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## European Union Foreign Affairs Journal (EUFAJ)

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## Editorial

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Dear readers,

*to publish a quarterly about EU foreign policy in the widest context, as we do, is not easy. We could, in fact, publish a daily, a quarterly means, to have the courage for leaving a gap. There are so interesting things going on like TTIP with the USA, like TTP between the US and the Pacific Rim, and like CETA between Canada and the EU. But our (surprisingly many!) readers want another accent on the eastern part of Europe and the surroundings of the EU. This is why this issue has an outlook on the newest EU initiative in defence policy, namely hybrid threats, and also cyber-attacks - the latter written by a young, idealistic woman in Moldova who heads there the Cyber Security Center. The EU has to care security in both fields, while cyber-attacks may be a part of hybrid warfare. This is the war of the future - not in the trenches as in WWI, and the EU must be very vigilant. On its own territory, but also in those of its Neighbourhood.*

*The economy and general future of Belarus, the anniversary of the assassination of Boris Nemtsov in Moscow, the political prisoners of Azerbaijan, the four-day war between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh, Turkish civil society are in this issue, as well as "Women in Power", a study for all six Eastern Partnership countries.*

*Well, sometimes we have to smile about the "grocery store" character of EUFAJ. We have also contributions about CARICOM, India and China, the Union for the Mediterranean and local authorities in developing countries. And this also as a mix of scientific works, policy papers, commentaries and so on.*

With best regards,



Hans-Jürgen Zahorka

# *Cyber Security in the Eastern Partnership States - The Example of Moldova*

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## **Natalia Spinu**



*Natalia Spinu is a cybersecurity expert with many years of work experience in governmental and non-governmental sectors in Moldova. As a cybersecurity expert, Ms. Spinu has experience in the following areas: team management, cybersecurity program & policy development, implementation & audit of information security management system (based on ISO 27001), project management. Natalia is also a member of the emerging security challenges working group, national coordinator of NATO SPS program in Moldova.*

*Cyber Security Center CERT-GOV-MD, headed by Natalia Spinu, is a governmental computer emergency response team of Moldova, which handles cybersecurity incidents occurred in governmental networks. Under her leadership, the CSC CERT-GOV-MD became actively involved in many national cybersecurity development processes, including national cybersecurity program & policy developments proposing amendments for change of national legislation, consulting Supreme Security Council on most acute problems, organizing cyber awareness conferences & workshops, building capacity of universities to prepare qualified workforce for cybersecurity sector of Moldova and others..*

Countries around the world increasingly depend on electronic services. It became already a norm of life to use the Internet for paying taxes, order goods and food, and to make many other things while staying at home. People cannot imagine any more to do the things in the old-fashioned way – as it greatly saves their time, allowing freedom of choice and ease of use.

However not many understand, that behind the simplicity stands complex set of technologies, which, if not properly protected, is vulnerable to cyber-attacks allowing cybercriminals, terrorists, hacktivists, state sponsored intruders and other threat actors to perform malicious activities ranging from paralyzing operation of governmental and business online services, stealing confidential information, to ones, which are able to do physical damage to infrastructure or even to the lives of citizen.

In order to protect the society from such threats developed countries established appropriate legal frameworks, built operational capacities, set up public-private partnerships, developed various cybersecurity plans, facilitated education of skilled specialists as well as rose awareness of the population.

Like the vast majority of the states, the Republic of Moldova confronted with the need of ensuring protection of its citizen against cybersecurity dangers. However, with the increasing number of electronic services and growing complexity of cyber challenges coupled with low digital literacy of population, flaws and uncertainties in the national legal framework as well as lack of a harmonized approach to cybersecurity formed a major threat to national security. That situation lasts already for many years creating serious risks for the economic prosperity and safety of Moldovan citizen. The size of those issues can be measured by identification and comparison of the latest cyber incidents occurred at national as well as governmental levels.

As of 2015, the number of high contrasting nationwide incidents multiplied five times. That included such cases as: "Starnet" ISP data breach, which exposed ~ 53 000 personal data records of its clients; secret correspondence leak of Moldovan Intelligence Service, Cyber Crime Police and National Anticorruption Center; massive ransomware attacks on governmental institutions and other media-visible incidents. In the same time the number of infiltration attempts into governmental information systems remained practically at the same threat-level consisting of 6.285.590 attempts for 2015. However the propagation of botnets across governmental networks significantly increased, reaching the point of 8.239 infection alerts comparing to 3.340 of alerts a year earlier. The same could be said for the diversity of spanned malware families - 15 different groups comparing to 6 in 2014. The good trend is observed only in the area of exposed computer network resources - their quantity decreased in 4.5 times making up 31.769 opened for entire Internet world and vulnerable for abusing services.

Another threatening tendency in Moldova is active application of cyber warfare techniques for influencing on local political situation. First available evidences of their utilization can be traced back in 2007 when pro-Kremlin Russian youth movement "Nashi", which is based in uncontrolled way by official Moldavian authorities in Transnistria region, utilized distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on Estonian official information portals within a scope of expressing their political protests against relocation of the Bronze Soldier of Tallinn. The similar methods were applied in April 2009 during "Twitter revolution" in Moldova. The attackers by engaging resource-exhausting DDoS caused severe performance degradation and complete service outages of official web portals of Moldovan public administration authorities. During the next years cyber warfare motives shifted from the scope of expressing protests to stealing sensitive information. So, in 2013, within Moldovan state institutions was detected a particularly sophisticated malware related to cyber espionage campaign "Red October". The threat actors, who were standing behind it, used targeted infiltration technique – the spear phishing – to penetrate and obtain sensitive data from informational systems of diplomatic and justice



agencies. Starting from that case cyber espionage campaigns in Moldova became an inalienable element of any politically significant event – whenever it is parliamentary elections, the election of the Prime Minister or a political struggle. However, the evolution of applied cyber warfare techniques did not stop on that. So, in 2015, a new form political weapon was detected – the hybrid warfare, which consisted of combination of highly shaped and “elegant” cyber-attacks altogether with elements of information warfare. The power of that weapon was enough to dismiss the newly elected Prime Minister, making the national cyber security issue ever more challenging.

Overcoming these threats require concerted efforts between the public and private sectors, law enforcement agencies and intelligence. Cooperation at the operational level with effective exchanges of information on cyber threats is also crucial in ensuring the security of networks and information by generating mutual trust, value and commitment.

In the recent years, due to the process of e-transformation, the Government of Republic of Moldova pays more and more attention to the subject of cyber security by establishing procedures, adopting standards and taking concrete steps for cyber protection.

Thus, in 2010, was established the main capacity of the government in responding to cyber threats – a governmental cyber security emergency response team “Cyber Security Center CERT-GOV-MD”, which operates within the State Enterprise "Centre of Special Telecommunications". CERT-GOV-MD's mission is to assist public authorities in the implementation of proactive and reactive measures to reduce risks of IT security incidents and assist in responding to incidents. The Center also examines incidents occurred Moldovan networks, including those reported by citizens and institutions in Moldova and abroad. Among the tasks of the CERT-GOV-MD include raising awareness of cybersecurity in the public sector and building strategic relationships to enhance cyber security of national critical infrastructure. For achieving of that goal the Center setup tight cooperation with Moldovan Law Enforcement Agency – Center for Combating Cybercrimes, General Prosecutors Office, Ministry of Information Technology and Telecommunication, Ministry of Internal Affairs and other responsible institutions.

Another step for cyber protection was made in 2015 by adoption of Government decision No. 811 “on National Program on Cyber Security of the Republic of Moldova for the years 2016 – 2020”. The program sets and deploys a coherent security management in Moldova, which covers public and private entities concerned for protection of national cyberspace by planning the use of available resources and identifying necessary interventions.

Today the Internet contains an uncountable number of dangers for cybersecurity of privately owned businesses and public authorities making them an attractive target for digital assaults administered by various threat actors like hacktivist groups, terrorists or state-supported



intruders. The Republic of Moldova is not an exception. The last high contrasting incidents only confirms that. In spite of establishing cybersecurity-devoted organizations and adopting legal framework, it became evident that the national cyber security issue cannot be solved without further efforts on building capacities of responsible institutions and establishing nationwide real-time cooperation mechanism. That should be the task for the nearest future.

## *Security and Hybrid Threats: EU strengthens response and wants to include also third countries*

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**In a step which was recognized by many experts as a breaker for a more common foreign and security policy, the European Commission and the High Representative ("EU Foreign Minister") adopted on 6th April, 2016 a Joint Framework to counter hybrid threats and foster the resilience of the EU, its Member States and partner countries while increasing cooperation with NATO on countering these threats.**

In recent years, the EU and its Member States have been increasingly exposed to hybrid threats that comprise hostile actions designed to destabilise a region or a state. This paper goes into a range of non-conventional foreign policy elements - like terrorism, cyber security, or hybrid threats. It could also be said that many "wars of the future" will not be prepared like e.g. WW I or II, but by hybrid threats, i.e. all what is under the threshold of a declared war.

**What are hybrid threats?** The concept of hybrid threats aims to capture the mixture of conventional and nonconventional, military and non-military, overt and covert actions that can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare. This includes also conflicts launched by groups, insurgents, separatists or similar, be they supported by governments or not. Hybrid threats target critical vulnerabilities and seek to create ambiguity in order to hinder swift and effective decision-making. The range of measures applied as part of a hybrid campaign may be very wide: from cyberattacks on critical information systems, through the disruption of critical services, such as energy supplies or financial services, to undermining public trust in government institutions or exploiting social vulnerabilities. It may be everything useful for destabilisation and subsequent social unrest in any EU country. But there are also "partner countries" mentioned, which means in particular the associated countries within the Eastern Partnership, i.e. Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova.

A first and crucial step on the road to achieving better protection against hybrid threats is to acquire proper situational awareness. This is why intelligence and information sharing becomes so important. In order to prevent and respond to hybrid threats effectively, it is paramount to enhance the resilience of societies and critical infrastructure. Given the nature of hybrid threats, it is essential to work across geographical borders and agency boundaries. After all, this is the first supranational approach to hybrid threats, acknowledging that EU Member States (and their partners around) are a community bound to European values, like democracy, human rights, the rule of law, a social net and a market economy system, etc., which might come under threat.

An extensive interpretation of hybrid threats includes cyberattacks and "information war" in the sense of disinformation. Most governments start only now to counter hybrid threats, many have different agencies who should counter cyberattacks. In the administrative reaction the last word is not yet spoken, and things are in motion. But everything requires more and more effective efforts in inter-agency or inter-ministerial cooperation on state level, and of course in EU (or beyond this framework) cooperation.

The Joint Communication proposes, besides a closer cooperation with NATO, a "Cell of Excellence" for hybrid threats which should be integrated into INTCEN, the Intelligence Centre embedded into European External Action Service (EEAS). With regards to third countries (and without naming any of them), the EU has "underlined in the European Agenda on Security, and increased its focus on building capacities in *partner countries* in the security sector, *inter alia*, by building on the nexus between security and development and developing the security dimension of the revised European Neighbourhood Policy<sup>44</sup>. These actions can also promote partners' resilience to hybrid activities.", as written in the relevant chapter of the communication.

The Commission intends to further intensify the exchange of operational and strategic information with enlargement countries and within the Eastern Partnership and Southern Neighbourhood as appropriate to help combat organised crime, terrorism, irregular migration and trafficking of small arms. On counter-terrorism, the EU is stepping up cooperation with third countries by establishing upgraded security dialogues and Action Plans. Insofar, the EU mentions also the Southern Neighbourhood - which is appropriate as some of these dangers are also stemming e.g. from the Maghreb states.

EU external financing instruments aim at building functioning and accountable institutions in third countries<sup>45</sup> which are a prerequisite for responding effectively to security threats and for enhancing resilience. In this context, security sector reform and capacity building in support of security and development<sup>46</sup> are key tools. Under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace<sup>47</sup>, the Commission has developed actions to enhance cyber-resilience and partners' abilities to detect and respond to cyber-attacks and cybercrime, which can counter hybrid threats in third countries.

Finally, in the spirit of the comprehensive approach to crisis management, Member States could deploy Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) tools and missions, independently or to complement deployed EU instruments, in order to assist partners in enhancing their capacities. The following actions could be considered:

- support for strategic communication,
- advisory support for key ministries exposed to hybrid threats;
- additional support for border management in case of emergency. Further synergies could be explored between CSDP instruments and security, customs and justice actors, including the

relevant EU agencies, INTERPOL and the European Gendarmerie Force, in accordance with their mandates.

***After all, in its "Action 18" the Joint Communication proposes that the High Representative, in coordination with the Commission, will launch a hybrid risk survey in neighbourhood regions: "The High Representative, the Commission and Member States will use the instruments at their respective disposal to build partners' capacities and strengthen their resilience to hybrid threats. CSDP missions could be deployed, independently or to complement EU instruments, to assist partners in enhancing their capacities".***

When this concept was presented on 6.4.2016, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini had said that in recent years, the security environment has changed dramatically. "We have seen the rise of hybrid threats on EU's borders. There has been a strong call for the EU to adapt and increase its capacities as a security provider. The relationship between internal and external security needs to be further strengthened. With these new proposals, we want to enhance our capacity to counter threats of hybrid nature. In this effort, we will also step up cooperation and coordination with NATO."

Also, Elzbieta Bienkowska, Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs, had expressed herself - thus giving a view of the attempts of the Commission which certainly add a missing stone into the mosaic of Common Security and Defence Policy: "The EU must become a security provider, able to adapt, anticipate and react to the changing nature of the threats we are facing. This means enhancing our resilience and security from within while increasing our capacity to counter emerging external threats. With this Framework, we act together to counter common hybrid threats. We are presenting concrete proposals for the Union and Member States to increase cooperation in security and defence, improve resilience, address strategic vulnerabilities and prepare a coordinated response" This also in context of possible dangers for financial institutions, cyber security, healthcare, water, electricity, space, nuclear power plants etc. - all single market-related soft targets.

The Joint Framework offers a comprehensive approach to improve the common response to the challenges posed by hybrid threats to Member States, citizens and the collective security of Europe. It brings together all relevant actors, policies and instruments to both counter and mitigate the impact of hybrid threats in a more coordinated manner. In particular, it builds on the European Agenda on Security adopted by the Commission in April 2015, as well as on sectorial strategies such as EU Cyber Security Strategy, the Energy Security Strategy and the European Union Maritime Security Strategy. The Joint Framework brings together existing policies and proposes twenty-two operational Actions aimed at:

- raising awareness by establishing dedicated mechanisms for the exchange of information between Member States and by coordinating EU actions to deliver strategic communication;
- building resilience by addressing potential strategic and critical sectors such as cybersecurity,

critical infrastructures (Energy, Transport, Space), protection of the financial system, protection of public health, and supporting efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalisation;

- preventing, responding to crisis and recovering by defining effective procedures to follow, but also by examining the applicability and practical implications of the Solidarity Clause (Article 222 TFEU) and the mutual defence clause (Art. 42(7) TEU), in case a wide-ranging and serious hybrid attack occurs;
- stepping up the cooperation between the EU and NATO as well as other partner organisations, in a joint effort to counter hybrid threats, while respecting the principles of inclusiveness and autonomy of each organisation's decision making process.

The Framework, after the Joint Communication, is designed to provide a robust foundation to support Member States in countering hybrid threats collectively, supported by a wide range of EU instruments and initiatives and using the full potential of the Treaties. After all, it also follows the more political guidelines of the Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker who called on the need "to work on a stronger Europe when it comes to security and defence". It also delivers on the invitation of the Foreign Affairs Council of 18 May 2015 to present actionable proposals to counter hybrid threats. Next step will be that the Framework will be presented to the Council of the European Union.

## *OSCE Peacekeepers for Ukraine?*

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Should there be armed peacekeepers stationed in eastern Ukraine? With what kind of mandate, and how long? This question was, or is examined also now in the framework of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), although not (yet?) officially. Russian peacekeepers alone are excluded, EU peacekeepers probably as well, and NATO peacekeepers too. Peacekeepers should be accepted by all the parties of a conflict. Whether this would be the case of OSCE armed personnel might be written in the clouds, but it is good that this possibility has been and will be discussed. It would be a "first" for the OSCE.

This led to a statement by a spokesperson of Germany's Federal Foreign Office on alleged plans for armed OSCE mission to eastern Ukraine, on 27 April 2016. Germany is holder of the 2016 OSCE Chairmanship, and issued the following statement in Berlin in response to reports on alleged plans for an armed OSCE mission to eastern Ukraine: "The OSCE monitoring mission currently in place in eastern Ukraine is a civilian, unarmed mission. This was decided by the 57 participating States of the OSCE, and neither Germany nor France are involved in any agreement about changing the civilian nature of the mission – neither within the OSCE nor in the Normandy format.

It is true that we have, in our capacity as Chair of the OSCE and following consultations within the Normandy format, asked the Secretariat to develop options for improving security at the planned local elections. It is too early to say what the findings will be.

Without wishing to preempt any decision, we can say that we find it difficult at this time to imagine what an armed OSCE mission might look like, that had the objective of effectively ensuring the security of the elections in the separatist areas and enhancing the security of OSCE observers. The OSCE currently has no precedent for an armed mission. On the contrary, being civilian in nature is a particularly important feature of OSCE monitoring missions, which require the consent of conflict parties to operate. When you take the idea of an armed mission to its logical conclusion, it raises a whole range of difficult legal, political, practical and military issues. We plan to arrange another meeting in the Normandy format in the foreseeable future, which will include the foreign ministers. A meeting of this kind would be the right opportunity to raise all the issues relating to the OSCE monitoring missions for discussion among the Normandy partners."

In the background was a condemnation of threats against OSCE monitors in Ukraine:

OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier also on 27 April 2016 had expressed concern following the recent increase in ceasefire violations in Eastern

Ukraine and the growing number of incidents involving OSCE monitors. Referring to recent threats against the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, Steinmeier had declared: "The SMM is a civilian, unarmed mission. It is instrumental for supporting the implementation of the ceasefire. The safety and security of SMM monitors must be assured by the sides. Those responsible for threatening or using force against the monitors must be held accountable."

Maybe the "loud thinking" about an armed OSCE mission should deter those who are against the OSCE as such ("... they want to intervene in our internal affairs", as declared by the eastern Ukraine separatists). But if the loud thinking would have no effect, then indeed OSCE should think about their first armed peacekeepers, and this if only for the duration of local elections. Then OSCE would have found another, additional role - a role which would make sense if peacekeepers in Europe are needed. As mentioned, Russian peacekeepers alone are unthinkable, NATO ones as well, and the EU is not yet so far to deploy an armed force to keep the peace, if they would not be rejected as well. So rests the OSCE, and in a peacekeeping mission lies a sensible and adequate task. At least it should be demanded, and who is against, this will speak for itself. By the way, there is a good old tradition in OSCE that surrounding, adjacent states do not participate in the (so far only civilian) peacekeeper force.

It could be expected that at the meeting in the Normandy format, with foreign ministers from Russia, Ukraine, France and Germany, on the 11 May 2016 in Berlin also the issue has been discussed. But there has been no agreement on if and if yes, how the security of the local elections should be guaranteed. The date of the elections is not determined yet, but the issues around these elections have to be solved under the Minsk 2 Agreement. Elections are a must after Minsk 2, and above all, no elections throw a very bad light on both the separatists, and on Moscow. Russia had agreed to the Minsk 2 Agreement, after all. So Ukraine will be on the agenda, including the preparation and security of these elections. As SMM is not armed and a civilian force, and an upgrade of SMM is not likely at all, there may be only a solution in deploying an armed OSCE force to eastern Ukraine. But in a time when 17 Ukrainian human rights NGOs have delivered their observations on torture and murders in eastern Ukraine, at first a local election is not likely. This is again a revealing fact on the separatists, who are accountable for the biggest part of the new problems. That this is covered by Russia, makes things only more surrealistic. If there is a common position within most of the OSCE members, it will be helpful - by a simple vote about armed peacekeepers. Then it is clear who is the obstacle. .



### Marek Dabrowski



*Dr. Dabrowski is non-resident scholar at Bruegel, Brussels, Professor of the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Fellow under the 2014-2015 Fellowship Initiative of the European Commission – Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs, Co-founder and Fellow at CASE - Center for Social and Economic Research in Warsaw, former Chairman of its Supervisory Council and President of Management Board (1991-2011), Chairman of the Supervisory Board of CASE Ukraine in Kyiv, Member of the Scientific Council of the E.T. Gaidar Institute for Economic Policy in Moscow, Former First Deputy Minister of Finance of Poland (1989-1990), Member of Parliament (1991-1993) and Member of the Monetary Policy Council of the National Bank of Poland (1998-2004). He is author of academic and policy papers, and editor of book publications.*

*The current article original appeared in the Bruegel on January 21, 2016. See under:*  
<http://bruegel.org/2016/01/belarus-at-a-crossroads/>

**Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Belarus has maintained a largely non-market economic system. This did not prevent rapid growth of its economy over a sustained period up to 2011. However, the period of economic growth in Belarus seems to be over. The factors that underpinned Belarus's growth, mainly the beneficial external environment, have gradually disappeared. As a result, the country is confronted by the need to start the far-reaching programme of market-oriented economic reforms and macroeconomic stabilisation which it tried to avoid for so long. Reform will not be easy, economically and politically.**

**The potential hardship facing Belarus could be at least partly cushioned by external assistance, in the first instance from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. However, the IMF has relatively fresh memories of the failure of its 2009-10 Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) with Belarus, which provided substantial balance-of-payments support, but which was derailed by its too-narrow focus on monetary and fiscal quantitative performance criteria, and by insufficient reform commitment on the Belarusian side. Other donors, such as the European Union, might be reluctant to offer**

**assistance as long as Belarus does not improve its poor human rights record and start some political reforms.**

In this analysis, we describe the characteristics of Belarus's economic model, explain how the Belarus growth 'miracle' was possible, why it cannot be continued, the reforms that are needed and why they might be difficult to implement and, finally, what the chances are, and what the conditions might be, under which Belarus could obtain external support.

### **Europe's last non-market economy**

According to the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's (EBRD) transition indicators<sup>1</sup> Belarus is among the least advanced of the former USSR's successor states in building a market economy. It is one of three reform laggards, the others being Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. This assessment relates to both 'first generation' reforms such as price, trade and foreign exchange liberalisation and small-scale privatisation (Fig. 1-3), and to more sophisticated 'second generation' reforms such as large-scale privatisation, governance and enterprise restructuring, and competition policy (Fig. 4-6). On average, all post-Soviet countries other than the Baltic States, lag behind Central and Eastern Europe in the implementation of 'second generation' reforms, which makes Belarus even less advanced than Fig. 4-6 suggest.

Price controls in Belarus have remained extensive, and have been reinforced with each macroeconomic crisis. For example, in 2011 after a major devaluation and its consequent pass-through to domestic prices, administrative price regulation of 'socially important goods' reached almost half (49 percent) of the consumer price index (CPI) basket. It subsequently went gradually down to 25 percent in 2014. However, after the devaluation of the Belarusian ruble (BYR) at the end of 2014, a temporary ban on all price increases was imposed (IMF, 2015a; IMF, 2015b) and stayed in force until April 2015<sup>2</sup>. Use of such broad price regulation has led to price distortions, which are particularly evident in the utility sector. Electricity tariffs remain, on average, at the level of about 50 percent of cost recovery. For natural gas, central heating and water supply, the situation is even worse, with tariffs converging to 20 percent of the cost recovery level in early 2015 (IMF, 2015a). It is worth remembering that Belarus is a net importer of energy resources (mainly from Russia) and excessive energy imports contribute to trade and current account deficits.

Although in 2001 Belarus formally introduced current-account convertibility of the BYR (as determined by Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement), it has never fully respected it. Various forms of foreign-exchange restrictions have remained in place and in times of market strain, for example in 2008-09, 2011 and 2014-15, exchange restrictions were intensified, leading to the re-emergence of a 'black' foreign exchange market and multiple exchange rates (IMF,

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<sup>1</sup>All the transition indicators use the scale from 1 (no progress at all) to 4+, i.e. 4.33 (transition agenda completion).

<sup>2</sup> See [http://2015.trebrd.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/TR2015\\_16\\_CA\\_Belarus.pdf](http://2015.trebrd.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/11/TR2015_16_CA_Belarus.pdf).

2015c). The role of the private sector remains limited. In 2010, according to the most recent EBRD estimate, the private sector's share of Belarusian GDP amounted to 30 percent only<sup>3</sup>; probably it has not changed substantially since then. The activities of private firms are administratively restricted in various ways and are often the target of hostile government propaganda. Meanwhile, state-owned enterprises must still meet mandatory production targets, as in the era of the centrally-planned economy. If they fail to do so, their managers put their careers at risk or even face criminal prosecution. Overall, Belarus retains a largely non-market economy, which is business unfriendly (IMF, 2012). Not surprisingly, the Heritage Foundation's 2015 Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) ranks Belarus 153 among 178 countries, making it one of the 'repressed' economies<sup>4</sup>. Somewhat surprisingly, the World Bank Doing Business ranking placed Belarus much higher in its 2015 and 2016 reports – ranked 43 and 44 respectively, out of 189. Belarus has also systematically improved its 'distance to frontier' (i.e. to the best practices) scores since 2010<sup>5</sup>.

However, methodological differences must be taken into account. The World Bank Doing Business ranking concentrates on the number of administrative procedures (and their length) related to starting in business, dealing with construction permits, getting electricity, registering property, obtaining credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency. It hardly captures the systemic remnants of a command economy such as de-facto mandatory production targets, and government-inspired investment, exchange restrictions, high inflation, or politically motivated insecurity of property rights. The latter are, at least partly, included in the IEF.

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<sup>3</sup> See <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/macrodats/sci.xls>.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking>.

<sup>5</sup> <http://www.doingbusiness.org/customquery#Result>.

Figure 1: Commonwealth of Independent States, progress in price liberalisation, 2014.




Figure 2: Commonwealth of Independent States, progress in trade and foreign exchange system liberalisation, 2014.




Figure 3: Commonwealth of Independent States, progress in small-scale privatisation, 2014.




Figure 4: Commonwealth of Independent States, progress in large-scale privatisation, 2014.




Figure 5: Commonwealth of Independent States: progress in governance and enterprise restructuring, 2014.





Figure 6: Commonwealth of Independent States, progress in competition policy, 2014.



Source for all figures: EBRD Transition Indicators, 2014.

Note: AM = Armenia, AZ = Azerbaijan, BY = Belarus, GE = Georgia, KZ = Kazakhstan, KG = Kyrgyzstan, MD = Moldova, RU = Russia, TJ = Tajikistan, TM = Turkmenistan, UA = Ukraine, UZ = Uzbekistan.

## **Rapid growth**

Despite the slow pace of market reforms (or even their reversal in the second half of the 1990s), the Belarusian economy recorded quite impressive growth for the decade and a half between 1997 and 2011 (Figure 7). This allowed some politicians and economists in the country to claim the advantage of the ‘Belarusian economic model’ over the market-oriented transition strategies pursued by Belarus’s neighbours.

To understand how the last enclave of the non-market economy in Europe not only managed to survive but also was able to grow rapidly, one must take into consideration several specific factors.

First, when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Belarus was the second most developed country, after Russia, of the newly-formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), in terms of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP). It enjoyed well-developed physical infrastructure and human capital and its industrial capacities were relatively modern and better oriented towards consumer and producer market demand, compared to other republics. This legacy allowed Belarusian industry to continue its previous role as a supplier of medium-quality and relatively inexpensive consumer goods to other post-Soviet countries, primarily Russia.

Second, also since the Soviet era, Russian oil and natural gas exports to Europe have transited through Belarus. Unlike Ukraine, Belarus has managed to extract substantial economic rent from this activity. This was made possible by various integration projects with Russia since the mid-1990s. Most of these, except the most recent – the 2010 customs union and the 2015 Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) – were short lived. However, they allowed Belarus to purchase Russian energy resources at a lower price. Moreover, for several years, Belarus was able to resell to other countries Russian oil purchased at domestic or nearly domestic Russian prices (ie without export duties) and processed in Belarusian refineries (Novopolotsk and Mozyr) at market prices.

Third, unlike most other post-communist countries, Belarus has retained political and administrative capacity to continue operating a sort of command economic system - a result of the reluctance of the then prime minister Myechislav Kebich and his government in 1991-94 to start even partial market reforms. Belarus’s non-market system was then reinforced by the authoritarian political regime built by Alexander Lukashenko since his presidency in 1994.


Fourth, the largely command character of the Belarusian economy manifested itself, among other ways, in a very high investment rate, significantly exceeding the average in the CIS and central and eastern European countries (Figure 8). This was somewhat reminiscent of the experience of forced industrialisation in the communist era. Most investment came from state-owned



enterprises or was committed under government programmes. Obviously, such a high investment rate had to contribute to rapid growth but the non-market character of the investment process led to its low and steadily decreasing effectiveness (Kruk & Bornukova, 2014).


Finally, as we know from economic history, growth rates in non-market systems are not always fully comparable to those in market economies. This is not only because of potential over-reporting bias caused by the system of mandatory output targets. Even more important is the incomparability of GDP deflators when prices do not reflect the relative scarcity of goods because of extensive price controls, multiple exchange rates, trade barriers and physical shortages of good and services (see for example Bratkowski, 1993). Even in the periods of less severe price regulation and a single exchange rate, the choice of goods and services in the Belarusian market has remained more limited than in neighbouring countries.

Figure 7: Belarus, GDP, constant prices, % change, 1996 – 2014.



Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2015.

Figure 8: Investment rate in Belarus, CIS and emerging and developing Europe, % of GDP, 1996 – 2014.



Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2015.

Note: emerging and developing Europe includes Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Hungary, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Turkey.


## Macroeconomic disequilibria

As Figure 9 shows, Belarus has suffered from chronic inflation at the high or moderately high level, despite its administrative price controls. Cumulatively, between 2000 and 2014, the consumer price index increased more than 17-fold (!) giving the country the dubious honour of inflation champion of the former USSR. In particular, periodic inflation hikes resulted from abrupt devaluations of the BYR (see Figure 10). The most recent was triggered by the currency crisis in Russia at the end of 2014 and early 2015 (Figure 11) that spilled over to other CIS economies (Dabrowski, 2015). In turn, these devaluations were caused by balance-of-payments crises. Domestic monetary expansion originating from extensive quasi-fiscal activities has been another source of rapid price growth. High inflation and frequent devaluations undermined trust in the BYR, which led to the high level of actual dollarisation. The ratio of foreign-currency denominated loans to total loans exceeded 55 percent in the first quarter of 2015 (IMF, 2015a).

As Figure 12 shows, Belarus recorded continuous high current account deficits (resulting, among other factors, from the high investment rates) which, unlike in other transition economies, were largely financed by official borrowing (mainly from Russia, the Anti-Crisis Fund of the Eurasian


Economic Community, and the IMF) and only partly by net inward foreign direct investment (Figure 13). As a result, the gross international reserves of the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus (NBRB) remained at the low level of \$5.1 billion at the end of 2014 (IMF, 2015a). The net NBRB international reserves, i.e. gross reserves minus foreign liabilities, are negative. FDI flows have mainly originated from Russia. Some have resulted from one-off large transactions involving the sale of Belarusian assets to Russian owners, such as sales to Gazprom in 2007 and 2011 of shares in Beltransgaz, which operates a gas transit pipeline from Russia to the EU.

Figure 9: Belarus, end-of-year inflation, %, 1996 – 2014.




Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2015.

Figure 10: End-of-year exchange rate, BYR/1 USD, 1992 – 2014.




Source: Bruegel based on <http://www.nbrb.by/engl/statistics/Rates/RatesDaily.asp>

Figure 11: Daily exchange rate, BYR/1 USD and BYR/1 EUR, December 2014 – January 2015.




Source: Bruegel based on <http://bru.gl/1NmcywM>.

Figure 12: Belarus, current account balance, % of GDP, 1996 – 2014.



Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2015.

Figure 13: Belarus, net inward FDI, percent of GDP, 1996 – 2014.



Source: Bruegel based on <http://bru.gl/1OyEyLs>.

## **Fiscal and quasi-fiscal balances**

When an economy suffers from chronic high inflation and current account deficits, fiscal imbalances are the prime suspect. Paradoxically this is not the case in Belarus, at least at first sight. As Figure 14 shows, Belarus has had either fiscal surpluses or relatively small deficits since 1998. But the gross public debt statistics look less rosy (Figure 15). To resolve this apparent inconsistency, two factors must be taken into account: the necessity of official borrowing to close the balance-of-payments financing gap and domestic quasi-fiscal imbalances.


The second factor explains, to a great degree, the observed macroeconomic imbalances and repeated balance-of-payments crises in Belarus (see Miksjuk et al, 2015). While quasi-fiscal operations are present in various sectors of Belarusian economy, such as the energy sector and public utilities forced to provide their services at tariffs below the cost-recovery level, they mainly fall on the banking sector and the central bank.

State-owned enterprises and farms that have to meet production targets and invest in new production capacity (often regardless of the effective market demand for their output) and carry out the government's required wage increases are kept afloat by directed loans on highly concessionary terms. Directed and subsidised loans also serve as an instrument to support various government programmes, for example, in the housing sector. The exact legal forms of these loans have changed frequently, so measuring them is not an easy task. According to the IMF (2015a) their size increased from about 6 percent of GDP in 2010 to 9.3 percent in 2011 and then gradually decreased to about 4 percent of GDP in 2014. Without any doubt, this was a major driver of the rapid increase in both NBRB reserve money and BYR broad money (Figure 16), and a primary cause of the subsequent balance-of-payments crises.

Directed lending also leads to high levels of non-performing loans in the banking sector and the need for periodic recapitalisation of state-owned banks. For example, the cost of bank restructuring measures amounted to 4.9 percent of GDP in 2011 and is expected to amount to a further 2.8 percent of GDP in 2015.


In addition, each year, the government must cover part of its credit guarantees related to directed lending. In the period 2011-15, this involved expenditures in the range of 0.3 and 0.9 percent of annual GDP (IMF, 2015a). These items are not included in the general government balances reported in Figure 14.

Figure 14: Belarus, general government net lending/borrowing, % of GDP, 1998 – 2014.



Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2015.


Figure 15: Belarus, end-of-year general government gross debt, % of GDP, 2004n-14.



Source: Bruegel based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, October 2015.



Figure 16: Belarus, nominal increase in monetary aggregates, %, 2011 – 14.



Source: Bruegel based on IMF (2015a), Table 1, p 26.

### The end of the Belarusian model?

As seen in Figure 7, the debate on the sources and costs of Belarus's high growth rate has already become a historical matter. Since 2011, growth has slowed substantially. For 2015, a 3.6 percent contraction is expected, according to the IMF World Economic Outlook October 2015 forecasts. The reasons for such a dramatic change are numerous.

Over the years, the country's relative structural advantages have gradually disappeared. Growth in total factor productivity in Belarus's dirigiste economy was relatively modest until 2008, and then started to decline (Kruk and Bornukova, 2014). Unreformed state-owned enterprises not sufficiently exposed to competitive market pressures lost part of their export markets, including Russia and other CIS countries. Russia's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2012 and the formation of the EaEU exposed Belarusian companies to stronger external competition, on the Russian and domestic markets. In fact, being still far from completing its own WTO accession bid, Belarus has become unilaterally exposed to the WTO rules and competition from WTO members (via the EaEU) without symmetric access to their markets. This situation will become even more disadvantageous for Belarus following Kazakhstan's WTO accession, which was completed in November 2015.

Gradual withdrawal by Russia of preferential prices for imported oil and gas has reduced substantially the oil and gas-related rents that accrue to the Belarusian economy and budget. The oil price decline in the second half of 2014 further reduced this rent and led to deterioration in Belarus's terms of trade.

Belarus has also been hit indirectly by the consequences of the Ukrainian conflict, including the western sanctions against Russia and, especially, by Russia's countersanctions against the EU and US, even if some Belarusian enterprises have been able to either substitute EU exporters to Russia or profit from circumvention of Russian countersanctions in the single EaEU customs space in the short-term.

The opportunity to receive further financial support from Russia or the EaEU in order to close the balance-of-payments gap has also diminished because of the increasing fiscal constraints in Russia and geopolitical differences over the Ukrainian conflict. More strategically, President Lukashenko seems to be reluctant to further increase Belarus's dependence on Russia.

### **The required reform agenda...**

To avoid a new round of the balance-of-payments crisis and to return to growth Belarus must finally accelerate its process of transition to a market economy. Macroeconomic stabilisation and completing basic reforms are the most urgent tasks. These require the abandonment of price controls, direct and indirect subsidies, full current account convertibility of the BYR and the elimination of quasi-fiscal operations, in particular, directed lending. The NBRB must obtain genuine independence with a single mandate to ensure price stability.

However, this is not enough. As previous experience demonstrates, macroeconomic stabilisation will not be sustainable without accompanying microeconomic, structural and institutional reforms. These should involve a broad set of measures aimed at, among other objectives, dismantling the remnants of the command system, large-scale privatisation, opening up to foreign investment, completing WTO accession, closing down loss-making firms, easing the business and investment climate and reforming the financial system. Such an agenda will not be easy, economically, socially or politically. However, Belarus has lost too much time to wait longer.

### **...and its potential pitfalls**

Since the end of 2014, there have been attempts to modify Belarus's economic policy, including personnel changes in the government economic team and the NBRB, and a change in the official rhetoric in favour of less government control. For the first time, the presidential election in October 2015 was not preceded by massive credit expansion and administrative pressure for wage increases. The new leadership of the NBRB declared it would move to a flexible exchange rate for the BYR and monetary targeting, which will replace the previous regime of a crawling

band against a currency basket. On the microeconomic front, there have been some measures to restructure the largest state-owned enterprises, including shedding of redundant labour (Alachnovic, 2015). These moves go in the right direction, but are not sufficient to restore growth and ensure macroeconomic stability in the long term.

It remains a big question whether the country's authorities will decide to intensify reforms and make them sufficiently comprehensive. Apart from the usual political risks that accompany far-going market reforms in any country, in Belarus reform has always been seen as a challenge to its authoritarian political regime. This has been so far the main difference between Belarus and other CIS countries, many of which are also far from political freedom and democracy. However, for Belarus the status quo does not look sustainable: it does not offer the continuation of economic growth and living standard improvements, the basic preconditions of the regime's political legitimacy.

### **The question of external support**

Another question relates to the potential external support for a reform process. Obviously, Belarus can count on the support of the Bretton Woods institutions – in first instance, the IMF. The latter started discussing the prospects for a three-year Extended Fund Facility (EFF) programme with Belarusian authorities in November 2015 but it remains unclear how long this negotiation will take and what its final outcome will be. As put diplomatically in the IMF press release of 20 November 2015 ‘...discussions on some issues require more time’<sup>6</sup>. These are, most likely, structural and institutional issues that, as discussed, are key conditions for reform success. If completed successfully, the EFF might be supplemented by World Bank loans focused on concrete structural and institutional reforms.

The IMF faces a major challenge to avoid repeating the mistakes of the 2009 SBA when under the geopolitically motivated pressure of some of its major shareholders (including the EU), the programme was insufficiently tough and comprehensive (especially in relation to structural benchmarks). The Belarusian authorities used the programme's various loopholes to continue directed lending to state-owned enterprises on concessionary terms (IMF, 2011 and 2012) and to de-facto finance the 2010 presidential election campaign, which ended up with the large-scale currency crisis in the first half of 2011 (i.e. just after completion of the SBA). As discussed, the success of macroeconomic stabilisation in Belarus depends on a front-loaded programme to dismantle the legacies of the command system, complete basic market reforms and carry out comprehensive microeconomic restructuring. Some of these reforms should go beyond the standard agenda of SBA/EFF and even World Bank programmes, especially when they touch governance issues and the political system. Here interventions by other bilateral and multilateral donors, including the EU and the US, play usually a useful role. However, it remains unclear if

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<sup>6</sup> See <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2015/pr15532.htm>.

