated that some villages have better conditions for horticulture as they have milder climates and land is easier to cultivate (intensity mean is 4.00). For example, the location and size of arable land in Azatamut are not convenient for agriculture; thus most residents work in the service and construction industries. Another example is Aygepar where most people work in wine production, but also work in agriculture. In Khachardzan, one of the most vital occupations of local residents is cattle breeding, which serves as one of the most important sources of income (mean 3.85). Another case showing comparative advantage is Paravaqar, which is approximately 2 km from the Armenia border with Azerbaijan. The interviews and focus groups indicate that an important source of earning money besides seasonal migration is horticulture, particularly viniculture (intensity mean is 3.86).

In addition, the regional government representatives interviewed stated that they do their best to strengthen the role of government in identifying the specific non-farm activities most beneficial considering the comparative advantage of respective rural/urban areas. They stated that government is now paying attention to such issues and, for border villages, providing incentives in the form of tax-exemption for a number of years from the start of a new production/manufacturing operation, especially food processing.

With respect to improving the household budget and quality of life through income raised from non-farm activities, the focus groups revealed that there is slow progress (intensity mean is 3.86). Though urban focus groups stated that their overall quality of life had improved in the last 3-5 years through the development of service related activities, rural focus groups were less optimistic maintaining that progress is very slow and it is impossible to live better with income from non-farm activities only. Working in agriculture at the same time is equally necessary. On the contrary the intensity mean of the interview with the heads of socio-economic and financial development department and development projects and analysis department is 4.16, which suggests that there is a progress and non-farm activities help to improve the quality of life and make the life better.

Concerning activities related to tourism and adventure sport, the heads of urban communities mentioned that in the recent 5-10 years, tourism has developed considerably in Dilijan (intensity mean is 4.25). Whereas the heads of other rural communities were almost neutral on this issue, with a mean of 2.95, indicating that tourism activities are not developed and do need to pay attention to.

The new law on Dilijan (Law on development and investment programs of Dilijan urban community and adjacent areas in Tavush marz), which came into force on August 1<sup>st</sup> 2015 is expected to further promote regional development and open new prospects for regional tourism,

education, as well as hospitality and cultural centers driven by its geographical characteristics and climate. The law aims at encouraging investments and attracting new entrepreneurs with new ideas in the development of the area, which in turn will create a more favorable environment for locals and also open new workplaces. In time, these programs will derive tax benefits for the region and country. More specifically, according to article 10 “*in the framework of the project implementation, the revenues of those implementing it before the taxation or the part of it which is invested till April 15, 2016 will be freed from profit tax*”<sup>372</sup> (Parliament.am 2015).

## Survey Analysis

The sample surveyed comprised 153 citizens of Armenia (selected in the manner explained earlier), 18 years of age or older, and residing in Tavush Marz. The survey contained 15 questions.

Figure 3 depicts the gender distribution of the sample surveyed: 54% females and 46% males from urban communities and 53% of females and 47% of males from the rural villages of Tavush Marz.




Figure 3. Gender Statistics Related to Survey

Figure 4 presents the educational profile of the sample surveyed showing that the urban-rural educational levels are not very diverse. The most vivid difference is in the percentage of people holding master’s degrees in urban communities (11%) versus rural villages (3%).

<sup>372</sup> Within the framework of the implementation of the program, the profit of the persons implementong it, before the taxation or the part of it which is used (invested) within the frameworks of the program until April 15 of the year following the reporting year, is exempt from income tax.




Figure 4 — Educational Profile of Sample Surveyed

In general, the highest educational level that citizens attained was masters and only 3% of those who hold master's degrees were females. It is noticeable that the percent of those who attained primary education was higher in rural communities (27%) compared to urban communities (16%). The results were the same in terms of initial professional education. From figure 4, it is visible that in rural villages of Tavush Marz the percent of citizens who received professional education is 26%, which is much higher than those in urban communities (19%).

As shown in the literature review, many authors hold the view that education plays a vital role in non-farm activity. Particularly they argued that the more advanced the level of education, the higher is the participation in non-farm activities. Moreover many authors argued that in rural areas the level of education is low, that is why the citizens of rural areas are more removed from the labor market and unemployment is high. Thus, the level of education is vital in citizens' engagement in non-farm activities.

Figure 5 represents the engagement in non-farm activities in relation with educational level of citizens. It is evident that all those respondents who hold master's degree or higher were engaged in non-farm activities. The majority of respondents who hold bachelor degrees are also engaged in RNFA and only a small proportion of the respondents were only engaged in farming activities. The respondents who stated that they are not engaged in non-farm activities only had primary education (445), followed by secondary education (28%), and no education at all (12%).




Figure 5. The level of Education and Engagement in Non-Farm Activities





Figure 6. Engagement in Non-Farm Activities in Urban and Rural Communities

However, there is inconsistency in the data from rural communities. The majority of rural villagers are involved in non-farm activities, albeit mostly in seasonal migration work. This suggests that in rural communities the opportunity for being involved in village based non-farm activities is low.

Figure 7 measures the influence of income from non-farm activities on the overall quality of life of rural and urban households. According to the figure, 42% of respondents state that income from non-farm activities positively influences their quality of life. Of those, only 6% responded

Figure 6 shows the overall percentage of the responses from rural and urban communities who are either engaged or not in rural non-farm activities. The majority of respondents from urban communities (74%) are involved in non-farm activities and only 26% are not. Likewise, 68% of rural villagers are involved in non-farm activities and 32% are not.



that the effect is very small. These responses indicate that particularly in Tavush Marz, residents would not be able to have quality of life with income from agriculture only. Thus, the role of non-farm activities is significant on quality of life and household budget.