Belarus can expect such support, similar to other Eastern Partnership countries, without carrying out at least limited political reforms and improving its poor human rights record.

To restructure its economy, Belarus also needs large-scale FDI, primarily from the OECD countries. This might be difficult to accomplish as long as Belarus does not improve its business and governance image and fails to complete its macroeconomic stabilisation. Although in the 2014 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, Belarus is rated ahead of Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Ukraine, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, its position far down the ranking in place 119 out of 174 countries means that this area also requires a lot of effort.

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# *Belarus: A Repressed Economy*

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*The current report was published in March, 2016, by European Parliamentary Research Service, responsible there Naja Bentzen and Christian Dietrich.*



Following 19 years of positive economic growth, Belarus's economy contracted by 3.6% in 2015, partly due to the deep recession in Russia, the country's closest trading partner. With shrinking foreign reserves and an increasing need for loans and investment, Belarus is looking for alternative support in an attempt to temporarily stabilise its economy.

However, it remains uncertain if the recession will prompt fundamental changes to President Lukashenko's repressive economic policies.

## **Belarus's economy: from 'miracle' to recession**

After 19 years of uninterrupted, albeit gradually slowing, growth from 1996 to 2014, Belarus's economy contracted by an estimated 3.6% in 2015 due to weak external and domestic demand, effectively ending the Belarusian 'growth miracle'. The country is now entering its second year of recession, and the future looks bleak: Economy Minister, Vladimir Zinovskii, has predicted a 'tough' 2016, and the country's Prime Minister, Andrei Kobyakov, in February 2016 warned that Belarus should be prepared for a 'worst case scenario'.

Belarus was the second most developed post-Soviet country, after Russia, in terms of GDP per capita at purchasing power parity (PPP) after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Thanks to its well-developed physical infrastructure and industrial capacities, the country continued to supply consumer goods to other post-Soviet countries, not least Russia. Minsk has relied heavily on Moscow as its key ally, trading partner and energy provider. It has received reduced-rate loans and enjoyed the most favourable Russian energy prices in the region, paying three to five times less for Russian gas in 2007 than neighbouring Poland.

Approximately one third of Belarusian export revenues is generated by refining and exporting Russian oil.

Russia's subsidies have amounted to up to 20% of Belarus's GDP, and half of Belarus's exports go to Russia.

**As Russia's economic support diminishes, Belarus looks for alternative support.** However, 25 years after the Soviet collapse, Belarus is among the least developed former Soviet states in



terms of building a market economy and conducting reforms, as Marek Dabrowski (Bruegel) points out.

Heavy state interference and a weak private sector have rendered it a ‘repressed’ economy, ranked 157<sup>th</sup> among 186 countries in the Heritage Foundation’s 2016 Index of Economic Freedom. Belarus’s economy is very vulnerable to developments in Russia. The on-going Russian recession has dampened hopes for increased trade between the two countries. Moscow can no longer afford to endlessly aid its allies and has gradually reduced its oil and gas subsidies to Belarus. At the same time, the falling oil prices have resulted in lower revenues. The energy dependence on Russia seems hard to tackle without wide-ranging reforms: Belarusian heavy industries use very energy-hungry Soviet-era technologies, and Belarusian citizens have become accustomed to artificially low energy prices.

Shrinking foreign reserves prompt tentative reforms to accommodate IMF demands. In 2016, Belarus has significant debt repayments due. At the same time, the country’s foreign exchange reserves had fallen to US \$4.03 billion by the beginning of February 2016; equal to approximately one and a half months of import cover (below the level considered safe). As access to financing from Russia is uncertain, in February 2016 Belarus introduced measures to improve the economy (reduced public expenditure, diversification of exports, increased foreign investments), following the EU’s decision to ease sanctions and ahead of talks with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, on 1 March, Belarus suspended talks with the IMF over a US\$3.5 billion support package and instead announced that it was in the ‘final stage’ of negotiating a US\$2 billion aid package from the Russia-led Eurasian Fund for Stabilisation and Development. Analysts widely agree that economic reforms in the country are long overdue. However, reforms in key areas could undermine public support for President Lukashenko and increase the risk of social tension, something the government may be reluctant to risk ahead of September 2016 parliamentary elections.

Gross domestic product (current prices) (€ million)												GDP per capita (€)
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2014
EU-28	11 016	11 502	12 168	12 901	12 986	12 246	12 790	13 173	13 420	13 521	13 920	27 400
Armenia	2.9	3.9	5.1	6.7	7.9	6.2	7.0	7.3	8.3	8.4	8.8	2 911
Azerbaijan	7.0	10.6	16.7	24.1	33.2	31.7	40.0	47.4	54.2	55.8	56.5	6 006
Belarus	18.6	24.3	29.4	33.1	41.4	35.4	41.6	46.2	49.5	55.1	57.3	6 053
Georgia	4.1	5.1	6.2	7.4	8.7	7.7	8.8	10.4	12.3	12.2	12.4	2 770
Moldova	2.1	2.4	2.7	3.2	4.1	3.9	4.4	5.0	5.7	6.0	6.0	1 687
Ukraine	54.1	71.6	89.2	108.6	128.5	87.1	106.4	121.6	142.1	143.5	99.7	2 318
Real GDP growth rate (%)												
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
EU-28	2.5	2.0	3.4	3.1	0.5	-4.4	2.1	1.7	-0.5	0.1	1.3	
Armenia	10.5	13.9	13.2	13.7	6.9	-14.1	2.2	4.7	7.2	3.3	3.5	
Azerbaijan	10.2	26.4	34.5	25.0	10.8	9.3	5.0	0.1	2.2	5.8	2.8	
Belarus	11.4	9.4	10.0	8.6	10.2	0.2	7.7	5.5	1.7	1.0	1.6	
Georgia	5.9	9.6	9.4	12.6	2.6	-3.7	6.2	7.2	6.4	3.3	4.8	
Moldova	7.4	7.5	4.8	3.0	7.8	-6.0	7.1	6.8	-0.7	9.4	4.6	
Ukraine	11.8	3.1	7.6	8.2	2.2	-15.1	4.1	5.4	0.2	0.0	-6.8	
Analysis of gross value added by economic activity (NACE Rev. 2), 2004 and 2014												
	Agriculture, forestry and fishing		Industry		Construction		Services					
	2004	2014	2004	2014	2004	2014	2004	2014	2004	2014		
EU-28	2.0	1.6	20.4	18.9	6.1	5.4	71.6	74.1				
Armenia	24.4	20.3	23.8	17.9	16.7	10.1	35.1	51.7				
Azerbaijan	11.8	5.7	41.3	44.9	13.4	13.5	33.4	35.9				
Belarus	10.1	8.9	36.5	30.5	7.3	11.9	46.1	48.7				
Georgia	17.9	9.2	17.6	17.1	8.8	7.3	55.7	66.4				
Moldova	19.9	14.6	19.6	17.5	3.9	4.1	56.6	63.7				
Ukraine	11.5	11.8	27.5	22.7	4.8	2.6	56.3	62.9				
General government net borrowing (-)/net lending (+), relative to GDP (%)												
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
EU-28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-4.5	-4.2	-3.2	-2.9	
Armenia	-1.5	-1.7	-1.3	-1.5	-0.7	-7.5	-5.0	-2.8	-1.5	-1.5	-1.9	
Azerbaijan	0.1	-0.7	0.4	-0.3	0.0	-0.5	-0.9	0.6	-0.2	0.6	-0.5	
Belarus	0.0	-0.7	1.4	0.4	1.4	-0.7	-2.6	2.1	0.5	0.2	-	
Georgia	0.8	1.4	2.7	0.3	-2.0	-6.5	-4.5	-0.9	-0.6	-1.1	-2.0	
Moldova	0.2	1.5	-0.3	-0.2	-1.0	-6.3	-2.5	-2.4	-2.1	-1.8	-1.7	
Ukraine	-3.3	-1.3	-1.0	-0.6	-1.6	-5.6	-6.3	-2.2	-3.7	-4.1	-4.5	
General government consolidated gross debt, relative to GDP (%)												
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	
EU-28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	81.0	83.7	85.5	86.8	
Armenia	32.6	24.4	19.2	16.4	16.4	40.6	40.0	42.2	41.4	40.9	43.6	
Azerbaijan	18.3	12.5	9.4	7.4	6.1	7.7	7.3	7.6	8.2	8.2	-	
Belarus	8.1	8.7	8.4	10.6	21.6	30.7	36.9	23.3	22.9	21.4	23.9	
Georgia	43.8	35.1	27.9	23.1	27.0	34.6	36.8	32.5	32.5	33.9	35.3	
Moldova	33.7	34.0	28.3	23.5	19.4	21.5	26.8	25.6	23.8	22.1	24.8	
Ukraine	23.9	17.1	14.3	11.8	19.1	33.6	38.6	35.1	35.3	38.4	70.3	

Source: Eurostat.



## Présentation

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## *27.02.2016 – One Year since the Assassination of Boris Nemtsov*

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27.02.2016 marked a year of the assassination of Boris Nemtsov (see the picture) - a Russian oppositionist and former Deputy Prime Minister under President Boris Yeltsin. He can be named as one of the architects of market economy reforms in Russia. Later, he became one of the leading opposition personalities against the incumbent president – Vladimir Putin, who ran and runs the country more and more autocratically. Nemtsov was shot shortly before publishing a report on the Russian involvement in the Ukraine conflict – “Putin. The War”. The paper was translated into English and published in a Special Issue of EUFAJ. See under: <http://www.libertas-institut.com/eufaj/special-2015/>

In commemoration of him the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) Party in Europe held a conference, called “Strengthening Russia’s European Foundations” on 01.03.2015. Representatives of the Russian democratic opposition and civil society including current PARNAS party leader **Mikhail Kasyanov**, the daughter of Boris Nemtsov, **Zhanna Nemtsova** and anti-corruption activist **Alexey Navalny** discussed their vision for Russia with the leader of the ALDE Group in the European Parliament **Guy Verhofstadt**, ALDE Party President **Hans van Baalen** MEP, former President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) **Anne Brasseur** and numerous other political leaders. Also, at the conference Boris Nemtsov was awarded the International Jean Rey Prize in memoriam.



Guy Verhofstadt, Leader of the ALDE Group in the European Parliament





Zhanna Nemtsova, daughter of Boris Nemtsov



Mikhail Kasyanov, PARNAS party leader



Alexey Navalny, anti-corruption activist

The conference can be followed in the LIVECASTS page of the ALDE Group. Go to <https://alde.livecasts.eu/strengthening-russias-european-foundations/help>.

# *Don't Forget Azerbaijan's Political Prisoners*

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## **Rebecca Vincent**



*Rebecca Vincent is a human rights activist, writer and former US diplomat. She currently coordinates the Sport for Rights campaign. She has worked with a wide range of international and Azerbaijani human rights and freedom of expression organisations. She holds an MA in Human Rights from University College London, and a BA in Political Science from the University of North Texas. - The article first appeared in OpenDemocracy on 7 April 2016.*

See under: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/rebecca-vincent/dont-forget-azerbaijan-s-political-prisoners>.

Following Azerbaijan's recent moves to release political prisoners, American and European policymakers must not falter in their focus on human rights.

Over the past few weeks, much international attention has been focused on Azerbaijan. In the midst of an unprecedented human rights crackdown, there have been a few small glimmers of hope. Through a pardon decree on 17 March, Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev released 14 political prisoners in one fell swoop. Also on 17 March, the Baku Court of Appeal released a jailed journalist on parole and, on 28 March, Azerbaijan's Supreme Court similarly released a jailed human rights lawyer on parole.

Perhaps in reaction to these releases, Aliyev was given a warm welcome by the US government during the Nuclear Security Summit at the end of March in Washington. Despite calls from human rights groups to freeze him out, the president was granted meetings with Joe Biden, John Kerry, and Penny Pritzker, US secretary of commerce, as well as a photo opportunity with Barack Obama. Before Aliyev embarked on his return journey home, the supposedly "frozen" Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted again, with dozens of people reportedly killed in the first few days alone.

At the same time, Azerbaijan has been experiencing serious economic troubles, as oil prices fall and the national currency collapses. Unemployment is high, resulting in a series of protests rocking Azerbaijan's regions in January. To top it all off, several stories related to corruption of Azerbaijan's ruling family have already emerged from the Panama Papers leak.

European Union Foreign Affairs Journal – N° 2 – 2016

## The crackdown continues

In the midst of all of this, the ongoing human rights crackdown in Azerbaijan deserves sustained focus. There are still dozens of political prisoners in Azerbaijani jails, guilty of nothing more than disagreeing with the ruling regime.

Parliament has been busy adopting regressive legislation, civil society is largely paralysed with a number of NGOs facing criminal investigations, and journalists are working in a climate of fear.

While the recent releases of political prisoners are a step in the right direction, they are far from ideal. None of these 16 people should have ever spent a single day in jail. Releasing them after slapping them with trumped-up charges, putting them through show trials, and in some cases, mistreating them in detention, hardly represents justice. Further, the criminal convictions against the two paroled prisoners still stand, and they are subject to travel restrictions.

The 14 pardoned prisoners have also been left with criminal records, as their convictions have not been overturned. Some of the released prisoners are prohibited from standing for public office, joining the bar association and running a non-profit organisation, and face other restrictions which impede their professional activities.

The exclusion of certain political prisoners from the pardon decree speaks volumes. Prominent investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova remains jailed, targeted for exposing corruption among Azerbaijan's ruling elite. Journalist Seymur Hezi is still behind bars, doing time on the all-purpose charge of "hooliganism" so favoured by the authorities when nothing else will stick. Youth activist Ilkin Rustemzade — initially arrested for the great crime of doing the Harlem Shake — remains imprisoned. Opposition leader Ilgar Mammadov was also not released, despite the European Court of Human Rights ordering the Azerbaijani government to do so. The list goes on.



28 March: Azerbaijan's Supreme Court orders the release of Intigam Aliyev, human rights defender. Source: Europe without Political Prisoners.

As the human rights community has pointed out, the revolving door of releases and new politically motivated arrests seems to be still in motion. On 30 March, 79 year-old writer Akram Aylisli was detained at Baku airport, told he was under a travel ban and questioned for 12 hours before being informed that he is facing criminal hooliganism charges.

Investigations and trials are on-going in a number of other cases of political prisoners, including some arrested in connection with the January economic protests.

### **Need for European action**

Washington's warm welcome for Aliyev and failure to take a strong stand on the release of the remaining political prisoners and further concrete reforms was a mistake. And so far, Europe has not done much better. The reactions of many European politicians to the president's actions were largely congratulatory with little focus given to the work which remains.

A prime example is EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, who was quick to praise the "positive development" and take partial credit for releases she had not called for — at least not publicly — during her recent trip to Baku. The EU's reaction to the release of human rights lawyer Intigam Aliyev was also overwhelmingly positive. Both statements gave a perfunctory nod to the EU's "hopes" that others "currently imprisoned or under restriction of movement in Azerbaijan on political grounds" would be released, but a clearer and stronger EU stance is needed.

President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) Pedro Agramunt also applauded the move. In his reaction to the initial pardons, Agramunt neglected to mention the fate of the other political prisoners, including Ilgar Mammadov.

Azerbaijan's continued detention of Mammadov, despite the European Court judgment ordering his release, is becoming a serious problem for the Council of Europe, and has led to repeated condemnation from the Committee of Ministers and a rare investigation, initiated by Secretary-General Thorbjørn Jagland, into Azerbaijan's compliance with its obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights.

In his reaction to human rights lawyer Intigam Aliyev's release on parole, Agramunt added a concessionary line on Mammadov's case: "I will continue my dialogue with the Azeri authorities on the political activists' [sic] case of Ilgar Mammadov". This, however, fell far short of the tough position needed. The Council of Europe's inability to secure Mammadov's release is now undermining the credibility of the entire body, which must take firm action to hold Azerbaijan accountable for its obligations as a member state.



Europe's haste in praising these releases without a strong stance on further concrete reforms is short-sighted. **These prisoner releases signal a rare chance for real negotiation with a regime that has been hostile to the international human rights community for many years.**

The EU in particular must seize this opportunity to ensure that clear human rights benchmarks are included in its on-going negotiations with Azerbaijan. They must address the need for the immediate and unconditional release of all remaining political prisoners, but also broader reforms, as the existence of political prisoners is a symptom of a much more serious disease — the Aliyev regime's systematic destruction of Azerbaijan's democratic institutions, which is simply incompatible with EU values.

So far, the EU leadership has ignored strong calls by the European Parliament in a September 2015 resolution to explore the use of individual sanctions against Azerbaijani officials responsible for human rights violations. But that resolution, coupled with a similar call in the US through the Azerbaijan Democracy Act tabled in Congress, may have in fact triggered the releases, showing that international pressure on the Azerbaijani authorities works.

Now is the time to sustain, and even increase that pressure and not to accept these releases as the endgame, only to end up with a new wave of political arrests in coming months.

### **End the vicious cycle**

**One thing is certain: rewarding Aliyev now without pressing for the release of the remaining prisoners and further reforms will only encourage further politically motivated arrests. The existence of high-profile political prisoners ensures that the Azerbaijani regime always has a hand to play when it wants something from the west.**

Human beings cannot continue to be used as bargaining chips in these political games. This vicious cycle of politically motivated arrests must be stopped once and for all, and the underlying causes addressed.

Rather than patting Aliyev on the back and ignoring the plight of the dozens of other political prisoners — not to mention the overall dire state of human rights in the country — now is the time to press further.

An opening has been created, and Washington, Brussels, and Strasbourg must take this opportunity to live up to their stated commitments to promote democracy and human rights in Azerbaijan.

# *The Four-day war in Nagorno-Karabakh: EU and NATO*

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**Grisha Aghajanyan**

Nagorno-Karabakh is a 4400sq km self-governing state, sited in the northeastern part of the Armenian highland. This territory has been a ground of struggle between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis since 1918-1920. The region has been disputed mainly for historical motives by both of the sides. Azerbaijan insists that it has been under their rule since renowned history and on the contrary, the Armenian side claims that Nagorno-Karabakh was an Armenian territory originally and that the claims of Azerbaijan are not legitimate.

The conflict escalated by 1988, when under the Azerbaijani repressions in Nagorno-Karabakh large-scale demonstrations and strikes erupted, which brought Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh to its epicenter. On February 13, 1988 the Supreme Soviet of Karabakh adopted a resolution, which signposted that Nagorno-Karabakh region must be transferred from Azerbaijan to Armenia<sup>7</sup>.

The perceived frozen conflict erupted on April 2, 2016, continued for four days and left dozens of casualties on both sides. The situation remains extremely volatile, despite a temporary truce and calls from the international community and organizations to immediately stop the fighting and get back to the negotiations table. Among those were international organizations, NATO and the EU, which both have wide-ranged interests in the South Caucasus region.

South Caucasus is geographically located on the most crucial crossroad linking the West and East, North and South of Eurasia and has always drawn the attention of superpowers and while aspiring to strengthen their military political influence, they attached significant importance to taking control over this particular crossroad.

As David Kereselidze<sup>8</sup> states “The South Caucasus has in recent years surged to the geopolitical center stage as a result of three processes: first, the recession of Russian power after 1990, which gave the region’s states a historic chance to pursue a Western orientation; second, the discovery

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<sup>7</sup> Chorbajian, L. ed., (2001) *The Making of Nagorno-Karabakh: From Secession to Republic*: Palgrave Publishers Ltd, New York

<sup>8</sup> David Kereselidze (2012) *NATO policies in the South Caucasus: expectations and factors*  
Alternate Director General, International Centre for Black Sea Studies

since the mid-1990s of the real potential of Caspian oil and gas, which provides with the unique transit corridors from Caspian energy supplies to the Euro-Atlantic area; and, third, the operational requirements of antiterrorism coalitions after 9/11 and offering direct access for allied forces to NATO-led operations. Furthermore, the unpredictable situations in Iran and Syria also increase the geopolitical importance of the Caucasus for NATO, especially taking into account the common border shared by Armenia, Iran and Azerbaijan, with the controversial bilateral relationship between two latter countries and as well as active Israeli military partnership with Azerbaijan”.

NATO’s policy in the Caucasus has never been static. Rather, it has evolved under the influence of many factors, including the strategic interests of the United States and its European allies, aspirations of the regional players (Turkey, Iran), key security challenges such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and regional conflicts, which can be addressed through concerted international cooperation. The region is located on key oil and gas transit routes, which makes it an extremely important place to be. South Caucasus, being in proximity to the NATO borders, the Alliance directly links the security in South Caucasus to the security in the entire Euro-Atlantic zone; therefore, the alliance tries to play a significant role in enhancing security and stability in the region. NATO is most interested in the stability in the South Caucasus region, with the reform-capable states, sharing democratic values with the Alliance that are the best guarantors of security, stability and prosperity.

NATO and other European structures as well are eager to perceive South Caucasus as a geopolitically unified area and work with the region as such, whereas the region is united only geographically, and totally fractured politically. An integrated approach towards the region fails as Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan follow quite different foreign policy vectors.

A statement<sup>9</sup>, urging the sides to respect the ceasefire, was made by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg: “I am encouraged by the reports of the cessation of hostilities along the Nagorno-Karabakh Line of Contact. I urge the sides to respect the ceasefire, show restraint and prevent any new escalation. NATO supports the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group. The parties need to go back to the negotiating table and find a comprehensive settlement, under the auspices of the Co-chairs. There is no military solution to the conflict. The peaceful resolution of conflicts is one of the core commitments to which all NATO’s partner countries commit when joining the Partnership for Peace”.

NATO Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow receiving Armenia’s Deputy Defense Minister David Tonoyan underlined as well that there can be no military solution to Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and that it urgently requires de-escalation and diplomatic progress under the

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<sup>9</sup> [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_129719.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_129719.htm)

auspices of OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs, referring to the heavy clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Earlier James Appathurai, the NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia stated that NATO is not directly involved in the process of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and that it supports the Minsk Group's efforts and a peaceful resolution to this conflict.

These statement level actions show that the alliance does not have the goal to get fully engaged in the conflict as leading members of NATO, United States and France are already co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk group, which mediates the peace talks. South Caucasus is largely considered by the West as a Russian "space" to which Russia gives utmost importance, regarding it as its southern gate, an access to the Middle East. Being fully engaged in the region and in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict means confronting Russia and other regional powers, which is not worth.

Armenia and Russia are supposed to be strategic partners, but "strategic partnership", some Armenian analysts acclaim, has become outlined more by a precarious amount of Armenian overdependence than unbiased cooperation. Russia embraces a unique place in the Armenian foreign policy notion of 'complementarism'. Armenia considers the military-political cooperation with Russia as a critical component of its policy in the scope of defense and security and if NATO-Armenia relations want to proceed any further, NATO must offer more than just the Individual Partnership Action Plan and cooperation on democratic, institutional, and defense reforms. Security matters most to the Armenian interests because Armenia is at war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh and at odds with Turkey over the 1915 Armenian Genocide, Turkey also supporting Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict.

The European Union has become engaged in this area since the independence of the South Caucasian states in 1991 and though the EU borders the South Caucasus through the Black Sea, lacking direct land border, the region is still perceived as a potential threat for the European security.

As the transnational non-profit, non-governmental organization International Crisis Group states<sup>10</sup> "Instability (Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia, and Ossetia conflicts) in the South Caucasus is a threat to European Union's security. Geographic proximity, energy resources, pipelines and the challenges of international crime and trafficking make stability in the region a clear EU interest"

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<sup>10</sup> <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/south-caucasus/173-conflict-resolution-in-the-south-caucasus-the-eu-role.aspx>

Another prevailing factor for EU's interest is the need for diversification of energy resources for the EU and the role of the South Caucasus for production and transportation of hydrocarbons. Along with energy security, the role of trade, transport, and communications corridor should be highlighted on the background of the region's strategic location between Europe and Asia.

EU has included Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in its Eastern Partnership, an initiative of the European Union governing its relationship with the post-Soviet states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, intended to provide an avenue for discussions of trade, economic strategy, travel agreements, and other issues between the EU and its eastern neighbors. The project was initiated by Poland and a subsequent proposal was prepared in co-operation with Sweden.

The South Caucasian states are also included in the European Neighborhood Policy, through which the EU works with its southern and eastern neighbors to achieve the closest possible political association and the greatest possible degree of economic integration. This goal builds on common interests and on values — democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and social cohesion. The ENP is a key part of the European Union's foreign policy.

European External Action Service website<sup>11</sup> mentions that partner countries agreed with the EU an ENP action plan or an Association Agenda demonstrating their commitment to democracy, human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development. The EU supports the achievement of these objectives.

Although politically and economically highly involved in the region, EU's attitude to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is distanced. European Union like NATO has remained satisfied with just making statements on the four-day war between Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijan.

An immediate statement<sup>12</sup> by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini on the escalation in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was made that called on the parties to stop the fighting immediately and observe the cease-fire and stated that the European Union fully supports the efforts of the OSCE Minsk Group and the three Co-Chairs.

On its turn the European Parliament plenary debate regarding the fighting stressed the fact the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be resolved only by peaceful means. The overwhelming majority of Members of the European Parliament representing all political groups, stressed the fact that there can only be a peaceful solution to the conflict, and called on Azerbaijan to accept the OSCE Minsk Group proposals for an independent mechanism to investigate ceasefire violations. A speech was made by Federica Mogherini, which factually repeated her initial statement.

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<sup>11</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/enp/about-us/index_en.htm)

<sup>12</sup> [http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2016/160402\\_03\\_en.htm](http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/2016/160402_03_en.htm)

MEP Frank Engel (EPP, Luxembourg) said, that the only solution is the recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh, because today Azerbaijan is the aggressor, and it was the aggressor 24 years ago, and continued to violate the ceasefire on a smaller scale, and Baku glorifies a convicted killer, Ramil Safarov and believes that all Armenians in the region must disappear. MEP Eleni Theoharous (ECR, Cyprus), reiterated her support to Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, stressing that the EU needs to put sanctions on the regime in Baku, and recognize the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh. MEP Stetina (EPP, Czech Republic) stressed the fact that Karabakh was handed over to Azerbaijan by the Bolsheviks, and not supporting the Armenians, means accepting the Soviet regime's rulings.

European think tanks were active in observing and discussing the four-day war, and various articles were published. One article published<sup>13</sup> by the European Policy Centre called for the EU not to remain a passive observer of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The authors of the article Amanda Paul (Senior Policy Analyst) and Dennis Sammut (Member of the EPC's Advisory Council; Director, LINKS) stated, “When Federica Mogherini visited the South Caucasus in March, she was quoted as saying that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was a top priority for the EU. Facts, however, do not seem to match the words of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. As violent clashes in the conflict zone unfolded over the past week, the EU was a passive observer, with few visible signs of engagement apart from a cursory phone call urging Armenia and Azerbaijan to show restraint. The escalation has shown how quickly and dangerously the situation can develop, and the unassailable nature of the Line of Contact (LoC). If the diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict show no progress, a repetition is very probable. Furthermore, it is likely the next incident will be more devastating in human and material costs than this recent one, and may not be contained so quickly. The EU needs to be part of the renewed diplomatic effort.”

Britain-based think tank Chatham House published two articles (Violence in Nagorno-Karabakh a Reflection of Azerbaijan's Security Dilemma<sup>14</sup>, and Four-Day Battle over Nagorno-Karabakh May Be a Prelude to a New War<sup>15</sup>). The first stated that Azerbaijan's offensive was clearly the result of planning and training but it was not a blitzkrieg aimed at liberating territories under Armenian occupation and the timing of escalation led to speculation that the Azerbaijani authorities used the conflict chiefly to distract the population from domestic factors – such as the country's economic decline and corruption scandals revealed in the Panama Papers. The more likely scenario the article suggests is that Armenia's declaration in February that it would pursue a deterrence strategy including the possibility of a preemptive strike became strategically problematic for Baku. Such a policy could limit Baku's abilities along the Line of Contact.

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<sup>13</sup>Amanda Paul, The EU cannot remain a passive observer of the Karabakh conflict, EPC, 7 April 2016, [http://www.epc.eu/pub\\_details.php?pub\\_id=6447&cat\\_id=4](http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?pub_id=6447&cat_id=4).

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/violence-nagorny-karabakh-reflection-azerbaijan-s-security-dilemma>.

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/four-day-battle-over-nagorny-karabakh-may-be-prelude-new-war>



The second article stated that with its early-April offensive against Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan might have sought to prove its long-standing rhetoric that it can take lands by force. Gaining control over some territories would allow Baku to speak from a position of strength at the peace talks, whose format and principles are not satisfying Azerbaijan.

The European Council on Foreign Relations, an independent pan-European think tank also came up with an article asserting that why and when violence erupted, remains an open question. It is said in the article that both the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents were in Washington DC attending the Nuclear Security Summit when the fighting happened. One theory is that hardliners in Baku took advantage of President Ilham Aliyev's absence to launch a limited offensive to demonstrate Azerbaijan's military strength. Others have suggested that Baku launched the attack to divert attention away from Azerbaijan's increasingly difficult economic situation and, in particular, the release of the Panama Papers, which implicate President Aliyev and his family, on 4 April. Others have speculated that the fighting was meant to draw the world's attention to the conflict following years of neglect during which focus has been on other crises such as Ukraine and Syria.

Thomas de Waal, a senior associate with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus region publish an article in the New York Times stating that it seems one of the players most likely Azerbaijan decided to change the facts on the ground. Dozens of soldiers from both sides were killed before a cease-fire was proclaimed on Tuesday. It could fall apart at any moment. The situation is volatile, and there is a danger that the conflict could escalate further unless the international community stops it.

The EU and NATO despite having no direct role in the negotiation process fully support the current mediation efforts and have called for a peaceful settlement.

At first stance the EU's position looks rather vague - proposing two opposite solutions, territorial integrity and self-determination, show the EU's lack of interest in the specifics of the conflicts at the EU's periphery. Indeed, the EU's overall strategy towards Nagorno-Karabakh and the South Caucasus in general has been incoherent, resembling to a child who is just about to walk and is still making clumsy steps. EU has developed its own distinctive, though not always effective, approach to conflict resolution and that is Europeanisation, comprising both conditionality and social learning. Whilst by applying conditionality, be it through the 'carrots' or 'sticks', the European policy-makers seek to achieve the required changes in the domestic structures in a third country, social learning advocates an internalization of the EU norms by the domestic actors who would consider these norms both legitimate and intrinsically valuable. However, this nudging concept of social learning has little chance of being welcomed in the states like Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the vast implications of the contagious Soviet legacy are still felt throughout. Civil society reform in both countries is far from fully developed.

It is by the use of sanctions, and in particular, targeted sanctions, the EU can reinforce and exert its influence, thus yielding positive changes in the policy making of the two South Caucasian countries. That may take the form of sanctions in the event of violations of contractual obligations undertaken by both countries. These positive changes towards democratization should lead to a more constructive conflict resolution that should be enabled by an active support of civil society initiatives and thus fostering of an open dialogue between conflict-affected parties. This would make the EU's stake in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution more tangible and effective.

The EU has done little for Nagorno-Karabakh. To become more proactive, the EU must increase its political visibility and develop a plan for its involvement in the conflict resolution process. Deployment of EU peacekeepers is being discussed as a more proactive way of the EU engaging in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Hans-Jürgen Zahorka Chief Editor of European Union Foreign Affairs Journal has stated,<sup>16</sup> “There is much discussion now about Russian peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh. This would if at all accepted with a grim face of the two mentioned countries, and by Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia has a security agreement with Armenia, and at the same time sold weapons for four billions USD to Azerbaijan – so its credibility can be heavily criticized. No country could have better expressed its interest in having no peaceful settlement. NATO or US troops would not be accepted by Russia, and everything including US troops even as peacekeepers may be considered as too much of an “intruder”. Although of course possible, it may be perceived as a certain provocation, which might need efforts to explain. OSCE troops as such are not likely; the OSCE has observers only in likewise conflicts. UN troops are theoretically possible, but if one looks to some African missions by the UN, I think under efficiency criteria it should be avoided, if possible, that the UN which otherwise is also rather inflexible (UN Security Council) should be switched in in an operative way. However, the EU – which has not yet been asked but can submit the offer to Armenia and Azerbaijan – could and should be ready for a new role as peacekeeping power.”

The EU peacekeeping effort will be doomed to fail, as Russia will not allow any western troops to be stationed in a region, which is of strategic importance to it. Moscow wants Russian “peacekeepers” at Nagorno-Karabakh, in order to emphasize its power in Southern Caucasus.

Azerbaijan partially, Armenia totally are under the control of Russia and it has more than enough pressure mechanisms, especially on Armenia, of not allowing any soldier, other than Russian to put boots on the ground in Nagorno-Karabakh.

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<sup>16</sup> <https://libertasblogs.wordpress.com/2014/08/05/eu-peacekeepers-for-nagorno-karabakh/>



# Turkey, What Future for a Split Civil Society?

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## Raffi Kalfayan



*Raffi Kalfayan is an Armenian Lawyer based in France. He is, former Secretary General of the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH<sup>17</sup>).*

## Abstract

*In this article, lawyer Raffi Kalfayan tries to define civil society in Turkey by going back in history, and then outlines its recent evolution from the 1990s to the present day. He thus tries to get a better understanding of its structuring process, its political environment and its values before depicting its divisions in the face of totalitarian power. This analysis points out that the inner contradictions of Turkey's civil society itself are instrumental in keeping it under the thumb of State authority and in thwarting its influence on the country's public life. Finally, Raffi Kalfayan raises issues about the future of a civil society historically marked by the religious imprint and asks a crucial question after the Gezi Park protests of 2013 which saw part of the nation rise against an increasingly authoritarian government and the growing islamisation of Turkish society: "What will be the response of the social media generation?"*

Trying to describe civil society in Turkey and above all its effective role is a real challenge since the situation in that country has gone through great changes in recent years, and particularly in the last 24 months and weeks. Indeed, on 15 January 2016, 21 academics out of the 1,128 who had signed a petition asking the government to end crimes committed against Kurds and return to the negotiating table<sup>18</sup> were arrested at their homes<sup>19</sup>. They were charged with insulting the

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<sup>17</sup> FIDH is an international human rights NGO federating 178 organizations from 120 countries. Since 1922, FIDH has been defending all civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See more under: <https://www.fidh.org/en>.

<sup>18</sup> <http://factsonturkey.org/24077/academics-researchers-in-turkey-call-for-immediate-end-to-violence-in-kurdish-areas/>.

Turkish nation – per Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, a tote law article used to target unwanted personalities or opinions<sup>20</sup> – as well as with terrorist propaganda. This wave of arrests came only hours after an impassioned presidential speech calling these academics traitors and accusing them of forming a “fifth column” within the country connected to foreign powers, a very worrying speech indeed in the light of historical precedents<sup>21</sup>.

Between 2000 and 2013, there was a liberalisation in all the fields of Turkish society (economic, political, and religious) and we could observe positive gestures towards minorities, in particular but not only Kurdish<sup>22</sup>. But since then, the country has slipped again into the unknown, leading to the *de facto* weakening of a divided civil society whose structure and context are influenced by the ruling power and the rampant islamisation initiated by the AKP<sup>23</sup>.

Turkey is experiencing a severe multidimensional crisis. After defining Turkish civil society with a look back at the history of the country, and a depiction of its recent evolution (from the 1990s), we shall try to better understand the way it was structured, its political environment and its values, in order to better assess its real power today.

### **A civil society with a religious imprint**

The history of civil society in Turkey depends on how you define it. If you look at it from the angle of organised community life, then the Ottoman Empire had seen the emergence of many structures, famously known as *Vakif*, between 1850 and 1918. These were both Muslim and non-Muslim religious foundations<sup>24</sup>, although there were tens of thousands of Muslim Turkish foundations while only 168 non-Muslim ones were created before the Republic<sup>25</sup>. Authorised by imperial *firman*s, without any other formal authorisation, the foundations have had to register again from 1936 onwards, listing all their possessions and property<sup>26</sup> through a painstaking

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<sup>19</sup> See column of 18th January 2016 by the international work group for freedom in research and teaching (in French), [http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/01/18/m-erdogan-cessez-votre-offensive-contre-la-liberte-de-recherche-et-d-enseignement-en-turquie\\_4849110\\_3232.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2016/01/18/m-erdogan-cessez-votre-offensive-contre-la-liberte-de-recherche-et-d-enseignement-en-turquie_4849110_3232.html).

<sup>20</sup> As a reminder, Hrant Dink (the Turkish journalist of Armenian descent assassinated in January 2007); novelist Orhan Pamuk, many lawyers, journalists and political figures defending the cause of minorities or the respect and defence of their rights, have been indicted and prosecuted under that article of the Penal Code.

<sup>21</sup> The same wording was used by leaders of the Union and Progress Committee in 1905 before proceeding to exterminate and deport the Armenian population of Anatolia.

<sup>22</sup> President Erdoğan or Prime Minister Davutoğlu have had soothing words for Armenians, recognizing and sharing their suffering caused by the tragic events that they underwent in 1915.

<sup>23</sup> Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or Justice and Development Party, currently in power.

<sup>24</sup> The first written document mentioning the creation of a foundation in Anatolia dates back to 1048.

<sup>25</sup> Each worshipping place was turned into a foundation.

<sup>26</sup> In 1974, after a xenophobic campaign targeting “foreigners” and “enemies from the inside” (Cyprus crisis), the acquired property, received as gifts or donations by non-Muslim foundations, were confiscated by the law for not being registered in 1936. After these rulings were legally challenged in 2007, including before the European Court

administrative procedure. They developed philanthropic activities and solutions to social, economic and cultural problems that the State had no time or means to address. These foundations administrated congregations and their possessions.

Under the Republic, all the procedures and administration related to the foundations were transferred to the Directorate General for Foundations, under direct supervision of the Prime Minister (1924). The main duty of that Directorate was to make sure that all the foundations pursued their activities according to their statutes, perpetuating their vocational spirit of institutionalised mutual aid and solidarity, and passing on these notions to future generations.

During the whole kemalist period of State modernisation (1923-1945) and parliamentary democracy (1945-1980), civil organisations could not take part in public life in a modern sense – i.e. as a sector of society contributing to public life and democratisation. The State was all-powerful and the sole motor of public life. It completely controlled organised community life.

The obstacle to taking part in political life was even constitutional. Article 33 of the Turkish Constitution of 1982 said that associations had to be recognized by administrative authorities and that their activities should not run against Article 13 of the Constitution. That article protected the unity of the State and the Nation, the national sovereignty, the Republic, public order, general peace, morals, health and public possessions; the potentially large interpretation of its provisions was a real threat to the very purpose of civil society organisations which is to intervene in political, economic and social debates. The constitutional reform of 1995 cancelled these provisions.

It was not until the 1980s and early 2000s that a modern civil society started to emerge and expand. Thanks to legislative developments and the mind-set shift imposed by reforms and harmonisation measures with European community standards, a new era opened for NGOs<sup>27</sup>, which in the end considerably strengthened the dynamics of the civil society<sup>28</sup>. By 2005, there were 80,750 active associations<sup>29</sup>, half of them socially oriented (in the fields of culture, health, social solidarity, women and trade), 3,056 with a cultural purpose, 13,468 a charity purpose, 5,748 an educational purpose, and 13,992 a sports purpose. There were also 4,500 foundations, the other structured organisations being cooperatives (58,100) and professional chambers (4,750). The total number of members in civil society organisations, including trade union members reached almost 8.5 million, half of which in associations<sup>30</sup>.

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of Human Rights, the government backed down and, in 2011, it signed a decree ending this situation by declaring its intent to hand back the properties.

<sup>27</sup> Non-Governmental Organisation, used in our article in the sense of a civil society organisation.

<sup>28</sup> Around 1,650 NGOs take part in the European-Turkey dialogue.

<sup>29</sup> Statistics from the Ministry of Interior Affairs, Department of Associations and Foundations, 2005. See the study made by the TUSEV Foundation, “Civics civil society index country report for Turkey”, TUSEV Publications N° 42, December 2006.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

Paradoxically, that same 1980-2000 period also saw an upsurge of islamisation in the Turkish society through the coming to power of political parties advocating and promoting Islamic values. That factor encouraged the development of a new civil society both active in public life, but also instrumental in encouraging people and the representative bodies in various fields of civil society to conform to Islamic law.

The creation of “Islamic” NGOs<sup>31</sup>, which became more and more influential, happened right upon the return to the political scene of Necmettin Erbakan’s *Refah Partisi* or “Prosperity Party”<sup>32</sup>, the ideological master of current President Erdoğan and mastermind of the AKP rise to power<sup>33</sup>.

Some key organisations include:

- *Ak-Der* (Association of Women against Discrimination), founded in 1999. Officially, it aims to fight discrimination in education, the workplace, careers, etc. but its real object is to guarantee that the right of women to wear the Muslim headscarf is respected.
- *Ozgür-Der* (Association for the freedom of thought and educational rights), founded in 1999, that officially promotes and defends educational rights but in fact overtly fights against female modernism, and in particular for the right of women to wear the headscarf.
- *Müsiad* (Association of Independent Industrialists and Merchants), founded in 1990, with 35,000 companies and 7,500 members in 71 cities, is made of the new Islamic business-owning bourgeoisie (even though they do not present themselves as such), and opposes the powerful *Tüsiad* (Turkish top corporations) on certain subjects, for instance by condoning repressive violence against Gezi Park demonstrations in May-June 2013<sup>34</sup> or by justifying the above-mentioned measures against petitioning academics.
- *Mazlum-Der* (Association for Human Rights and Solidarity with Oppressed Peoples), founded in 1991 as a reaction against the assertive secularism of the main human rights NGO IHD<sup>35</sup> who had become hostile to headscarf wearing in public life and within their ranks.

Although the first two NGOs are ideologically radical and more set on defending moral values, the latter two are relativist, and consequently much more open onto the political field and desirous to act according to their statutory principles.

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<sup>31</sup> On the subject, see article “Civil Society, Islam and Democracy in Turkey: A Study of Three Islamic Non-Governmental Organizations”, Ayçe Kadioglu, Sabanci University, Istanbul, Turkey.

<sup>32</sup> Necmettin Erbakan was a Turkish politician and pioneer of political Islam in Turkey, where he was the first Islamist head of government from June 1996 to June 1997, before being roughly forced to resign for not respecting the principle of secularism written in the Constitution.

<sup>33</sup> In 2002.

<sup>34</sup> The repression caused the death of 4 demonstrators and injured 4,000.

<sup>35</sup> İnsan Hakları Derneği (Human Rights Association of Turkey).

Undeniably, these organisations did take part in the public debate, but at the same time their creation and activity contributed to the reinforcement and support of the governmental political programme implemented by the ruling party.

Of course, this phenomenon is not specific to Turkey because in most other countries in the world, there are few strictly independent organisations defending values and principles with constant and objective determination.

The abundance of Turkish NGOs has even spilled into the field of AKP foreign policy. The Muslim-inspired NGO *İnsani Yardım Vakfı* (IHH, or Foundation for Humanitarian Aid), has become a referential player in the field of humanitarian action. IHH carries out campaigns to help people in hardship both in Turkey and abroad. It is the IHH who organised and launched the *Navi Marmara* flotilla to the coast of Gaza in order to help the deprived Palestinian civilians undergoing the Israeli blockade.

**The contradictions within Turkey's civil society are instrumental in keeping it under the thumb of State authority and thwarting its influence on public life.**

The organisations active in the Turkish civil society are torn by many contradictions and it is uncertain whether they may come to form a pole of power cutting through the socio-political divisions which keep undermining Turkey. Tigrane Yegavian, journalist at 100lives.com has identified three distinct groups: the secular-nationalist associations, NGOs affiliated to several trends of political Islam, and associations carrying the legacy of the former revolutionary left<sup>36</sup>.

Although they have seen a dynamic development, the reality of their influence on public life seems limited because of the social, economic, political, cultural and religious divisions within them, on the one hand, and of inadequacy between their competencies and resources on the other.

Above-mentioned examples illustrate how counter-power forces are cancelled out in civil society as soon as new NGOs directly or discreetly supported by the government oppose the action of others.

And there are other parameters playing against the proper recognition and effectiveness of civil society.

First, the fragility of the state of law (although respect of its rules has made a quantitative leap between 2003 and 2013), systemic corruption and a highly centralised administration, interplay to prevent civil society from blooming and taking part in public life.

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<sup>36</sup> See article by Tigrane Yegavian (in French), *Turquie: une société qui s'interroge sur elle-même et son histoire* in *Afrique-Asie* 9, Jan-Feb 2011, 42-47.

Besides, just like the executive power, civil society organisations are poor practitioners of the principles of tolerance, of internal democracy and good governance.

As for the activities of those organisations, it can be said that overall few of them carry out general purpose social actions, such as reducing poverty or fighting social inequalities. The areas that developed between 2003 and 2013 concerned the promotion of human rights, gender equality, promotion of non-violence (against torture and ill-treatments by police forces or within detention centres) and sustainable development.

What is more, the legal, financial and administrative environment is not favourable to the development of civil society, and in particular of those initiatives that could hinder or run counter to the government policy or its leaders.

NGOs are submitted to disproportionate control on the part of the State, which affects their daily operations and discourages private donations, in particular those coming from foreign foundations. The most prominent NGOs avoid receiving aid or subsidies from outside the country to avoid being easy targets of accusations that they are manipulated by “foreign enemies”. The Ministry of the Interior is responsible for registering NGOs, for their tax control and for the prevention of illegal activities, which gives its offices exorbitant power over them.

The public funding dedicated to that area of society is subjected to allocation and distribution rules that are far from transparent, with clearly established criteria. Public funds are granted through ministries and partnership mechanisms, but rarely in the form of subsidies, aid or contracts.

The State has always played a controlling role in the spheres of associative life dealing with educational, cultural and religious purposes. Article 14 of the Constitution reads that moral and religious education must be carried out under State control and supervision. The *Diyanet*, or Presidency of Religious Affairs, is mentioned at Article 36 of the Constitution. This administration created by Kemal Atatürk on 3 March 1924, now handles 100,000 civil servants<sup>37</sup> and 77,000 mosques. It only finances the Sunni Moslem cult (non-Sunni cults must have their own financial autonomy, when they are lucky enough not to be prevented to function at some administrative level, which is the case with Alevis, a group of 10 to 12 million people practising an Anatolian Shiite rite). For tax collection, all Turkish citizens are equal. The tax rate does not vary according to religious denomination. However, in the eyes of the *Diyanet*, all Turkish citizens are not equal when it comes to using the tax revenues. The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which handles a budget of 6.5 billion Turkish liras (2 billion euros)<sup>38</sup>, is a sort of State within State. The budget allocated to the *Diyanet* has grown bigger than that of 12 other

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<sup>37</sup> The Diyanet has recruited 10,000 people a year between 2010 and 2015 but the total number of employees has remained the same because around number of its employees were transferred to other institutions.

<sup>38</sup> <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/intelligence-religious-affairs-set-to-take-huge-share-of-turkeys-2016-budget-.aspx?pageID=238&nID=89761&NewsCatID=344>.



ministries; it is 40 percent higher than the budget of the Ministry of the Interior and equals in amount the combined budgets of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, of Energy, of Culture and of Tourism<sup>39</sup>.

Could it be that the imprint of Islam in Turkey is an ideological hindrance to the constitution of a form of counter-power as is the case in a Western type of secular civil society? Ayçe Kadioglu cites Ernest Gellner's studies of the relationship between Islam and the civil society, in which Islam appears to be in rivalry with the very concept of civil society<sup>40</sup>.

In conclusion, civil society is developing dynamically in Turkey, but it is more than ever divided, contrasted, directly or indirectly under the control of the State, with political and social Islam competing with the concept of a civil society with considerable political and financial means through the Presidency of Religious Affairs<sup>41</sup>. Finally, there still aren't any mechanisms of institutional cooperation with the government that offer a framework of systematic consultation of NGOs on legislative reform bills.

### **President Erdoğan's unsettling runaway reaction**

Since early 2014, we have observed a full-blown attack on various civil society entities, in the world of free enterprise but also and mostly in the public service, with a resulting degradation of rights and liberties not to mention a breach of the principle of separation of powers.

It was allegations of corruption on the part of people in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's close circle in December 2013 – when he was Prime Minister – which triggered his wrath and authoritarian clampdown. He accused the whistle-blowers of plotting a political coup and started a witch hunt against followers of Fetullah Gülen's movement<sup>42</sup> (or "*Fetullahci*") accused of being the leaks' sources. That episode reactivated the interference of the executive power in matters of law and in the press.

Claiming to fight "parallel structures"<sup>43</sup>, a task high on the agenda of the National Security Council<sup>44</sup>, the President pronounced many dismissals in the civil service, in particular in the

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<sup>39</sup> <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2015-05-17/turkey-casts-diyanet>.

<sup>40</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1994). Gellner claims that Islam displays unique characteristics as a religion in terms of its immunity to secularization. Since secularization is viewed as the only way to generate liberal individuals who are the sine qua non of civil society, this view rules out the possibility of its existence in the absence of secularization. Therefore, Islam appears to be the "other" or the "rival" of civil society.

<sup>41</sup> [http://www.todayszaman.com/national\\_religious-affairs-directorate-used-as-tool-for-govt-favoritism\\_348039.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/national_religious-affairs-directorate-used-as-tool-for-govt-favoritism_348039.html).

<sup>42</sup> President of the eponymous brotherhood, exiled in the United States.

<sup>43</sup> See the working document of the European Commission on Turkey: EU enlargement strategy report, Brussels, 10.11.2015, SWD (2015) 216 final.

corps of police, intelligence and justice. The executive power has already taken back effective control over the judiciary and its High Council of Judges and Prosecutors<sup>45</sup>, which makes it possible to transfer or remove defiant prosecutors or judges.

The National Security Council, formerly headed by secular Kemalist military officers, had pointed to Islam as the first internal enemy in Turkey<sup>46</sup>. After the government took control of that institution in 2007 (through arrests in connection with the Ergenekon plotting accusations and dismissal of high-ranking secular Kemalist army officers), Erdoğan and the AKP are now proceeding to make a second purge, of the “Gülenists”.

Meanwhile, President Erdoğan continues to threaten the freedom of the press and to imprison journalists. The most recent cases of Can Dündar, Editor-in-chief of *Cumhuriyet*, and Erdem Gül<sup>47</sup>, his representative in Ankara<sup>48</sup>, are emblematic but far from isolated<sup>49</sup>. These journalists have been detained since 26<sup>th</sup> November 2015 for revealing the arms trafficking of the MIT<sup>50</sup> with Syria. They stand accused of “spying”, “disclosure of State secrets” and “support to a terrorist organisation”<sup>51</sup>, and risk a life sentence.

The prosecutors in charge of investigating that arms trafficking between Turkey and ISIS have also recently been dismissed on 14 January<sup>52</sup>.

Finally, some breaches of scientific freedom have taken place in universities as of December 2015 – in particular with a campaign against the Middle East Technical University (METU)<sup>53</sup>, accused of not respecting religious freedom – and are continuing today with the serious attack on freedom of opinion in the academic world I referred to in the introduction.

The swing in President Erdoğan’s policies is harsh and disturbing. It is hard to figure out the deep motives of his decisions.

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<sup>44</sup> The highest decision-making authority in Turkey treating cases connected to “national security”, many of which are handled secretly.

<sup>45</sup> The equivalent of the High Council of the Judiciary

<sup>46</sup> Ruling of 28th February 1997.

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/jailed-journalists-in-turkey-say-arrest-aimed-at-gagging-press.aspx?pageID=238&nID=94085&NewsCatID=339>.

<sup>48</sup> They were released on the 26th February 2016.

<sup>49</sup> Turkey is 149th out of 180 countries in the 2015 Freedom of the Press ranking by Reporters Sans Frontières, even though 40 journalists were freed (on probation with charges maintained). RSF has noted the worsening of cyber-censorship, legal prosecutions, sacking of critical journalists and prohibition to publish on certain subjects. Shaken by a vast scandal of alleged corruption, the executive team has done everything to put the lid on it and fight the influence of its archenemy, the Gülen Brotherhood.

<sup>50</sup> Turkish secret services.

<sup>51</sup> See website of Reporters Sans Frontières.

<sup>52</sup> [http://www.todayszaman.com/national\\_all-prosecutors-in-weapons-truck-probes-dismissed-from-profession\\_409611.html](http://www.todayszaman.com/national_all-prosecutors-in-weapons-truck-probes-dismissed-from-profession_409611.html).

<sup>53</sup> See Today’s Zaman of 29 December 2015.



First, he has put an end to judiciary ongoing processes he had himself initiated a few years earlier. Some members of the Ergenekon group were released<sup>54</sup>. The prosecutor in charge of the Hrant Dink's case was recently dismissed<sup>55</sup>, although Erdoğan himself had given his agreement on 9 December 2015 to prosecute 26 police officers in Istanbul and the provinces – although charges against higher-ranking officers and civil servants had been dropped in that case<sup>56</sup>.

These decisions are disconcerting because they don't show any strategy other than to assert the President's power and protect his interests, mainly aiming to intimidate and frighten all those who might threaten them. They naturally lead to self-censorship in the press and a neutralization of civil servants in the public service (teachers, judges, policemen, etc.), who worry about their jobs, their promotions and their careers.

In 2015, although parliamentary elections were held in June and voting itself was quite respectful of democratic standards, the election campaign unfolded in that liberticidal and discriminatory environment: attacks on the media and journalists, on supporters and campaign offices of HDP<sup>57</sup> in the South-East. In spite of that, the AKP lost its parliamentary majority, which made President Erdoğan furious. He then initiated a radical change in his policies. He unilaterally put an end to the negotiations started with PKK and HDP to settle the Kurdish question, launched a war against PKK activists, and announced that elections would be held again on 1<sup>st</sup> November 2015. The 11 June 2014 legal foundation for the peace process in the Kurdish issue was declared void and, with it, the goals of stability and protection of human rights that the law was trying to establish.

That deliberately hurtful move aimed to intimidate and influence the various Kurdish officials in dire need of budgets to administrate their regions or communities, economically left out and where unemployment and poverty are rampant. The ultimate goal was to bring voters back to choosing AKP, who could then pose as the sole rampart against insecurity and chaos.

Although the approach was crude, it worked. And alongside its new military thrust, the government hardened its political stance in the wake of the terrorist attacks attributed to ISIS<sup>58</sup>, with a security-oriented rhetoric and anti-terrorist policies that open the door to arbitrary rule.

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<sup>54</sup> In particular Gendarmerie Colonel Veli Kuçuk, accused of being the key person of the Ergenekon coup and supposed mastermind of Hrant Dink's assassination.

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.agos.com.tr/en/article/13970/gokalp-kokcu-the-prosecutor-of-dink-case-dismissed-from-the-investigation>.

<sup>56</sup> <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/26-police-officers-to-stand-trial-in-dink-case.aspx?pageID=238&nID=92594&NewsCatID=509>.

<sup>57</sup> Halkların Demokratik Partisi, or Peoples' Democratic Party, which is pro-Kurdish.

<sup>58</sup> It should be noted that none of the terrorist attacks of 2015 (Suruç, Ankara) and early January 2016 in Istanbul was claimed by "Daesh". No serious enquiry was launched and journalists were prevented from carrying out their own investigations into these matters.

Finally, the use of State resources to promote the party in power and the personal involvement of the President in favour of the AKP during the campaign overpowered the voters' previous choices and the AKP recovered its absolute majority upon the 1<sup>st</sup> November 2015 poll.

Discriminations and the rhetoric of hate made a powerful come back, with minorities, LGBT people and feminism as scapegoats.

The process of constitutional reform is stalled. There is profound dissension between AKP and the rest of the players in the Parliamentary Committee for Conciliation.

Some AKP dignitaries have taken their distances with President Erdoğan<sup>59</sup>.

The ambiguous foreign policy of Turkey – in particular, its dealings with ISIS, the downing of a Russian combat fighter plane, its alliance with Saudi Arabia and Israel against the regional influence of Iran, its interference in the strife between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and its insistence on overthrowing Bashar al-Assad's regime at all cost – have destroyed the “zero problem” policy (with neighbouring countries) which was previously dear to Ahmet Davutoğlu<sup>60</sup>. In contrast, the recent policy created new tensions. Could that be an intended strategy to create external threats in order to better repress the internal disagreeing voices, which are then turned into national security threats?

### **The new divides in the civil society and their consequences**

The nature of current crises are only adding to the traditional divides, which are of several order: constitutional (between Muslim Turks and non-Muslim minorities), denominational (between Sunnis and Alevis), social (between secular and non-secular), and economic (between the Western metropolises and the South-East provinces).

Since Mr. Erdoğan's shift towards authoritarianism and personification of executive power, the country has become split, even within the majority party, the AKP, adding to the blunt opposition between leaders Gülen and Erdoğan, with major effects on the main governmental Justice, Army and Police corps.

Rights and liberties are the great losers of this deep crisis. And because nationalism remains such a strong ideology, minorities will be the victims of that hard-line political twist. Let's recall the first line of the preamble to the Turkish Constitution: *“In line with the concept of nationalism and the reforms and principles introduced by the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk, the immortal leader and the unrivalled hero, this Constitution, which affirms the eternal existence of the Turkish nation and motherland and the indivisible unity of the Turkish State...”* The

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<sup>59</sup> Bülent Arinc, Abdullah Gül

<sup>60</sup> Former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

nationalism so strongly felt in that assertion transcends the ideologies of traditional parties and will not yield, exacerbating divisions and resulting in massive arrests of activists or Kurdish representatives in the last months, in embargos and destruction of Kurdish living places, in unsolved murders and a full-fledged warfare against PKK rebels. Non-Muslim minorities (Armenians and Jews), the Kurdish minority, as well as Western powers through them, are again the target of hate speech, suspected of being the instigators of some alleged destabilisation attempt.

### **What kind of resiliency to expect from a structured civil society?**

The stir caused by the attack against academics who had signed the 11 January petition has had repercussions through several circles of civil society. In response, 1,000 more academics signed the petition, but also 500 journalists in support of academics, followed by over 2,000 lawyers from various courts in the country, film producers, literary circles, actors, psychologists...<sup>61</sup> However, the larger segment of civil society, characteristically unstructured and most important in the fight against abuse of power, are students, and their response should be closely observed. On 18 January, already 30,000 had signed a petition in support of the threatened academics.

Will the remarkable dynamism and modernity of that youth in Turkey's great metropolises manage to placate President Erdoğan as in Gezi Park in May-June 2013? The latter is bolstered by nationalist and Muslim conservatism from the people in the provinces, many of whom have already moved into main cities. The risk for a socio-political conflict is real. Will the sacrosanct constitutional nationalism be able to overcome the numerous cracks in the civil society caused by the current regime?

For sociologist Mustafa Poyraz, the protest movement of the Turkish youth at Gezi expressed an aspiration to freedom and dignity in a country which is trying to reconcile economic liberalism with conservatism in its accepted mores and public liberties. After neutralising army power and Kemalist bureaucracy, the country is looking for new secular forces of progress. Today, the young consider that the counter-powers which are supposed to counterbalance the conservative and religious forces are not working anymore, and that they are themselves the only citizens capable of defending this aspiration to modernity – an aspiration shared by many Turks beyond their political or denominational differences. The left, the far-left, ecologists, Kurdish autonomists and even some Islamists are suddenly coming together around common values of freedom and democracy, and display tolerance for the other movements. We are seeing the emergence of a civil society which is exercising and building up opposition forces in legal way<sup>62</sup>.

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<sup>61</sup> <http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/171097-academics-for-peace-we-stand-by-our-signatures>.

<sup>62</sup> <http://www.injep.fr/article/les-jeunes-font-emerger-une-societe-civile-legale-et-democratique-en-turquie-point-de-vue-de>.

# *Women in Power and Decision-Making in the Eastern Partnership Countries*

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*Gender has been identified as priority area by the EaP Platform I Work Programme 2014-2017. The Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), the European Union External Action Service and the European Institute for Gender Equality, Vilnius, Lithuania, are the driving forces in cooperation with EaP partner countries on this theme. The European Institute for Gender Equality has provided methodological support to the present Study to ensure comparability between the EU-28 and Eastern Partnership data.*

*The Study has been implemented by the following team under the leadership of Serena Romano, Study Team Leader: Kateryna Shalayeva, Study Team Coordinator. Country Researchers: Sevan Petrosyan in Armenia, Uliviyya Mammadova in Azerbaijan, Iouri Zagoumenov in Belarus, Georgeta Mincu in Moldova, Nana Berekashvili and Tsisana Goderdzishvili in Georgia, Sviltlana Repik in Ukraine. The overall supervision, quality check and management has been carried out by Przemysław Musiałkowski, Team Leader of the HiQSTEP Project.*

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## Abbreviations and acronyms

BEIS	Basic, Economy, Infrastructure, Social (Ministry)
BPfA	Beijing Platform for Action

CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations against Women

EU European Union

EaP Eastern Partnership

HiQSTEP High Quality Studies for the Eastern Partnership

IDP Internally Displaced Person

MDGs Millennium Development Goals

STL Study Team Leader

## Country codes

AM Armenia

AZ Azerbaijan

BY Belarus

GE Georgia

MD Moldova

UA Ukraine

**Keywords:** women almost absent from structures of power, the economy and media, high gender-pay gaps, vertical and horizontal labour segregations, poverty, women individual entrepreneurs, emigration, lack of social services, legal parity and equal rights guaranteed by constitutions, women active in civil society.

## 1 Executive Summary

In the Eastern Partnership Countries, women are remarkably absent from the structures of power. In politics, 17 women are currently appointed to Senior Minister posts out of 136 such posts, women elected as Parliament Members constitute 16 per cent and 3 political parties are led by women. Only 17 per cent of women managed to break the glass ceiling to reach the highest ranking civil servants positions. Small bright spots can be found in the judiciary, where women judges count for 29 per cent of the Supreme Courts posts, and in Local Assemblies, where their share reached 27 per cent.

Looking more closely at some countries, timid but possibly real gender-related advances can be identified, such as in Ukraine where two women were appointed to the most important financial positions of the Minister of Finance and the Head of the Central Bank. However, the Minister of Finance is the only woman in the Ukrainian cabinet. In Moldova, a different approach led to the appointment of 6 women out of 22 as Senior Ministers<sup>63</sup>, the highest number in the EaP, and to the attribution of socio-cultural portfolios to 4 of them. In Georgia, a system of exams based on

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<sup>63</sup>The present study refers to the Strelț government that ruled Moldova from July 30, 2015 to October 29, 2015 and was in place until January 20, 2016 when it was replaced by the government of Mr. Filip with 5 women out of 21.

qualifications resulted in a higher number of women judges than men (51 to 49 per cent respectively).

Women are even less present in positions of economic power. They represent 9 per cent of members of the boards of central banks, 15 per cent of members of the governing bodies of trade-unions and 10 per cent of members of the governing bodies of employers' organisations. Women in the boards of companies registered on the stock exchange are less than 15 per cent. Ukraine, however, stands out again as the only EaP country with two women Presidents and two women Vice-Presidents in two of its organisations representing workers.

These results are not surprising when one analyses the social and economic situation endured by women in the EaP Countries, where they often face severe horizontal and vertical segregations that constrain them in low-paid and informal jobs – predominantly in services sectors such as retail trade, education and health care. Protective regulations that prohibit the employment of women in dangerous or harmful conditions can further deprive women of jobs, which is the case in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Ukraine. Despite their higher levels of education than those of men across EaP Countries, gender pay gaps for women can be as high as 50 per cent, as is the case in Azerbaijan. Except in Belarus<sup>64</sup>, women's unemployment is higher than men's and they are more exposed to poverty.

The combination of these factors drives large numbers of women to entrepreneurship, such as in Belarus where women are 63 per cent of all individual entrepreneurs<sup>65</sup>. Access to credit or even micro-credit is difficult and the span of women's activities remains limited. Women will often be excluded from the trade networks that facilitate the launch and development of businesses and companies for men. Many women, especially in rural areas, work in the agricultural sector of countries, such as Georgia, where land is mostly owned by men. Their work is not registered and they cannot benefit from allowances nor can they apply for compensations, thereby limiting their capacity to engage in society and politics.

When all other possibilities fail, women resort to emigrating: this is the case of Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Not only has Moldova the lowest level of labour participation amongst the EaP Countries, but it also experiences a continuing decrease of the active female labour force, losing 7 per cent of its active female population in the 2004-2014 decade.

The lack of social services is particularly critical, when one considers that child-care services were more readily available prior to the current transition period. This is compounded by the fact that men are rarely involved in children's education.

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<sup>64</sup>By the end of 2015 women represented 35% of all unemployed in Belarus;

<http://www.belta.by/society/view/udelnyj-ves-zhenschin-sredi-zaregistrirovannyh-bezrabotnyh-snizilsja-v-belarusi-do-35-179642-2016/>

<sup>65</sup> The legal system in all EaP Countries allows registering as individual entrepreneurs without creating a separate legal entity.



Women are scarcely present at the highest echelons of universities, with an average of 12 per cent women rectors in the EaP Countries, or in media, although some more women are appointed in positions at the second level of power. Their capacity to influence the public discourse appears therefore limited.

All Eastern Partnership Countries are affected by different forms of violence against women including human trafficking and harmful practices. Violence against women negatively affects women's general well-being and prevents them from fully participating in society.

From a legal standpoint, women in the Eastern Partnership Countries benefit from virtually all the gender equality requisites. All EaP constitutions, adopted between 1994 and 1996, rigorously impose parity between women and men and all legislations provide for equal rights, albeit in varying degrees. In contrast, however, legislation on violence and harassment against women remains insufficient.

All these factors have direct and indirect implications on women's roles in leadership and decision-making.

## **1.1 Background and purpose**

The Study on Women in Power and Decision-Making in the Eastern Partnership Countries is based on the global objective of reviewing area (G) on Women in Power and Decision Making of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action for Equality Development and Peace in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine i.e. the Eastern Partnership Countries. Undertaken in accordance with the methodology developed by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) for their recent study of area (G) for the EU-28 countries<sup>66</sup> (referred to as EIGE EU-28 Study later in this report), its intent is to seamlessly complement EIGE's information and data by providing a matching picture for women's status in the Eastern Partnership Countries and allowing for direct comparison and benchmarking with the EU-28 countries.

Similarly to the EIGE's support to the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, the study was implemented in the context of the July 1 to December 31, 2015 Luxembourg Presidency of the Council of the European Union. The study focused on bodies of public power (legislative and executive political institutions, political parties, public administration and the judiciary) and of economic and social decision-making. It offered the possibility to assess and

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<sup>66</sup>The study on EU-28 Gender Equality in Power and Decision-Making: Review of the Implementation of the Beijing Platform for Action in the EU Member States, Vilnius, 2015 is available online on the European Institute for Gender Equality website: <http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/eige-publications/gender-equality-power-and-decision-making-report>.



review the progress made in Eastern Partnership Countries in the advancement of women in public power positions. In addition, the study collected, identified and hereby recommends a number of gendered good examples of initiatives undertaken by the state and/or by civil society in the areas researched, which have learning potential for all stakeholders. Finally, the report integrates, by providing recommendations, the relevant Conclusions of the Conference on the Participation of Women in Public and Political Life in the Eastern Partnership Countries, adopted on December 10, 2013 in Chisinau, Moldova.

This activity relates to the agreed objectives of Eastern Partnership Platform 1 (Democracy, Good Governance and Stability) for 2014-2017 and was promoted by the Georgian, Moldovan and Swedish governments.

## **1.2 Description of the assignment, objectives and expected results**

### **1.2.1 Assignment**

The Study is composed of two parts:

Part A: Evaluation of women's and men's participation in decision-making in the political, economic and social spheres.

Part B: Collection, identification and recommendations of good examples in the area researched.

The Study Report provides an overview of the most recent research and policy and legislative developments in the areas of women and men's access to, and full participation in, power and decision-making structures, as well as in the area of measures for the enhancement of women's capability to participate in decision-making and leadership in the Eastern Partnership Countries.

The present Report also provides an overview of major research findings in the area of gender equality as regards bodies of public power (political, economic, and social) in the six Eastern Partnership Countries. In the political sphere, this covers: legislative and executive political institutions, political parties, public administration and the judiciary. In the economic sphere: central banks, economic ministries, employer confederations, labour unions and the largest companies that are publicly quoted on national stock exchanges. In the social sphere: media, academic and research institutions.

The Study Report presents a selection of good examples of promotion of women's participation in connection with the strategic objectives formulated in Beijing's Platform for Action, Area G: Women in Power and Decision Making, across the European Partnership Countries. Good examples can generate various effects, i.e. they can have a direct effect on women's participation in political or corporate life, such as quotas, but they can also have an indirect effect such as a

well-measured plan for child-care leading to a greater participation of women in the labour force or in public power positions.

## **1.2.2 Objectives**

### **1.2.2.1 Objectives of Part A**

Objective 1 - To create an overview of developments and measures in women's and men's participation in power structures.

This consisted of: a literature review of legal and policy developments, achievements and challenges in the implementation of gender equality; an identification of good examples of legal and policy measures taken by the Eastern Partnership Countries that had or are likely to have a positive impact on gender equality in decision making; and a list of bibliographical sources addressing the topic.

The Country Researchers adhered to a common framework for literature overview and analysis.

Objective 2 – To present a review of the indicators on the number of women and men in public power positions.

In analysing public power positions, the Study focused on legislative and executive political institutions at central and local level, political parties, public administration and the judiciary.

The area of women in political and public power and decision-making in the EU Member States was reviewed during the Finnish Presidency in 1999 and the European Council took note of the indicators proposed. The proposed set of indicators was reviewed in the EIGE EU-28 Study. The following indicators have been used in the present Study:

1. Proportion of women in the single/lower houses of the national/federal Parliaments
2. Proportion of women in the regional assemblies, where appropriate
3. Proportion of women in the local assemblies
4. Policies to promote a balanced participation in political elections (policy)
5. Proportion and number of women in the national/federal Governments
6. Proportion and number of women and men in the senior/junior fields of action (portfolios/ministries) in the national/federal Governments
7. Proportion of women among the highest-ranking women civil servants: proportion of women in the two highest ranking positions (after the Minister) of the ministries (appointed, elected or nominated) (central government)
8. The distribution of the highest-ranking women and men civil servants in different fields of action (portfolios/ministries by BEIS type)

9. Proportion and number of women among the members of the Supreme Courts
10. Proportion and number of women and men among the leaders and deputy leaders of the major political parties represented in the national parliament.

Objective 3 – To present a review of the indicators on the number of women and men in economic positions.

Analysing the area of economic decision-making, the Study Report provides data on men's and women's representation in Central Banks, economic ministries, employers' confederations, labour unions and the largest companies publicly quoted on the national stock exchange.

In 2003, during the Greek and Italian Presidencies, the area of women in economic decision-making in the EU Member States was reviewed and the European Council took note of the indicators proposed, which were then reviewed and developed in the EIGE EU-28 Study. The following indicators have been used in the present Study:

1. Proportion and number of women and men among Governors and deputy/vice Governors of Central Banks
2. Proportion and number of women and men among members of the decision-making bodies of Central Banks
3. Proportion and number of women and men among Presidents and Vice-Presidents of social partner organisations representing workers at national level
4. Proportion and number of women and men among members of the total governing bodies of social partner organisations representing workers at national level
5. Proportion and number of women and men among Presidents and Vice-Presidents of social partner organisations representing employers at national level
6. Proportion and number of women and men among members of the total governing bodies of social partner organisations representing employers at national level
7. Proportion and number of women and men among presidents and chief executive officers of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange
8. Proportion and number of women and men among members of the highest decision-making body of the largest nationally registered companies listed on national stock exchanges.

Additionally, the indicator on policies for the promotion of gender balance in economic decision-making positions, as proposed in the EIGE EU-28 Study, is only taken into consideration when the results of the inquiries prove successful.<sup>67</sup>

Objective 4 – To present data on the number of men and women in top management positions in academia and the media.

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<sup>67</sup> The results were not considered to be sufficient for this indicator to be taken into consideration in the present Study.

This objective is researched through four indicators, one for the academic sphere and three for the media, focusing on who makes the decisions in the social sphere and whether women reached high-level positions:

1. Proportion of women and men in academic staff differentiated by level of seniority and in total
2. Proportion of women and men at levels 1 and 2 in public media
3. Proportion of women and men at levels 1 and 2 of decision-making in private media organisations
4. Public broadcasters - board members

Objective 5 – To prepare a detailed report in a publishable form

The Final Report presents the results of the literature, legal and policy reviews; the research methodology; the analysis of the situation based on existing indicators, highlighting trends, achievements and challenges; as well as conclusions and recommendations emerging from the data collected in the Eastern Partnership Countries following the Objectives 1 to 4.

### **1.2.2.2 Objective 6 Part B**

The goal of Objective 6 is to collect good examples, promoting women's participation in connection to strategic objectives formulated in Beijing's Platform for Action, Area G: Women in Power and Decision Making, across the European Partnership Countries. The Good Examples will serve as reference tools for EaP Countries governments in their policy making.

### **1.2.3 Expected results**

The results of the Study fed into the activities organised by the Luxemburg Presidency and provides Member States and Eastern Partnership Countries with knowledge in this field to assist them in their policy making.

The Study shall also serve as a basis to complement EIGE's information and data by providing the available similar information and data on women's status in the Eastern Partnership Countries and by allowing for direct comparison and benchmarking with the EU Member States.

The Team has developed an adequate research methodology that is relevant and feasible in the context of the Eastern Partnership Countries, to cover: data collection approach; interpretation of definitions; interpretation of indicators; dataset which can serve as a basis for further similar studies that might measure the progress and study women's participation in power and decision making in areas not covered by this Study in the EaP Countries.

## 2 Part A - Overview (Objective I)

### 2.1 General legal framework, gender policies and parity institutions

From a legal standpoint, women in the Eastern Partnership Countries benefit from virtually all the gender equality requisites. All EaP constitutions, adopted between 1994 and 1996, rigorously impose parity between women and men and all legislations provide for equal rights, albeit in varying degrees.

The Armenian, Azerbaijani, Belarusian and Ukrainian constitutions and legislations forbid gender-based discriminations. In Armenia, Belarus, Georgia and Ukraine, laws are gender-neutral, i.e. they do not make distinction between sexes. Most laws, except those that specifically address women - such as for the protection of maternity - remain gender-neutral. In Belarus the provision of protection mechanisms in case of discrimination<sup>68</sup> remains a challenge.

All Eastern Partnership Countries ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discriminations against Women (CEDAW) without any reservations: Belarus and Ukraine in 1981 and the other four countries<sup>69</sup> in 1993-1995. Armenia and Moldova have adopted some of the recommendations of the CEDAW Committee to introduce non-gender discrimination clauses in their codes, laws and regulations. Moldova has also integrated many of the Council of Europe gender recommendations into its own gender policies. All the EaP Countries are signatory to the major human rights treaties and conventions.

In close relation with the ratification of CEDAW, since 1996, all six EaP Countries have issued three- and five-year national gender policy programmes, which were generally translated into two-year action plans.

- **Armenia** has in place its 2011-2015 Strategic Programme of Gender Policy of the Republic of Armenia, which entails gender mainstreaming for the Government's programmes and policies. Since 2011, Action Plans have been adopted every year to implement the provisions of the Strategic Programme. They describe in detail the activities to undertake in a given year and the sources of funds that the state should attribute to them. However, most of the activities requiring financial resources were undertaken by external donors.
- In **Azerbaijan**, the 2011 National Plan of Action on Human Rights avows to fight all forms of violence against women, including domestic violence, and provides for the organisation of large-scale awareness-raising programmes. In the 2012 programme Azerbaijan 2020: Vision of the Future, a chapter is dedicated to the Guarantees for Gender Equality and the Development of the Family Institute. Some work was undertaken by the State Committee for

<sup>68</sup> [http://www.unecce.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/Belarus\\_Beiging\\_review\\_annex\\_1\\_2\\_3\\_4.pdf](http://www.unecce.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/Belarus_Beiging_review_annex_1_2_3_4.pdf).

<sup>69</sup> [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtsg\\_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en).

Family, Women and Children's Affairs on child strategy and on the institution of family but neither activities have an impact on the empowerment of women.

- Since 1996, **Belarus** adopted four subsequent national plans of action for gender equality. The goals of the latest one, which covers the 2011-2015 period, are: to create the conditions for full-scale participation of men and women in all areas of life; to ensure their equal social and economic rights; to provide an equal access to social security and healthcare; to prevent trafficking in human beings and gender-based violence and to develop gender education and provide media support. Except for feasibility studies no implementation mechanism was adopted and neither had gender- targeted budgets or resources been attributed to ensure the operation of these plans.
- Georgia adopted a number of plans relating to UN initiatives such as the 1995 Beijing Platform for action, the 2000 commitment to achieve Goal 3 on the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the 2011 National Action Plan for the implementation of the UN SC Resolutions on Women, Peace and Security. Moreover, Georgia approved a series of plans in connection with the EU policies, such as: the 2006-2011 Action Plan for European Neighbourhood Policy Implementation that envisages to support gender equality of men and women in society and economic life and the EU-Georgia Association Agenda for 2014-2016, which should ensure women's representation on equal terms with men in Parliament, Government and local governments.<sup>70</sup> Finally Georgia promoted a series of national plans such as the 2011-2014 National Action Plan on Gender Equality Policy and in 2013, the 2014-2016 Action Plan on the Implementation of Gender Equality Policy Measures to support women's political participation that addressed the lack of gender equality in institutional mechanisms at local level. The plan also established mechanisms for women's empowerment by ensuring the re-training of 350 women farmers in universities and defining the participation of women in companies as one of the criteria for financing business projects. Further Government's initiatives were supported by external donors.
- In **Moldova**, in 1998, the Government approved the Priority Action Plan for improving the situation of women and increasing their role in the society, which was then followed by national plans and programmes on promoting gender equality in society, the latest being the 2010-2015 National Programme for gender equality, which is the first one to include budget allocations for its planned activities. The EU-Moldova Action Plan also proposes actions to promote equality between women and men. The third MDG was reviewed and approved in 2007 with two specific targets for Moldova: increasing women's political participation and reducing income inequalities between women and men. From 2009 onwards, two gender-related specific objectives appear in the Government Activity Programme: increasing the rate of women's participation in decision making and ensuring equal opportunities in the socio-

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<sup>70</sup> EU-Georgia Association Agenda 2014-2016, part 2.1. Political dialogue and reform, section: Equal Treatment. Available at: [http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/pdf/eu-georgia\\_association\\_agenda.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/georgia/pdf/eu-georgia_association_agenda.pdf).



political area. In the field of employment and migration the 2010-2015 National Programme for Gender Equality objectives were achieved by reducing the gender pay gap from 28 to 12.8 per cent<sup>71</sup> increasing the number of women trained in business and supporting actions to assist the voluntary return of Moldovan women migrants. In the area of Gender Responsive Budgeting about a hundred specialists were trained; a gender audit was undertaken according to Gender Responsive Budgeting practices at the National Employment Agency, the Central Election Commission and the State Labour Inspectorate, providing specific recommendations to these three institutions in order to implement further equality between women and men. Trainings were organised for the candidates standing for parliamentary and local elections on participation of women in decision making. Various awareness-raising activities were organised to support women candidates in elections while political parties' electoral programmes were analysed for their gender-related content.