Figure 7. The effect of income from non-farm activities on household's activities quality of life




Figure 8 depicts the types of activities that citizens are involved in rural and urban communities of Tavush Marz.

Figure 8. Non-farm activities

## Discussion

From the analysis of collected data, it became clear that the overall involvement in non-farm activities was comparatively higher than in agricultural activities: 72% of respondents stated that they are involved in non-farm activities in Tavush Marz. Moreover, the bigger the size of the farm and arable land, the lesser is the engagement in non-farm activities. Among the citizens who are engaged in non-farm activities, 54% are females and 46% are males. These results show

that engagement in non-farm activities is common in Tavush. Rural non-farm activities suggest different job opportunities for rural and urban residents. Amongst the citizens who are engaged in non-farm activities, approximately 70% are involved only in one kind of non-farm activity, 26% in two types and only 4% in three types. Comparing engagement in non-farm activities by gender, the results show that males exceed females. Thus, out of 15 non-farm activities, 2 activities were carried out by women, 7 by men, and 6 had both. These results are the same as what was found from studies elsewhere. As Canagarajah and Newman (2001) and Ellis (1998) had shown, certain non-farm activities are better suited for females than for males, but RNFE is more suited for males.

As in the literature reviewed, this study has shown a strong relationship between the role of government and use of the comparative advantage of rural areas. The data collected from the regional representatives of Tavush shows that the government focuses on improvements that are most advantageous for RNFE in regions, considering their respective comparative advantages. While there are some government policies related to tax exemption from rural income in the *Marz*, the heads of rural villages and local residents stated that policies related to the development of the non-farm economy of rural communities is very slow.

On the question of improving the quality of life and increasing the household budget through non-farm activities, again the pace of progress was found to be slow in smaller rural villages. In general, in rural cities more residents were engaged in non-farm activities mostly related to the service industry; this has improved their quality of life and continues to be developed. In contrast, in rural communities, it is difficult to live on non-farm activities alone; thus, local residents combine non-farm and farm activities to live better and to improve their living conditions. In contrast to the literature reviewed, even in those villages of Tavush *Marz* where agriculture is more or less developed, non-farm activities are not as developed yet, which hinders the development of the region.

The current paper also examined the composition of principal non-farm activities in the communities of Tavush *Marz*. The general composition of rural non-farm activities appears to be roughly 15-20% in construction, 23-30% in services, including government services, around 20% in labor migration mainly to the Russian Federation, 9% in manufacturing, particularly in food processing plants and wood, 20-25% in commerce, and 8% in transport. However, the general assessment of the role of non-farm activities in rural and urban communities and the dependency of Tavush residents on non-farm employment is determined. However, the absence of data on household income makes it difficult to state precisely the relative significance of revenues from non-farm activities, although 42% of respondents validated that the revenue they get from non-farm activities is important for their household budget, 34% stated that it has neutral importance for them, 22% indicated that it is very important and 6% mentioned that it has no importance. Non-farm activities appear to have greatest importance for residents that do not own land.

The data analyzed and presented above are sufficient to conclude that in Tavush *marz*, even including wages from non-farm activities and the corresponding increase of household income, the overall quality of life depends on many factors, including the degree of involvement in non-farm activity and the number of household members engaged in RNFA, etc. Thus, being engaged in non-farm activities is not enough to reduce the level of poverty especially for the most vulnerable households.

## Conclusion

The current essay focused on rural non-farm activity and its impact on household livelihoods. Engagement in non-farm activities is prevalent in rural and urban communities of Tavush Marz. Engagement in non-farm activities is related to numerous factors such as age, gender, education, location, comparative advantage, etc. Therefore government should direct policies intended to improve factors that have an impact on increasing engagement in non-farm activities.

While answering the first research question “*Is there a role for Rural Non-Farm activity in the Tavush Marz?*” the study used the data from interviews with heads of communities and results of focus groups with those who are engaged in non-farm activities. According to the focus group results rural villagers cannot only live with agriculture alone. And even though the development of non-farm activities is very slow in rural areas, it is vital for increasing household income. The heads of communities also confirmed that working in agriculture alone is not enough and cannot provide sufficient livelihood for rural households.

The second research question “*What are the Rural Non-Farm activities in Tavush Marz?*” is answered by both in-depth interviews and survey results. From the results of interviews with Tavush Marzpetaran representatives, the study identified the types of non-farm activities in Tavush: services, migrant labor, manufacturing, and banking. Furthermore, through the survey the research revealed the main and the most important sectors of non-farm activities. The major and vital ones are: employment opportunities in schools, banks, cultural centers, retail shops, pharmacies, military works, tourism, different services in hotels and guest houses, in construction segment, taxi driving etc.

In order to answer to the third research question “*How do the non-farm activities result on rural household income?*” most of the respondents mentioned that the revenue they get from non-farm activities is of crucial importance for their household budget. In rural villages along with the income families obtain from non-farm activities they also engaged in farm related activities. While in urban communities of Tavush Marz families live only by the revenues they attain from non-farm activities. From the survey analysis the 42percent of respondents stated that the effect of income from non-farm activities on their household quality of life is important and only 6 percent mentioned that it is not important.

The answer of the forth research question “What are the triggers/challenges in Rural Non-Farm development in Tavush Marz?” the research used qualitative tools to reveal the main challenges/triggers of the development of non-farm activities. From the interviews with heads of communities it turned out that one of the main challenges is the lack of information and lack of education. Focus group results showed that the government investment and special policies are the major triggers that attract investors.