- In **Ukraine**, the Government adopted the State Programme on Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities of Women and Men up to 2016 to ensure the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals, in particular with regards to promoting gender equality, development of women's leadership skills to participate in decision-making and business skills. The latest annual report on the implementation of the State Programme is dated 2014. It presents indicators, activities and people responsible for their execution and the state of implementation of the tasks. The following activities were reported in 2014: submission to Parliament of a draft law introducing a 30 per cent gender quota for electoral candidates<sup>72</sup>; launching of a gender monitoring of the parliamentary elections; implementation of a study on women in politics at local level and production of an annual MDG monitoring report in cooperation with the Ministry of Social Policy<sup>73</sup>. The total of 5,897,140 UAH<sup>74</sup> is foreseen to be spent for the implementation of the State Programme in the 2014-2016 period and allocated from the central and local budgets and from other sources. For 2014, 66,800 UAH<sup>75</sup> were allocated from state budget and 569,100 UAH<sup>76</sup> from local budgets. However in 2014 only 436,400 UAH<sup>77</sup> were utilized from local budgets and no financial resources were spent from state budget.

Since the beginning of the current century, influenced by international institutions and civil society, all the EaP Countries except Belarus have introduced legislations to rebalance disparities between women and men.

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<sup>71</sup> PNAEG Evaluation Report (Valentina Bodrug-Lungu, Ina Triboi, Eugenia Ganea, [http://www.mmps.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/raport\\_evaluare\\_pnaeg\\_2010-2015.pdf](http://www.mmps.gov.md/sites/default/files/document/attachments/raport_evaluare_pnaeg_2010-2015.pdf) & Moldova MDG Indicators: TR2. Reducerea inegalității de gen pe piața muncii prin mi.

<sup>72</sup> Further information on quotas is provided in the next pages of the report.

<sup>73</sup> [http://www.idss.org.ua/arhiv/2014\\_19\\_12Dopovid.pdf](http://www.idss.org.ua/arhiv/2014_19_12Dopovid.pdf).

<sup>74</sup> About € 200.000.

<sup>75</sup> About € 2.250.

<sup>76</sup> About € 19.200.

<sup>77</sup> About € 14.700.



- **Armenia** enacted the Law on Provisions of equal rights and equal opportunities for women and men in 2013. The law protects citizens from gender-based discrimination and regulates equal rights and opportunities between women and men in politics, public administration, labour and employment, entrepreneurship, healthcare and education. When the draft Law was submitted to the Parliament some parliamentarians, NGOs and the Armenian Church found the introduction of the concept of gender in general as “improper from the point of view of Armenian values and mentality” and associated with trans-sexuality, homosexuality and paedophilia. This discourse had a pervasive effect on activists, journalists, politicians and even on women. The bill underwent several changes and wording such as gender relations was replaced by relations between women and men. After its adoption, the law was not followed by any awareness raising activities and - apart from mandatory reporting, action plans and concept papers - no real steps were undertaken to put the law into effect.
- **Azerbaijan** promulgated in 2006 the Law on Guarantees of Gender Equality which followed the 2000 Presidential Decree on the Implementation of the State Women’s Policy in the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Decree had been a mere declaration of intent for equal representation of women and men in all state bodies, encouraging the Cabinet of Ministers to seek gender equality in economic reforms and reaffirming the importance of gender-disaggregated data.
- **Georgia** adopted the Law on Gender Equality in 2010.
- **Moldova**’s Law on ensuring equal opportunities for women and men dates from 2006 and defines inter alia gender discrimination.
- **Ukraine**’s law On Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities of Women and Men was adopted in 2005. It provides for equality of women and men in all areas of life; determines national gender policy; establishes national gender mechanism and prohibits gender-based discrimination. It also introduced the obligation of gender-related expertise for all draft legislative acts. Prior to the adoption of the law in 2004, the Ministry of Justice conducted gender-legal expertise of all spheres of law. The results, conclusions and relevant proposals on improvement of legislation were sent to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

By way of a 2008 amendment to the Labour Code, collective bargaining agreements now include equal opportunities for women and men. In the same year, the Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights began to control the application of equal rights and opportunities for women and men further to the amendment of the law. Since 2012 the Law on the Principles of Prevention and Combating Discrimination prohibits all forms of discrimination and the Law on the Employment of Population provides for equal opportunities for all citizens irrespective of their sex. Finally, in the same year, an amendment was introduced to the Family Code to raise women’s minimum marriage age to eighteen years, the same age as men’s. Protection of women and/or defence of their rights is taken in charge by various entities from Agencies and Ministries to local authorities:

- In **Armenia**, the Women's Council is in charge of gender equality at national level. Regional commissions were set in 2011 to implement the Government's Gender Policy Concept Paper. They are headed by the Deputy Regional Heads and include employees of the Regional Governor's offices and representatives of Non-Governmental Organisations.
- In **Azerbaijan**, the State Committee for Family, Women and Children's Affairs replaced in 2006 the Committee on Women's Issues that had been in place since 1998.
- In **Belarus**, gender equality policy is coordinated by the National Council on Gender Policy at the Council of Ministers. In addition, the Ministry of Labour and Social Protection has a department in charge of population, gender and family policy. Finally, Local Executive Committees have gender and social assistance departments.
- In **Georgia**, since 2010 there is a Gender Equality Council in the Parliament. Gender focal points were appointed in a few ministries and in forty-nine local administrations. In 2013 a Gender Assistant to the Prime Minister and another to the Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure were appointed. In the same year, the Department of Gender Equality was established at the Public Defender's Office (Ombudsman) to take care of gender parity at national level.
- In **Moldova**, the Governmental Committee on Equality between women and men coordinates all gender equality issues. The secretariat of the Committee is staffed by the Department for Gender Equality and Prevention of Violence Policy of the Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family, which also develops gender equality policies. Gender focal points monitor the administration's compliance with gender legislation.
- In **Ukraine**, the Ministry for Social Policy of Ukraine takes care of gender equality. Gender discrimination, especially in media and advertising, is examined by its Expert Council. The Commissioner for Human Rights on the Protection of Child Rights, Equality and Non-discrimination was appointed in 2010, as a representative of the Ukrainian Parliament. Gender focal points which were created to advise ministries and regional governments gradually ceased to exist.

### 3 Review of the Indicators

#### 3.1 In the bodies of public power

##### 3.1.1 Women in politics


The share of women in politics and political institutions remains significantly low in all Eastern Partnership Countries. There are no women Presidents or Prime Ministers. The share of women senior ministers vary from a low 2 per cent in Azerbaijan to a high 31.6 per cent in Moldova. The EaP average of 14 per cent is well below the 27 per cent of the EU's. Junior ministers<sup>78</sup> are

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<sup>78</sup>For explanations on junior minister see Mapping Table in Annex 2.

even less abundant: they number 4 out of 88 and 5 out of 59 in Azerbaijan and Armenia respectively, 7 out of 41 in Ukraine and 12 out of 45 in Moldova<sup>79</sup>.

Figure 1 – Objective II - Indicator 5




The types of ministries attributed to women assign them to the socio-cultural roles that they traditionally play in society. The horizontal segmentation from which women suffer at all professional levels, discussed in Section 4.2, is also portrayed at the highest levels of power. Indeed, except for Ukraine, where a woman, Ms. Natalie Ann Jaresko, is the current Minister of Finance, women are excluded from any form of responsibility related to finance or the economy. Similarly, in Belarus the Minister of Information is the only woman who, among all the Governments of the EaP Countries, holds responsibility for an infrastructure ministry. Since countries' infrastructures have a strategic aspect, the relevant portfolios are under men's control. In the basic category of ministries<sup>80</sup>, Armenia has a woman Minister of Justice, Georgia has two in Defence and Justice and so has Moldova in Foreign and European Affairs in addition to the Governor of the Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia who is a woman. However, the highest concentration of women ministers is in the socio-cultural category. Every EaP Country, except Ukraine, has appointed ministers in this category: the only Azerbaijan woman minister, one in Belarus and Georgia, two in Armenia and four in Moldova.

<sup>79</sup> Please note that the Governments of Belarus and Georgia do not have a Junior Minister level at an II.

<sup>80</sup> BEIS categories are Basic, Economy, Infrastructure and Socio-cultural.

Figure 2 – Objective II – Indicator 6



The data show that in the EaP Countries women represent – on average – 16.3 per cent of the total number of members of single or lower houses of national Parliaments, well below the EU average of 28 per cent. While women represent no less than 9.9 percent of parliamentarians in any country, only in Moldova and Belarus their representation levels exceeded 21 per cent. Only in Moldova one of the two speakers of the Parliament is a woman. In all the Eastern Partnership Countries the state is highly centralised, with only a limited devolution of power to local administration. There are no women among elected representatives at regional administrative level in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Belarus with over 21% has currently (in 2015) the highest level of women representation in local assemblies, closely followed by Georgia with 19%. Ukraine had almost 12% in 2013, while in Moldova the women presence is just around 3%.

Figure 3 – Objective II – Indicator 1






Figure 4 – Objective II – Indicator 2



Data on the presence of women in local assemblies are more encouraging than for central and regional parliaments: women count for 9.5 per cent in Armenia, to reach almost 47 per cent in Belarus. To note, however, that in the last two Georgian elections women's presence at local level has decreased. The most promising results, from Azerbaijan and Belarus, may be somewhat diminished by local political conditions that are not always transparent and by the circumstance that local representatives do not appear to be independently elected.

However, in these and other cases it is a paradox that local administrative elected posts are more open to women because they represent the lowest, less prestigious levels of government. In this case the EaP average of 26.7 per cent is close the EU of 32 per cent. It is also true that these entry level posts provide experience at local level that will prove useful in the future, helping to nurture a generation of women politicians at national level<sup>81</sup>

Figure 5 – Objective II - Indicator 3



For the time being, there are very few women amongst the leaders of the major political parties represented in the Parliaments of the Eastern Partnership Countries: there are none in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Moldova, whilst Armenia, Georgia and Ukraine have just one.

<sup>81</sup> Serena Romano, Women's participation in political life: Women in Italy, Women in the Mediterranean, First monitoring Report of the Euro-Mediterranean Women's Foundation, 2015, <http://www.iemed.org/publicacions-en/historic-de-publicacions/coedicions/femmes-en-mediterranee.-premier-rapport-de-suivi-de-la-fondation-des-femmes-de-l2019euro-mediterranee-n-de-conferences-ministerielles>.

Women are more represented amongst the deputy party leaders with figures ranging from 4 to 33%. The EaP average is a low 10.7 per cent but the EU is not in a much better position with 17%.

Figure 6 – Objective II – Indicator 10







Figure 7 – Objective II – Indicator 10



In analysing the different approaches to women's exercise of political power adopted in EaP Countries, it is striking to see how gender imbalances are similar across the region and how their roots are alike: deeply entrenched societal stereotypes that assign gendered roles at a very young age; religious education that often challenges the very idea of gender equality – perceived as a distinctly secular value; and legacies from past regimes that did not foster a competitive labour market, in practice often discouraging women from playing active roles.

An interesting research<sup>82</sup>, which included surveys conducted in Armenia by the Yerevan State University Centre for Gender and Leadership Studies about women and politics reflects the obstacles facing women who want to access political positions and exercise political power. Mutatis mutandis, its results could be applied to all EaP Countries. Indeed, the research carried out for this Study provided quite similar results and revealed a deeply embedded, patriarchal, social and cultural system of values. That stereotyped view that a woman's place is at home and reserving political careers and political life to men continues to prevail, including amongst women. Men are sceptical of women's ability to run for office or to effectively take decisions and to govern predominantly male staff.

<sup>82</sup> Strengthening Women's political participation in the Republic of Armenia: Existing Efforts, Challenges and Opportunities, Centre for Gender and Leadership Studies, Yerevan State University, 2015.

The same research considers that women who choose a political career are often perceived as unsuccessful in their personal life while the political arena is commonly perceived as a men's world. In Armenia, it is common for politically or economically active women to be single or divorced without children. The political culture is generally perceived in a negative way and the political arena is commonly seen as the reserve of a limited number of people – be they women or men – who must accept practices that women may not want to partake. As a consequence, women often prefer civil activism to politics. In addition, as in the rest of the world, in the EaP Countries women politicians face discriminatory practices from men – and women – that include criticising their personal appearance, arguing that they possess a lower intelligence than men and purporting that they use ambiguous methods to reach their career goals. In its turn, the media do not contribute to avoiding those stereotypes by raising awareness towards gender-related issues.

These additional hardships and gender prejudices discourage women from starting political careers and establishing political contacts at a young age. Therefore an active woman, who from an early age is determined to play a political role and to pursue a political career, is a rare phenomenon. In addition, and also because of all this, social demand and interest from women themselves is limited. Women in Armenia - but it applies to all EaP Countries - often lack role models and they have not united to form truly large-scale movements.

Also, as in all countries and not just in the EaP, running for political elections represents a major financial investment and therefore women's political participation is limited by their scarcity of financial resources and limited independence. Women may be more successful in local elections, as less financial support is needed in small communities and a woman candidate can more easily be elected as village mayor or member of a local municipal council.

Once women are elected it must be emphasised that they are less welcomed than men within the major political and economic networks, making it even more challenging for them to have an opportunity for a meaningful participation in political decision-making. Indeed, once they have access to the political positions that they have so much striven for, they often face another type of prejudice. This is exemplified in Belarus by male MPs who feel that it is good to have women in a men's team because it ennobles it and beautifies politics, thereby relinquishing women to a purely decorative function<sup>83</sup>

More particularly:

- In addition to the research quoted above, it has to be stated that although **Armenia** has introduced a 20 per cent gender quota and requires that every fifth person in party lists running for Parliament must be from a different gender, in fact today, only 13 parliamentarians, out of 131, are women. This is due to the legislation that allows women candidates included in the lists to withdraw and let the man candidate next on the list to

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<sup>83</sup><http://oeec.by/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Analysis-of-Gender-Sector-in-Belarus.pdf>.

occupy the seat. Only 3 women were appointed ministers out of 19 and 4 women deputy ministers out of 61. At local level, 9.5 per cent of members of local assemblies in the city and village councils are women.

- With 2.6 per cent of women as senior ministers, **Azerbaijan** has the lowest participation of women in the governments of the EaP Countries. Its women deputies [Members of Parliament] however count for 15 per cent, close to the EaP average, and the presence of women in local assemblies is as high as 35 per cent. Local research has shown that Parliamentarians are elected through a selection rather than an election system. Candidates have more chances of being elected if representing the ruling party and with the help of connections with high-level government representatives. Local elections at municipal level operate along a similar mechanism. Although there is no official quota system, an unofficial quota has been applied by the ruling party to increase the number of women represented in municipalities. For example, further to the 2009 municipal elections, the number of women elected jumped from 3 to 26 per cent and in 2014 this figure rose again to the above-mentioned 35 per cent. In the parliamentary elections of 1 November 2015 none of the 65 candidates of the new political movement 125s Club comprising 13 women was elected, despite they were very popular. The political environment in Azerbaijan is not sufficiently transparent to comment on this data and does not appear to be conducive of the promotion and election of independent women.
- All top politicians in power in **Belarus** are men, including its President, Prime-Minister and Chairmen of both Chambers of Parliament. In 2015, the traditionally men-dominated political arena was challenged by a woman candidate for presidential office, who for the first time in Belarus' history obtained the second best results ahead of two male candidates. There is no quota mechanism in Belarus to promote women's participation in politics. However, the percentage of women in the Parliament is relatively high: as of November 2015 there were 30 women out of 110 delegates in the Lower Chamber of the National Assembly<sup>84</sup> In the regional and local assemblies, women's representation is even higher, reaching 46.3 per cent<sup>85</sup>.

According to a 2013 country report of the East-European School of Political Studies,<sup>86</sup> women's representation in Belarus is the result of the President's order, who in one of his speeches declared that there should be no less than 30 to 40 per cent of women in the Parliament. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers, a powerful political body, is composed of eleven members and only one is a woman. Ms. Natalia Kochanova is also one of the five deputy prime ministers. There are no women ministers in the basic and economy types of ministries, traditionally a male-dominated area in Belarus, and there is only one female minister in the infrastructure and one in the socio-cultural ministries that represent a customary area of women's

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<sup>84</sup> [www.house.gov.by](http://www.house.gov.by) 17, <http://www.rec.gov.by/sites/default/files/pdf/Elections-MS27-soob8.pdf>.

<sup>85</sup> <http://www.rec.gov.by/sites/default/files/pdf/Elections-MS27-soob8.pdf>.

<sup>86</sup> [http://www.coe.int/t/DEMOCRACY/ELECTORAL-ASSISTANCE/publications/Women-Belarus\\_en.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/DEMOCRACY/ELECTORAL-ASSISTANCE/publications/Women-Belarus_en.pdf) - <http://oeec.by/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Analysis-of-Gender-Sector-in-Belarus.pdf>.

employment. Political parties in Belarus oppose, rather than support, the idea of gender equality despite the fact that their programmes declare democratic values and freedoms<sup>87</sup>. None of the three political parties represented in the Chamber of Representatives (the lower chamber of the Parliament) is led by a woman. Only one of fifteen political parties officially registered in Belarus has a female leader, what appears to be highly suggestive of the limited influence that women can have on the Belarus political parties<sup>88</sup>.

- Gender equality in **Georgia**'s political life remains a major challenge. Women hold four out of nineteen ministerial positions in the cabinet and their presence has been stable. The portfolios are diversified: Defence, Justice, Education and Science, European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Having a woman - Ms. Tinatin Khidasheli - as Minister of Defence, a traditionally male-dominated sphere, is important for Georgia as this provides a powerful role model and may help change popular expectations about women's participation in the defence and security fields.

The 14 women deputy ministers represent 28 per cent of all deputy ministers. It is worth noting that in 2013 a few high-level strategic positions were attributed to women for the first time: the National Security Council Secretary, assisting Georgia's President on national security issues, the Chair of the Central Election Commission and that of the Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission<sup>89</sup>. Georgian women won 17 out of the 150 seats in the October 2012 parliamentary elections, or 11 per cent of its members. This is a slight improvement in comparison with the 2008-2012 legislature where women only obtained 6.4 per cent of the seats. Not only are there few women in the Parliament, but their presence in high ranking positions is very limited. Ms. Manana Kobakhidze is the first deputy chairperson of the Parliament and the chair of its Gender Equality Council. None of the eleven parliamentary factions, or parliamentary groups, is headed by a woman. There are only three women as deputy heads of factions. Only one of the fifteen Parliamentary Committees, the Human Rights and Civil Integration Committee, is chaired by a woman and only one woman in the Committee of European Integration takes up the first deputy chairman's position<sup>90</sup>.

Two political parties, not represented in the Parliament, are led by women. The Democratic Movement-United Georgia is headed by Ms. Nino Burdjanadze, former Speaker of the Parliament and a strong opposition party leader, who ran for the 2013 presidential elections and arrived second in the poll. The Georgian Way is headed by the former minister of Foreign Affairs, Ms. Salome Zurbishvili, but the party and its leader, after losing the elections are no longer visible. It is interesting to note that the promotion of women in politics is not on the agenda of these parties' programmes.

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<sup>87</sup> <http://oeec.by/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Analysis-of-Gender-Sector-in-Belarus.pdf>.

<sup>88</sup> <http://www.bsdp.org/presidium>.

<sup>89</sup> Georgia – Beijing +20 National Review of the Implementation of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, [http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/59/national\\_reviews/georgia\\_review\\_beijing20.ashx?v=1&d=20140917T100730](http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/59/national_reviews/georgia_review_beijing20.ashx?v=1&d=20140917T100730).

<sup>90</sup> Official Website Georgia's Parliament: <http://www.parliament.ge/ge/saparlamento-saqmianoba/komitetebi>.

At local level, all nine governors appointed by the Prime Minister to represent the executive branch of the central government in the nine regions of Georgia, are men<sup>91</sup>. There are only two women out of 69 local Gamgebelis (heads of provincial municipal districts) while all Mayors of the 12 local self-governing cities are men<sup>92</sup>. The 2014 local elections have revealed another alarming picture of gender imbalance. There were no improvements to the two previous elections in 2006 and 2010 as women account only for 11.6 per cent of the members of Sakrebulo, the local representative councils. Women chair only 2 out of 64 Sakrebulo, i.e. 3 per cent. The female participation ratio is particularly low in local representative bodies of the areas where Azerbaijani and Armenian population minorities reside and represents only 2.7 per cent of the total number of Sakrebulo members.

Finally as far as diplomatic services are concerned, there are only 6 Georgian women Ambassadors out of 52.

- With six ministers out of nineteen, **Moldova** has the highest proportion of women in the Governments of the EaP Countries, reaching almost 30 per cent. However, as previously mentioned, these ministers are highly concentrated in the socio-cultural sectors. Women's representation in the Moldovan Parliament has been increasing progressively from a mere 4 per cent in the 1990s to attain its highest level in the 2009-2010 legislature and then decreased in the last two legislatures to reach 21,8 per cent in the September 2015 elections as can be seen from the table below.

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<sup>91</sup> <http://www.transparency.ge/en/node/5218>.

<sup>92</sup> Gender Monitoring of Local Self-Government Bodies and Strengthening Women Involvement in Political Life. Published by ISFED: [www.scribd.com/doc/243941369/Gender-Monitoring-of-Local-Self-Government-Bodies-and-Strengthening-Women-Involvement-in-Political-Life](http://www.scribd.com/doc/243941369/Gender-Monitoring-of-Local-Self-Government-Bodies-and-Strengthening-Women-Involvement-in-Political-Life).

Table 1- Evolution of Moldovan women's representation in Parliament from 1990 to 2015

Legislature	N° of women in Parliament	N° of members of Parliament	Women's representation (percentage)
1990-1993	12	300	4.0
1994-1998	5	101	5.0
1998-2001	9	101	8.9
2001-2005	16	101	15.8
2005-2009	21	101	20.8
2009-2010	26	101	25.7
2010-2014	20	101	19.8
2015	22	101	21.8

Four out of nine parliamentary standing committees<sup>93</sup>, which exert a substantial amount of negotiating power in the adoption of legislative texts, are chaired by women. Local politics do not appear to be more inclined towards having Moldovan women in their representation, as the number of District Councilors and Mayors stagnates around 18 per cent since 2007.

- **Ukrainian** women compose 55 per cent of the electorate, but are represented only by 12 per cent of women in the Parliament. This picture improves at local level: in January 2013, women members represented 12 per cent of regional councils, 23 per cent of district councils, 28 per cent of city councils, 51 per cent of village councils and 46 per cent of small village and settlements councils. The councils' authority level is negatively correlated with its gender balance: the lower the level of the authority the better are the chances for women of being elected, in particular among the council members of villages and village settlement councils. It is an excellent illustration of vertical gender segregation of policy areas<sup>94</sup>.

The gender ratio of the Members of Parliament and local council members in the 2000-2012 period shows slight fluctuations, but remained low. During the 2009-2014 period, the Cabinet of Ministers never included more than three women at any time. In 2014 there was only one woman

<sup>93</sup>Committee for public administration and regional development; Committee for social protection, health and family; Committee on Foreign Policy and European Integration; Legal Committee for appointments and immunities, <http://parlament.md/StructuraParlamentului/Comisiipermanente/tabid/84/language/en-US/Default.aspx>.

<sup>94</sup> National Review to the UN 2015 Commission on the Status of Women, [http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/NV111.07\\_att1\\_att2\\_att3\\_merged.pdf](http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/NV111.07_att1_att2_att3_merged.pdf).



in the Government as Minister of Social Policy. In 2015, the Minister of Finance is the only woman out of seventeen Ministers.

Often, under the pressure of international organisations and women civil society organisations, the absence or limited presence of women in politics the debate about quotas in politics takes centre stage in all the countries except Azerbaijan and Belarus. The issue has been dealt with in different ways:

- In **Armenia**, according to the internal rules of the political parties, one-fifth of the candidates in electoral lists must be of a different gender. However many women candidates once elected withdrew in favour of men candidates.
- In **Georgia**, financial incentives are granted to political parties if they apply voluntary quotas. The 2012 OSCE's Elections Observation Mission concluded that these incentives failed to promote a more balanced gender representation in politics.
- In **Moldova**, the law mandates that political parties must ensure women's representation in their management bodies and candidates' lists. Parties have adhered to the law by including women mainly at the bottom of the electoral lists thereby substantially reducing their chances of getting elected. To overcome these shortcomings, in 2010 at the initiative of the Women's Parliamentary Group, the Government supported the inclusion of a 30 per cent gender quota in the electoral code. The amendment is however still pending in the Parliament and the quota did not benefit women candidates in the 2015 elections.
- A similar situation prevails in **Ukraine** where the law mandates political parties to include a 30 per cent gender quota in the candidates' lists. In the 2013 elections, only ten out of the twenty-nine registered parties adhered to this obligation, which carries no penalties if not satisfied. A similar law was adopted at local level in 2015 and is expected to produce the same results.

As already highlighted by EIGE<sup>95</sup>, public debate in the EaP Countries on the need to tackle gender imbalances in political decision-making is met, with some variations, by a strong socio-cultural resistance to the idea of quotas, which is possibly a legacy from the past.

In addition to the socio-economic reasons that hinder women from joining politics, described under Section 5.2, there is a general lack of political education centres, hence a lack of understanding of the significance of women's representation in politics. This is probably why the number of political leaders supporting female politicians is limited and why less money is attributed to support women candidates in conducting their election campaigns.

Male politicians who do not wish to compete with women politicians can rely on deeply ingrained stereotypes that define politics as an exclusive male practice.

In looking at this seemingly bleak description it should be remembered that social changes can neither be ordained by the state nor imposed by civil society, but, rather, they evolve with time

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<sup>95</sup> Interim Report, Women in Power and Decision Making, EIGE/2014/OPER/13, December 2014.



and action. Interestingly, however, the debate about the role of women in politics and in the social-economic sphere is lively in all EaP Countries. Encouragingly, actions are undertaken by civil society, Members of Parliament or the governments, even if perhaps at too slow a pace.

### **3.1.2 Women in public administration**

In the EaP Countries, the average proportion of women among highest ranking civil servants is 17.4 per cent at level 1, the next highest level below a minister, and 33.7 per cent at level 2, immediately below. Variance in the EaP Countries is considerable: not a single woman was represented among the highest-ranking civil servants at level 1 in Armenia, while the proportion was 40.0 per cent in Moldova. However, Moldova is particular as only 3 men and 2 women Level 1 civil servants were appointed. Similarly, representation of women civil servants at level 2 ranges from 13.1 per cent in Armenia to 65.3 per cent in Moldova, where a very large number of Level 2 Civil servants are appointed compared to the other EaP Countries<sup>96</sup>. The proportion of both Level 1 and Level 2 civil servants in Moldova is higher than the EU-28 average. However, with a regional average of 17.4 per cent, the EaP Countries are well below the EU's 31 per cent.

Data concerning the distribution of portfolios show that the highest-ranking women civil servants were represented in all functions at both Levels. In basic ministries, women at Level 1 did not exceed 25 per cent. At Level 2, the highest variability is observed in the socio-cultural field: the proportion of women in these positions ranged from 6.3 per cent in Armenia to 59.4 per cent in Moldova. The EaP average of 33.7 per cent is significantly lower than the EU average of 40%.

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<sup>96</sup> Total numbers of Level 2 of civil servants range from about 60 in Armenia to about 100 in Ukraine and 250 in Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia. In Moldova they are over 500.

Figure 8 – Objective III – Indicator 7




Figure 9 – Objective III- Indicator 7




Figure 10- Objective III – Indicator 8





Figure 11- Objective III – Indicator 8




### 3.1.3 Women in the judiciary

The judiciary's decisions influence the public and legal discourses, thus impacting on society at all levels. Therefore it is crucial that women are equally represented there.

In 2015, Moldova has almost reached the gender balance among the members of the Supreme Court, women representing 46.9 per cent. However, high variations are visible among EaP Countries. While women make up nearly a half of the Supreme Court members in Moldova and 27.7 and 23 per cent respectively in Ukraine and Belarus, they only represent 19 and 10 per cent in Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively. Overall, in EaP Countries the chances of women accessing the top echelons of the judiciary appear to be slightly more limited than in the EU, as they represent less than 29 per cent of all Supreme Courts members in the region, compared to the EU average of 39 per cent. Georgia can boast to have appointed, first and only in EaP Countries, a woman President of the Supreme Court, Ms. Nino Gvenetadze.

Figure 12 - Objective II – Indicator 9



Research has shown that in Georgia the examination system based on judicial qualifications has opened access to a higher number of women judges than men in the proportion of 51 to 49 per cent. In 2013 in Armenia, women judges who were selected through exams, interviews and

President's approval were 24 per cent<sup>97</sup>. However, in both countries courts chambers and tribunals are headed by men.

### **3.2 Economic decision-making**

Women's labour force participation varies significantly across the EaP Countries according to the International Labour Organisation's data for 2013. From the high 61 per cent in Azerbaijan, 58 in Ukraine, 57 in Georgia and 56 in Armenia these data are comparable to the European Union's average of 62,5 per cent<sup>98</sup> - it sharply drops down to 39 per cent in Moldova. Belarus' last comparable data, from 2009, showed a 54 per cent participation<sup>99</sup>.

The horizontal and vertical segregations that women face in all EaP Countries deprive them of managerial positions and prevent from developing their careers. They are predominantly active in services such as hotels, restaurants and retail trade, education, health care and social services. Some sectors remain the privileged purview of men: as an example, in Georgia women's involvement in the construction, transport and communications sectors is well below 10 per cent. Despite women's higher levels of education in all EaP Countries, gender pay gaps can be as high as 50 per cent, as is the case in Azerbaijan, and women tend to work in low paid, often informal jobs. In Azerbaijan, Belarus and Ukraine labour codes protect women from undertaking certain jobs, thereby creating additional discriminations on the labour market. Women's unemployment is higher than men's and they are more exposed to poverty. This is especially the case of the many women who tend to take up agricultural jobs in the rural areas of countries like Georgia, where land is mostly owned by men. Their work is not registered and they cannot benefit from any allowances nor can they apply for compensations, thereby limiting their capacities to engage in society and politics. Women's non-formal participation in agricultural sector activities makes them invisible to official data.

The combination of these factors pushes large numbers of women to become entrepreneurs: in Belarus women individual entrepreneurs represent 63 per cent of the total. It is worth noting in this respect that the legal systems of all EaP Countries allow any individual to register as individual entrepreneur without the need to create a separate legal entity. The new market economy has brought a different paradigm that leaves women, who used to have some form of state protection, more economically vulnerable than men. Faced with severely diminishing job opportunities and having less business experience, they are also less likely to adapt to entrepreneurship requirements, especially in an environment that imposes significant constraints

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<sup>97</sup>No overall results on the numbers of women judges were provided for the other countries.

<sup>98</sup> 2009 data.

<sup>99</sup> International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market database, Labour force participation rate, female (per cent of female population ages 15-64). Data in Belarus is presented according to different criteria since 2010 and could not be included in the 2013 comparison.

on women who want to start and grow a business. Access to credit or even micro-credit is difficult and the range of women's activities remains limited. Women will often remain outside the trade networks that facilitate the launch and development of businesses and companies for men.

When other opportunities fail, women resort to emigration, particularly from Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. However, emigration can have different forms. In Armenia, the high number of households headed by a female may be a consequence of the large number of men who emigrate. Armenia has one of the highest levels of women's participation to the labour force in the EaP Countries. Conversely, in Moldova it is mainly women who emigrate. Moldova has the lowest level of labour participation amongst the EaP Countries and suffers from a decreasing quantity of women in the active labour force. In 2004 there were 730,000 active women, representing 39 per cent of the female population. Ten years later, the active women were only 607,000, or 32 per cent of the female population.

The lack of social services is particularly critical when one considers that prior to the current transition period child-care services were more readily available. This is compounded by the fact that men are rarely involved in children's education. In countries like Moldova, the consequences are far-reaching: when both parents need to work they often have no other recourse but to leave their young children at home, guarded by elder siblings in most cases girls, causing their absenteeism in school, contributing to depriving them of the benefits of education and limiting their career prospects.

All these factors have direct and indirect implications on women's roles in leadership and decision-making.

The paragraphs below analyse these factors in a more detailed manner in each EaP Country.

- An ILO survey on young women and men in the **Armenian** labour force shows that already at a very young age women's choices are confined to certain sectors such as education whereas young men enjoy a wider array of options in terms of possible jobs, including manual labour. This results in unemployment rates for young girls of 36.6 per cent, 12 percentage points above the rate for males. Young women are therefore not only much less likely than young men to get employed, they are also much more prone to disappearing from the labour force, either out of discouragement or because they have to tend to family responsibilities. In addition, the survey demonstrates a marked gender pay gap: on average female employees are paid one third less than the amount earned by male employees, despite the higher levels of education attained by girls, which should normally result in better opportunities and higher salaries<sup>100</sup>. Once these unequal paths are set they never appear to

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<sup>100</sup> "Strengthening Women's political participation in the Republic of Armenia: Existing Efforts, Challenges and Opportunities", Centre for Gender and Leadership Studies – Yerevan State University – 2015. The 2012 standard

change throughout the working lives of women and men. Armenian women work mainly in hotels and restaurants, with 64.9 per cent of the sector's total employment, in education at 80.9 per cent, in health and social services at 83.4 per cent and in households at 71 per cent. Women's unemployment reaches 18 per cent, compared to 14 per cent for men, and the gender pay gap is 34.4 per cent<sup>101</sup>.

- The gender pay gap is higher than 50 per cent<sup>102</sup> in **Azerbaijan**. According to 2014 State Statistics Committee information out of 455,000 individuals who applied to be registered as entrepreneurs<sup>103</sup>, 81,650 were women, representing almost 18 per cent of the total number of enterprises. The distribution of the registrations shows that women's greatest interest concentrates on trade business with a 43.5 per cent share, followed by agriculture with 14 per cent. The remaining registrations are low: 4 per cent in tourism business, 3 per cent in real estate, 3 per cent in professional, scientific and technical activity, 2 per cent in processing industry and 1.7 per cent in education. Women tend to work in low-paid jobs and more in the informal economy than men. Many production enterprises hire most of their employees without a labour contract and women often have to work in menial jobs<sup>104</sup>.
- Women constitute more than half of the human capital in **Belarus** and they have a higher level of education than men. However, they have lower paying jobs than men, earning on average 80 per cent of a man's salary. The difference in salary generally appears in the way bonuses are distributed<sup>105</sup>. Women are concentrated in professional sectors such as healthcare (85 per cent), education (82 per cent), hotels and restaurants (76 per cent), finance (75 per cent) and trade (71 per cent). Their involvement is limited in the production and distribution of electricity, gas and water, mining and fisheries (around 30 per cent). According to Ms. Iryna Alkhouka, who chairs the international public association Gender Perspectives, gender inequality in the labour market between men and women continues to prevail. In the year 2000, a Council of Ministers' decision<sup>106</sup> specifically prohibited many professions to women in hazardous industries and jobs considered to be dangerous for health. The list is extensive and covers, in addition to works such as those connected with lifting and moving weights manually, jobs such as drivers of buses, cars and trucks, firepersons, tractor operators or lumber persons. Potential motherhood is perceived by employers as an obstacle to offering a job. Hence, Belarusian women are more likely than men to agree to low-pay jobs and all these combined factors push them to becoming individual entrepreneurs. Indeed, 63 per cent

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ILO school-to-work transition survey was adapted to the Armenian context and implemented by the National Statistical Service based on a consultative process with ILO. Youth from 3300 households were questioned.

<sup>101</sup> ILOSTAT database (data of 2013).

<sup>102</sup> ILO, [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/briefingnote/wcms\\_410196.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/briefingnote/wcms_410196.pdf).

<sup>103</sup> In all EaP Countries professionals can register as individual entrepreneurs. This does not imply that they create a company. They can hire people and they remain liable towards their creditors on their own personal assets.

<sup>104</sup> The absence of available gender-disaggregated data has restricted the analysis of Azerbaijan in the present Study.

<sup>105</sup> <http://odb-office.eu/expertise/gender/what-are-gender-rights-and-opportunities-belarus#sthash.rjfJ1cqr.dpuf>.

<sup>106</sup> The list of heavy manual work and work involving hazardous conditions for which women's recruitment is prohibited, Council of Ministers decision N°765, May 26, 2000.



of the individual Belarusian entrepreneurs are women. In 2013, an Enterprise Survey conducted by the World Bank showed that 33 per cent of the surveyed Belarusian firms had women top managers in the economic sector<sup>107</sup> and 44 per cent of those firms had women among their shareholders. Firms headed by women had twice the amount of permanent full-time women workers than firms headed by men. The largest GDP-forming companies in Belarus do not yet have gender-balanced policies and do not tend to employ women and promote them to management positions. Women's share of CEOs in the largest companies is about 10 per cent and among the corporate board members it is about 29 per cent<sup>108</sup>.

- **Georgia** suffers from relatively high unemployment rates of both men and women. Women however, are further disadvantaged in the labour market, by vertical and horizontal segregations, pay gap and unpaid domestic and caring work in the households. Men with higher education are 1.2 times more likely to get employed than women with higher education<sup>109</sup>. The average monthly nominal salaries of women are lower than those of men in all sector of the economy<sup>110</sup>. Women, who make up 39 per cent of business employees, earn between 32 and 37 per cent less than men in the business sector<sup>111</sup>. Women make up between 80 and 85 per cent of employees in the education, healthcare and social assistance sectors; 61 per cent in hotels and restaurants. Only the wholesale and some retail trade sectors have more balanced employment patterns, with 52 per cent of men and 48 per cent of women. Some sectors remain the privileged province of men: women's involvement in the construction, transport and communications sectors is well below 10 per cent. They fare better in the energy and manufacturing sectors (19 and 27 per cent<sup>112</sup> respectively). Women made up 43.6 per cent of the recipients of micro-credits in 2012<sup>113</sup>. In a 2013 UN Women study<sup>114</sup>, the majority of women interviewed said that their main source of information on loan products was the social network such as neighbours, friends, or relatives, rather than direct marketing. Women often struggle to obtain a loan from a microfinance institution since a collateral such as immovable property is required as security, and land is usually registered solely in their husband's name. Particularly in rural areas, women often have little involvement in economic decision-making and they lack information about their rights under civil law<sup>115</sup>. Indeed,

<sup>107</sup>The World Bank Enterprise Survey involved a sample of 360 Belarus firms, [www.enterprisesurveys.org/Data/ExploreTopics/gender](http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Data/ExploreTopics/gender).

<sup>108</sup> The list of GDP-forming companies was selected from the Belarus largest companies, [www.government.by](http://www.government.by).

<sup>109</sup> International Centre for Education Policy Planning and Management (EPPM), 2012. Education and workforce in Georgia.

<sup>110</sup> GeoStat data for 2014

<sup>111</sup> Woman and Men in Georgia, 2013; pg.60, [http://geostat.ge/cms/site\\_images/files/english/health/women\\_per\\_cent20and\\_per\\_cent20men\\_per\\_cent202013Analytical.pdf](http://geostat.ge/cms/site_images/files/english/health/women_per_cent20and_per_cent20men_per_cent202013Analytical.pdf).

<sup>112</sup> Sumbadze, 2008.

<sup>113</sup> Data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (<http://genderindex.org/country/georgia>) women made up 43.58% of recipients of micro-credit in 2012.