And in order to answer to the fifth research question “Has the Republic adopted policies to help develop Rural Non-Farm Economy?” the results of the interviews with the community leaders and Tavush Marzpetaran representatives indicates that the most recent law government adopted recently(2015) is a law which makes the investment more efficient and beneficial especially in the border regions. The law aims at encouraging investments and attracting new entrepreneurs with new ideas in the development of the area, which in turn will create a more favorable environment for locals and also open new workplaces.

Taking into consideration the findings from the above analysis, there is sufficient evidence to accept the hypothesis that “Rural Non-Farm activities positively impact the social welfare of households in Tavush Marz.”

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## **Appendix I – Survey Questionnaire**

### **Section 1: General information on respondents**

1. Gender: ☐ Male ☐ Female
2. Please, choose your age group:
  - ☐ 18-24
  - ☐ 25-35
  - ☐ 36-45
  - ☐ 46-50
  - ☐ 51-64
  - ☐ 65+
3. What is your highest completed education?
  - ☐ None
  - ☐ Primary
  - ☐ Basic
  - ☐ Secondary
  - ☐ Initial professional
  - ☐ Vocational
  - ☐ Higher
  - ☐ Postgraduate
4. Are any of your family members employed out of the country? ☐ Yes ☐ No
5. Does he send money to home? ☐ Yes ☐ No
6. If yes, how frequently does he send money to you?
  - ☐ Every month
  - ☐ Two times per month

- ☐ Once per quarter
- ☐ Yearly
- ☐ Other (please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

## **SECTION 2: Rural Non-Farm Activities**

7. Did your family have any non-farm employment in the past last year? ☐ Yes ☐ No
8. If yes, please indicate the types of non-farm activities where your family/family member was involved in the past 12 months?
- ☐ Non-agricultural industry
  - ☐ School
  - ☐ Cultural Center
  - ☐ Tourism
  - ☐ Food processing plant
  - ☐ Construction
  - ☐ Retail store
  - ☐ Temporary migration
  - ☐ Permanent migration
  - ☐ Taxi driver
  - ☐ Services
  - ☐ Other
9. What is the frequency of your family member involvement in the above mentioned non-farm activities?
- ☐ Proprietor / partner
  - ☐ Casual worker
  - ☐ Regular employee
  - ☐ Manager
  - ☐ Other (please specify)

## **SECTION 3: The role of non-farm activity in household social standing**

10. How many members of your household were engaged in non-farm activities in the last year?
- ☐ One
  - ☐ Two
  - ☐ Three
  - ☐ Four
  - ☐ More than four
11. How many members of your household have temporary non-farm occupation?
- ☐ One
  - ☐ Two
  - ☐ Three
  - ☐ Four
  - ☐ More than four
12. How many members of your household have permanent non-farm occupation?
- ☐ One
  - ☐ Two
  - ☐ Three

- ☐ Four
- ☐ More than four

13. Considering the significance of income derived from your household's non-farm activities, please rank order them from the most important (5) to least important non-farm activities (1)?

- ☐ Non-agricultural industry
- ☐ School
- ☐ Cultural Center
- ☐ Tourism
- ☐ Food processing plant
- ☐ Construction
- ☐ Retail store
- ☐ Temporary migration
- ☐ Permanent migration
- ☐ Taxi driver
- ☐ Services
- ☐ Other

#### **SECTION 4: Encouraging non-farm activities in Tavush marz**

14. On a scale of 1 to 5 (where 5 indicates very strong effect and 1 indicates the least effect) how would you prioritize the effect of income from non-farm activities on your household quality of life? **1 2 3 4 5**

Additional comments: \_\_\_\_\_

15. What are the advantages of non-farm activities from your household's perspective? Review each of the categories below and rate each taking in mind that in terms of 1 you strongly disagree,

2- Disagree, 3- Neutral, 4- Agree, 5- Strongly agree

	1	2	3	4	5
Improved income					
Able to live comfortably					
More promising future					
More flexible workday					
Offers new work options					
Seasonal employment					
Other (Specify)					
Other (Specify)					

## **Appendix II - Questions Used In In-Depth Interviews and Focus Group Questions**

1. Could you describe the main types of RNFE activities in your region?
2. Would you say that these activities have increased in the past year? Do you foresee that they will increase in the next five years?
3. Are there any impediments or constraints for growing RNFE? Would it be possible to facilitate more RNFE activity?
4. What in your opinion is most valued as RNFE in your region? Why? Are there experts and surplus labor that could be directed that way?
5. In your opinion, would increase of RNFE help your regions' residents stay? Please elaborate.

# *Strategic Challenges for a New Model of European Economic Development*

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## **Nuno Gama de Oliveira Pinto**

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## **Abstract**

**Motivating enterprises by provision of e-government services in Europe acts as a powerful incentive for enterprises, in particular for small and medium sized enterprises, to adopt electronic ways of working in their dealings with public administration. A leading example is e-procurement, which facilitates the integration of public administration requirements into the work processes of enterprises and so contributes to building of the European business environment that encourages and supports entrepreneurs and competitiveness.**

**Economic growth and job creation are at the heart of the EU's current priorities. But what factors determine the productivity that influences Europe's overall competitiveness levels and ability to deliver these two principal objectives?**

## **Keywords**

European Union; single market; productivity, competitiveness, small and medium-sized enterprises (SME's).

## **Europe: Strategic Challenges for a New Model of Economic Development**

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SME's) account for 99% of all companies in Europe. The EU's 23 million SME's are a major component of the European economy as more than 75 million jobs are concerned.

Europe's SME's account for up to 80% of jobs in some sectors, such as textiles, construction and furniture. Although their base is local or regional, SME's, just like large companies, must adapt to factors such as increasing international competition, movements of capital and its

globalization, the speed of technological change and the rapid cyclical shifts which characterize modern economies.