<sup>114</sup> Accessibility of Microfinance Institution Services for Women: Existing Barriers and Opportunities. Results of two studies conducted in Georgia in 2012 and 2013. UN Women, 2013.

<sup>115</sup> USAID (n.d.) 'USAID Country Profile: property rights and resource governance. Georgia', USAID, Washington, D.C.

tradition, customary law and religious practices have a strong influence on attitudes to land ownership in practice, and these factors typically discriminate against women. As an alternative to employment, women can launch their own companies and indeed they were 32 per cent of the owners of newly registered enterprises in 2014. Looking at women on the boards of companies<sup>116</sup>, none is a President or a CEO and only the Caucasus Energy and Infrastructure Company has a woman on its board. One of the reasons for women's lower involvement in the labour market in Georgia is labour emigration. It is currently estimated that 56 per cent of all labour migrants leaving Georgia are women. Abroad, the majority of them accept unofficial work as housekeepers or caretakers.

- The main sources of occupation for **Moldovan** women are the public administration, education, health and social work. They are also employed in services, such as shops, hotels and restaurants, or information communication and transport industries. A significant proportion of the working women in Moldova is employed by the government<sup>117</sup>. In 2014 there were about twice as many women as men in the public service. The majority of these women are employed as professionals and clerks, and some as senior officials and managers. Women tend to be concentrated at the lowest occupational levels. They remain underrepresented in senior management. In reviewing the limited data on women's occupation in different sectors from 2004 to 2014 it is striking to see how figures remain remarkably stable except for a substantial drop in skilled agricultural and fishery workers<sup>118</sup> and a limited increase in the administrative and service sectors. In Moldova, 27.5 per cent of the entrepreneurs are women, approximately 2 per cent of women managers run big enterprises, 10 per cent are in mid-sized enterprises, 40 per cent are in small enterprises and the remaining 48 per cent are in micro-enterprises. Women's increasing participation in entrepreneurship is viewed as a positive alternative to unemployment. In Moldovan firms, including small and medium enterprises, women do not attain management positions. If promoted, they will not have any line responsibilities but will rather be granted non-operational positions, such as vice-president, or staff positions, such as chief accountant.
- One of the most prominent manifestations of inequality between **Ukrainian** women and men in the economy is the wage gap, which is largely due to the gender segregation in the labour market. Average women's wages were 76.3 per cent of men's in 2014. Experts believe that in the informal economy the gender pay gap is even wider. Women are mostly employed in sectors that do not offer high salaries, mostly in the public sector while men are employed in manual activities, management and information technology. The latter employment segments

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<sup>116</sup> In Georgia most of the large companies are not listed on the national stock exchange. Six companies with available information listed at the Georgian Stock Exchange were analysed for the present Study.

<sup>117</sup> Biroul National de Statistica (National Bureau of Statistics), 2014.

<sup>118</sup> From 228.700 workers in 2004 to 76.500 in 2014.

provide much higher salaries<sup>119</sup>. Female employment has traditionally been predominant in activities with the lowest average wage, such as public and private services, hotels and restaurants services, education, health and social welfare, where women constitute the largest proportion of workers. Men tend to work, instead, in transport and construction. The Ukrainian Labour Code has a number of protective provisions for women that can create additional discrimination on the job market. In 2014, 10.8 per cent of men and 7.5 per cent of women were unemployed<sup>120</sup>. Only 22 per cent of businesses are owned by women and only 6 per cent of big businesses are run by women<sup>121</sup>; 31.5 per cent of companies in Ukraine have a female participation in ownership; 12.8 per cent of companies have majority female ownership and 18.8 per cent of firms have a female top manager<sup>122</sup>. It is more difficult for women to be granted loans, as they have fewer resources that can be used as collaterals. In practice a credit offered to a woman is short term and has high interest rate.

### **3.2.1 Women in financial decision-making positions**

Against the backdrop described in the previous section, it is difficult for women to obtain financial and economic independence and to reach positions of power. It is interesting to note that while Ms. Valeria O. Gontavera was appointed in 2014 as Head of the Ukrainian Central Bank, she remains, the only woman amongst governors and vice-governors of Central Banks in the Eastern Partnership Countries. At a lower level, Belarus and Ukraine have each three women, respectively out of ten and out of twelve members of the decision-making bodies of their Central Banks. With a 9.2 per cent average, EaP Countries fall short of the EU's 21 per cent average.

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<sup>119</sup> United Nations Development Programme, "Women and Men on the Ukrainian Labour Market: A Comparative Study of Ukraine and the EU", Kyiv: VAITE company, 2011, p.20,


[http://www.undp.org.ua/files/en\\_25051Women\\_and\\_Men\\_on\\_the\\_Ukrainian\\_Labour\\_Market\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.undp.org.ua/files/en_25051Women_and_Men_on_the_Ukrainian_Labour_Market_Eng.pdf).

<sup>120</sup> State Statistics Service of Ukraine, статистичний збірник "Жінки і чоловіки України", [Statistical digest "Women and Men in Ukraine"], Kyiv, 2015, p. 65.

<sup>121</sup> Enterprise Surveys of World Bank Group "What Businesses Experience", retrieved 20 November, 2015 <https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/>.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

Figure 13 – Objective III – Indicator 2




### 3.2.2 Women in social partner organisations

Only Belarus has a woman President in the governing bodies of social partner organisations representing employers at national level. The attribution to women of the role of Vice-Chair is more common: employers' organisations appointed two women to this level in Azerbaijan, one in Belarus and one in Ukraine. Women have also started to fill the ranks of the members of the governing bodies as they are now present in all employers' organisations, with the exception of Azerbaijan, reaching an EaP average of 10,4 per cent.

Ukraine is the only EaP Country that appointed two women as Presidents and two women as Vice-Presidents in two of its social partner organisations representing workers at national level. Women Vice-Presidents' number is just one in both Belarus and Georgia, an average of 15.3 per cent, compared to the EU 25 per cent average.

Research has demonstrated in Belarus that trade-unions generally do not specifically represent women's interests<sup>123</sup>. It remains to be seen whether the choice of appointing women in Ukraine will favour another type of policy.


Figure 14 – Objective III – Indicator 4



In 2015, only in Belarus a woman was appointed President of an organisation representing employers. Belarus also has a position for a woman deputy and so has Ukraine, while Armenia has two. Women members of employers' organisations represent 10 per cent of the total, compared to an EU average of 14 per cent with peaks of 18 and 22 per cent for Georgia and Moldova respectively.

<sup>123</sup> <http://oeec.by/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Analysis-of-Gender-Sector-in-Belarus.pdf>.

Figure 15 – Objective III – Indicator 6



To sum up, there is still a large gender gap in social partner organisations in the EaP Countries. Although overall levels are low, the social partners' organisations that represent workers have slightly more women in decision-making positions than those representing employers.


### 3.2.3 Women in business leadership

Representation of women and men in economic decision-making is measured by the proportion of women as presidents or CEOs and among members of boards in the largest companies listed on the national stock exchanges of the Eastern Partnership Countries.

Women are almost absent at the top of the largest companies: only one president and six CEOs in Moldova and another CEO in Belarus. On average, the representation of women among members of the boards of the largest registered companies on the stock exchange is 14.3 per cent in the EaP, compared to 21 per cent in the EU. Only in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus the proportion of women is higher: 17.3 and 28 per cent respectively. It should be noted that Azerbaijan has no women on the boards of the two companies that were researched<sup>124</sup>.

<sup>124</sup>Due to the difference of definitions of listed companies and lack of available information, only a limited number of companies could be researched: 5 in Armenia, 2 in Azerbaijan, 9 in Belarus, 10 in Moldova and Ukraine.

Figure 16 – Objective III – Indicator 8



### 3.3 Social decision-making

#### Decision-making in the academia

The importance of safeguarding a major role of women in the academia has often been stressed. Their capacity to influence and shape public discourse, to conduct oriented research or to become role models for the many women that study at universities all plead in favour of a greater gender balance in the ranks of the university decision-makers.

Unfortunately, data shows that in the universities, as elsewhere, women are underrepresented at the highest levels and that there is only a limited willingness within the academic structures of power to see women in high level positions. This occurs in spite of the fact that in all EaP countries women represent the highest number of graduates.

In the latest figures, 12 per cent of universities in EaP countries<sup>125</sup> have a woman rector<sup>126</sup>. The highest number is for Belarus and Georgia where women are 20 per cent of the heads of


<sup>125</sup> Only the ten largest public universities in each EaP country were researched for this indicator.

<sup>126</sup> No data is available for the EU.



universities. In Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova the number is 10 per cent, while in Ukraine there are no women at the helm of universities.

Figure 17 – Objective IV – Indicator 1



The following data was available only in Azerbaijan: at the beginning of the 2013-2014 academic year, in the state-run Azerbaijani universities female professor-teacher staff were 48.8 per cent of the total. Only 10.5 per cent of university rectors were women while 14.3 per cent of vice-rector and branch directors, 19.2 per cent of faculty deans and 22.1 per cent of heads of departments were women.

## Decision making in the media

Today, in the EaP Countries as in the rest of the world media are directed by men and it is often argued that the content they provide does not always reflect correctly the image of the society, in that it is deeply gender-biased. Women and men are mostly portrayed according to gender stereotypes that contribute to perpetuate, in the mind-set of the audience, the aspects of a profoundly traditional society, often not conducive to the necessary gender balance between sexes. Ensuring that women are at the highest decision-making levels in the media should lead to more gender-sensitive content and programming, presenting a more balanced picture of women's and men's lives.

There is only one woman director of a public broadcaster, and this is in Armenia. In all other EaP countries all directors are men. There is a larger presence of women at the lower Level 2: with the exception of Azerbaijan, all EaP countries have between 1 and 3 women representatives<sup>127</sup>.

Private broadcasters appear to be slightly more inclined towards women: they appointed a woman CEO in Azerbaijan and in Ukraine<sup>128</sup>. They are also showing positive signs at Level 2 where women are present in all countries and represent: 25 per cent in Armenia, 22 per cent in Azerbaijan, 86 per cent in Belarus, 32 per cent in Georgia and 56 per cent in Moldova<sup>129</sup>.

Further research would be necessary to find out if the public broadcaster in Armenia has adopted any programmes that would be more gender-oriented and if the women that hold Level 2 positions have sufficient influence to change attitudes towards women.

### Decision making in civil society

Due to the importance of women's involvement in civil society and to how often it is presented as a substitute for women's representation in politics, this Study provides a qualitative analysis of women's movements and civil society in the EaP countries.

- In contrast to women's absence from public office, **Armenian** women have a more significant role as leaders of non-governmental organisations and they have visible roles. It is believed that there are 60 active NGO organisations in Armenia that deal with gender equality issues. Women work in four major fields of operation: protection of women's rights, promotion of professional activities, and provision of social services and elimination of violence against women. The NGOs have undertaken a large number of researches, funded mainly by international donors.<sup>130</sup>
- Today there are more than thirty active women NGOs in **Belarus**, whose activities are mainly dedicated to developing women's entrepreneurship and business, defending reproductive health and combating domestic violence. NGOs are often the only actors who raise gender equality issues, advocate policy measures to be adopted by the state and monitor how they are addressed by the state. The most active NGOs are: the international NGO Gender Perspectives, Belarusian Young Women Christian Association, Women's Independent Democratic Movement, Radislava and the feminist initiative Gender Route. Regrettably, the Belarusian civil society appears to have little influence or impact on the

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<sup>127</sup> No data was provided for Moldova.

<sup>128</sup> No data was provided for Moldova.

<sup>129</sup> No data was provided for Ukraine.

<sup>130</sup> Women in Armenia Peace, Security and Democracy from a Women's Rights perspective, [http://bim.lbg.ac.at/sites/files/bim/Women\\_per\\_cent20in\\_per\\_cent20Armenia\\_Peace\\_Security\\_Democracy\\_0.pdf](http://bim.lbg.ac.at/sites/files/bim/Women_per_cent20in_per_cent20Armenia_Peace_Security_Democracy_0.pdf).

development of the state gender policies<sup>131</sup>. It is worth noting however, that in December 2012 an independent movement composed of political parties, NGOs and trade unions signed a memorandum on the implementation of the National Gender Platform. The memorandum, which is addressed to both the civil society and the Government, proposes to attain gender equality through measures related to decision-making, reproductive health, gender-sensitive public awareness, and domestic violence. The Platform decided to create a permanent women's leadership school to prepare women for local elections campaigns.

- **Georgia** is witnessing an unprecedented development in women's participation in informal politics, in building civil society, and in NGOs. Organisations working in the area of women's rights represent roughly 10 to 12 per cent of all the registered organisations in Georgia<sup>132</sup>. Civil society has already gained experience and has the potential to assist government in making informed decisions concerning women's rights and status, as well as in empowering women generally. Women's NGOs promoted the adoption of gender related laws. There is a significant research, awareness raising and advocacy capacity mobilised in the sector. There are good examples of NGOs transmitting knowledge and capacities on the empowerment of women to government at central and local levels. The Fund for Women Entrepreneurs operates in Western Georgia supporting women's active involvement in decision-making processes and economic independence.
- In **Ukraine**, further to the exacerbation of civil confrontation between November 2013 and February 2014 and the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by foreign troops, which led among other things to an increase of violence against women, the women leaders of the civil society, culture and art celebrity figures, journalists and Ukrainian women have actively taken part in non-violent resistance and promotion of national unity. The participants of civil protests dubbed Euromaidan have organized the O. Kobylanska<sup>133</sup> Female Sotnia of Self-defence<sup>134</sup>, provided legal, medical and other volunteer help, ensured public safety, organized events and made countless efforts to keep the protest peaceful and to overcome the effects of violence when the protest ceased to be peaceful. Such efforts attracted public attention and began to change the stereotyped roles that women are assigned to in society, including during the civil confrontations and international conflicts. NGOs, public communities and local authorities were also the first to provide protection and help to the displaced people of Ukraine - further explanations are provided in Section 3.4. A number of women members of parliament are working personally on the frontline, where they provide assistance to volunteers and hospitals. They also mobilised citizens by raising funds in support of internally displaced people, most of whom are women and children.

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<sup>131</sup> Analysis of the gender sector in Belarus, Office for European Expertise and Communication.

<sup>132</sup> Assessment of needs of women's movement in Georgia, Briefing-paper for the international development agencies and grant making institutions, WIC, 2007.

<sup>133</sup> Olha Kobylanska (1863-1942) was a Ukrainian modernist writer and feminist.

<sup>134</sup> [http://www.academia.edu/8241376/The\\_Womens\\_Squad\\_in\\_Ukraines\\_Protests\\_Feminism\\_Militarism\\_and\\_Nationalism\\_on\\_the\\_Maidan](http://www.academia.edu/8241376/The_Womens_Squad_in_Ukraines_Protests_Feminism_Militarism_and_Nationalism_on_the_Maidan).

### 3.4. Women's participation in conflict resolution and reconciliation

In the EaP Countries, the effects of the absence of women from power and decision making positions can be profoundly felt by those women whose status is precarious. The Study Team felt it was important to include some information on women's participation in conflict resolution and reconciliation processes even though no formal methodology could be applied. This section should be considered as flagging an important issue and it provides some examples. It also provides information collected on an ad-hoc basis, on some of the EaP Countries and cannot be seen as complete or conclusive.

Women in countries with frozen conflicts or in post-conflict situation are particularly vulnerable, as they endured hardships during wartime and are now suffering from the related transformation of the society.

**Armenia** adhered to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325<sup>135</sup>, which supports the promotion of women's active participation in all operations of peaceful resolution and reconciliation of conflict. However it does not have an action plan addressing the resolution. Most of the steps taken towards peace-building, involving women and gender-related issues were initiated by networks of women NGOs and international organisations.

The Gender Policy Strategic Programme, the National Action Plan on Improving the Status of Women and Enhancing their Role in Society and the Gender Policy Action Plans in Armenia outline how women should be integrated in decision-making positions at all levels and sectors. However, despite these commitments women are mainly active at informal levels and excluded from official decisions.

The Trans-Caucasus Women's Dialogue, for instance, established in 1994, brought together women from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to work on projects such as the rehabilitation of children victims of war and the training for peace and democracy-building capacity. Women for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in the Southern Caucasus, an initiative started by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in 2001, addresses the condition of the unresolved conflict known as no-war-no-peace in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia.

Women have not been involved in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh formal peace process. The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, as part of the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, developed an advocacy strategy for the Minsk Group<sup>136</sup>. They urged political actors in peace negotiations to increase women's participation in political

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<sup>135</sup> Text of the Resolution <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement>.

<sup>136</sup> The Minsk Group, the activities of which have become known as the Minsk Process, spearheads the OSCE's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation and the United States <http://www.osce.org/mg>.

decision-making, through special temporary measures such as quotas, and in peace talks, such as by their representation in the OSCE/Minsk Group talks, making gender-sensitive training available to all participants involved in talks on this region and ensuring support for women who are victims of violence.

The Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons, Occupied Territories, Accommodation, and Refugees of **Georgia** is in charge of IDP women's problems. As of 2010, the Ministry and UN Women were supporting the operation of five Legal Clinics that provide IDPs and conflict-affected citizens, particularly women, with free of charge legal aid particularly in relation to their property and housing rights. The denial of women's property right was identified as one of the mostly widespread problems in these communities.<sup>137</sup>

In 2011 the Parliament approved the 2012-2015 National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security for the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions Nos.1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, and 1960. The action plan is divided into the so-called 3P actions: Prevention of conflict and incidents of violence towards women in conflict; better Protection of women during and after the conflict; increasing and enhancing women's Participation in conflict prevention and managing processes. In order to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, the civil society organisations demand a higher representation of women in the Geneva Talks<sup>138</sup>. In 2012, there were four women representatives among the Georgian delegation in the Geneva Talks out of ten participants, which is considered to be the highest female participation in such activities. Today there are only two.

The Ministry for Reconciliation and Civic Equality is in charge of coordination and monitoring of activities undertaken towards the Georgian–Ossetian and Georgian–Abkhazian conflict resolution, generating new peace initiatives and reintegrating the conflict regions and their population with the rest of Georgia. The minister is a man, and his first deputy minister is a woman, Ms. Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, a member of the Geneva talks' delegation.

In **Ukraine** “women are often excluded at decision-making level, as well as from the military response to the crisis”<sup>139</sup>. However, a great amount of work is being carried out by the civil society, women organisations and local authorities. Regional executive bodies and local authorities provide temporary housing and food, ensure welfare payments and provide support for the internally displaced persons who are job seekers. Given the large number of women with children among the displaced persons, there is a need to give them employment, access to

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<sup>137</sup> IDP Women Association “Consent”, online publication #1, 2015, Georgian at [http://issuu.com/association\\_consent/docs/online\\_publication\\_-\\_1.1\\_-\\_draft\\_-\\_70eccd57dae660](http://issuu.com/association_consent/docs/online_publication_-_1.1_-_draft_-_70eccd57dae660).

<sup>138</sup> Geneva Talks are official negotiations with representation of parties in conflict: Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia.

<sup>139</sup> NATO, “The role of women in the Ukraine military conflict”, retrieved 27 November, 2015, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_123557.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_123557.htm).

advanced professional training or retraining, welfare, childcare, healthcare and access to education for their children.<sup>140</sup>

## **4 Part B - Identification of Good Examples**

This Study Team has identified the following examples of good practices with potential. They will be further analysed in the second phase of the Study, after the publication of the present report. A separate annex will therefore be published later containing a more detailed analysis of these good practices.

### **4.1 Armenia**

Prime Minister's Awards: In recent years, in order to mainstream gender into political and public life and to raise gender awareness, the Armenian Government together with non-governmental organisations held annual contests in different categories such as The best urban community implementing the gender policy, The best rural community in implementing the gender policy, The best female entrepreneur and The best media outlet in providing coverage of gender issues. The winners receive a Prime Minister's award. The objective of the initiative is to eradicate gender stereotypes and advocate a different image of women in the Armenian society.

### **4.2 Azerbaijan**

Mentoring programme for newly elected female politicians: In 2012 the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) launched a Support Mentoring Programme (DAYAQ<sup>141</sup>). The aim of the programme is to increase the participation of women in politics by pairing up newly elected local female politicians or mentees, with women or men who have acquired knowledge and experience of public and political life in Azerbaijan.

### **4.3 Belarus**

National Gender Platform for political parties and movements: Several political parties and movements, the United People's Party, Belarusian Social-Democratic Party Hramada, Tell the Truth movement, For Freedom movement, A Just World left party, Belarusian Congress of

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<sup>140</sup> National Review to the UN 2015 Commission on the Status of Women, [http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/NV111.07\\_att1\\_att2\\_att3\\_merged.pdf](http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/NV111.07_att1_att2_att3_merged.pdf).

<sup>141</sup> <https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.573375809371875.1073741846.438667252842732&type=1>.

Democratic Trade Unions, have signed the National Gender Platform. The Platform is a strategic document prepared by civil society organisations and political parties, addressed to civil society and to Belarusian authorities. Its aim is to consolidate society by achieving gender equality in the country and strengthening its influence on gender policy decisions.

#### **4.4 Georgia**

The struggle for more women in parliament: On 8 March 2015, the Georgian Women's Movement, an informal women's initiative composed of more than six hundred women activists, held a demonstration called More Women in Parliament in twenty-five cities throughout the country in support of mandatory party quotas.

Task Force: Established in 2014, this multi-partisan task force brought together representatives of political parties, civil society, members of parliament and the international community to promote women's participation in politics. The task force has played a significant role in raising nationwide support on gender quotas in Georgia.

#### **4.5 Moldova**

Business incubators: A Network of Business Incubators was established in Moldova in 2013 to support small and medium-size enterprises in business development. The business incubators facilitated the creation of eighty-six enterprises, of which thirty-one are companies founded or managed by women. The incubated companies have created 368 new jobs, 178 of which are for women.

Temporary Special Measures: The UN Women UNDP 2014-2017 project on Women in Politics is proposing the adoption of Temporary Special Measures (TSM) in Moldova. The project supports civil society groups in order to launch a campaign to create the political conditions for necessary legal and policy reforms for the adoption of appropriate TSM for more inclusive electoral and political processes. The project targets key stakeholders i.e. political parties, MPs, central and local public administrations, NGOs and undertakes activities such as: advocacy trainings, demanding the annual public hearings in Parliament, organising debates with political parties, independent experts, academia, NGOs, ordinary citizens, developing position papers and submitting them to relevant authorities and actors, organising press conferences and flash mobs, targeting political parties, MPs, the Cabinet of Ministers and other actors.



## 4.6 Ukraine

Quotas for women in the governing body of the Association of the Ukrainian cities: The Association of Ukrainian Cities, which unites 456 city and towns mayors, has a powerful voice on self-governance matters. In 2012 the Section on Ensuring Equal Rights and Opportunities of Women and Men was created. The Association of Ukrainian Cities has amended, with the help of the Section, its Statutes on the representation of women mayors in the Board of the Association. A 5 per cent quota for women was introduced as a special temporary measure. In December 2012, five women mayors were elected to the Board, representing almost 10 per cent of the Board members. It must be noted that in the Association's twenty years life, the Board has never had any single female member.

These examples illustrate the diversity of initiatives undertaken by governments, local self-governmental bodies, political parties, businesses and civil society, in order to promote women's access to power structures and to strengthen women's participation in decision-making in political, economic and social life.

In Part B of the Study, the Team will research whether the Good Examples selected, or others, were maintained over time. At least two sources will be interviewed, possibly one from civil society and one from official representatives, to gather information and report on the benefits of the measure. In the event that the measure had little impact, reasons will be reported.

## 5 Recommendations and Conclusions

### 5.1 Recommendations

#### 5.1.1 Social

States should take measures to ensure that families can have access to good quality, affordable, subsidised child-care, as these measures can trigger a virtuous cycle by offering additional work opportunities to women and creating additional tax revenues that can compensate the subsidy.

Governments and media should reinforce the cultural importance of parental leave by adopting bold policies that mandate paternity leave and broadcast a positive image of child-caring fathers. These policies can have major beneficial consequences on the organisation of society and directly benefit women's careers and hence their potential access to power and decision-making.

States and national, local and municipal authorities should collect and monitor gender disaggregated-data and making it publicly available. Readily accessible data on women and men will improve policy makers' knowledge and understanding of gender issues and streamline the measures that they will adopt.

States and national, local and municipal authorities should develop policies that target the most vulnerable groups of particular social or regional origin - such as women from poor or alcoholic families and men from small towns and villages who seek earnings abroad – in order to encourage their professional and personal development and help them find decently paid jobs at home.

### **5.1.2 Political**

Political parties, civil society, local and municipal authorities should provide political training for young women and men that can encourage more women to engage in politics.

Political parties should specifically dedicate funds to finance the women candidates' campaigns to encourage women to present their candidacy at election time.

Parliaments, civil society and national and international institutions should launch studies on women and politics in media and social media to develop further understanding on women's wishes and aspirations and the place of women in society.

States should promote women's political participation at all levels, especially in rural communities, through: the adoption of effective mandatory gender quotas in parliament and at local level, the inclusion of women's rights and active female participation in all spheres of public life including in the curricula within the education systems.

### **5.1.3 Economic**

States, local authorities or municipalities should identify women as a target group for entrepreneurship in their policies. In this way women, will benefit from policies they often do not have access to. Civil society organisations, national and international institutions should consider teaching women a trade in order to help avoiding the pitfalls of entrepreneurship.

States, civil society organisations, national and international institutions should consider studying the specific impact of emigration on women as opposed to men and how it affects women's participation to the economy.

The private sector, media, civil society organisations, national and international institutions should organise awareness-raising campaigns on women's potential as economic decision-makers and economic partners.

#### **5.1.4 Employment**

States should eliminate the prohibitions that prevent women from working in certain sectors and amend labour codes to ensure that women, during their pregnancy, breastfeeding and child rearing years, are not overprotected in order to support employers in hiring and promoting them.

#### **5.1.5 Women in conflict areas**

Civil society, organisations, national and international institutions should launch researches on women's involvement in conflicts as victims and/or as active participants in order to consolidate data on the impact of armed conflict on women and girls.

#### **5.1.6 General**

Governments and all authorities promoting gender parity should assess the costs and benefits of gender-related measures. They should clearly explain and debate with citizens that gender parity measures benefits all citizens as they are addressing societal norms that are deeply entrenched in peoples' habits.

Governments and authorities in charge of gender parity should promote measures that encompass the political, economic and social aspects of women's lives, rather than focussing for instance on a limited programme - such as devoting funds to women suffering from domestic violence – in order to overcome the overarching problem of a society divided by gender stereotypes.

Governments and authorities that take gender-parity measures should consult civil society and particularly women's associations to better define women's needs, the relevance of the proposed measures and their dissemination.

Governments and authorities that take gender-parity measures should also control, assess and reporting on the impact of the adopted measures to ensure their success and the implementation of future projects.

#### **5.1.7 Proposal of new indicators for Women in Power**

It is proposed that in further studies the following indicators could be taken into consideration:

The Heads or Chairs of Parliamentary Committees subdivided in BEIS categories: Basic, Economy, Infrastructure, and Socio-cultural.

The number of judges in the first level of courts and tribunals subdivided according to the method applied to access that position for instance: exam, appointment, election.

## 5.2 Conclusions

When drawing conclusions from this Study, it may be tempting to solely consider that women are absent from public positions of power and decision-making in the Eastern Partnership Countries. Whilst their presence is generally limited, a general effort as regards positions of public power can be witnessed at different levels and in varying approaches. This points to the need to further analyse and try to better understand the impact that just few women can have in groups that are predominantly organised by men. For instance: will Ukrainian women obtain greater benefits with a single woman Minister of Finance than Moldovan women with six women in government, four of which are concentrated in the socio-cultural fields?

If the State is now devoting some attention to gender diversity, the private sector appears impervious to the notion that it spurs economic growth and yields better results for corporations. In view of women's generally dire economic situation in the EaP Countries, compounded by the effects of large numbers of active women emigrating, urgent measures are needed at all levels to alleviate their plight, such as: widening the range of sectors in which they can work, reducing the gender-pay gap, proposing affordable child-care and ensuring mandatory quotas on the boards of publicly-owned companies and companies registered on the stock-exchange. Civil service, where women have a major presence, can also be a sector where governments have the capacity to intervene directly, for example by imposing merit-driven state exams, not just to access civil service, but also to progress in their careers. Exams should not discriminate between women and men but allow women in the EaP Countries, who on average have a higher education than men, to advance in their professions. The higher number of women judges in Georgia, as opposed to men, is a telling example in this perspective.

Naturally, those better equipped to address gender imbalances are women in political positions. Although almost all EaP Countries have shown the best intentions towards adopting effective quotas in national and local politics, unsurprisingly, none succeeded. The socio-cultural barriers are so high that much more mutual understanding and dedication from all stakeholders is necessary to bring them down.

The most encouraging signs come from a lively and active civil society that stimulates the necessary changes to women's roles in society and has opened the public debate on gender parity, even if it has not yet managed to impose gender policy agendas to the governments of the EaP Countries. Efforts are also being undertaken to combat the different forms of violence against women including human trafficking and harmful practices. Much more should be done especially on the enactment of an effective legal framework to ensure women's general well-

being and to allow them to fully participate in the society. A systematic culture of advocacy and greater coordination of efforts between different groups of women are needed to better succeed in obtaining the adoption of measures in parliaments, government and corporations. The gender programmes and national plans promulgated by most governments in the EaP Countries could then be the civil society's tools to hold governments accountable for their actions.

The women who hold power and decision-making positions need to be constantly reminded that they are responsible towards other women and that they have a decisive role to play in changing the policies of their country.

## **6 Methodology**

### **6.1 Data collection**

Data has been collected through all justified sources and means: official requests for information to the public bodies, literature review, interviews with governmental officials and experts.

Official letters were sent, information was requested and interviews were conducted.

The objective of the Team was to adapt the existing research methodology, as used by EIGE for the EU-28 study, to the context of the Eastern Partnership Countries. Specifically, attention was paid to finding equivalent researched targets such as sets of definitions, elaboration of the definitions, interpretation of indicators in accordance with national contexts, taking care of the accessibility of data, and to drawing conclusions based on national cultural contexts. A pragmatic approach was applied throughout.

The Mapping Tables, which include the set of definitions used and the interpretation of indicators for EaP Countries, can be found in the Annexes.

The EaP Countries do not have a common statistical framework with consistent data available every year for the same number of years. It was therefore decided to collect only the latest data available, with the intent of having this Study serve as a basis for future data collection efforts. At the same time, the data collected in the Study will be hosted in EIGE's Gender Statistics Database under the BPfA entry point along with similar data from EU-28.<sup>142</sup>

The Statistical Tables used to collect data on Part A of the Study were developed in close cooperation with EIGE.

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<sup>142</sup> The Database will be available online from early 2016 at the following address: [www.eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/](http://www.eige.europa.eu/gender-statistics/).

## **6.2 Quality assurance**

To the extent possible, all data provided by national researchers was cross-checked by the Study Team Leader and the Study Team Coordinator. The Team used a common approach to referencing all sources throughout literature reviews and the final report. The Team ensured that all data sources are traceable, with the objective of providing valid and reliable information and consistent conclusions.

The following criteria were applied for data quality control:

- Triangulation – data is collected from multiple sources and with multiple means, statistics and opinions are cross-checked and compared in order to provide for a fuller and more objective picture;
- Sources of information – only data whose origin can be traced was used;
- Interpretation of indicators for national data collection was verified individually for each country under review;
- Mapping tables were aligned through common Excel-based templates.

## **6.3 Literature Review**

The first step in data collection was the literature review. In order to provide a horizontal overview of the situation for the six EaP Countries, a thorough analysis of national situations was first carried out.

The primary focus of the literature review was on the legal frameworks and the cultural, social, economic and political contexts in each EaP country.

The first objective of the literature review was that of collecting comparable sets of information describing country backgrounds (such as legislation, gender institutions, cultural traditions); the second was to facilitate the interpretation of national statistics.

Believing that understanding national contexts is a factor in the correct analysis of data, the Team devoted significant efforts to context consideration, sustaining arguments on opportunities and hindrances that relate to women in power positions.

## **6.4 Mapping Tables**

The Mapping Tables developed by the Team cover definitions for each indicator used for data collection and interpretation for each EaP country. In order to ensure validity and reliability of

final conclusions, the Team needed a common framework of interpretation of definitions and comparability with the definitions used in the EU-28 study.

The Mapping tables are evocative of the diversity of the national contexts, names and meanings of the institutions that we are dealing with in the EaP Countries.

They provide comparable equivalents of definitions of each indicator, in national language and in the most adequate translation into English.

The Mapping tables are enclosed in the Annexes.

## **6.5 Interpretation of indicators**

To the extent possible, a common approach on the interpretation of indicators was developed. The Team looked for equivalents and applicability of the indicators to national contexts.

Often, the indicators developed for the EU-28 study were not directly applicable to all EaP contexts. Inter alia, these can be relative to junior ministers, highest ranking civil servants per levels or level of seniority of academic staff. Appropriate interpretations were therefore made by the Team: justifications are provided in the Annexes.

The Team also reviewed the number of publicly listed companies, social partner organisations representing employers and workers, universities and media organisations analysed in this Study, in order to adapt these indicators to different national environments.

Complete information on the interpretation of the indicators is provided in the tables for each country and reported in the Annexes.

## **6.6 Statistical tables**

The Team collected statistical data for each objective indicated in the Terms of Reference and reported through the Excel templates.

The Statistical tables, which provide figures for political, economic, academic and media indicators, were developed in close cooperation with the EIGE. They are not annexed to the present Study and will be delivered separately.



## **6.7 Limitations of the study**

Several difficulties appeared while carrying out the Study, requiring the use of great analytical care and the maximisation of the available time schedule.

### **Access to data**

Differences in administrative procedures across the EaP Countries led to delay and required adaptation. For example, as contacts with governmental structures may range from very formal to very informal, their effectiveness may also vary. In some instance, government representatives may show reluctant to provide information, notwithstanding its public nature. In these cases, complex, time-consuming procedures had to be followed to obtain information.

Data collection from private companies proved particularly difficult. Since part of the relevant information was collected through surveys, the statistical quality of results may vary due to the different and limited number of companies surveyed and should be used with care.

### **Time constraints**

The Team faced important time constraints, as the total time allocated to adapt the methodology, collect data from mainly primary sources, draft the national literature reviews and the Final report, did not exceed two months. Although this does not reflect on the quality of the data collected and presented, in a further iteration of the study more information may be added for an enlarged picture.

### **Adaptation of methodology**

While for Objective II the study Team could approach different administrative structures, dissimilar procedures had to be used for Objective III and Objective IV. Consequently, a research device covering and comparing statistical elements must take into account their diverse origin.

## Annex 1 – Country Results

### Armenia

#### Objective II - Public power positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women senior ministers	3	15,8	14,2
Distribution of ministers in different fields of action			
Basic	1	20	17,1
Economy	0	0	4,2
Infrastructure	0	0	1,9
Socio-cultural	2	33,3	26,5
Women in national parliament	13	9,9	16,3
Women in regional assemblies (not applicable to Armenia)			
Women in local assemblies	555	9,5	26,7
Women leaders in political parties	1	33,3	10,7
Women deputy leaders in political parties	0	0	14,9
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 1	0	0	17,4
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 2	8	13,1	33,7
Distribution of Level 1 in different fields of action			
Basic	0	0	11,0
Economy	0	0	27,5
Infrastructure	0	0	32,3
Socio-cultural	0	0	7,2
Distribution of Level 2 in different fields of action			
Basic	4	17,4	32,9
Economy	3	42,9	38,7
Infrastructure	0	0	32,2
Socio-cultural	1	6,3	34,6

### Objective III – Economic positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women Governors and vice Governors of Central Bank	0	0	
Women board members of Central Bank	0	0	9,2
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of workers' organizations	0	0	15,3
Women members of the governing bodies of workers' organizations	8	34,8	
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of employers' organizations	P: 0 - VP: 2	P: 0 - VP:	10,4
Women Presidents and CEOs of registered companies	0	0	14,7

### Objective IV – Top management position in academia and media

	N°	%	EaP%
Women in academic staff by level of seniority	L1 1 - L2 7	L1 10 - L2 7,5	N/A
Women at levels 1 and 2 in public media	2	100,0	N/A
Women at levels 1 and 2 in private media	L1 0 - L2 1	L1 0 - L2 25,0	N/A
Women board members of public broadcasters	1	25,0	N/A

### Women and politics

Although **Armenia** has introduced a 20 per cent gender quota and requires that every fifth person in party lists running for Parliament must be from a different gender, in fact today, only 13 parliamentarians, out of 131, are women. This is due to the legislation that allows women candidates included in the lists to withdraw and let the man candidate next on the list to occupy the seat. Only 3 women were appointed ministers out of 19 and 4 women deputy ministers out of 61. At local level, 9.5 per cent of members of local assemblies in the city and village councils are women.

An interesting research, which included surveys conducted in Armenia by the Yerevan State University Centre for Gender and Leadership Studies<sup>143</sup> about women and politics reflects the obstacles facing women who want to access political positions and exercise political power.

Mutatis mutandis, its results could be applied to all EaP Countries. Indeed, the research carried out for this Study provided quite similar results and revealed a deeply embedded, patriarchal, social and cultural system of values. That stereotyped view that a woman's place is at home and reserving political careers and political life to men continues to prevail, including amongst women. Men are sceptical of women's ability to run for office or to effectively take decisions and to govern predominantly male staff.

<sup>143</sup> Strengthening Women's political participation in the Republic of Armenia: Existing Efforts, Challenges and Opportunities, Centre for Gender and Leadership Studies, Yerevan State University, 2015.

The same research considers that women who choose a political career are often perceived as unsuccessful in their personal life while the political arena is commonly perceived as a men's world. In Armenia, it is common for politically or economically active women to be single or divorced without children. The political culture is generally perceived in a negative way and the political arena is commonly seen as the reserve of a limited number of people – be they women or men – who must accept practices that women may not want to partake. As a consequence, women often prefer civil activism to politics. In addition, as in the rest of the world, in the EaP Countries women politicians face discriminatory practices from men – and women – that include criticising their personal appearance, arguing that they possess a lower intelligence than men and purporting that they use ambiguous methods to reach their career goals. In its turn, the media do not contribute to avoiding those stereotypes by raising awareness towards gender-related issues.

These additional hardships and gender prejudices discourage women from starting political careers and establishing political contacts at a young age. Therefore an active woman who, from an early age is determined to play a political role and to pursue a political career, is a rare phenomenon. In addition, and also because of all this, social demand and interest from women themselves is limited. Women, in Armenia but it applies to all EaP Countries, often lack role models and they have not united to form truly large-scale movements.

Also, as in all countries and not just in the EaP, running for political elections represents a major financial investment and therefore women's political participation is limited by their scarcity of financial resources and limited independence. Women may be more successful in local elections, as less financial support is needed in small communities and a woman candidate can more easily be elected as village mayor or member of a local municipal council.

Once women are elected it must be emphasised that they are less welcomed than men within the major political and economic networks, making it even more challenging for them to have an opportunity for a meaningful participation in political decision-making. Indeed, once they have access to the political positions that they have so much striven for, they often face another type of prejudice. This is exemplified in Belarus by male MPs who feel that it is good to have women in a men's team because it ennobles it and beautifies politics, thereby relinquishing women to a purely decorative function<sup>144</sup>.

## **Women and the economy**

An ILO survey on young women and men in the Armenian labour force shows that already at a very young age women's choices are confined to certain sectors such as education whereas young men enjoy a wider array of options in terms of possible jobs, including manual labour.

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<sup>144</sup> <http://oeec.by/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Analysis-of-Gender-Sector-in-Belarus.pdf>.