However, in dealing with these transformations, they do not have the same support structures, in terms of either financial or human resources, as large companies, and the changes affecting them have not been analysed enough.

For SME development and structural change, driving forces like globalization, increasing pressure for skills, development and training, privatization and liberalization of markets and public sector restructuring, and the challenges due to demographic change are crucial.

Good practices with regard to reacting to these driving forces and managing change have been identified in the following fields of action:

- Anticipating and monitoring change in the SME sector;
- Supporting SME's in preparation for change and managing restructuring;
- Improving the skills base and training and competence development in SME's;
- Initiatives by large companies to support SME's and examples of a pro-active role of public authorities, professional organizations and social partners.

The latest thrust for innovation policy comes as many major decisions for modernising the EU's economy have already been taken. The relaunch in 2005 of the Lisbon Agenda for growth and jobs provides an overall policy framework to make Europe's regulatory and economic environment more innovation friendly.

More specifically, the Commission's communication on «More Research and Innovation» adopted in October 2005 offered, for the first time, an integrated approach to EU research and innovation. It aims to improve the conditions for private sector investment and identified 19 initiatives to promote innovation and research.

Some elements of these individual headings have already been completed. Among the more important are the changes to state aid rules to help small businesses and easier access by companies to innovative capital, the creation of 11 sectoral cluster networks and the promotion to standards to support innovation.

The European Council meeting in Lisbon established as a 10-year objective that the EU would reach a position of economic leadership in terms of growth rate and competitiveness by means of a strategy based on three courses of action.

In the first place, it would step up the transition toward an economy based on knowledge by means of promoting research and development (R&D) and on the information society, stepping up structural reforms and fully extending the European internal market. A second area established the objective of modernization of the European social model.

Finally, the third objective involved maintenance of appropriate macroeconomic policies oriented to stability. In macroeconomic terms, the results of these reforms would be an improvement in the capacity for sustainable growth without inflation along with a lower level of unemployment and balanced government finances.

In order to move ahead on these three fronts, at various meetings of the European Council (Lisbon itself in 2000; Stockholm in 2001; Göteborg in 2002; Barcelona in 2002; Brussels in 2003) the European Union has been establishing a series of quantified objectives or objectives with a time limit, along with other less specific aims.

With regard to productivity determinants, outstanding among which is the human capital resource (this also being related to employment) and the creating of knowledge through technological innovation and research, action is to be taken in the areas of social cohesion, innovation and research. Finally, having an indirect effect on employment opportunities and the improvement of productivity will be the existence of a more efficient domestic market, that is to say, the aim of integrated measures under the heading of economic reforms.

These changes are therefore essential for the development of the EU's new policy objectives (Europe 2020), and thereby improve EU competitiveness through innovation.

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# *Intellectual Property in Kosovo: The Case of Musical Works*

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## **Arbëreshë Zogjani**



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*Ministry of Justice in 2012.*

*The current article is the short version of her LL.M. thesis "Protection of the musical work as copyright: Kosovo case", at the University of Pristina, Kosovo, in 2013.*



## **Introduction**

The copyrights can be considered at the same time an old but also a new field in Kosovo, taking into consideration the developments before and after the 1999 War. Since that time, this field had a rapid development in Kosovo, although it stopped for a while but started successfully afterwards. Saying stopped taking into account the time of the former Yugoslavia, part of which was Kosovo as well, and at that time the copyrights were governed by SOKOJ - the Serbian Organization of Music Authors.

After the war, the field of copyright in the country was re-established with adoption of the Copyrights Law, being followed with its amendments, adoption of other laws of the same field, adoption of the Criminal Code, adoption of Government Strategies, launching of various national and international projects, and many other initiatives. The protection of musical works was also included in these developments. Naturally, such an extensive history of copyrights provides for researchers and scholars a great deal of scientific textbooks, legal infrastructure, researches, scientific papers and different articles to base and expand the knowledge.

## Chapter I: Intellectual Property Rights

### 1. The Notion

The notion Intellectual Property Rights implies the legal rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial, scientific, literary and artistic fields. The intellectual property rights have the role of protecting the authors and other producers of intellectual materials and services, thereby providing them the rights to control the use of works, namely, their products within a specified time period.<sup>373</sup> The field of intellectual property protects a wide range of inventions and creations that have an identifiable economic value. Thus, the IP is divided into two main categories:

1. Copyright (which protects textbooks, lectures, plays, musical works, choreographic works, cinematographic works, drawings, paintings, architectural works, maps, plans, sketches, photographic works and other similar works), and
2. Industrial Property (which includes patents, trademarks, trade secrets and industrial designs).<sup>374</sup>

According to the Law of the Republic of Kosovo on Intellectual Property, the copyright belongs to the author for his works in the field of literature, science and art. The above-mentioned works, qualified as author's works, are legally protected, yet the following does not have such rights: ideas, guidelines, official laws, bylaws, regulations, official materials and publications of parliamentary bodies, official translations of official materials, acts in administrative and judicial proceedings, official materials published for public information, folklore performances and daily news.<sup>375</sup>

## Chapter II: Musical Works

### 2. The Notion

Musical work is an intellectual concept of the sound, which can be converted into the documentary form in different ways. The primary goal of conversion into the physical form is for the intellectual concept to be conveyed from one person to another. However, the fact that musical works are essentially meant to be listened, conversion into the physical form is not always the first priority of creators and consumers. But, it is the media who are reproducing the musical works. Defining the musical works as a concept of voice, provides us with the opportunity to overcome the difficulties that arise between the composed and improvised

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<sup>373</sup> World Intellectual Property Organization, Intellectual Property, Publication No. 895 (E), pages 9-10.

<sup>374</sup> World Intellectual Property Organization, What is Intellectual Property, Publication No.450 (E), 2010, page 2.

<sup>375</sup> Article 8-13, Law No.2004/45 on Copyrights and Related Rights in the Republic of Kosovo.

works.<sup>376</sup> Musical works include a series of activities, primarily divided into listening and analysis, performance, composition and improvisation.<sup>377</sup>

## 2.1 Protection of Musical Works

Copyright as a form of legal protection provides protection for the musical works in general i.e. all its components, such as compositions, texts, recordings, etc. Even for the protection of musical works, the same criterias are being applicable, such as for other author's works, however, these works must be original (not to be copied from any other source), be expressed, respectively exist in a way which can be conveyed to the public and have a creativity level. In musical terms, copyrights can protect not only the song (which usually consists of melody and text) but also the recordings (CDs, mp3, tapes and other forms of recordings). The author of the protected musical work has the following rights:

- Reproduction (the right of multiplication of certain works),
- Distribution (the right to distribute and sell copies of a musical work to the public)
- Performance (the right to control the use of the song in the public)
- Derivative processing (the use of the song in any other version), and
- Digital broadcasting.<sup>378</sup>

This implies that four key areas of the focus of protection of musical works are: composition, arrangement, text and interpretation. At the same time, these are going to be the elements we will mainly focus on. The authors of the composition of a song usually acquire the copyright over the composition immediately, automatically, however, there are still reasons why an author must register a work, in this case, his/her composing. The registration provides the author with many benefits of the legal strategy, among others, in the event of a dispute, only the submission of the registration document of the composition will be sufficient proof to shorten the proceedings, as the date of registration will be the shield of the case. Composing a song with similar substance to the composition of any other song, and presenting it to others as your own original work is considered plagiarism or violation of copyright. The motive of plagiarism can vary from complete innocence to provocative intentions, and up to complete culpability. Innocence can be achieved in the case when using another song's through "fair use" i.e. the fair use parody.<sup>379</sup> Parody is considered a new work that is a subject to copyright and is based on another protected work, and despite being used in the new work it can be easily picked out, but it is not used more than is necessary, and it does not damage the value of the existing original work.<sup>380</sup>

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<sup>376</sup> Richard Smiraglia, *Musical Works as Information Retrieval Entities*, Long Island University, New York, 2001, p3

<sup>377</sup> David Murray-Rust, *Musical Acts and Musical Agents*, University of Edinburgh, 2008, pp. 10-19.

<sup>378</sup> Legal Issues involved in the Music Industry, *Lawyers for the Creative Arts*, 2005, pp. 1-2.

<sup>379</sup> Washington State University, "Music and Copyright", for more: <http://publishing.wsu.edu/copyright/music.html>.

<sup>380</sup> Michael C. Donaldson, *Clearance & Copyright*, 2003, pp. 292- 293.

Another variant to use the composition of another author is the "summary" which is considered the work formed by the collection and collation of existing materials but which are selected, coordinated or arranged in such a way resulting in the original work of an author. When the author contributes somehow, at least minimally in the authorship, in the creation of the originality during the selection and arrangement of existing musical compositions, the author creates a composition that is legally protected. Protection of a composite work extends only to the selection and ranking of musical compositions.<sup>381</sup>

### **2.1.1 The title of a musical work**

The text, as an important integral part of a song, is also legally protected. Whether the title of a musical work is protected or not is an issue that always causes confusion, and not only among the general public but also among the authors themselves. In our country the title of a work has legal protection. The author of a work cannot use a title, which has already been used by another author for the work of the same kind, especially if such action would cause confusion as to the authorship of the work.<sup>382</sup>

The title protection issue is regulated differently in legislations of different countries. Considering the fact that the title usually represents a single word or a short and general sentence, many countries find it difficult to provide legal protection. Many authors often tend to be protective of the title that they used in their work, and many others try to take advantage of the popularity of another author's title of work. As much as it is a minor issue, very often it managed to create public controversy. Finally it can be said that in many legislations the copyright does not include protection of title of the work. The title is rather regarded as a denomination or label of the work in question, be it film or theatrical work, or musical in our case, and not its integral part. There are many cases when the author after writing the text of a song, changes its title at the end, and titles are translated very rarely. This practice confirms the truth of the real world of legal theory. What individuals often confuse are the trademarks, because they are subject to copyright. The name of a product can be included in the trademark and can enjoy protection, but not a song title, and this is because one of the main goals of the trademark is to identify the origin of the product.<sup>383</sup>

### **2.1.2 The text of a musical work**

Unlike the title, the part of a musical work that has legal protection in all legislations is doubtlessly its text. The text is considered a literary work which is a part of the group, subject to copyright. To have a legal protection, the text of a musical work must meet certain criteria. First

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<sup>381</sup> United States Copyright Office, Copyright registration for musical composition, February 2012, p. 3.

<sup>382</sup> Article 9, Paragraph 1, Law No.04 / L-065 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Republic of Kosovo.

<sup>383</sup> Michael C. Donaldson, Clearance & Copyright, 2003, pages 185-190.

of all, it must be original, creative and in a written form.<sup>384</sup> The text of a musical work may also be a derivative work, collection of works or even intertwined works, and in all 3 cases it enjoys legal protection.

### **2.1.3 Composition and the audiovisual part**

Other elements of a musical work that has legal protection are also the composition and its audio-visual part. These two elements are certainly indisputable creations of the author that are not only protected by law, but also administered as collective rights of the respective associations. Subchapter G of Law No. 04/L-065 on Copyright and Related Rights, regulates the use of the work in material form, which regulates in detail the issue of public performance, the right of public communication, inter alia, the broadcasting and rerun of audiovisual content. How this issue is regulated in Kosovo will be discussed in the chapter for the collective Association VAPIK.