This results in unemployment rates for young girls of 36.6 per cent, 12 percentage points above the rate for males. Young women are therefore not only much less likely than young men to get employed, they are also much more prone to disappearing from the labour force, either out of discouragement or because they have to tend to family responsibilities. In addition, the survey demonstrates a marked gender pay gap: on average female employees are paid one third less than the amount earned by male employees, despite the higher levels of education attained by girls, which should normally result in better opportunities and higher salaries<sup>145</sup>. Once these unequal paths are set they never appear to change throughout the working lives of women and men. Armenian women work mainly in hotels and restaurants, with 64.9 per cent of the sector's total employment, in education at 80.9 per cent, in health and social services at 83.4 per cent and in households at 71 per cent. Women's unemployment reaches 18 per cent, compared to 14 per cent for men, and the gender pay gap is 34.4 per cent<sup>146</sup>.

### **Decision making in civil society**

It is believed that there are 60 active NGO organisations in Armenia that deal with gender equality issues. Women work in four major fields of operation: protection of women's rights, promotion of professional activities, and provision of social services and elimination of violence against women. The NGOs have undertaken a large number of researches, funded mainly by international donors.<sup>147</sup>

### **Women's participation in conflict resolution and reconciliation**

Armenia adhered to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325<sup>148</sup>, which supports the promotion of women's active participation in all operations of peaceful resolution and reconciliation of conflict. However it does not have an action plan addressing the resolution. Most of the steps taken towards peace-building, involving women and gender-related issues were initiated by networks of women NGOs and international organisations. The Gender Policy Strategic Programme, the National Action Plan on Improving the Status of Women and Enhancing their Role in Society and the Gender Policy Action Plans in Armenia outline how

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<sup>145</sup> "Strengthening Women's political participation in the Republic of Armenia: Existing Efforts, Challenges and Opportunities", Centre for Gender and Leadership Studies – Yerevan State University – 2015. The 2012 standard ILO school-to-work transition survey was adapted to the Armenian context and implemented by the National Statistical Service based on a consultative process with ILO. Youth from 3300 households were questioned.

<sup>146</sup> ILOSTAT database, data of 2013.

<sup>147</sup> Women in ARMENIA Peace, Security and Democracy from a Women's Rights perspective, [http://bim.lbg.ac.at/sites/files/bim/Women\\_per\\_cent20in\\_per\\_cent20Armenia\\_Peace\\_Security\\_Democracy\\_0.pdf](http://bim.lbg.ac.at/sites/files/bim/Women_per_cent20in_per_cent20Armenia_Peace_Security_Democracy_0.pdf).

<sup>148</sup> Text of the Resolution, <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement>.

women should be integrated in decision-making positions at all levels and sectors. However, despite these commitments women are mainly active at informal levels and excluded from official decisions.

The Trans-Caucasus Women's Dialogue, for instance, established in 1994, brought together women from Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia to work on projects such as the rehabilitation of children victims of war and the training for peace and democracy-building capacity. Women for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in the Southern Caucasus, an initiative started by the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) in 2001, addresses the condition of the unresolved conflict known as no-war-no-peace in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia.

Women have not been involved in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh formal peace process. The Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, as part of the European Partnership for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, developed an advocacy strategy for the Minsk Group<sup>149</sup>. They urged political actors in peace negotiations to increase women's participation in political decision-making, through special temporary measures such as quotas, and in peace talks, such as by their representation in the OSCE/Minsk Group talks, making gender-sensitive training available to all participants involved in talks on this region and ensuring support for women who are victims of violence.

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<sup>149</sup> The Minsk Group, the activities of which have become known as the Minsk Process, spearheads the OSCE's efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is co-chaired by France, the Russian Federation and the United States <http://www.osce.org/mg>.

## Azerbaijan

### Objective II - Public power positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women senior ministers	1	2,6	14,2
Distribution of ministers in different fields of action			
Basic	0	0	17,1
Economy	0	0	4,2
Infrastructure	0	0	1,9
Socio-cultural	1	9,1	26,5
Women in national Parliament	19	15,3	16,3
Women in regional assemblies (not applicable for Azerbaijan)			
Women in local assemblies	5236	34,9	26,7
Women leaders in political parties	0	0	10,7
Women deputy leaders in political parties	0	0	14,9
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 1	1	3,6	17,4
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 2	43	17,6	33,7
Distribution of Level 1 in different fields of action			
Basic	0	0	11,0
Economy			27,5
Infrastructure			32,3
Socio-cultural	1	10,0	7,2
Distribution of Level 2 in different fields of action			
Basic	5	27,8	32,9
Economy	9	12,5	38,7
Infrastructure	9	15,3	32,2
Socio-cultural	20	20,8	34,6

### Objective III – Economic positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women Governors and vice Governor of Central Bank	0	0	
Women board members of Central Bank	0	0	9,2
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of workers organizations	0	0	15,3
Women members of the governing bodies of workers' organizations	2	7,7	
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of employers' organizations	0	0	10,4
Women members of the governing bodies of employers' organizations	0	0	10,4
Women Presidents and CEOs of registered companies	0	0	14,7



#### Objective IV – Top management position in academia and media

	N°	%	EaP%
Women in academic staff by level of seniority			N/A
Women at levels 1 and 2 in public media			N/A
Women at levels 1 and 2 in private media			N/A
Women board members of public broadcasters			N/A

#### Women and politics

With 2.6 per cent of women as senior ministers, Azerbaijan has the lowest participation of women in the governments of the EaP Countries. Its women deputies [Members of Parliament] however count for 15 per cent, close to the EaP average, and the presence of women in local assemblies is as high as 35 per cent. Local research has shown that Parliamentarians are elected through a selection rather than an election system. Candidates have more chances of being elected if representing the ruling party and with the help of connections with high-level government representatives. Local elections at municipal level operate along a similar mechanism. Although there is no official quota system, an unofficial quota has been applied by the ruling party to increase the number of women represented in municipalities. For example, further to the 2009 municipal elections, the number of women elected jumped from 3 to 26 per cent and in 2014 this figure rose again to the above-mentioned 35 per cent. In the parliamentary elections of 1 November 2015 none of the 65 candidates of the new political movement 125s Club comprising 13 women was elected, despite they were very popular. The political environment in Azerbaijan is not sufficiently transparent to comment on this data and does not appear to be conducive of the promotion and election of independent women.

#### Women and the economy

The gender pay gap is higher than 50 per cent<sup>150</sup> in Azerbaijan. According to 2014 State Statistics Committee information out of 455,000 individuals who applied to be registered as entrepreneurs<sup>151</sup>, 81,650 were women, representing almost 18 per cent of the total number of enterprises. The distribution of the registrations shows that women's greatest interest

<sup>150</sup> ILO [http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/briefingnote/wcms\\_410196.pdf](http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---gender/documents/briefingnote/wcms_410196.pdf).

<sup>151</sup> In all EaP Countries professionals can register as individual entrepreneurs. This does not imply that they create a company. They can hire people and they remain liable towards their creditors on their own personal assets.

concentrates on trade business with a 43.5 per cent share, followed by agriculture with 14 per cent. The remaining registrations are low: 4 per cent in tourism business, 3 per cent in real estate, 3 per cent in professional, scientific and technical activity, 2 per cent in processing industry and 1.7 per cent in education. Women tend to work in low-paid jobs and more in the informal economy than men. Many production enterprises hire most of their employees without a labour contract and women often have to work in menial jobs<sup>152</sup>.

## Belarus

### Objective II - Public power positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women senior ministers	2	8,3	14,2
Distribution of ministers in different fields of action			
Basic	0	0	17,1
Economy	0	0	4,2
Infrastructure	1	11,1	1,9
Socio-cultural	1	20,0	26,5
Women in national Parliament	30	27,3	16,3
Women in regional assemblies	87	21,1	N/A
Women in local assemblies	8.622	46,9	26,7
Women leaders in political parties	0	0	10,7
Women deputy leaders in political parties	1	33,3	14,9
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 1	13	14,1	17,4
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 2	83	37,4	33,7
Distribution of Level 1 in different fields of action			
Basic	4	16,7	11,0
Economy	1	11,1	27,5
Infrastructure	6	15,0	32,3
Socio-cultural	2	10,5	7,2
Distribution of Level 2 in different fields of action			
Basic	18	22,2	32,9
Economy	13	41,9	38,7
Infrastructure	31	43,7	32,2
Socio-cultural	21	53,8	34,6

<sup>152</sup> The absence of available gender-disaggregated data has restricted the analysis of Azerbaijan in the present study.

### Objective III – Economic positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women Governors and vice Governor of Central Bank	0	0	0
Women board members of Central Bank	3	30,0	9,2
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of workers' organizations	1	33,3	15,3
Women members of the governing bodies of workers' organizations	8	18,2	
Women Presidents of employers' organizations	1	33,3	9,0
Women vice Presidents of employers' organizations	1	10,0	10,4
Women members of the governing bodies of employers' organizations	6	9,0	10,4
Women presidents and CEOs of registered companies	3	33,3	
Women members of the governing bodies of registered companies	15	28,8	14,7

### Objective IV – Top management position in academia and media

	N°	%	EaP%
Women in academic staff differentiated by level of seniority			
Level 1, rectors	2	20,0	11,7
Level 2, vice rectors	7	11,9	18,6
Women at level 1 in public media	0	0	16,7
Women at level 2 in public media	1	33,3	NA
Women at level 1 in private media	0	0	NA
Women at level 2 in private media	6	85,7	NA
Women board members of public broadcasters	2	40	NA

### Women and politics

All top politicians in power in Belarus are men, including its President, Prime-Minister and Chairmen of both Chambers of Parliament. In 2015, the traditionally men-dominated political arena was challenged by a woman candidate for presidential office, who for the first time in Belarus' history obtained the second best results ahead of two male candidates. There is no quota mechanism in Belarus to promote women's participation in politics. However, the percentage of women in the Parliament is relatively high: as of November 2015 there were 30 women out of 110 delegates in the Lower Chamber of the National Assembly<sup>153</sup>. In the regional and local assemblies, women's representation is even higher, reaching 46.3 per cent<sup>154</sup>. According to a 2013 country report of the East-European School of Political Studies,<sup>155</sup> women's representation in Belarus is the result of the President's order, who in one of his speeches declared that there

<sup>153</sup> [www.house.gov.by](http://www.house.gov.by), 17, <http://www.rec.gov.by/sites/default/files/pdf/Elections-MS27-soob8.pdf>.

<sup>154</sup> <http://www.rec.gov.by/sites/default/files/pdf/Elections-MS27-soob8.pdf>.

<sup>155</sup> [http://www.coe.int/t/DEMOCRACY/ELECTORAL-ASSISTANCE/publications/Women-Belarus\\_en.pdf](http://www.coe.int/t/DEMOCRACY/ELECTORAL-ASSISTANCE/publications/Women-Belarus_en.pdf), <http://oeec.by/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Analysis-of-Gender-Sector-in-Belarus.pdf>.

should be no less than 30 to 40 per cent of women in the Parliament. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers, a powerful political body, is composed of eleven members and only one is a woman. Ms. Natalia Kochanova is also one of the five deputy prime ministers. There are no women ministers in the basic and economy types of ministries, traditionally a male-dominated area in Belarus, and there is only one female minister in the infrastructure and one in the socio-cultural ministries that represent a customary area of women's employment. Political parties in Belarus oppose, rather than support, the idea of gender equality despite the fact that their programmes declare democratic values and freedoms<sup>156</sup>. None of the three political parties represented in the Chamber of Representatives (the lower chamber of the Parliament) is led by a woman. Only one of fifteen political parties officially registered in Belarus has a female leader, what appears to be highly suggestive of the limited influence that women can have on the Belarus political parties<sup>157</sup>.

### **Women and the economy**

Women constitute more than half of the human capital in Belarus and they have a higher level of education than men. However, they have lower paying jobs than men, earning on average 80 per cent of a man's salary. The difference in salary generally appears in the way bonuses are distributed<sup>158</sup>. Women are concentrated in professional sectors such as healthcare (85 per cent), education (82 per cent), hotels and restaurants (76 per cent), finance (75 per cent) and trade (71 per cent). Their involvement is limited in the production and distribution of electricity, gas and water, mining and fisheries (around 30 per cent). According to Ms. Iryna Alkhouska, who chairs the international public association Gender Perspectives, gender inequality in the labour market between men and women continues to prevail. In the year 2000, a Council of Ministers' decision<sup>159</sup> specifically prohibited many professions to women in hazardous industries and jobs considered to be dangerous for health. The list is extensive and covers, in addition to works such as those connected with lifting and moving weights manually, jobs such as drivers of buses, cars and trucks, firepersons, tractor operators or lumber persons. Potential motherhood is perceived by employers as an obstacle to offering a job. Hence, Belarusian women are more likely than men to agree to low-pay jobs and all these combined factors push them to becoming individual entrepreneurs. Indeed, 63 per cent of the individual Belarusian entrepreneurs are women. In 2013, an Enterprise Survey conducted by the World Bank showed that 33 per cent of the surveyed Belarusian firms had women top managers in the economic sector<sup>160</sup> and 44 per cent of

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<sup>156</sup> <http://oeec.by/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Analysis-of-Gender-Sector-in-Belarus.pdf>.

<sup>157</sup> <http://www.bsdp.org/presidium>.

<sup>158</sup> [http://odb-office.eu/expertise/\\_gender/what-are-gender-rights-and-opportunities-belarus#sthash.rjfJ1cqr.dpuf](http://odb-office.eu/expertise/_gender/what-are-gender-rights-and-opportunities-belarus#sthash.rjfJ1cqr.dpuf).

<sup>159</sup> The list of heavy manual work and work involving hazardous conditions for which women's recruitment is prohibited, Council of Ministers decision N°765, May 26, 2000.

<sup>160</sup> The World Bank Enterprise Survey involved a sample of 360 Belarus firms, [www.enterprisesurveys.org/Data/ExploreTopics/gender](http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Data/ExploreTopics/gender).

those firms had women among their shareholders. Firms headed by women had twice the amount of permanent full-time women workers than firms headed by men. The largest GDP-forming companies in Belarus do not yet have gender-balanced policies and do not tend to employ women and promote them to management positions. Women's share of CEOs in the largest companies is about 10 per cent and among the corporate board members it is about 29 per cent<sup>161</sup>.

### **Decision making in civil society**

Today there are more than thirty active women NGOs in Belarus, whose activities are mainly dedicated to developing women's entrepreneurship and business, defending reproductive health and combating domestic violence. NGOs are often the only actors who raise gender equality issues, advocate policy measures to be adopted by the state and monitor how they are addressed by the state. The most active NGOs are: the international NGO Gender Perspectives, Belarusian Young Women Christian Association, Women's Independent Democratic Movement, Radislava and the feminist initiative Gender Route. Regrettably, the Belarusian civil society appears to have little influence or impact on the development of the state gender policies<sup>162</sup>. It is worth noting however, that in December 2012 an independent movement composed of political parties, NGOs and trade unions signed a memorandum on the implementation of the National Gender Platform. The memorandum, which is addressed to both the civil society and the Government, proposes to attain gender equality through measures related to decision-making, reproductive health, gender-sensitive public awareness, and domestic violence. The Platform decided to create a permanent women's leadership school to prepare women for local elections campaigns.

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<sup>161</sup> The list of GDP-forming companies was selected from the Belarus largest companies, [www.government.by](http://www.government.by).

<sup>162</sup> Analysis of the gender sector in Belarus, Office for European Expertise and Communication.

## Georgia

### Objective II - Public power positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women senior ministers	4	21,1	14,2
Distribution of ministers in different fields of action			
Basic	3	42,9	17,1
Economy	0		4,2
Infrastructure	0		1,9
Socio-cultural	1	16,7	26,5
Women in national Parliament	17	11,3	16,3
Women in regional assemblies	4	19,0	
Women in local assemblies	242	11,6	26,7
Women leaders in political parties	1	14,3	10,7
Women deputy leaders in political parties	13	31,0	14,9
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 1	20	24,4	17,4
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 2	91	35,0	33,7
Distribution of Level 1 in different fields of action			
Basic	11	25,6	17,4
Economy	3	18,8	33,7
Infrastructure	3	50,0	
Socio-cultural	3	17,6	11,0
Distribution of Level 2 in different fields of action			
Basic	38	32,8	32,9
Economy	13	25,0	38,7
Infrastructure	11	52,4	32,2
Socio-cultural	29	40,8	34,6
Women in Supreme Courts	4	30,8	28,9

### Objective III – Economic positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women Governors and vice Governors of Central Bank	0	0	0
Women board members of Central Bank	0	0	9,2
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of workers' organizations	1	33,3	15,3
Women members of the governing bodies of workers' organizations	5	20,0	
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of employers' organizations	0	0	10,4
Women members of the governing bodies of employers' organizations	2	18,2	10,4
Women presidents and CEOs of registered companies	0	0	
Women members of the boards of registered companies	1	3,3	14,7

#### Objective IV – Top management position in academia and media

	N°	%	EaP%
Women in academic staff differentiated by level of seniority	11	25,5	N/A
Women at levels 1 and 2 in public media	3	37,5	N/A
Women at levels 1 and 2 in private media organisations	6	31,6	N/A
Women board members of public broadcasters	4	57,1	N/A

#### Women and politics

Gender equality in **Georgia**'s political life remains a major challenge. Women hold four out of nineteen ministerial positions in the cabinet and their presence has been stable. The portfolios are diversified: Defence, Justice, Education and Science, European and Euro-Atlantic Integration. Having a woman - Ms. Tinatin Khidasheli - as Minister of Defence, a traditionally male-dominated sphere, is important for Georgia as this provides a powerful role model and may help change popular expectations about women's participation in the defence and security fields. The 14 women deputy ministers represent 28 per cent of all deputy ministers. It is worth noting that in 2013 a few high-level strategic positions were attributed to women for the first time: the National Security Council Secretary, assisting Georgia's President on national security issues, the Chair of the Central Election Commission and that of the Energy and Water Supply Regulatory Commission<sup>163</sup>. Georgian women won 17 out of the 150 seats in the October 2012 parliamentary elections, or 11 per cent of its members. This is a slight improvement in comparison with the 2008-2012 legislature where women only obtained 6.4 per cent of the seats.

Not only are there few women in the Parliament, but their presence in high ranking positions is very limited. Ms. Manana Kobakhidze is the first deputy chairperson of the Parliament and the chair of its Gender Equality Council. None of the eleven parliamentary factions, or parliamentary groups, is headed by a woman. There are only three women as deputy heads of factions. Only one of the fifteen Parliamentary Committees, the Human Rights and Civil Integration Committee, is chaired by a woman and only one woman in the Committee of European Integration takes up the first deputy chairman's position<sup>164</sup>.

Two political parties, not represented in the Parliament, are led by women. The Democratic Movement-United Georgia is headed by Ms. Nino Burdjanadze, former Speaker of the Parliament and a strong opposition party leader, who ran for the 2013 presidential elections and arrived second in the poll. The Georgian Way is headed by the former minister of Foreign

<sup>163</sup> Georgia, Beijing +20 National Review of the Implementation of the Beijing Declaration & Platform for Action, [http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/59/national\\_reviews/georgia\\_review\\_beijing20.ashx?v=1&d=20140917T100730](http://www.unwomen.org/~media/headquarters/attachments/sections/csw/59/national_reviews/georgia_review_beijing20.ashx?v=1&d=20140917T100730).

<sup>164</sup> Official Website Georgia's Parliament: <http://www.parliament.ge/ge/saparlamento-saqmianoba/komitetebi>.



Affairs, Ms. Salome Zurabishvili, but the party and its leader, after losing the elections are no longer visible. It is interesting to note that the promotion of women in politics is not on the agenda of these parties' programmes.

At local level, all nine governors appointed by the Prime Minister to represent the executive branch of the central government in the nine regions of Georgia, are men<sup>165</sup>. There are only two women out of 69 local Gamgebelis (heads of provincial municipal districts) while all Mayors of the 12 local self-governing cities are men<sup>166</sup>.

The 2014 local elections have revealed another alarming picture of gender imbalance. There were no improvements to the two previous elections in 2006 and 2010 as women account only for 11.6 per cent of the members of Sakrebulo, the local representative councils. Women chair only 2 out of 64 Sakrebulo, i.e. 3 per cent. The female participation ratio is particularly low in local representative bodies of the areas where Azerbaijani and Armenian population minorities reside and represents only 2.7 per cent of the total number of Sakrebulo members.

Finally as far as diplomatic services are concerned, there are only 6 Georgian women Ambassadors out of 52.

## **Women and the economy**

**Georgia** suffers from relatively high unemployment rates of both men and women. Women however, are further disadvantaged in the labour market, by vertical and horizontal segregations, pay gap and unpaid domestic and caring work in the households. Men with higher education are 1.2 times more likely to get employed than women with higher education<sup>167</sup>. The average monthly nominal salaries of women are lower than those of men in all sector of the economy<sup>168</sup>. Women, who make up 39 per cent of business employees, earn between 32 and 37 per cent less than men in the business sector<sup>169</sup>. Women make up between 80 and 85 per cent of employees in the education, healthcare and social assistance sectors; 61 per cent in hotels and restaurants. Only the wholesale and some retail trade sectors have more balanced employment patterns, with 52 per cent of men and 48 per cent of women. Some sectors remain the privileged province of men: women's involvement in the construction, transport and communications sectors is well below

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<sup>165</sup> <http://www.transparency.ge/en/node/5218>.

<sup>166</sup> Gender Monitoring of Local Self-Government Bodies and Strengthening Women Involvement in Political Life. Published by ISFED, [www.scribd.com/doc/243941369/Gender-Monitoring-of-Local-Self-Government-Bodies-and-Strengthening-Women-Involvement-in-Political-Life](http://www.scribd.com/doc/243941369/Gender-Monitoring-of-Local-Self-Government-Bodies-and-Strengthening-Women-Involvement-in-Political-Life).

<sup>167</sup> International Centre for Education Policy Planning and Management (EPPM), 2012. Education and workforce in Georgia.

<sup>168</sup> GeoStat data for 2014.

<sup>169</sup> Woman and Men in Georgia, 2013, p. 60, [http://geostat.ge/cms/site\\_images/files/english/health/women\\_per\\_cent20and\\_per\\_cent20men\\_per\\_cent202013Analytical.pdf](http://geostat.ge/cms/site_images/files/english/health/women_per_cent20and_per_cent20men_per_cent202013Analytical.pdf).

10 per cent. They fare better in the energy and manufacturing sectors (19 and 27 per cent<sup>170</sup> respectively). Women made up 43.6 per cent of the recipients of micro-credits in 2012<sup>171</sup>. In a 2013 UN Women study<sup>172</sup>, the majority of women interviewed said that their main source of information on loan products was the social network such as neighbours, friends, or relatives, rather than direct marketing. Women often struggle to obtain a loan from a microfinance institution since a collateral such as immovable property is required as security, and land is usually registered solely in their husband's name. Particularly in rural areas, women often have little involvement in economic decision-making and they lack information about their rights under civil law<sup>173</sup>. Indeed, tradition, customary law and religious practices have a strong influence on attitudes to land ownership in practice, and these factors typically discriminate against women. As an alternative to employment, women can launch their own companies and indeed they were 32 per cent of the owners of newly registered enterprises in 2014. Looking at women on the boards of companies,<sup>174</sup> none is a President or a CEO and only the Caucasus Energy and Infrastructure Company has a woman on its board. One of the reasons for women's lower involvement in the labour market in Georgia is labour emigration. It is currently estimated that 56 per cent of all labour migrants leaving Georgia are women. Abroad, the majority of them accept unofficial work as housekeepers or caretakers.

### **Decision making in civil society**

**Georgia** is witnessing an unprecedented development in women's participation in informal politics, in building civil society, and in NGOs. Organisations working in the area of women's rights represent roughly 10 to 12 per cent of all the registered organisations in Georgia<sup>175</sup>. Civil society has already gained experience and has the potential to assist government in making informed decisions concerning women's rights and status, as well as in empowering women generally. Women's NGOs promoted the adoption of gender related laws. There is a significant research, awareness raising and advocacy capacity mobilised in the sector. There are good examples of NGOs transmitting knowledge and capacities on the empowerment of women to government at central and local levels. The Fund for Women Entrepreneurs operates in Western

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<sup>170</sup> Sumbadze, 2008.

<sup>171</sup> Data from the Microfinance Information Exchange (<http://genderindex.org/country/georgia>) women made up 43.58% of recipients of micro-credit in 2012.

<sup>172</sup> Accessibility of Microfinance Institution Services for Women: Existing Barriers and Opportunities. Results of two studies conducted in Georgia in 2012 and 2013. UN Women, 2013.

<sup>173</sup> USAID (n.d.), "USAID Country Profile: property rights and resource governance. Georgia", USAID, Washington, D.C.

<sup>174</sup> In Georgia most of the large companies are not listed on the national stock exchange. Six companies with available information listed at the Georgian Stock Exchange were analysed for the present study.

<sup>175</sup> Assessment of needs of women's movement in Georgia, Briefing-paper for the international development agencies and grant making institutions, WIC, 2007.

Georgia supporting women's active involvement in decision-making processes and economic independence.

### **Women's participation in conflict resolution and reconciliation**

The Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons, Occupied Territories, Accommodation, and Refugees of **Georgia** is in charge of IDP women's problems. As of 2010, the Ministry and UN Women were supporting the operation of five Legal Clinics that provide IDPs and conflict-affected citizens, particularly women, with free of charge legal aid particularly in relation to their property and housing rights. The denial of women's property right was identified as one of the mostly widespread problems in these communities.<sup>176</sup>

In 2011 the Parliament approved the 2012-2015 National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security for the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions Nos.1325, 1820, 1888, 1889, and 1960. The action plan is divided into the so-called 3P actions: Prevention of conflict and incidents of violence towards women in conflict; better Protection of women during and after the conflict; increasing and enhancing women's Participation in conflict prevention and managing processes. In order to implement the UN Security Council Resolutions 1325, the civil society organisations demand a higher representation of women in the Geneva Talks<sup>177</sup>. In 2012, there were four women representatives among the Georgian delegation in the Geneva Talks out of ten participants, which is considered to be the highest female participation in such activities. Today there are only two.

The Ministry for Reconciliation and Civic Equality is in charge of coordination and monitoring of activities undertaken towards the Georgian–Ossetian and Georgian–Abkhazian conflict resolution, generating new peace initiatives and reintegrating the conflict regions and their population with the rest of Georgia. The minister is a man, and his first deputy minister is a woman, Ms. Ketevan Tsikhelashvili, a member of the Geneva talks delegation.

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<sup>176</sup> IDP Women Association "Consent", Online publication #1, 2015, Georgian at [http://issuu.com/association\\_consent/docs/online\\_publication\\_-\\_1.1\\_-\\_draft\\_-\\_70eccd57dae660](http://issuu.com/association_consent/docs/online_publication_-_1.1_-_draft_-_70eccd57dae660)

<sup>177</sup> Geneva Talks are official negotiations with representation of parties in conflict: Georgia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Russia.

## Moldova

### Objective II - Public power positions

	Nº	%	EaP %
Women senior ministers	6	31,6	14,2
Women deputy / junior ministers	15	25,0	
Distribution of ministers in different fields of action			
Basic	2	40,0	17,1
Economy	-	-	4,2
Infrastructure	-	-	1,9
Socio-cultural	4	80,0	26,5
Women in national Parliament	22	21,8	16,3
Women in regional assemblies	1	2,9	
Women in local assemblies	3689	29,3	26,7
Women leaders in political parties	-	-	10,7
Women deputy leaders in political parties	5	20,8	14,9
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 1	2	40,0	17,4
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 2	343	65,3	33,7
Distribution of Level 1 in different fields of action			
Basic	0	0	11,0
Economy	1	100,0	27,5
Infrastructure	1	100,0	32,3
Socio-cultural	0	0	7,2
Distribution of Level 2 in different fields of action			
Basic	80	61,1	32,9
Economy	176	76,5	38,7
Infrastructure	30	44,1	32,2
Socio-cultural	57	59,4	34,6
Women in Supreme Courts	15	46,9	28,9

### Objective III – Economic positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women Governors and vice Governors of Central Bank	-	-	
Women board members of Central Bank	-	-	
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of workers' organizations	-	-	
Women members of the governing bodies of workers' organizations			
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of employers' organizations	-	-	
Women members of the governing bodies of employers' organizations	4	22,2	
Women presidents and CEOs of registered companies	7	17,9	

### Objective IV – Top management position in academia and media

	N°	%	EaP%
Women in academic staff differentiated by level of seniority			
Women at levels 1 and 2 in public media	1	10,0	11,7
Women at levels 1 and 2 in private media organisations	12	28,6	
Women board members of public broadcasters	5	62,5	

### Women and politics

With six ministers out of nineteen, Moldova has the highest proportion of women in the Governments of the EaP Countries, reaching almost 30 per cent. However, as previously mentioned, these ministers are highly concentrated in the socio-cultural sectors. Women's representation in the Moldovan Parliament has been increasing progressively from a mere 4 per cent in the 1990s to attain its highest level in the 2009-2010 legislature and then decreased in the last two legislatures to reach 21,8 per cent in the September 2015 elections as can be seen from the table below.

Table 1- Evolution of Moldovan women's representation in Parliament from 1990 to 2015

Legislature	N° of women in Parliament	N° of members of Parliament	Women's representation (%)
1990-1993	12	300	4.0
1994-1998	5	101	5.0
1998-2001	9	101	8.9
2001-2005	16	101	15.8
2005-2009	21	101	20.8
2009-2010	26	101	25.7
2010-2014	20	101	19.8
2015	22	101	21.8

Four out of nine parliamentary standing committees<sup>178</sup>, which exert a substantial amount of negotiating power in the adoption of legislative texts, are chaired by women. Local politics do not appear to be more inclined towards having Moldovan women in their representation, as the number of District Councilors and Mayors stagnates around 18 per cent since 2007.

## **Women and the economy**

The main sources of occupation for Moldovan women are the public administration, education, health and social work. They are also employed in services, such as shops, hotels and restaurants, or information communication and transport industries. A significant proportion of the working women in Moldova is employed by the government<sup>179</sup>. In 2014 there were about twice as many women as men in the public service. The majority of these women are employed as professionals and clerks, and some as senior officials and managers. Women tend to be concentrated at the lowest occupational levels. They remain underrepresented in senior management. In reviewing the limited data on women's occupation in different sectors from 2004 to 2014 it is striking to see how figures remain remarkably stable except for a substantial drop in skilled agricultural and fishery workers<sup>180</sup> and a limited increase in the administrative and service sectors. In Moldova, 27.5 per cent of the entrepreneurs are women, approximately 2 per cent of women managers run big enterprises, 10 per cent are in mid-sized enterprises, 40 per cent are in small enterprises and the remaining 48 per cent are in micro-enterprises. Women's increasing participation in entrepreneurship is viewed as a positive alternative to unemployment. In Moldovan firms, including small and medium enterprises, women do not attain management positions. If promoted, they will not have any line responsibilities but will rather be granted non-operational positions, such as vice-president, or staff positions, such as chief accountant.

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<sup>178</sup>Committee for public administration and regional development; Committee for social protection, health and family; Committee on Foreign Policy and European Integration; Legal Committee for appointments and immunities, <http://parlament.md/StructuraParlamentului/Comisiipermanente/tabid/84/language/en-US/Default.aspx>.

<sup>179</sup> Biroul National de Statistica (National Bureau of Statistics), 2014.

<sup>180</sup> From 228.700 workers in 2004 to 76.500 in 2014.

## Ukraine

### Objective II - Public power positions

		%	EaP %
Women senior ministers	1	5,9	14,2
Distribution of ministers in different fields of action			
Basic	0	0	17,1
Economy	1	25,0	4,2
Infrastructure	0	0	1,9
Socio-cultural	0	0	26,5
Women in national Parliament	51	12,1	16,3
Women in regional assemblies		11,7	
Women in local assemblies		28,0	26,7
Women leaders in political parties	1	16,7	10,7
Women deputy leaders in political parties	1	4,3	14,9
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 1	16	22,2	17,4
Women among the highest civil servants - Level 2	35	33,7	33,7
Distribution of Level 1 in different fields of action			
Basic	5	23,8	11,0
Economy	6	35,3	27,5
Infrastructure	4	28,6	32,3
Socio-cultural	1	5,0	7,2
Distribution of Level 2 in different fields of action			
Basic	12	36,4	32,9
Economy	12	33,3	38,7
Infrastructure	6	37,5	32,2
Socio-cultural	5	26,6	34,6
Women in Supreme Courts	13	27,7	28,0

### Objective III – Economic positions

	N°	%	EaP %
Women Governors and vice Governor of Central Bank	1	6,7	
Women members of the Central bank	3	5,0	
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of workers' organizations	4	3,3	
Women members of the governing bodies of workers' organizations	37	3,4	
Women Presidents and vice Presidents of employers' organizations	1	9,1	
Women presidents and CEOs of registered companies	0	0	



## Objective IV – Top management position in academia and media

	N°	%	EaP%
Women in academic staff differentiated by level of seniority	5	7,2	
Women at level 1 in academic staff	0	0	11,7
Women at level 2 in academic staff	5	8,5	
Women at levels 1 and 2 in public media	3	60,0	
Women at levels 1 and 2 in private media organisations	1	33,3	
Women board members of public broadcasters	N/A	N/A	

## Women and politics

**Ukrainian** women compose 55 per cent of the electorate, but are represented only by 12 per cent of women in the Parliament. This picture improves at local level: in January 2013, women members represented 12 per cent of regional councils, 23 per cent of district councils, 28 per cent of city councils, 51 per cent of village councils and 46 per cent of small village and settlements councils. The councils' authority level is negatively correlated with its gender balance: the lower the level of the authority the better are the chances for women of being elected, in particular among the council members of villages and village settlement councils. It is an excellent illustration of vertical gender segregation of policy areas<sup>181</sup>. The gender ratio of the Members of Parliament and local council members in the 2000-2012 period shows slight fluctuations, but remained low. During the 2009-2014 period, the Cabinet of Ministers never included more than three women at any time. In 2014 there was only one woman in the Government as Minister of Social Policy. In 2015, the Minister of Finance is the only woman out of seventeen Ministers.

## Women and the economy

One of the most prominent manifestations of inequality between **Ukrainian** women and men in the economy is the wage gap, which is largely due to the gender segregation in the labour market. Average women's wages were 76.3 per cent of men's in 2014. Experts believe that in the informal economy the gender pay gap is even wider. Women are mostly employed in sectors that do not offer high salaries, mostly in the public sector while men are employed in manual activities, management and information technology. The latter employment segments provide

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<sup>181</sup> National Review to the UN 2015 Commission on the Status of Women,  
[http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/NV111.07\\_att1\\_att2\\_att3\\_merged.pdf](http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/NV111.07_att1_att2_att3_merged.pdf).

much higher salaries<sup>182</sup>. Female employment has traditionally been predominant in activities with the lowest average wage, such as public and private services, hotels and restaurants services, education, health and social welfare, where women constitute the largest proportion of workers. Men tend to work, instead, in transport and construction. The Ukrainian Labour Code has a number of protective provisions for women that can create additional discrimination on the job market. In 2014, 10.8 per cent of men and 7.5 per cent of women were unemployed<sup>183</sup>. Only 22 per cent of businesses are owned by women and only 6 per cent of big businesses are run by women<sup>184</sup>; 31.5 per cent of companies in Ukraine have a female participation in ownership; 12.8 per cent of companies have majority female ownership and 18.8 per cent of firms have a female top manager<sup>185</sup>. It is more difficult for women to be granted loans, as they have fewer resources that can be used as collaterals. In practice a credit offered to a woman is short term and has high interest rate.

### **Decision making in civil society**

In **Ukraine**, further to the exacerbation of civil confrontation between November 2013 and February 2014 and the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by foreign troops, which led among other things to an increase of violence against women, the women leaders of the civil society, culture and art celebrity figures, journalists and Ukrainian women have actively taken part in non-violent resistance and promotion of national unity. The participants of civil protests dubbed Euromaidan have organized the O. Kobylanska<sup>186</sup> Female Sotnia of Self-defence<sup>187</sup>, provided legal, medical and other volunteer help, ensured public safety, organized events and made countless efforts to keep the protest peaceful and to overcome the effects of violence when the protest ceased to be peaceful. Such efforts attracted public attention and began to change the stereotyped roles that women are assigned to in society, including during the civil confrontations and international conflicts. NGOs, public communities and local authorities were also the first to provide protection and help to the displaced people of Ukraine - further explanations are provided in Section 3.4. A number of women members of parliament are working personally on the frontline, where they provide assistance to volunteers and hospitals.

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<sup>182</sup>United Nations Development Programme, “Women and Men on the Ukrainian Labour Market: A Comparative Study of Ukraine and the EU”, Kyiv, VAITE company, 2011, p. 20.

[http://www.undp.org.ua/files/en\\_25051Women\\_and\\_Men\\_on\\_the\\_Ukrainian\\_Labour\\_Market\\_Eng.pdf](http://www.undp.org.ua/files/en_25051Women_and_Men_on_the_Ukrainian_Labour_Market_Eng.pdf).

<sup>183</sup> State Statistics Service of Ukraine, статистичний збірник “Жінки і чоловіки України”, [Statistical digest “Women and Men in Ukraine”], Kyiv, 2015, p. 65.

<sup>184</sup> Enterprise Surveys of World Bank Group “What Businesses Experience”, retrieved 20 November, 2015 <https://www.enterprisesurveys.org/>.

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Olha Kobylanska (1863-1942) was a Ukrainian modernist writer and feminist.

<sup>187</sup>[http://www.academia.edu/8241376/The\\_Womens\\_Squad\\_in\\_Ukraines\\_Protests\\_Feminism\\_Militarism\\_and\\_Nationalism\\_on\\_the\\_Maidan](http://www.academia.edu/8241376/The_Womens_Squad_in_Ukraines_Protests_Feminism_Militarism_and_Nationalism_on_the_Maidan).

They also mobilised citizens by raising funds in support of internally displaced people, most of whom are women and children.

## Women's participation in conflict resolution and reconciliation

In **Ukraine** “women are often excluded at decision-making level, as well as from the military response to the crisis”<sup>188</sup>. However, a great amount of work is being carried out by the civil society, women organisations and local authorities. Regional executive bodies and local authorities provide temporary housing and food, ensure welfare payments and provide support for the internally displaced persons who are job seekers. Given the large number of women with children among the displaced persons, there is a need to give them employment, access to advanced professional training or retraining, welfare, childcare, healthcare and access to education for their children.<sup>189</sup>

## Annex 2 - Mapping Tables

### WIP Mapping tables: Parliament: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Lower House of Parliament
Armenia	National Assembly of the Republic of Armenia ՀՀ Ազգային Ժողով, HH Azgayin Joghov
Azerbaijan	National Assembly of Azerbaijan Republic (Milli Majlis)
Belarus	House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus
Georgia	Parliament of Georgia
Moldova	Parliament of the Republic of Moldova
Ukraine	Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine

<sup>188</sup> NATO, “The role of women in the Ukraine military conflict”, retrieved 27 November, 2015, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\\_123557.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_123557.htm).

<sup>189</sup> National Review to the UN 2015 Commission on the Status of Women, [http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/NV111.07\\_att1\\_att2\\_att3\\_merged.pdf](http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/Gender/publication/NV111.07_att1_att2_att3_merged.pdf).