### **Penalty provisions in case of infringement of copyright and related rights**

Considering the fact that sanctions are one of the most effective ways to achieve the meaningful observance of regulation or law, the Law on Copyright has provided what actions might be taken by the author whose work has been violated, and the New Criminal Code of the Republic of Kosovo provides sanctions for violators of copyright. According to Article 177 of the Law on Copyright and Related Rights, the person whose copyrights have been violated, not only can he/she seek legal protection, but may also ask for compensation. And, Article 296 of the New Criminal Code has foreseen the following penalties for the violators of copyright:

<b>No.</b>	<b>Penalty</b>	<b>Cause</b>
<b>1</b>	Imprisonment of 3 months - 3 years	When under his/her or someone else's name publishes the work already protected by copyright
<b>2</b>	Fine and imprisonment up to 1 year	Intentionally does not state the name, pseudonym or insignia of the author/performer of the original work
<b>3</b>	Fine or imprisonment up to 1 year	Changes, misrepresents or impairs the work protected by copyright or presentation of another
<b>4</b>	Fine or imprisonment up to 1 year	Inappropriately presents/communicates to the public the work protected by copyright, which is prejudicial to the honor and reputation of the author or performer
<b>5</b>	Imprisonment up to 3 years	Unauthorized use of the work protected by copyright

<sup>384</sup> Gregg B. Brelsford, IP Law and IP Licensing, Lecture 2013.

<b>6</b>	Fine and imprisonment of 3 months - 5 years	Unauthorized use of the work protected by copyright, thus gaining for himself or another person the amount of at least 10,000 Euro, but not more than 50,000 Euro
<b>7</b>	Fine and imprisonment of 6 months - 8 years	Unauthorized use of work protected by copyright, thus gaining for himself or another person the amount of more than 50,000 Euro
<b>8</b>	Items and equipment used in the commission of the offenses, described in this article of the Criminal Code, are a subject of confiscation. <sup>385</sup>	

## **Chapter IV: Intellectual Property Rights in Kosovo**

### **4.1 Legal Infrastructure**

Below I have tried to present in a professional and understandable form a brief summary of the legal framework that regulates the copyright issues in the Republic of Kosovo. Based on this scheme, the legislative institutions in the country have worked hard so that today we can have laws that are extremely important to this field, such as: Law on Copyright and Related Rights, Patent Law, Trademarks Law, Law on Industrial Design, Law on Customs Measures for protection of Intellectual Property Rights, Law on Protection of Plant Varieties.

All the issues raised in this paper, and even more than them, are regulated in detail by the Law No. 2004/45 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Republic of Kosovo. The issues regulated in this Law are: author's works and protection terms, the author, moral rights, economic rights and other rights, copyright limitations, duration limitations, transfer of copyright, special provisions for certain author's works, as well as related rights, namely the rights of performers, the rights of producers of phonograms, rights of film producers, broadcasters' rights, the rights of producers of databases, the rights of publishers, administration and management of these rights, the protection of rights, and finally the punitive provisions and protection of foreign persons.<sup>386</sup>

#### **4.1.3 Governmental Strategies of the Republic of Kosovo**

Other legislative initiatives that have been undertaken in our country, in addition to the establishment of Special offices that help in the development of this field and which will be discussed in a separate chapter, are the Government Strategies related directly to the protection of author's works, parts of it respectively, which include: the Intellectual Property Strategy and Strategy against Piracy and Counterfeiting.

<sup>385</sup> Article 296 (Infringement of Copyright), Criminal Code No. 04/L-082 of the Republic of Kosovo.

<sup>386</sup> Law No. 2004/45 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Republic of Kosovo.

### **a) Intellectual Property Strategy**

Intellectual Property Strategy is a policy document adopted by the Government of Kosovo, which sets the intent and purpose of the country in the field of intellectual property, as well as strategic objectives and measures for achieving these objectives at national level for the period 2010-2014. One of the main objectives of this strategy is to improve the investment climate and promote economic, scientific and cultural development in the country, aimed at providing a reliable system and stimulating the protection of intellectual property rights through the development and advancement of the legal framework and institutional capacities.

Naturally, this document identifies strategic objectives as well, six of them in total:

1. Consolidation of the legal framework in line with international and European standards,
2. Increasing the technical capacities of the management authorities of IP rights,
3. Increasing the technical capacities of law enforcement institutions and strengthening coordination and cooperation between them,
4. Establishment of organizations for collective administration of copyright and related rights, as well as the creation of a group of agents in the field of industrial property,
5. Increase public awareness for the observance of IP rights,
6. Accession of Kosovo in international IP institutions and ratification of international conventions in this field.<sup>387</sup>

### **b) Strategy against Piracy and Counterfeiting 2012-2016**

The Strategy against Piracy and Counterfeiting addresses the same issue that we are also treating in this paper, namely that of counterfeiting and piracy with regard to copyright. In Kosovo piracy materials are being produced and sold in many points of sale, in the physical as well as electronic form. For this reason, we had a public awareness campaign on copyright in our country, as well as projects of the European Commission on empowering the intellectual property.

The working group of the Strategy has defined the main objectives, ranking them in this order:

1. Reducing the level of piracy and counterfeiting,
2. Increased productivity in the creative industries,
3. Identifying the issues and causes that affect the increase of piracy and counterfeiting,
4. Combating informal economy and creating preconditions for foreign investments,
5. Interagency cooperation at national and international levels, and
6. Achieving European standards.<sup>388</sup>

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<sup>387</sup> Intellectual Property Strategy 2010-2014, Government of the Republic of Kosovo, May 2010, pages 11-18.