### WIP Mapping tables: President of the Parliament: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	President of the parliament (original name)	President of the parliament (most adequate translation into English)
Armenia	ՀՀ Ազգային ժողովի նախագահ	President of the RA National Assembly
Azerbaijan	Azərbaycan Respublikası Milli Məclisinin Sədri	Chair of Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan Republic
Belarus	Председатель Палаты представителей Национального собрания Республики Беларусь	Chairman of the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of the Republic of Belarus
Georgia	SaqarTvelos Parlamentis Tavmjdomare	Chairman of the Parliament of Georgia
Moldova	Presedintele Parlamentului Republicii Moldova	The President of the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova
Ukraine	Голова Верховної Ради України	Verkhovna Rada Chairperson

### WIP Mapping tables: Regional Assemblies: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Regional assembly (original name)	Regional assembly (most adequate translation into English)
Armenia	N/A	N/A
Azerbaijan	N/A	N/A
Belarus	Областной Совет депутатов	Regional Council of Deputies
Georgia	Ajaris avtonomiuri respublikis umaglesi sabcho	Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara
Moldova	Gagauzia Halk Toplusu	The People's Assembly of Gagauzia
Ukraine	Обласна рада	Oblast councils

## WIP Mapping tables: President of regional assemblies: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	President of regional assembly (original name)	President of regional assembly (most adequate translation into English)
Armenia	N/A	N/A
Azerbaijan	N/A	N/A
Belarus	Председатель областного совета депутатов	Chairmen of Regional Council of Deputies
Georgia	Gubernatori, Acharis respublikis umaghlesi sabchos tavnjdomare,	Governors, Chair of Supreme Council of Autonomous Republic of Adjara
Moldova	Gagauzianin Başkani	Governor (Baskan) of Gagauzia
Ukraine	Голова обласної ради	Head of oblast councils

## WIP Mapping tables: Local Assemblies: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Local assemblies (original name)	Local assemblies (most adequate translation into English)
Armenia	Գյուղական/քաղաքային համայնքների ավագանիներ (Gyughakan/kaghakayin hamaynkneri avaganiner)	Village/City Councils
Azerbaijan	Bələdiyyələr	Municipalities
Belarus	Местные советы депутатов Mestnie sovety deputatov	Local Councils of Deputies
Georgia	Municipalitetis Sakrebulo	Municipal Councils
Moldova	Primarii, consilii locale, municipale si raionale	Mayors, local – villages/ municipal/district councils
Ukraine	Місцеві ради	Municipal council

## WIP Mapping tables: Government: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Head of state	Head of government	Cabinet
Armenia	The President of RA, ՀՀ նախագահ, (HH nakhagah)	Prime Minister, ՀՀ վարչապետ, (HH varchapet)	Senior: Ministers, նախարարներ, (Nakharamner) Junior: Deputy Ministers, Heads of Government 6 Adjunct Bodies Փոխնախարարներ, Կառավարությանը առընթեր մարմիններ, (Pokhnakharamner, Karavarutyane areneter marminner) (National Security, Police, Cadaster, Civil Aviation, State Property, Nuclear Safety)
Azerbaijan	President	Prime Minister	Cabinet of Ministers of Azerbaijan Republic <b>Senior Ministers:</b> Primer Minister, plus 20 Ministers, 10 Chairs of State Committees, 2 heads of Administrations, 3 Services, 1 head of Office (National Archive Office) and 1 head of Fund (State Social Protection Fund) + 6 deputy Prime Ministers (one deputy minister is the same person as the head of State Committee for Refugees and IDPs) <b>Junior Ministers:</b> deputy Ministers, deputy State Committee Chairs, deputy Heads of Administrations, deputy heads of Services, deputy heads of offices and deputies of head of Fund that are within the Cabinet of Ministers
Belarus	President	Prime Minister	Council of Minister: 43 members including: Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime Minister, 4 Deputy Prime Minister Head of Presidential Administration, 24 Ministers 12 Heads of State Committees and central government agencies
Georgia	President	Prime Minister	19 Ministers, 2 Deputy Prime Ministers, Head of Government of Adjara Autonomous Republic
Moldova	President	Prime Minister	Cabinet of Ministers – 19 members 1 Deputy Prime Ministers 16 – Ministers (Senior Ministers) 2 –ex-officio members: President of Academy of Science of Moldova; Balkan of UTA Gagauzia – senior minister
Ukraine	President	Prime Minister	The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Senior: Minister (18) Junior: Heads of other state executive authorities (56)

## WIP Mapping tables: Senior and junior ministers: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Senior ministers	Junior ministers
Armenia	Ministers Նախարարներ, (Nakharamer)	Deputy Ministers, Heads of Government 6 Adjunct Bodies (National Security, Police, Cadaster, Civil Aviation, State Property, Nuclear Safety) Փոխնախարարներ, Կառավարության առկյաթեր մարմիններ, (Pokhnakharamer, Karavarutyane areneter marminner)
Azerbaijan	Ministries	Deputy Ministers Deputy Chairs of Committees within the Cabinet Deputy Heads of Administrations within the Cabinet Deputy Director of Offices within the Cabinet Deputy Head of Services within the Cabinet Deputy Head of Funds within the Cabinet
Belarus	Ministries	N/A
Georgia	Ministries	N/A
Moldova	Members of Minister's Cabinet, including President of Academy of Science and Brascan of UTA Gagauzia	Deputy Ministers Deputy of President of Academy of Science Head and Deputy of Executive Committee of Gagauzia
Ukraine	Ministries	Heads of central executive bodies (state services, agencies, inspections, commissions, etc.)



# WIP Mapping tables: Highest ranking civil servants: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	level 1 administrators-highest level of administrative(non-political) positions within each ministry	level 2 administrators-second level of administrative (non-political) positions within each ministry
Armenia	The highest posts of the State Service of RA (Sub group I): In Ministries: Chiefs of Staffs. In Government: Deputy Chiefs of Staff. The Highest posts of Diplomatic Service In Foreign Ministry (Sub group I):First Secretary Նախարարություններում՝ Աշխատակազմի ղեկավարներ: Կառավարությունում՝ Աշխատակազմի ղեկավարի տեղակալներ Արտաքին գործերի նախարարությունում՝ գլխավոր Քարտուլար (ashkhatakazmi ghekavarn, ashkhatakazmi ghekavari teghakalner, glkhavor kartughar)	The highest posts of the State Service of RA (Sub group II): In Ministries: Deputy-Chiefs of Staffs, Heads of Agencies. In Government: Heads of Departments, Executive Managers. The Highest posts of Diplomatic Service In Foreign Ministry (Sub group II): Head of State Protocol Նախարարություններում՝ աշխատակազմերի ղեկավարների տեղակալներ, գործակալությունների պետեր: Կառավարությունում՝ վարչությունների պետեր, գործերի կառավարիչներ: Արտաքին գործերի նախարարությունում՝ Պետական արարողակարգի ծառայության ղեկավար (ashkhatakazmeri ghekaarneri teghekalner, gorcakalutyunneri peter, gorceri karavarichner, petakan araroghakargi ghekavar)
Azerbaijan	Head of Apparatus	Chairs of Departments
Belarus	Deputy Minister	Heads of Departments
Georgia	Head of the Administration of Government of Georgia (State Chancellery), Head of Presidential Administration Head of the Apparatus of the Parliament, Deputy Ministers	Deputy head of the Administration of Government Deputy Head of Presidential Administration Head of Department Head of Agency/Lepls
Moldova	Authorities of central public administration, state secretary, deputy heads of administrative authority: Head of Agencies (Statistics, Cadaster, Interethnic Relation, Moldsilva, Reserves, Tourism, Anti-corruption, CNAS, Archive, National Accreditation, Science & Technological Dev, Civil Service; Customs, Tax Inspection	Authorities of central public administration, heads and deputies of the bodies subordinated to the Ministries and to other administrative authorities
Ukraine	Deputy Ministers	Directors of departments in the ministries

# WIP Mapping tables: Ministries by BEIS type: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	B-Basic functions	E-Economy	I - Infrastructure	S-Socio-cultural functions
Armenia	Ministry of Defense Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Justice Ministry of Territorial Administration and Emergency Situations	Ministry of International Economic Integration and Reforms Ministry of Economy Ministry of Finance Ministry of Agriculture	Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources Ministry of Transport and Communication Ministry of Urban Development Ministry of Nature Protection	Ministry of Culture Ministry of Diaspora Ministry of Education and Science Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs Ministry of Sport and Youth Affairs Ministry of Healthcare
Azerbaijan	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Internal Affairs Ministry of National Security Ministry of Defense Ministry of Justice Ministry for Emergency Situations State Statistics Committee State Sea Administration State Border Service State Service for Mobilization and Military Service State Civil Aviation Administration National Archive Office	Ministry of Finance Ministry of Taxes Ministry of Economy and Industry Ministry of Energy State Committee for Securities State Committee for Customs Ministry of Agriculture	Ministry of Defense Industry Ministry of Ecology and National Resources Ministry of Communication and High Technologies Ministry of Transportation State Committee for City planning and Architecture State Committee for Property Issues Committee for Standardization, Metrology and Patent	Ministry of Health Ministry of Labor and Social Protection of Population Ministry of Culture and Tourism Ministry of Youth and Sport Ministry of Education State Committee for Refugees and IDPs State Committee for Family, Women and Children's Affairs State Committee for work with Religious entities State Committee for work with Diaspora Migration Service Social Protection Fund
Belarus	Ministry of Justice Ministry of Internal Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defense Ministry of Emergency Situations Ministry of Taxation	Ministry of Economy Ministry of Finance Ministry of Agriculture and Food Ministry of Industry	Ministry of Architecture and Construction Ministry of Housing and Communal Services Ministry of Information Ministry of Forestry Ministry of Trade Ministry of Communication and Informatization Ministry of Transport and Communication Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Ministry of Energy	Ministry of Culture Ministry of Education Ministry of Labor and Social Protection Ministry of Sport and Tourism Ministry of Healthcare

Country	B-Basic functions	E-Economy	I - Infrastructure	S-Socio-cultural functions
Georgia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Internal Affairs Ministry of Defense Ministry of Justice State Ministry of Reconciliation and Civic Equality Ministry of Correction State ministry on European and Euro-Atlantic Integration	Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development Ministry of Finance Ministry of Energy Ministry of Agriculture	Ministry of Environment and National Resources Ministry of Regional Development and Infrastructure	Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Affairs Ministry of Education and Science Ministry of Culture Ministry of Sport and Youth Affairs Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons State Ministry of Diaspora
Moldova	Ministry of Justice Ministry of Internal Affairs Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration Ministry of Defense UTA Gagauzia	Ministry of Economy Ministry of Finance Ministry of Agriculture and Food Industry	Ministry of Regional Development and Construction Ministry of Transport and Road Infrastructure Ministry of Environment Ministry of Information Technology and Communications	Ministry of Education Ministry of Culture Ministry of Labour and Social Protection and Family Ministry of Health Ministry of Youth and Sports Academy of Science of Moldova
Ukraine	Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Ministry of Defense of Ukraine Ministry of Justice of Ukraine	Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food of Ukraine Ministry of Economic Development and Trade of Ukraine Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine Ministry of Industrial Policy of Ukraine Ministry of Finance of Ukraine	Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources of Ukraine Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine Ministry of Regional Development, Construction and Housing and Communal Services of Ukraine Ministry of Information Policy of Ukraine	Ministry of Culture of Ukraine Ministry of Youth and Sports of Ukraine Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine Ministry of Health of Ukraine Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine

### WIP Mapping tables: Supreme Court Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Supreme Court (original name)	Supreme Court (most adequate translation into English)
Armenia	ՀՀ Վճռաբեկ Դատարան ՀՀ Վճռաբեկ դատարան	Cassation Court of the Republic of Armenia
Azerbaijan	Azərbaycan Respublikasının Ali Məhkəməsi	Supreme Court of Azerbaijan Republic
Belarus	Верховный суд Республики Беларусь	Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus
Georgia	Sakartvelos Uzenaesi Sasamartlo	Supreme Court of Georgia
Moldova	Curtea Supremă de Justiție	The Supreme Court of Justice
Ukraine	Верховний Суд України	The Supreme Court of Ukraine

### WIP Mapping tables: President of Supreme Court Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	President of supreme court (original name)	President of supreme court (most adequate translation into English)
Armenia	ՀՀ Վճռաբեկ Դատարանի նախագահ, ՀՀ Վճռաբեկ դատարանի նախագահ	President of Cassation Court of the Republic of Armenia
Azerbaijan	Azərbaycan Respublikasının Ali Məhkəməsinin sədri	Chair of Supreme Court of Azerbaijan Republic
Belarus	Председатель Верховного суда Республики Беларусь	Chairman of Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus
Georgia	Uzenaesi sasamartlos tavijsdomare	The Chairperson of the Supreme Court
Moldova	Curtea Supremă de Justiție	Supreme Court of Justice
Ukraine	Голова Верховного Суду України	President of the Supreme Court of Ukraine

**WIP Mapping tables: Political parties present in Parliament: Coverage for data collection 2015**

Country	Political Party (original name)	Political Party (most adequate translation into English)	Party leader (position)	Deputy leader (position)
Armenia	Hayastani Hanrapetakan Kusaktsutyun, Հայաստանի հանրապետական կուսակցություն	Republican Party of Armenia	President	Vice Presidents (4)
	Bargavach Hayastan Kusaktsutyun, Բարգավաճ Հայաստան կուսակցություն	Prosperous Armenia	President	Deputy Head
	Hay Azgayin Kongress Kusaktsutyun, Հայ ազգային կոնգրես կուսակցություն	Armenian National Congress	President	Vice Presidents (2)
Azerbaijan	Yeni Azərbaycan Partiyası Sosial Rifah Ana Vətən Ədalət Bütöv Azərbaycan Xalq Cəbhəsi Vətəndaş Həmrəyliyi Böyük Quruluş Ümid Demokratik İslahatlar Vətəndaş Birliyi	New Azerbaijan Party Social Welfare Motherland Justice United Azerbaijan National Front Party Citizen Solidarity Great Formation Hope Democratic Reforms Citizens Union	Chairman in all parties	Deputy Chairs in all parties
Belarus	Коммунистическая партия Беларуси	Communist Party of Belarus	Chairman	Deputy Chair
	Республиканская партия труда и справедливости	Republican Party of Labour and Justice		
	Белорусская аграрная партия	Belarus Agrarian Party		
Georgia	Kartuli Otsneba-Demokratiuli Sakartvelo	Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia	Chairman	Secretary General
	Sakartvelos Respublikuri Partia Erovnuli Forumi	Republican Party of Georgia	Chairperson	Deputy Chair
	Sakartvelos konservatiuli partia	National Forum Conservative Party of Georgia	Political Secretary	Political council
	Mrecveloba Gdaarchens sakartvelos	Industry Will Save Georgia	Chairman	Deputy chair
	Ertiani Nacionaluri Modzraoba	United National Movement	Head Leader	Chairman Secretary General
	Chveni sakartvelo- Tavisufali	Our Georgia – Free	Chairman	Secretary

Country	Political Party (original name)	Political Party (most adequate translation into English)	Party leader (position)	Deputy leader (position)
	Demokratebi	Democrats		General
Moldova	Partidul Liberal Democrat al Moldovei  Partidul Democrat al Moldovei  Partidul Liberal  Partidul Socialistilor din Republica Moldova  Partidul Comunistilor din Republica Moldova	Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova  Democratic Party of Moldova  Liberal Party  Party of Socialists of the Republic of Moldova  Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova	Chairman, President Honorable President	Vice Presidents Political Executive Committee
Ukraine	Фракція Партії "Блок Петра Порошенка"  Фракція Політичної партії "Народний Фронт"  Фракція Політичної партії "Опозиційний блок" у Верховній Раді України восьмого скликання  Фракція Політичної партії "Об'єднання "Самопоміч"  Фракція політичної партії "Всеукраїнське об'єднання "Батьківщина" у Верховній Раді України  Група "Партія "Відродження"	Faction of the party "Petro Poroshenko Bloc"  Faction of the Political party "People's Front"  Faction of the Political party "Opposition Bloc" in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of the eighth convocation  Faction of the Political party "Samopomich" Union"  Faction of the Political party the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" in the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine  Group "Party "Revival"	Head	First Deputy Head, Deputy Head



## Mapping Tables: Central bank: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Central bank	Decision-making bodies
Armenia	The Chairman of the Central Bank of RA, ՀՀ Կենտրոնական բանկի նախագահ (HH Kentronakan banki nakhagah)	The Central Bank Board, ՀՀ Կենտրոնական բանկի խորհուրդ, (HH Kentronakan banki khorhurd)
Azerbaijan	Central Bank of Azerbaijan Republic	Board of Central Bank of Azerbaijan Republic
Belarus	National Bank of the Republic of Belarus	The Board of the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus
Georgia	National Bank of Georgia	The Board of the National Bank of Georgia
Moldova	National Bank of Moldova	Supervisory Council (Consiliul de supraveghere) Executive Committee (Comitetul executiv)
Ukraine	National Bank of Ukraine	Council of the National Bank of Ukraine

## WIP Mapping tables: Social partners, workers: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Social partner, workers (3 largest)	Governing bodies (for each social partner mentioned)
Armenia	Confederation of Trade Unions of Armenia Հայաստանի խորհրդային կոնֆեդերացիա	Council of Federation
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan Trade Unions Confederation	Assembly
Belarus	Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus  Trade Union Association Belarusian Congress of Democratic Trade Unions	Chairman Vice-Chairs Presidium Plenum  Chairman Vice-Chair Council
Georgia (there are 2 confederations and 19 professional unions in Georgia)	Georgian Trade Union Confederation Adjarian Trade Union Confederation	Board  Board
Moldova	National Trade Union Confederation of Moldova consist of 27 Trade Union organizations	General Council consisting of a) Representatives of the 27 member organizations; b) the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Secretary of the Confederation; c) Committee of Confederation (32 persons)
Ukraine	Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine Trade Union of State Institutions of Ukraine Trade Union of Education and Science of Ukraine Trade Union of Health Care of Ukraine	Head Deputy Head Central Committee, Presidium



## WIP Mapping tables: Social partners, employers: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Social partner, employers (3 largest)	Governing bodies (foreach social partner mentioned)
Armenia	The Union of Manufacturers and Businessmen (Employers) of Armenia	Council
	Republican Union of Employers of Armenia	Council
Azerbaijan	National Confederation of Entrepreneurs (Employers) of Azerbaijan Republic	Board
Belarus	Business Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers named after Professor Max Kuniavsky (BUEE)	Board 4 Co-chairs Chair
	Chamber of Commerce and Industry	Chairman 3 Deputies Board
	Republican Confederation of Entrepreneurship	Chairman Co-Chairs Board
Georgia	Georgian Employers' Association	Board
Moldova	The National Confederation of Employers of the Republic of Moldova (CNPM)	Board of Confederation of Employers = Executive Committee represents the decision making bodies and cover the representatives of all 16 members of the Confederation.
Ukraine	Federation of Employers of Ukraine All-Ukrainian Association of Employers All-Ukrainian Association of Employers "Confederation of Employers of Ukraine"	Heads Deputy Heads of employee federations Boards of employer federations

### WIP Mapping tables: Publicly listed companies: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Name of companies (up to 10)	Governing bodies (for each company to be specified)
Armenia	Pure Iron Plant OJSC Ararat bank OJSC Artsakh HEK OJSC Armenian Economy Development Armenian Development Bank	Board of Directors
Azerbaijan	AKKORD Industry Construction Investment Corporation  Ata Sighorta	President, Governing Board, General Director  Chairman of Board of Directors, Governing board
Belarus (The blue chip index is not yet used in Belarus. Still the Council of Ministers lists 73 GDP-forming most valuable companies and the Ministry of Finance in its Quarterly Review lists 30 most profitable companies)	Belarusian Potash Company  JSC "Keramin"  JSC "Integral"  JSC "Minsk Motor Plant"  JSC "KamVol"  JSC "Grodno Azot"  Development Bank  The «Amkodor» holding  Minsk tractor works	Supervisory Board: including Chairman. General Director; Deputies;  General Director, 10 Deputies, Supervisory Board, including chairman  General Director, 6 Deputies, Supervisory Board Chairman  General Director, 10 Deputies, Supervisory Board Chairman  General Director, 3 Deputies, Supervisory Board, Chairman  General Director, 5 Deputies, Supervisory Board Chairman  Supervisory Board, Chairman, Management Board Chairman  General director, Deputies, Board 7 people, including the chairman;  General director; Deputies; Board; Char

Georgia	Bank of Georgia	General Director, Deputies, Supervisory Board (7 members), Chairman of the supervisory board. All of them are men.
	Telasi	General Director, Directors, Supervisory Board, Chairman of the Supervisory, Board and Deputy Chairman (6 members in total). All of them are men
	Caucasus Energy and Infrastructure	General Director, Supervisory Board, Chairman of the supervisory board
	Liberty Bank	Chief executive officer, Directors, Supervisory Board, Executive chairman of the supervisory board (6 members in total). All of them are men
	VTB Bank (Georgia)	General Director, Directors (chief officers), Supervisory Board, Chair of the Board, Deputy chair of the board
	Teliani Valley	Chief Executive officers, Teliani Trading Georgia, Chief Executive Officer, Teliani Trading Ukraine, Chief Financial Officer, Supervisory Board (4 members), Chairman of Supervisory Board

Moldova	BC "MOLDOVA- AGROINDBANK" SA BC "COMERTBANK" SA BC "MOLDINDCONBANK" SA BC"ENERGBANK"SA SA Combinatul de panificatie "FRANZELUTA" BC "MOBIASBANCA- Groupe Societe Generale" SA BC "VICTORIABANK" S.A SA "ZORILE" SA "IPTEH" BC "EUROCREDITBANK"	General Director Council of the Company Executive Board Members
Ukraine	PJSC Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant PJSC Avdiivka Coke Plant PJSC Yenakiyevo Steel Plant PJSC Azovstal MP JSC Raiffeisen Bank Aval PJSC Tsentrenergo PJSC Donbasenergo JSC Motor Sich PJSC Ukrnafta PJSC Kryukov Wagon Works	Chief executive officer Members of the highest decision-making body

## WIP Mapping tables: University: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Name of university (up to 10 largest)	1st leadership position	2nd leadership position
Armenia	Armenian National Agrarian University Armenian State Pedagogical University Armenian State University of Economics Institute of Theatre and Cinematography State Engineering University of Armenia Yerevan Komitas State Conservatory Yerevan State Linguistic University after V. Bryusov Yerevan State Medical University Yerevan State University Yerevan State University of Architecture and Construction	Rector Chancellors Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector	Vice-Rector Vice-Chancellors Vice-Rector Vice-Rector Vice-Rector Vice-Rector Vice-Rector Vice-Rector Vice-Rector Vice-Rector
Azerbaijan	Baku State University Azerbaijan State Oil and Industry University Azerbaijan Medical University Azerbaijan University of Languages Azerbaijan State University of Economics Azerbaijan State Pedagogical University Azerbaijan Architecture and Construction University Baku Slavic University State Management Academy under the President of Azerbaijan Republic Azerbaijan Technical University	Rector	Vice rectors
Belarus	Belarus State University Belarus State Economic University Belarus National Technical University Belarus State Technological University Belarus State University of Informatics and Radioelectronics Belarus State Pedagogical University Belarus State Medical University Minsk State Linguistic University Belarus State Academy of Music Belarus State Agrarian Technical University	Rector	Vice-Rectors
Georgia	Ivane Javakhishvili State University Tbilisi State Medical University Ilia State University Shota Rustaveli Theatre and Film Georgian State Tbilisi State Conservatoire Tbilisi Academy of Arts Agricultural University of Georgia Georgia Technical University Free University Georgian University	Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector Rector President	Vice Rector Vice Rector Chancellor Chancellor Vice Rector Chancellor Vice Rector Vice Rector Vice Rector N/A

Moldova	Moldova State University State Pedagogical University "I.Creanga" Technical University of Moldova Academy of Economic Studies of Moldova State University "Alecu Russo" Tiraspol State University (based in Chisinau) State University Comrat State University of Physical Education and Sport State University of Medicine and Pharmacy "N. Testemitanu" 10. State Agrarian University of Moldova	Rectors	Pro-Rectors
Ukraine	National University "L'viv Polytechnic" Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv National Technical University of Ukraine "Kyiv Polytechnic Institute" National University "Odessa Law Academy" I. Franko L'viv National University L'viv National Aviation University National University of Life and Environmental Sciences of Ukraine National Technical University "Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute" M.P. Dragomanov National Pedagogical University V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University	Rector	Vice Rector

### WIP Mapping tables: Public media: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Name the media	1 <sup>st</sup> leadership position	2 <sup>nd</sup> leadership position
Armenia	Public TV Company of Armenia	Executive Director	Deputy Executive Director
Azerbaijan	Public Television and Radio Broadcasting Company	General Director	Deputy of General Director of Information and social-political programs
Belarus	National State Belteleradiocompany	Chairman	Deputy Chairs
Georgia	The Georgian Public Broadcaster	Director-General	Deputy Directors Managers
Moldova	National Public Broadcasting Institution Teleradio Moldova (TRM)	Director	
Ukraine	National Television Company of Ukraine	Chief Executive Officer (General Director)	Deputy of Chief Executive Officer (General Director)

### WIP Mapping tables: Public media board members: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Name the media	Executive position	Non-executive position
Armenia	Public TV Company of Armenia	Board President	Board Members
Azerbaijan	Public TV	Chair of Broadcasting Council	Broadcasting Council members
Belarus	National State Belteleradiocompany	Chairman	Board Members
Georgia	The Georgian Public Broadcaster	Board Chairman	Board of Trustees
Moldova	National Public Broadcasting Institution Teleradio Moldova (TRM)	President of Board	Board Members (Consiliul de Observatori)
Ukraine	National Television Company of Ukraine	Chief Executive Officer (General Director)	N/A

### WIP Mapping tables: Private media: Coverage for data collection 2015

Country	Name the media	1 <sup>st</sup> leadership position	2 <sup>nd</sup> leadership position
Armenia	Armenia TV H2 TV Shant TV	Executive Director Director Director	Chief Producer Deputy Directors Deputy Director
Azerbaijan	APA Holding Khazar TV Trend Information Agency	President President General Director	Vice President Vice President 5 deputy General director
Belarus	BelmuzTV Newspaper "Narodnaya Volia"  Tut By Media	Director Chief Editor  General Director	Deputy Director 3 Deputy Chief Editors  3 Deputies
Georgia	TV Company "Rustavi 2"  TV Company "IMedi"	General Director  General Director	First Deputy Director, Deputy Director, Managers  Deputy DIRECTOR, General producer, Heads of departments Managers
Moldova	Publika TV Jurnal TV ProTV	Administrator Administrator Administrator	Executive committees members Heads of Departments Producers of Key Emmisions



Ukraine	Media-holdings: • Starlight Media (Channels: STB, ICTV, "New Channel", M1, M2 and ITV) • Inter Media Group (Channels: "Inter", "NTN", "Enter Movie," "Pixel", "K1", "K2", "Mega") • 1 +1 Media (Channels: "1 + 1", "2 + 2", TET, "Plusplus")	General Director, Head of the company (group)	Deputy General Director, Head of the company (group)
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### Annex 3 – Interpretation of Indicators

No.	Indicator	Justification
Objective II		
1	Proportion of women in the single/lower houses of the national Parliaments	National Constitution
2	Proportion of women in the regional assemblies	National Constitution National Law on local governance Armenia and Azerbaijan do not have administrative division at regional level
3	Proportion of women in the local assemblies	National Constitution National Law on local governance
4	Proportion and number of women in the national/federal Governments and Presidency	National Constitution Law on Public Administration Law on Civil Service
5	Proportion and number of women and men among senior/junior ministers in the different fields of action (portfolios/ministries) in the national/federal governments	The BEIS distribution is taken from the EU-28 Study

6	Proportion of women in the two highest-ranking civil servant positions	Law on Public Administration Law on Civil Service
7	Distribution of women among the highest-ranking civil servants	The BEIS distribution is taken from the EU-28 Study
8	Proportion and number of women among the members of the Supreme Court	National Constitution
9	Proportion and number of women and men among the leaders and deputy leaders of major political parties with at least 5% of seats in national Parliament	Political parties and blocks considered
Objective III		
1	Proportion and number of women and men among Governors and Deputy/Vice Governors of Central Banks	Law on the National (Central) Bank
2	Proportion and number of women and men among members of the decision-making bodies of Central Banks	Law on the National (Central) Bank
3-4	Proportion and number of women and men among Presidents, Vice-Presidents and the total governing bodies of social partner organisations representing workers at national level	Largest by considered Both federations confederations Up to 3 largest
5-6	Proportion and number of women and men among Presidents, Vice-Presidents and total governing bodies of social partner organisations representing employers at national level	Largest by considered Both federations confederations Up to 3 largest
7-8	Proportion and number of women and men among presidents, chief executive officers and members of the boards of the largest nationally registered companies listed on the national stock exchange	The blue chip index is not used National lists used GDP-forming most valuable companies or Net Asset Value per Share UP to 10 largest
Objective IV		
1	Proportion of women and men in academic staff differentiated by level of seniority and in total	Top 10 largest universities by the number of students Both public and private
2	Proportion of women and men at levels 1 and 2 in public media	One public broadcaster largest by Audience Companies statutes
3	Proportion of women and men at levels 1 and 2 of decision-making in private media organisations	Three private largest by audience Companies statutes
4	Number of women board members in public broadcasters	One public broadcaster largest by Audience Companies statutes

## Annex 4 – Bibliography

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## *European Year for Development: Role of Local Authorities in Developing Countries*

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In mid-July 2015 a report has been adopted, with only a few votes against, otherwise with a convincing majority, by the European Parliament's Committee on Development. Its subject is the role of local authorities in developing countries in development cooperation. The Rapporteur was Ms. Eleni Theocharous, a Cypriot Member of European Parliament, who knows the business as she was in various developing countries, also as a medical doctor who worked there. 2015 was the European Year for Development, too, but as this year is over now it should be reminded that development policy is not.



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*The European Union has been engaged with decentralisation process since the early 1950s so as to conduct institutional reforms. The current wave of decentralisation involves a) devolution of power to the elected local governments as acknowledged stakeholders, b) local governance, acting in accordance with the principles of inclusion, transparency and accountability, c) an innovative model of local economic development, d) a reassurance*

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<sup>191</sup> The picture from „Regionen Und Gemeinden Europas“, Mai-Juni 2013, Dritte Jahreskonferenz zur dezentralen Zusammenarbeit: lokale Gebietskörperschaften als maßgebliche Akteure der Entwicklungspolitik (Third Annual Conference on decentralized cooperation: local authorities as authoritative players in development policy)

of the significance of the regional planning, and e) general modernisation of the state<sup>192</sup>. As such the EU is also implementing the so-called **decentralised cooperation**, which, as the European Commission defines is **the development partnership between local government from Europe and local governments from partner countries**. In the last years the EU development policies have more and more underlined the impact that local governments can have in development, due to their proximity to the citizens and their requirements, their potential for political inclusion, as well as to their awareness of the local advantages and challenges.<sup>193</sup>

In line with this **in 2007**, with the launch of a new multi-annual financial framework, the EU also set a new budget line to finance a sector programme on **“Non-State Actors and Local Authorities”**. In 2008 the EC published a communication on **“Local Authorities: Actors for Development”**, whereby “the European Commission recognised that local and regional authorities bring a unique added-value to development processes. In addition to concrete actions in developing countries, LRA have a key role in mobilising different stakeholders to work together, thus generating collaborative approaches to attaining common development goals. **The Communication foresaw several new proposals**, notably:

- **Establishing a dialogue on development policy with local and regional authorities. It will take the form of conferences and discussions involving all those active in development cooperation** in order to strengthen the contribution LRA and their networks and associations, enhance aid effectiveness and ensure long-term sustainability of their actions. **The first dialogue was the so-called “Assises” of Decentralised Cooperation, held on 2 December 2009 at the Committee of the Regions. The Second Assises on Decentralised Cooperation took place from 29-30 March 2011.<sup>194</sup> Third Assises of Decentralised Cooperation for development was held between 9- 10 April 2013<sup>195</sup>. The fourth Assises of Decentralised Cooperation for development took place from 1 - 2 June 2015.** Assises is a unique platform to bring together local and regional governments’ representatives from the EU and developing countries to discuss their approaches and form a political dialogue with the European institutions on development cooperation. **The key objective of it is to support development assistance efficiency towards the full integration of local and regional authorities into the development cooperation policies and establish a beneficial EU cooperation between the actors, involved in the development policy<sup>196</sup>.**
- **Creating mechanisms to report more effectively on local and regional authorities’ development cooperation.** The Atlas of Decentralised Cooperation is the empirical translation of this proposal and it provides an opportunity for LRA to declare their development cooperation activities in order to answer and overcome the lack of data.
- **The Atlas is part of Portal of decentralised Cooperation, bringing together as much as possible information, contacts and exchange opportunities on cooperation for development for LRA.** The Portal provides means to match skills and capacities with needs, allows discussion through forums, alerts about European and other funding opportunities, as well as informs about existing country strategies which would enhance the

<sup>192</sup> European Commission, “Supporting Decentralisation and Local Governance in Third Countries”, January 2007, EuropeAid Cooperation Office.

<sup>193</sup> The Africa-EU Partnership, 30 April 2013, <http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/en/newsroom/all-news/decentralised-cooperation-a-new-focus-development>.

<sup>194</sup> European Commission, The Second Assises on Decentralised Cooperation - 29 & 30 March 2011; Committee of Regions, <http://lra4dev.cor.europa.eu/portal/Pages/AssisesonDecentralisedCooperation2011.aspx>.

<sup>195</sup> European Commission, The Assises of Decentralised Cooperation for development, Committee of Regions, 9- 10 April 2013, <http://lra4dev.cor.europa.eu/portal/Pages/3rd-Assises-of-decentralised-cooperation-def.aspx>.

<sup>196</sup> European Commission, The Assises of Decentralised Cooperation for development, Committee of Regions, 1 - 2 June 2015, <http://lra4dev.cor.europa.eu/portal/Pages/4th-Assises-of-decentralised-cooperation.aspx>.

The local level is where most of the development cooperation is implemented, and while the donor institutions often think from their “hydrocephalus” level, they often have to do mainly with the government level but have also to take into account the effective recipient level - the local one. There are very many resolutions, papers, legal references and own EU sources from the last years which assume a multilevel governance of developing countries and the explicit or implicit need for taking into account the interest of local authorities, and Ms. Theocharous has made a science of its own to name many of them, arriving at the proud number of more than 40. This report (document no. (2015/2004(INI), report has doc. no. A8-0232/2015) is made in the European Year of Development 2015, and it merits to be named as it really sets an innovative pace. If only in 15 or 20% of the relevant EU Delegations, where future projects are thought over, the missing link to the local administration is seen and even bridged, then this report would have a concrete consequence.



Town Hall of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso

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<sup>197</sup>European Commission, Committee of the Regions, Decentralised Cooperation, <http://lra4dev.cor.europa.eu/portal/EN/Pages/Background.aspx>.





The centre of Luang Namtha, Laos

As such, the European Parliament adopted a resolution<sup>198</sup> on the role of local authorities in developing countries in development cooperation. Parliament considered that strategic planning at national and local level was absolutely essential to the promotion and integration of the three main dimensions of development: the social, economic and environmental dimensions. It highlighted the need for translating the Commission's new guidelines on local authorities and on recognising their role as state stakeholders into the effective implementation of European cooperation, both in terms of the 11th European Development Fund (EDF) and in terms of the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The EU is urged to promote decentralised cooperation as a way of implementing the development framework post 2015. To this end, Parliament called on the Commission to:

- consider the possibility of making decentralisation a priority funding sector for its external aid financing instruments, starting with the DCI and the EDF;
- step up efforts to include local authorities as full stakeholders in the implementation of the 11th EDF in partner countries, regions, and in relation to sectorial and budgetary assistance.

For their part, Member States should accord an appropriate role in their development programmes to local authorities and to coordinate their activities with those of the Commission and of other Member States.

Additionally, the Parliament stressed the importance of the following points:

- ensuring a fairer transfer of resources from national level to sub-regions, towns and municipalities, ensuring also that some European budgetary assistance be allocated to funding local authorities, and establishing a genuine political dialogue among local authorities as part of European cooperation;

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<sup>198</sup> European Parliament, Report on the role of local authorities in developing countries in development cooperation (2015/2004(INI)), 17 July 2015, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8-2015-0232+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN>. See also: European Parliament, Legislative Observatory, 2015/2004(INI) - 06/10/2015, Text adopted by Parliament, single reading, <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/summary.do?id=1405943&t=d&l=en>.

- bearing in mind the role of local authorities in the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals: the MDGs revealed the crucial role of LAs in the fight against poverty and in the delivery of community services, such as water and sanitation, primary healthcare and education; additional resources should be allocated to strengthening the capacities of decentralised authorities so that they could provide high-quality public services;
- setting reliable targets and indicators for the Sustainable Development Goals that match the contexts, needs and worries of local populations; the post-2015 process should provide a clear vision for an implementation of Rio+20 outcomes that recognises the role of local authorities;
- establish a renewed effective global partnership (with civil society, the private sector, etc.) with a clear definition and division of responsibilities among partners;
- strengthening partnerships with the private sector by supporting: (a) the emergence of a middle class through the promotion of private entrepreneurship; (b) local, micro, small and medium-sized enterprises in job creation and promoting sustainable and inclusive economic growth, notably through public-private policies; (c) effective implementation of accountability mechanisms and definitions of mandatory social and environmental safeguards;
- strengthening partnership with civil society: the post-2015 global development agenda needed to change the role and impact of civil society organisations (CSOs). The report wanted to see the setting up mechanisms for regular dialogue between CSOs and Member States;
- supporting domestic accountability and capacity building: governments must be accountable both to domestic stakeholders and to the international community. The report stressed the importance of promoting good governance at local level by promoting the principles of accountability, transparency, participation, responsiveness and the rule of law; strong efforts needed to be made to improve the capacity of LAs to deliver public services;
- engaging indigenous people in the preparation of local and regional development and investment plans;
- creating an enabling environment for the transfer of technologies through cooperation that should also include longer-term investments;
- providing in the Commission's partnership plans support for the management of a sustainable urbanisation process adopting a territorial approach to address issues such as waste management and urban poverty
- stepping up international cooperation to tackle illicit financial flows and decentralising power to combat corruption, including corruption originating from multinational companies;
- strengthening the mobilisation of resources: the report stressed the urgent need to consolidate LA capacities in partner countries in the area of municipal taxation and budgetary planning. It asked the Commission to encourage the mobilisation of innovative sources of financing for decentralised cooperation, and urges the EU to hence bolster the decentralised budgets that



are a prerequisite for local development. Parliament considered that it is more effective to act at local level in order to improve living conditions for communities, especially in rural areas. Lastly, it called on the World Bank and the international financial institutions to update environmental and social safeguard policies.

## *UfM Member States Further Enhance Regional Cooperation in 2016 by Endorsing 4 New Development Projects*

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- At their first meeting of 2016, the Senior Officials of the Member States of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) approved four new regional projects in the fields of Inclusive Growth, Sustainable Development and Women's Empowerment.
- The meeting also provided an opportunity for the 43 Member State representatives to highlight the achievements of 2015 with a view to further develop regional cooperation and integration in the Mediterranean within the framework of the UfM.



The Senior Officials of the UfM member countries met on 16 February 2016 in Brussels and approved four new regional projects by according to them the UfM label, bringing up the total number of UfM-labelled regional cooperation projects to 41.

The four new UfM-labelled projects will contribute to strengthening regional cooperation in the following areas:

- private investments for renewable energies
- marine litter
- shipping services
- women's health.