<sup>388</sup> Strategy against Piracy and Counterfeiting 2012-2016, page 25

To achieve the objectives, a series of activities have been planned: completion and implementation of the current legislation, strengthening of relevant institutions and establishment of other necessary institutions, establishment of institutional mechanisms and functionality of existing ones, identification of products protected by copyright, creation of information system management by responsible institutions, public awareness on copyright, organizing awareness campaigns, seminars and conferences, seizure of piracy and counterfeit materials, seizure of materials suspected of copyright infringement, confiscation of equipment used for production of piracy materials, disabling the functioning of Web pages with pirated content, organization of surveys and researches, providing labels or bar codes for products protected by copyright, providing the points of sale of protected products with producers' authorizations, prevention of organized crime in the field, establishment of a Task Force, signing memoranda of understanding with relevant institutions, participation in international and regional conferences, exchange of experiences with countries in the region, strengthening regional cooperation ation, etc.<sup>389</sup>

## **4.2 Institutional Infrastructure**

To implement the laws, regulations and strategies, the institutional support is necessary, i.e. the institutions are those that initially implement these rights. At this time we cannot list other institutions without starting with the Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, for legislative initiatives and the adoption of legal instruments in this field. However, those specifically dealing with this field include: Office of Copyrights and Related Rights, Industrial Property Office, Ministry of Justice, Prosecution Council, Judicial Council, Market Inspectorate, Kosovo Police, Customs, Chamber of Commerce, Ministry of Youth, Culture and Sports, Ministry of Education , Science and Technology, University of Prishtina, the Independent Media Commission, as well as Collective associations and other institutions that directly or indirectly help in this regard.

Greater responsibility falls to the Office for Copyright and Related Rights which certifies associations of authors and other holders of rights, as well as other legal entities specialized in the management of copyrights, cancels the above-mentioned certification if the association of authors or another legal entity specializing in collective administration of copyright does not meet the criteria, oversees the activities of collective associations, designates the list of mediators and provides administrative assistance, defines mediation procedures, as well as other conditions, prepares the legislation on the criteria referred to in the Law on Copyright, and performs other duties and responsibilities specified by law.<sup>390</sup>

### **4.2.1 Associations for collective administration of copyright**

The holder of the copyright can administer his/her rights in two ways, individual or collective. The individual method is considered when administering copyright on his/her works is done for

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<sup>389</sup> Strategy against Piracy and Counterfeiting 2012-2016, the Government of the Republic of Kosovo, pages 25-26.

<sup>390</sup> Article 2, Regulation No. 01/2010 on the Establishment of the Office of Copyright and Related Rights.

each work separately, and it is exercised by the author himself or his/her representative through authorization, while the collective method is considered the one where administration covers a number of author's works, and may be exercised either by a natural or a legal person.

**a) APIK- Collective Association for Copyright Administration in the field of music.**

One of the two collective associations for the administration of copyrights licensed in Kosovo, is the APIK association, which dedicates its work to musical works, chaired by Mr. Florent Boshnjaku, one of the most renowned producers in our country. This association aim is to collect the incomes from the usage of the songs and distribute it to authors themselves. Based on the work plan, it is the association that starts negotiations with the users of a musical work, doing everything possible to convince them to pay for the use of musical works, but if the same do not comply with the negotiations, than the Government of Kosovo takes the necessary measures. If it happens that the Government negotiations fail, then the Government is authorized to fine these users. The law stipulates that the association takes 30% of the provided income by the users for its costs, but at the beginning such a percentage would not be enough, and should therefore be bigger, but according to the advice provided by representatives of the EU, it should not exceed 60 %.<sup>391</sup>

**b) VAPIK - Visual Artists, Producers and Performers of Kosovo**

VAPIK - is another licensed association in Kosovo that deals with collective administration of copyrights, in particular in the audio-visual field. The word VAPIK is an abbreviation for Visual Artists, Producers and Performers of Kosovo, defining at the same time the group of interest of this association. What VAPIK does for this specific field of art, is the administration or management of copyrights, which in one way or another protects the work of the artist, but does not directly protect their copyrights. In other words, this organization enables the registration of audiovisual works of artists, and manages their use by others, enabling them financial gains and distribution of the works to the artist in question.<sup>392</sup>

## **Conclusions and Recommendations**

Based on the conducted research we can definitely conclude that:

1. Copyright, as a right guaranteed by law, belongs to the author of the work in the field of literature, science and art;
2. The musical work represents an intellectual concept of sound, which being complemented with other works of art, can easily be converted into documentary form, becoming one of the

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<sup>391</sup> Research "Protection of Musical Works as a Copyright", Prishtina, January-May 2013.

<sup>392</sup> Rules of Procedure of the Association for collective administration of copyright VAPIK.

author's works that enjoys legal protection. Naturally, in order to be transformed in this format, and like this reach the public much easier, a series of professional activities need to be joined, starting from text, composition, orchestration, arrangement, interpretation, as well as the video clip;

3. In Kosovo, in this regard, not only the laws and regulations were adopted, but also institutions were established with the aim of empowering the protection of copyrights, and even there was a Strategy approved for the protection of copyrights, combating counterfeiting and piracy, whose goals are achieved through the Task Force;

4. We now have a legal and institutional infrastructure ready to protect the authors, as a guarantee that in the future copyrights will be best protected in Kosovo.

Being aware of the current situation on copyrights in Kosovo, namely, the protection of musical works, we recommend that:

1. State authorities, prosecutors and courts to be more efficient in the future in finding and putting before justice of all violators of copyright in order for them to receive appropriate sentences for the committed criminal offenses and in the civil procedure make them compensate the damage caused;

2. Work more in raising awareness for copyrights, not only with citizens but the authors themselves as well, especially in the protection of musical works, especially now that we have a new Law and Strategy;

3. Taking into account that a song can easily reach different countries, it can be accepted by the foreign public, and therefore especially regional cooperation is necessary in order to have effective protection of bearers of copyright, therefore more should be done in this regard.

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## Présentation

Multipol est un réseau international et interdisciplinaire de chercheurs et d'experts en droit international et relations internationales, provenant de milieux professionnels tels que la justice internationale, la diplomatie multilatérale et bilatérale, la recherche et la formation, la fonction publique internationale.

Sa première et principale réalisation est le site <http://reseau-multipol.blogspot.com> plateforme d'échanges, d'analyses et d'informations en temps réel sur l'actualité internationale. Ce nouveau media se positionne ainsi entre les publications journalistiques, qui manquent parfois de recul et de données précises sur les événements de la scène internationale, et les publications scientifiques, qui paraissent dans un délai souvent tardif.

Multipol est né à Genève, durant l'été 2006, de la rencontre de passionnés de relations internationales. Le réseau est régi par une association de droit suisse, apolitique, non religieuse et à but non lucratif. Il est composé d'une vingtaine de membres spécialisés dans les différentes branches des relations internationales (droit international, science politique, géopolitique, économie internationale, géostratégie, etc.).

## Objectifs

Animer un réseau de chercheurs et de professionnels issus de cultures, de nationalités, de localisations, de formations et d'environnements professionnels différents.

- Proposer un support d'information innovant, rigoureux et gratuit, offrant à la fois des analyses de fond et des brèves d'actualité internationale, publiés par des chercheurs et des experts en relations internationales.
- Permettre aux membres de ce réseau de publier leurs analyses et les informations dont ils disposent dans un délai très court, et susciter des commentaires pertinents de la part des autres membres du réseau et des lecteurs.
- Organiser des colloques visant à diffuser la connaissance du droit et des relations internationales.
- Établir des liens avec des institutions et organismes poursuivant des buts analogues ou voisins.
- Proposer l'expertise scientifique des membres du réseau.

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## *Response of Arctic Temperature to Changes in Emissions of Short-lived Climate Forcers*

A new research directed by CICERO<sup>393</sup> and published in Nature Climate Change on 30 November 2015<sup>394</sup>, has calculated Arctic warming from various sources of black carbon emissions. Emissions from Asia and gas flaring in Russia have the greatest impact on Arctic warming. In a study headed by CICERO researcher Maria Sand, the researchers have conducted hundreds of simulations with advanced models to investigate how current black carbon and sulphur emissions and other pollution from various countries are distributed in the atmosphere. “The Arctic is warming twice as fast as the rest of the world, resulting in melting sea ice and an earlier onset of spring. While large cuts in CO<sub>2</sub> emissions are needed to stop the temperature increase, carbon black emissions also play a critical role in the Arctic. The area is covered by ice and snow, which has a cooling effect because it reflects the sunlight. When the ice turns dark from soot, the heat is absorbed, the snow melts faster and temperatures rise even more,” says Sand.




Figure 1: Model-mean annual Arctic equilibrium surface temperature response

<sup>393</sup> CICERO is a Norwegian institute for interdisciplinary climate research. It seeks to provide insight that help solve the climate challenge and strengthen international climate cooperation. The current article is taken from the Cicero's press release. See more under: <http://www.cicero.uio.no/en>.

<sup>394</sup> Sand, M., Berntsen, T. K., von Salzen, K., Flanner, M. G., Langner, J., Victor, D. G., Nature Climate Change, 30 November 2015, <http://www.nature.com/nclimate/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nclimate2880.html>

Unlike CO<sub>2</sub>, black carbon disappears from the atmosphere within one week. Today the effect of emission cuts is noticed in the course of a politician's term. Cuts in emissions also improve the local air quality. This has made black carbon a politically relevant issue. In order for anti-emission measures to have the greatest impact, the decision-makers must know which sources contribute the most to rising temperatures.

“Our simulations show that the greatest warming in the Arctic is caused by emissions in Asia. The emissions from the industrial sector contain a great deal of sulphur. These particles are light and thus have a cooling effect. However, Asian households produce a large amount of soot when they cook food and heat their homes. Indoor food preparation on ovens that don't burn clean are primarily a health problem, but it is a problem for the climate as well,” explains Sand.




Figure 2: Annual mean Arctic equilibrium surface temperature response per unit of emissions due to direct forcing of BC, BC in snow, and direct and indirect forcing from OC and sulphate averaged over the models.

The World Health Organization estimates that 4.3 million people die each year from indoor air pollution, caused mainly by heating and cooking with ovens fuelled by coal, wood and manure. These emissions also promote warming in the Arctic.

Emissions from Asia contribute the most to Arctic warming because the volume is so large. Emissions closer to the Arctic, such as oil production in Russia and wood heating in Norway, increase temperatures far more per kilo emission. Although these emissions are relatively small, reducing them can be very effective.




Figure 3: Contribution to annual mean reductions of Arctic surface temperatures in 2050 due to mitigation of SLCFs according to the MIT mitigation scenario.

Sand's study presents detailed calculations of the effect of black carbon emissions on temperature from various sources and regions. Together with cost estimates of anti-emission measures, the study provides valuable knowledge that decision-makers can use to assess which measures are the most cost effective. "According to our calculations, warming in the Arctic can be reduced by 0.2 °C by 2050 by making major emission cuts in those sectors that cause the greatest warming," concludes Sand.



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