The endorsement by UfM Member States of new regional projects confirms the 2015 dynamics of development and implementation of the UfM's pipeline of labelled projects: by December 2015, 19 projects had been already launched. From 29 projects in 2014, 8 more were endorsed by the UfM Member States in 2015, representing close to €5 billion in investments for the region, reaching around 200,000 beneficiaries in the fields of Youth Employability and Inclusive Growth and targeting 50,000 beneficiaries in the field of Women's Empowerment. In addition to the labelling of 4 new projects, two other new projects were presented to the UfM Member States with the aim to be labelled at the next SOM:

- The first project aims to set up a regional demand-driven toolbox for youth-orientated labour market services in Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Palestine and Tunisia. This regional project is promoted by "GIZ" (Global Initiative on Innovative Labour Market Services for Youth – YouMatch), commissioned by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Federal Republic of Germany, and in cooperation with the UfM Secretariat under the Med4Jobs Initiative.
- The second project, "*OPTIMED IMPLEMENTATION, Implementing a new Mediterranean Corridor: from South-Eastern to North-Western ports*", is promoted by the Autonomous Region of Sardinia (Italy) with the objective of optimising trade relations in the Mediterranean Basin through the improvement of commercial connections between public and private operators in maritime transport and logistics sector in Spain, France, Italy, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey, and Cyprus.

The representatives of the 43 Member States commended the activities undertaken by the UfM Secretariat in various fields throughout 2015. Over the last year, the UfM Secretariat continued to act as the platform for regional dialogue and operational cooperation in the Mediterranean engaging relevant actors and stakeholders as well as institutional partners, and addressing a number of strategic issues related to regional integration and development.

### Summary of the four new UfM-labelled projects:

- ***SEMed Private Renewable Energy Framework (SPREF)*** is an innovative framework to boost the development of private renewable energy markets in Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan with efficient policy dialogue and financing mechanisms promoted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). With a total budget of ca. EUR 835 million, the project will aim to overcome barriers that can prevent the development of private renewable energy markets and provide technical cooperation support through policy dialogue. Most importantly, the framework will aim to develop efficient financing mechanisms for the realization of renewable energy project to directly stimulate an estimated EUR 600 million in investments and encourage local private energy companies in renewable energy in beneficiary countries.
- ***PLASTIC-BUSTERS for a Mediterranean free from litter*** is a truly regional initiative aiming to tackle the issue of marine litter on a regional level through an integrated approach. Promoted

by the University of Siena (SDSN - MED Solutions) with a number of Mediterranean partners, the four-year project will be working to closing knowledge gaps, identifying hot spots and launching concrete pilot demonstration activities on the collection of marine litter and prevention measures, including joint activities with the fishing communities to remove the so-called 'ghost fishing nets' that can cause serious damage to marine environments as well as prevent and reduce marine litter overall. The findings and information is then aimed to be fed into awareness raising campaigns, providing information and elaborating recommendations to facilitate effective policymaking at regional, national, local levels with regards to the reduction of marine litter in the Mediterranean Sea. The budget of the project is of 8.8 M EUR and 10 countries are currently participating in it.

- **UfM MoS: The Turkey-Italy-Tunisia Project** aims to propose and develop a “Motorway of the Sea”, i.e. a seamless intermodal goods transport service bridging Turkey with Maghreb area with calls in the Ports of Bari, Brindisi and Taranto in Italy, offering a door-to-door Roll-on-Roll-off service which combines Short Sea Shipping with other modes of transport (road, rail). In addition to Turkey, Italy and Tunisia other Maghreb countries could take advantage of the new maritime services, which will be developed in the framework of the Trans- Mediterranean Transport Network (TMN-T) implementation strategy and of the connection between the TMN-T and the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T). The project costs are estimated at 500 Mio Euros for the service with a revenue estimation of 600 Mio Euros over the life cycle of 20 years. The Promoter of the Project is the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in Italy, with the technical support of the Italian College of Railway Engineers and of “Titi Shipping”, a maritime company based in Brindisi, under the patronage of the Honorary General Consulate of Turkey in Brindisi.
- **Women’s Right to Health - The WoRTH Project** aims to implement a comprehensive cervical and breast cancer control strategy through multi-sectoral partnerships anchored in relevant national policies and plans in Albania, Montenegro and Morocco. With a budget of just over 4.1 million, WoRTH will target, in addition of health professionals, 15.000 women disadvantaged women living in vulnerable situations who will be offered the opportunity to be tested for free for cervical and breast cancer. The project will be carried out in a comprehensive approach: National diagnostics, training activities for policy makers, health professionals, other relevant actors, women’s awareness campaigns, early detection activities for disadvantaged women, establishment of national networks for exchange of updated information and knowledge on CC and BC early detection and screening, strengthening of the existing Mediterranean network to promote translational and implementation research, and North-to-South and South to South cooperation and concluding policy recommendations. The project is promoted by the Centre for Epidemiology and Prevention of Cancer in Piedmont (CPO) in partnership with the World Health Organization and will be implemented over 4 years.

## *Significant Progress on the UfM Labelled Project “Desalination Facility for the Gaza Strip”*

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- On 15 February 2016, the UfM Secretariat organised a meeting in Brussels with the participation of the Government representatives of Palestine, Israel and representatives of both the European Commission and the Office of the Quartet to advance on the implementation of the Desalination Facility project for the Gaza Strip, endorsed by the 43 Member States of the UfM.
- The Israeli Delegation confirmed the Government’s political support to the project and its commitment to facilitate the construction of the facility.
- The Palestinian Delegation emphasised its readiness to take all necessary measures for the project’s implementation.
- The large-scale desalination facility is aimed at addressing the water crisis in the Gaza Strip, where 95% of the water is not drinkable due to the over-pumping of the Coastal Aquifer, the only available water source in the strip.



Delegations from Palestine, Israel, the European Commission and the office of the Quartet met on 15 February 2016 in Brussels under the auspices of the Secretariat of the Union for the Mediterranean to discuss the next concrete steps for the launch of the UfM-labelled Desalination Facility project for the Gaza Strip.

The meeting consolidated the ground for the forthcoming Donor Conference. All the participants agreed on the project’s vital importance for the region in terms of humanitarian and development impact. The large-scale desalination facility and its associated water supply infrastructure will supply drinking water to more than 1.8 million Palestinian inhabitants, thereby presenting a

sustainable solution for the chronic and longstanding water shortage in the Gaza Strip. The Donor Conference should secure the necessary funds for the construction of the facility.

The Israeli Delegation confirmed its Government's political support to the project and its commitment to facilitate the construction of the facility.

The Palestinian Delegation confirmed its readiness to take all necessary measures for the project's implementation.

Michael Koehler, Director for Neighbourhood South at the European Commission expressed the European Union's full support to the project through contributing to the financing of the project. The Commission also expressed its commitment to participate in the ongoing efforts aiming at reaching significant progress in the coming months at both political and technical levels.

#### **About the Desalination Facility for the Gaza Strip**

*On 22 June 2011, the 43 member countries of the UfM unanimously endorsed the Desalination Facility for the Gaza Strip project. The project, developed with the Palestinian Water Authority, aims to address the water crisis in Gaza; where over 95% of the water is not drinkable.*

*The investment of the project is of 350 million Euros. The UfM Secretariat is working closely with the Government of Palestine to help secure the engagement of a number of international financial institutions and international organisations. Outstanding efforts have been led by the European Investment Bank to advance technical preparations for the desalination plant, including the preparation of all tenders for different studies and engineering work, procurement and construction.*



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# *“Too-Big-To-Fail - in the USA and the EU” - A Contribution to the Discussion*

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**Alec Schaerer**

*While ‘Too Big to Fail’ has become a buzzword among politicians and gave rise to the acronym ‘TBTF’, its meaning may not be obvious to everybody. Especially banks are said to be Too-Big-to-Fail when they are deemed to be of systemic importance, or in other words when today’s ruling economic system would seriously be threatened if that particular business or bank would fail and go bankrupt. In such cases the respective government will provide all necessary assistance to prevent its failure, finally by pillaging the public purse. The relevance of the problem is in the fact that business is usually being conceived as a domain where the people are fully responsible for what they do, while in cases of TBTF this notion suddenly is being thrown overboard and the taxpayers are made to pay (in fact often twice, because before the failure they had already been soaked, but less blatantly). The point is that this practice of assistance pushes nation states closer to state bankruptcy, while previously they themselves had also been pushed into debt by the bank system.*

*There is thus obviously a problem of adequacy between institutions and society, and a subjacent problem of adequate systemic understanding among decision makers. They do not recognize the intimate bond of money and debt in today’s monetary system. Lately in the Minneapolis branch of the United States’ Federal Reserve Banks, its President Neel Kashkari has had the courage to address squarely the issue. He gave a speech on this hot issue at the Brookings Institution in Washington on Feb. 16, 2016 (<https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/presidents-speeches/lessons-from-the-crisis-ending-too-big-to-fail>), then launched an initiative to develop a plan to end TBTF (<https://www.minneapolisfed.org/>), and is even seeking public input for help to identify solutions (<https://www.minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/news-releases/president-kashkari-announces-initiative-to-end-too-big-to-fail-at-the-brookings-institution>). There will be a policy symposium to end TBTF, to be held April 4, 2016, at the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (<https://minneapolisfed.org/news-and-events/news-releases/save-the-date-minneapolis-fed-announces-date-of-first-ending-too-big-to-fail-policy-symposium>). – The letter presented below has been written to President Neel Kashkari in response to his excellent initiative.*

In seeking to resolve the TBTF problem, the first question is (like with any other), how deep one wants to reach in the grasp of the phenomena and interconnections. The trouble with seeking a really complete view is that the factual grasp of the state of the art in theorizing is not up to the task. In spite of that, human action has produced mammoth institutions such as the monetary and banking system, whose real-life effects reach far beyond the conceptual grasp of the designers. We are compelled to grapple with the effects that outrun the design, allowing some actors to exploit weak points, wreaking havoc. The question then is: Does one want to regulate by (subjective, finally moralistic) legal restriction of consequences, or by (objective, finally systemic) insight that allows structural causes to be eliminated. This difference was the core topic in the debate after your TBTF speech at Brookings, but the participants were so bogged

down in technical details that they were not able to make the difference. Nevertheless, it is no coincidence that David Wessel asked you: *How do we know that the problem is solved?* You said you believe that one can never be sure, so there is always a risk. Yet your stance merely reveals the crux of being methodologically insecure, which is on the other hand not human fate but a problem of sound methodology. You need better instruments of structural insight. The fact that today's mainstream cannot offer them is part of the drama, but not a hopeless situation.

It is important to notice that the notional basis for action these days is (in practically all fields) not in secure knowledge, but ultimately in mere *beliefs*. These range from rational scientific ones like axioms, definitions, hypotheses, postulates, premises, etc. up to irrational ones like subjacent fears, hopes and illusions. The real problem is in contenting oneself with this basis – for example allowing oneself be pushed by beliefs and talking about a ‘need to decide under incomplete information’ – rather than being courageous and honest enough for unflinchingly investigating the interconnections and their consequences for insight into basic structural facts. In the face of today's situation it is not sufficient to have some theory or other (such as neoclassics or monetarism) unless it offers a strictly complete grasp of the structural facts (which today's theories do precisely not yield). Having a theory does not warrant much, and wanting to validate it by empirical means can never reach to the top-level laws that are relevant, because no empirical data can cover the respective totality. This is the Achilles heel of today's intellectual habit – and I think I can offer an interesting basic contribution to the consequential real-world problem that is fully man-made. Please allow me to outline a path of thought that allows riddles to be dissolved – and I hope you will not be upset by the need to do some quiet deep thinking, not managing usual ideas. Obviously I can offer only a sketch.

I am a methodologist, specialized in systematically complete ways of thinking that are applicable to practically all fields of knowledge. Besides that I have been working since several decades on clarifying fundamentally the problems between nature, thinking, and the socio-economic process, including the monetary system. There are many of my publications in the web, but here I will outline a contribution towards ending TBTF. I will aim not only at the situation in the United States (which is reasonable since the effects – not only of the FED and its USD – are spilling over), and I will focus on the primary problem of method rather than secondary and tertiary issues of managerial techniques and tools of current governance.

## **1 Situating the problem**

The phenomenon of TBTF is a consequence of the conception of today's global monetary system and the banking system as a corollary. There is no naturally constitutional element at its root, but there are highly specific human assumptions concerning the nature of value and money. This fact contrasts strongly with the implacability with which many of the system's representatives defend

it, trying to justify it with ever more detailed justifications, but which can never make up for the foundational flaws. It is therefore only a question of time until the setup breaks down. This point in time is slowly but surely coming. For a succinct analysis see e.g. *GEAB / LEAP Petro-Euro, money-debt, banking crisis, real economy: ten years to seal the fate of an economic-financial system*. (orig. French, available in English)<sup>199</sup>

Today's tense situation is a result of not completely clarifying first of all the nature of value and money, imposing suppositions that please some actors, and then acting out this prejudicial setup. We got there through a historical process, and some contend that therefore – by empirical evidence – this must be the correct way of functioning. But the tensions show that one has merely followed a collective error based on human ideas, instead of seeking to understand the *inherent laws of nature* that determine the human need to act in an economic sense and to exchange goods, which requires an adequate conceptual grasp and adequate institutions. Many economists say that the economy is a free human choice and thus eludes any regularity. They mistake arbitrariness for freedom and don't realize that this is why at the end there are tensions in the produced reality. In spite of opinions, there is an objective law that determines strictly all forms of economy, purely in terms of value. For becoming aware of this one has to notice the root of economic action, where the strict regularity is in evidence.

## 2 A law of nature that governs all economic activity

This law is embodied in the fact that the activity of setting all resources into value by means of physical work on nature ('land' in the broad sense) is the *necessary and sufficient condition for sustaining the global totality of the eco-social process*. Since that act constitutes a necessary and sufficient condition, the correlation is a law, a strictly general regularity. The material result of the act ('primary product') allows – by providing all of what is necessary for food, shelter, machinery, monetary system, etc. – strictly all goods to be produced ('secondary production') and management, distribution, consumption and disposal to be organized. This primal activity constitutes thus objectively the *fundamental form of capital* ('that which allows all future action'), *prior to any subjective assessment* (in monetary or other terms) and to activities such as saving or investing. The point is in being conceptually precise, free of empirical biases (conventional approaches to capital theory as e.g. in Birner (1990) cannot foster this clarity).

If there were no division of labor, *all people* would have to participate in the primal act – and a division of labor is possible only because the capable people are *fully supported* in their organizational work, on the ideational level by the 'primal act' and on the material level by the 'primary product'. This is why the fundamental performance 'behind' the division of labor is

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<sup>199</sup><http://geab.eu/en/petro-euro-argent-dette-crise-bancaire-economie-reelle-dix-ans-pour-sceller-le-sort-dun-systeme-economico-financier-2>

relevant to the whole of society (and not only according to physiocratic conceptions of value) as the *compelling real value*; all value judgments of people (especially those according to the ‘theory of subjective economic value’) – as in possession/ownership, interest, capital, labor, etc. – constitute only a layer of *imaginary value*, fantasized additionally. Values added by dint of such imaginary values are always and inescapably *dependent on the real value*.

The fundamental basis, the population, constitutes the maximum value of physical labor, and it would have to be performed if there was no division of labor. A division of labor is only possible by dint of organizational labor and organizational value, which at the same time can come into existence only where it is carried by physical labor and physical value. This dialectical relationship is dynamic and can thus be understood completely only as a *process*. Practical action always is composed of both aspects, but any thorough understanding requires the conceptual differentiation. Even the most esoteric writer must still move some matter, even if it’s just a pencil, and even the simplest chopping work is successful only with some intelligence. The proposed distinction between physical labor and organizational labor is conceptually completely appropriate, because it is rooted in the distinction between the movement of matter and the movement of thought for moving matter, and therefore reaches in a precise way into all of one’s actions, including those in one’s own mental realm. This basic distinction of labor introduces no empirical concepts, but applies purely analytical terms, a conceptually polar pair of concepts (i.e. embodying total opposites in meaning) as the purely logical necessity for a precise understanding of human labor in its complete spectrum. Both together are necessary for a thorough understanding of the economic phenomena.

### **3 An objective calculatory basis of real value**

In a theoretical sense, another distinction is relevant too, namely between population and the needed natural basis. Now a quotient can be determined: the natural basis divided by the population, the *per capita basis*. It is the average amount of resources (primary product) that is attributable to one single person. This real value is necessary for supporting on average one person; thereby the value is determined that the product of the indemnified person will have, because this quantity is actually necessary for indemnifying her. This can be called the ‘unit of account’ and used as such, because it is generally the dimension that allows counting off the money saved in values of physical labor by values of organizational labor. Schaerer (2009) offers a detailed account of the calculus in its application to social structures.

We have been led to realize that a *law of nature* is imposed in having to set resources into value for the purpose of securing our existence. But as materially living beings we also have the power to do whatever is necessary. The natural order includes both sides, and the complex can be formulated in terms of laws. This in no way limits the freedom, because a pure law can never

operate absolutely on its own; in order to have an effect, *a force* must be connected with the law (in the human mind: the will). Also the terms of ‘law’ and ‘force’ are analytical, purely theoretical concepts. Any phenomenon appears as a combination of the two, if it is to be understood from the viewpoint of modification or process. In the whole universe there is the order of the universe, including the forces that make things arise and fall apart in accordance with their intrinsic laws. Our being incarnated forces us to conform to the basic law of economics. But in this state we have materially the forces for doing what is necessary, and ideationally the ability to deliberate the relationship. Adequate mental activity can gradually liberate us from purely physical coercion as soon as we become aware of our fundamental query perspective and when we develop the appropriate analytical concepts in it, in order to clarify the empirical questions.

#### **4 The value of money: its objective side**

As mentioned, the fact that human beings are constrained to set resources into value for being able to start an economy constitutes a law imposed by nature; this is reflected in the fact that the compelled act is a necessary and sufficient condition for the realization of the process. The ascertainment is completely precise. Insight into this intrinsic law allows then to recognize the objective value of money. It is in the fact that *the total amount of resources brought forward* (‘primary product’) in one period of time (for instance, one year) *corresponds – in terms of value – exactly to the amount of money that is circulating in this period*. This is because exactly this activity and on the material level precisely this primary product bears the entire economic process, both materially and in terms of value (the considered aspect – things or values – determines the result of the consideration). Interestingly, in this ratio the number of monetary units is irrelevant (\$, £, €, etc.) because only the numbers vary, but not the reality of the constant physical relationship. The portion relating on average to each person merely has a different numerical value, but remains a constant material value. This factual context provides a conceptual bridge between the value of the existential basis and the value of the medium of exchange. The uncompromising basic terminology shows clearly that *money has nothing to do with debt*, which results from additional attributions. The law of needing primal production applies in a strict sense only to mankind as a whole, because differences between countries (and hence their national economies) in the distribution of natural resources and manpower differ somewhat from the arithmetic average. The balance achieved by trade is secondary and should not be allowed to act as if it were primal.

The fact that additional attributions of value are of course possible does not justify them to be placed center stage. The real differences in validity should be acknowledged. For example, in search of a solid theoretical basis for measuring the objective value of money, today the national product (as GNP or GDP) is considered almost in unison to be the objective basis and hence as

reasonable. In this view, the value of the circulating money corresponds to the value of traded goods and services, and varies with them in growth and decay. But this is an error because in this design the value of goods and services is measured at the same time in money. Formally speaking: 'While *A* is a function of *B*, *B* is a function of *A*.' This would not get mathematics very far, but leading economists – usually very proud of their math skills – produce the entire world economy from the shaky basis, like the rabbit out of the hat. Another complicating element is that money and labor are still being handled like tradable goods, which does not correspond at all to their essence. Due to the uncertain basis of thought and simultaneously the global coverage of the system, global crises occur by no means randomly, but are a fruit of intellectual neglect, which the vast majority of people pays very dearly and on many levels.

## **5 A brief look at money creation and annihilation today**

What is money today? First we must distinguish between on the one hand cash, the forms of money that are made materially, and on the other hand the money that is created by enfeoffing property, which is a type of money that exists only in the form of information on whatever storage medium – formerly on paper and now in computers. The riddle dissolves upon identifying the mechanism of money creation on the basis of debt by enfeoffing goods.

Today many people believe that money has a liberating effect, while at the same time in today's monetary system the money is designed as a *liability* by the fact that goods are mortgaged as security. This starts at the highest level, where central banks need a capable national economy for reasonably being able to create money. At the next level the commercial banks create checkbook money based on the security of their clients; this process is extremely lucrative for banks, because on a scant reserve basis they can draw a huge amount of money and use the self-created money by bringing into the flow. At the basic level, private loans, borrowers must offer to the lender something along the lines of a pledge.

What does a bank do when giving a credit? In its double-bookkeeping it registers on one side the mortgaged property and the other side the amount to lend. As it should be, the balance is zero, balanced. But the bank retains the legal right to seize the mortgaged property in case the loan is not repaid. In addition it requires an interest, most often compounded. From where does the bank take its power to lend money? Simply from the fact that other customers have offered their property to be enfeoffed, and all that legal right together to seize property forms a basis of action for the bank. Based on about 2.5% of mortgaged property value, the bank is permitted to create money up 100%; this is called bank money or checkbook money. Before the signature of the borrower, the money that the bank lends did not exist. It is being created by dint of the borrower's signature. In fact, the borrower creates his own money by his signature (a detailed account is given for instance in Werner 2014 p 12-16).



The bank's excuse is that it must take risks. There are elaborate lists of risks that are more or less official. Some risks stem from the structure of the monetary system and not the contact with the borrower. But even concerning the latter, in fact the greatest risk is borne by him who must be concerned that his property – which from the legal point of view does not fully belong to him any more – from deteriorating, as is the nature of any worldly property, while in this design money can never deteriorate. And the banks go out of their way for never letting know the borrower that in fact the expenditure and risk to the bank is *almost nil* since its performance is limited to registering signs on a storage medium. Conversely, the fact that borrowers offer their property as collateral, gives the bank its advantages: on this basis it can operate its cashless mechanisms. The banks should be grateful – but that is not what we see. And why? Because the client does not know the mechanisms of money. And banks dearly want it never to be known, since this would dethrone the secret of their power. The monetary system is based on this secret, and so far barely any of the system's representatives care about its harmful effects. Most still naively take for granted that this system can be operated forever. It is fairly obvious that systems are possible that do not generate any painful constraints – but they must be designed and carried out. The big question is: Who is interested in doing this?

As a result of the invented debt, this type of money can in reality not be liberating but must be used in profitable ways. The coercion to profit imposes a scarcity of money in the economic sectors that cannot directly be profitable, such as education, nursing, agriculture, and governance, and it makes appear wages primarily as a cost factor that the entrepreneur needs to minimize, even though the employees are forced to live on it. The legal obligation of repaying the loan plus (compounded) interest engenders a coercion to growth, and the ensuing overburdening of social charges on the public purse engenders a coercion to public debt. It is an illusion to want to solve the problem by band aid solutions such as swamping the markets with liquidity (QE), because that does not address the root cause of the produced tensions: a conception of money that does not correspond to the fundamental reality of economic values.

## 6 Consequences on the social level

Society can now not escape debt because it is a systematically constituent element in the global monetary system. In the prevailing view, the debt should be reduced – since there is no mention of the possibility in principle to understand the problem rather than submitting to it blindly – and this reduction must be achieved by profitable work. But who is to perform this work in accordance with the prevailing view? More and more decision makers boast about job creation as if it would document their social benevolence. But actually they want to eke out a continuity of the system, while on the other hand is not the task of the economy to create jobs, but to produce good products. There is plenty to do and there are enough people who like to perform the work – but what is missing is the money for remunerating them decently since it is forced in today's



global system to run after the highest return on investment. Therefore, the means that should allow social self-organization – ‘money’ – obstructs in the currently staged form precisely what it should facilitate! The effects resulting from ill-considered ideas burden society and the nation states – but the origin of the strain is not clearly being discussed. One merely keeps asking taxpayers to bear the costs – not the architects of the whole system, who are allowed to remain anonymous.

This kind of money creation through credit enslaves the borrower in a legal prison – but then the created money is concretely in circulation, it actually moves the economy by dint of values induced through human actions in working. Under close scrutiny, money today is a *huge Ponzi scheme* by thoroughly betting on the *future* work of the people who are being coerced by legal means to reimburse the imagined debt! The individual is punished severely if it installs a Ponzi scheme, but the pilots behind closed doors have the right, moreover not only in some cases but for enslaving all of mankind! It is obvious that they do not want the issue to be known, so they tweak the truth as much as possible. There is therefore a fundamental one-eyedness in the system, maybe in some cases even a dishonesty, and the problem is not on the level of economics, but on the level of *legality*. (Gebauer 2014)

In contrast to that, the set of facts presented in sections 2-4 constitutes a clear basis for solving the problems and a precise and strictly general differentiation of all fundamental concepts of economic theory. The real satisfaction of needs does not require e.g. growth, but a comprehensive ascertainment of deficiencies and needs in full mental clarity. The standard basic concepts of today’s economic theory – land, labor, capital, balance, exchange, utility, market, price, etc. – reflect aspects of a structure that is the subject of economic theory and should be covered systematically and without conceptual gaps, in complete coherence. Since the usual terms – due to their empirical stain – do not allow this to be accomplished in a strictly complete way, the real meaning of the aspects and concepts of economic theory can be measured fully only in the context of a conceptual complex such as the one proposed here, which offers a really sound foundation (Schaerer 2008 offers the basis for a sound conceptual development).

## 7 Getting back to TBTF

Once the real value of goods and money in the dynamic economic relation is clear in thinking, one can consider truly adequate paths for solving also the problem of TBTF. This can obviously not happen in one single thrust because a huge machinery of academic habits and institutional consolidations needs to be taken into account. In such far-reaching processes, for arriving at a true consolidation in the socio-cultural reality, efforts at different levels are needed. On the one hand there is the *strategic* level where one has to be geared to the laws imposed by nature – including the fundamental laws of pure logic – in order to develop truly efficient theoretical

structures. On the other hand there is the *tactical* level where action is needed under the constraints and limitations of the existing concrete situation, in which the appropriate material movements must be identified. But one should not expect to have good tactics before one has developed a good strategy. This dependency is very clear, and if we are now stuck in a quagmire, it is a result of not having thought thoroughly before. But we can always learn! It is therefore advisable to cultivate both strategy and tactics, simultaneously, in *parallel* – but in a very precise intellectual order.

Concerning banks and their being TBTF one essential point is to be considered: their habitual abuse of the double entry bookkeeping, as exposed above. The end effect is not only local, but global. Therefore, solutions must be envisioned on a global level, in a truly integral conceptual grasp of the whole socioeconomic process, encompassing the real value of money and not only some subjective aspects that are now being generalized. This can result in a global legal framework that is up to the required task.

The difference between reality and today's situation can be bridged by different processes. Where today's majority of decision makers persist in the mainstream opinion, due to reasons of principle they cannot avoid generating – as the development clearly shows – sooner or later a *state bankruptcy*. Interestingly, however, a bankruptcy of the existing global monetary system is never to be worried about, although it is in private hands and constitutes, as it were, a state for itself. The reason for this superiority is that the existing system benefits of any conflict and disaster because loans for reconstruction are then always necessary, while the fate of all goods is to decay anyway. The principle of debt, jealously kept secret (but gradually becoming known), guarantees at the very end the desperation of the clientele – but she does not know that. All the more the currently most visible representatives of this system, the banks, must give themselves a very splendid gloss. All this should give state leadership something to think about in terms of structure on principle, and preferably before considering assistance to TBTF businesses.

A state bankruptcy is still only a disaster if the people lose their belongings, as is the case in today's type of organization. Since most decision-makers are themselves involved in this organization, and hence benefit from the misfortune of others, they have hardly any interest in changing the situation. They feel justified in it because the usual way of thinking offers them no reasonable alternative. For precisely this reason the intrinsic law of obligation to primary production was outlined above, for facilitating non-ideological forms of thought (in-depth considerations are surely required for further steps). If experts would minister this intrinsic law of the economic process, society could proceed relatively efficiently. Otherwise, the state bankruptcy will be *actualized*. It is known that in the euro area, such a moment is to be feared in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy, etc., and specialists are of the opinion that the series will continue. Now the U.S. is faced with the problem too. Concerning the ways of handling this danger, one should not lose sight of who may have an interest – considering the situation geopolitically – in a development that makes some nation states (and not others) go bankrupt. Not infrequently,

interests in raw material resources in the sacrificed countries play an important role, which then can be taken over.

The situation is, however, rarely discussed in an appropriate way. When it is thought in complete transparency, the tangle can be resolved smoothly. Even if a state bankruptcy arises, it can run off lightly if a broad awareness of the positive ways of thinking is already effective. This can become more and more likely, because handling goods, money and values will sooner or later awaken the awareness for the basic interrelations. Distractions cannot be effective forever (Abraham Lincoln is said to have reminded of that very nicely). In a state bankruptcy, the facilities, services and goods are still available; the question is how to balance them against each other. The outlined real value of money reveals the foundation that allows a transformation of the situation without any real conflicts; where conflicts arise, they are due to illusory ideas being imposed arbitrarily.

This short survey is meant as an outline of possibilities on principle, a stimulus for having a closer look at neglected interconnections. *The problems of TBTF can indeed be solved, but only under the condition of thinking very clearly and completely outside the box. But doing so, seeking uncompromising transparency, would have immense advantages over the habitual policy of half-truths and its combination of secrecy-plus-violence (which is the characteristics of terrorism). A thorough clarification would boost public trust and confidence in the governance and its institutions, which is dangerously waning.* – It would obviously be useful to discuss details in an appropriate context.

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## *CARICOM and Its Competition Policy*

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The first comprehensive attempt of **Caribbean States at regional integration took place in 1973 when four Caribbean States**: Barbados, Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago signed the Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) at Chaguaramas. Subsequently 11 more Caribbean States became Contracting Parties to that Treaty. The 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas provided for the free movement of the factors of production and for the co-ordination of many policies. It was described as ‘little more than an optical illusion in terms of positive enforceable rights and legally binding obligations’. Revision was necessary in order to deepen regional economic integration and to respond to the challenges of globalization. This need was acknowledged by the Heads of Government of the Member States of the CARICOM in 1989 at a Conference held in Grand Anse which decided to establish the CARICOM single market and economy. As a result, **the 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas was replaced by the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (RTC), which entered into force on 1 January 2006, establishing the Caribbean Community including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.**

One of the vital elements of the **RTC** is the inclusion, under its Chapter Eight, Part One, of competition policy and law as areas of competences of the CARICOM. Chapter Eight also **provides for the establishment of a system for enforcement of competition law. This system comprises the CARICOM Competition Commission (CCC)**, which was inaugurated on 18 January 2008, the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ), which was established on 16 April 2005, and national competition authorities

**Identification, and more importantly, the ranking of the objectives of CSME competition policy with a view to establishing which of them are the most important to the achievement of the general objectives of the CSME is essential to the framing of a coherent body of substantive competition rules.**

Indeed, Chapter Eight of the RTC and, in particular its Part One which concerns rules of competition, will be interpreted in the light of those objectives, which CSME competition policy will strive to achieve whilst not forgetting the wider political and economic goals set out by the RTC. Accordingly, on some occasions, conduct of enterprises operating within the CSME will be regarded as lawful or unlawful depending upon which of the objectives of the CSME competition policy is being given priority. This point is well illustrated when one compares US antitrust law with EU competition law. For example, the priority given by the EU competition authorities (i.e. the European Commission, and European Court of Justice (ECJ)), to the objective of integrating the markets of the Member States and thus creating an internal market

has resulted in some business conduct of firms being condemned under EU law whilst the same conduct is perfectly lawful under US antitrust law.

Figure 1. Map of the Caribbean Region



Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

## CARICOM Member States

1. Antigua and Barbuda
2. The Bahamas
3. Barbados
4. Belize
5. Dominica
6. Grenada
7. Guyana
8. Haiti
9. Jamaica
10. Montserrat
11. Saint Lucia
12. St. Kitts and Nevis
13. St. Vincent and the Grenadines
14. Suriname
15. Trinidad and Tobago



## **CARICOM Associate Members**

1. Anguilla - 4 July 1999
2. Bermuda - 2 July 2003
3. British Virgin Islands - 2 July 1991
4. Cayman Islands - 15 May 2002
5. Turks and Caicos Islands - 2 July 1991

## **The Community has the following objectives:**

- a. improved standards of living and work;
- b. full employment of labour and other factors of production;
- c. accelerated, co-ordinated and sustained economic development and convergence;
- d. expansion of trade and economic relations with third States;
- e. enhanced levels of international competitiveness;
- f. organisation for increased production and productivity;
- g. the achievement of a greater measure of economic leverage and effectiveness of Member States in dealing with third States, groups of States and entities of any description;
- h. enhanced co-ordination of Member States' foreign and [foreign] economic policies; and
- i. enhanced functional co-operation, including -
  - (i) more efficient operation of common services and activities for the benefit of its peoples;
  - (ii) accelerated promotion of greater understanding among its peoples and the advancement of their social, cultural and technological development;
  - (iii) intensified activities in areas such as health, education, transportation, telecommunications.

## **The CARICOM Competition Commission**

The CARICOM Competition Commission (the Commission) was established under Article 171 of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas; and was inaugurated on January 18, 2008.

Only Member States or The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) can make a request to the Commission to undertake an investigation, and individuals or firms must take their complaints to their respective governments. At the national level, individuals or firms must take complaints to their National Commissions. It is funded by subventions from the Member States. The Caribbean Court of Justice is the final court of appeal in respect of decisions of the Commission.<sup>200</sup>

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<sup>200</sup>ABA Section of International Law 2014, Welcome to the Club: CARICOM Joins its Neighbours in Antitrust Enforcement, North America Forum November 17, 2014



## Functions

The following are among the main functions to be performed by the Commission:

- to apply the rules of competition in respect of anti-competitive cross-border business conduct
- to promote and protect competition in the Community
- to monitor anti-competitive practices of enterprises operating in the CSME
- to investigate and arbitrate cross-border disputes
- to keep the Community Competition Policy under review and advise and make recommendations to COTED to enhance its effectiveness
- to provide support to Member States in promoting and protecting consumer welfare
- to develop and disseminate information about Competition Policy and Consumer Protection Policy

## Powers

To facilitate the effective execution of its functions, the Commission is empowered to, among other things:

- secure the attendance of any person before it to give evidence
- require the discovery or production of documents - order the termination or nullification of prohibited agreements, conduct, activities or decisions
- issue Cease and Desist orders in respect of anti-competitive business conduct
- order payment of compensation to persons affected by anti-competitive business conduct
- impose fines for breaches of the rules of competition

**It is important to note that by virtue of Article 174 (6) Member States are required to enact legislation to ensure that determinations of the Commission are enforceable in their jurisdictions.**

### ***Competition Laws in Latin America***

*The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century coincided with the issuance of a third generation of competition laws in Latin and substantial reforms to the antitrust regimes established decades before. Although more than 90 % of Latam's Gross National Product of the region is produced in the countries that have competition policies and laws, a number of Latam's countries lack national antitrust legislation. On the other hand, 18 countries have national competition laws currently in force: Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. These antitrust systems have different degrees of maturity and the enforcement of the laws is not uniform.*

Furthermore, the Andean Community of Nations, the CARICOM and the Mercado Comun del Sur (Mercosur) have enacted supranational competition laws.

Table 1. Statutory provisions on collusion

Jurisdiction	Competition laws	Statutory provisions for collusion	Specific tacit collusion provisions
Argentina	Law 25.156 of 1999 (amended 2001), <i>Ley de Defensa de la Competencia</i>	Art 2	No
Andean Community	Decision 608 of 2005, <i>Normas para la protección y promoción de la libre competencia en la Comunidad Andina</i>	Art 7	Yes: Art 1 <sup>11</sup>
Barbados	Fair Competition Act 2002-19	§13(3) and §§ 33–35	No
Brazil	Law 8.884 of 1994 (amended 2000), <i>Transforma o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica—CADE em Autarquia, dispõe sobre a prevenção e a repressão às infrações contra a ordem econômica e dá outras providências</i>	Art 20 <sup>12</sup>	No <sup>13</sup>
CARICOM	Protocol VIII, Treaty Establishing the Caribbean Community	Art 30	No
Chile	Decree Law 211 of 1973 (amended, 1994, 1999, 2002 and 2003) <sup>14</sup>	Art 3	Yes: Art 3(a) <sup>15</sup>
Colombia	(i) Law 155 of 1959, <i>Por la cual se dictan algunas disposiciones sobre prácticas comerciales restrictivas</i> and (ii) Decree 2153 of 1992, <i>Mediante el cual se reestructura la Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio y se dictan otras disposiciones</i>	Art 47, Decree 2153	Yes: Art 45(1), Decree 2153 <sup>16</sup>
Costa Rica	Law 7472 of 1994, <i>Ley de Promoción de la Competencia y Defensa Efectiva del Consumidor (LPCDEC)</i>	Art 11	No

Jurisdiction	Competition laws	Statutory provisions for collusion	Specific tacit collusion provisions
Dominican Republic	Law 42-08 of 2008, <i>Ley sobre la Defensa de la Competencia</i>	Art 5	Yes: Art 4 <sup>17</sup>
El Salvador	(i) Legislative Decree 528 of 2004 (amended 2007), <i>Ley de Competencia</i> and (ii) Decree 126 of 2007, <i>Reglamento de la Ley de Competencia</i>	Art 25, Decree 528	Yes: Art 12, Decree 126 <sup>18</sup>
Honduras	Decree 357 of 2005, <i>Ley de Competencia</i>	Art 5	No
Jamaica	Fair Competition Act of 1993 (amended 2001)	§§ 17, 34–37	No
Mercosur	Decision 18 of 2006, <i>Protocolo de defensa da concorrência do MERCOSUL</i>	Art 6	No
Mexico	(i) Federal Law of Economic Competition of 1992 (amended 2006) and (ii) Regulation of the Federal Law of Economic Competition (2007)	Art 9, Federal Law	Yes: Art 5, Regulation of the Federal Law <sup>19</sup>
Nicaragua	(i) Law 601 of 2006, <i>Ley de promoción de la competencia</i> and (ii) Decree 79 of 2006, <i>Reglamento a la Ley No 601, Ley de promoción de la competencia</i>	Art 18, Law 601	Yes: Art 17, Law 601 <sup>20</sup>
Panama	(i) Law 45 of 2007, <i>Que dicta normas sobre protección al consumidor y defensa de la competencia y otra disposición</i> and (ii) Executive Decree No 31 of 1998, <i>Por el cual se reglamentan el Título I (Del Monopolio) y otras disposiciones de la Ley 29 de 1 Febrero 1996</i>	Art 13, Law 45	Yes: Art 7, Decree 31 <sup>21</sup>
Jurisdiction	Competition laws	Statutory provisions for collusion	Specific tacit collusion provisions
Peru	Decree Law 1034 of 2008, <i>Ley de represión de conductas anticompetitivas</i> <sup>22</sup>	Art 11	No <sup>23</sup>
Trinidad & Tobago	Fair Trading Act of 2006	§§ 17–18	No
Uruguay	Law 18.159 of 2007, <i>Ley de Promoción y Defensa de la Competencia</i>	Art 4	No
Venezuela	Law to promote and protect the exercise of free competition of 1992	Arts 9–10	No

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<sup>201</sup> Eleanor M Fox, D. Daniel Sokol, *Competition Law and Policy in Latin America*, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009

## Competition law and CARICOM Member States

Competition law has not got off the ground in some CARICOM countries as a body of law worthy of fidelity in and of itself for the enforcement of obligations specified in governing legislation. The main theory advanced for this state of development is the lack of a competition culture among judges to be observed from a collection of decided cases that have faltered at the altar of traditional principles of statutory interpretation, constitutional law, or other body of law taking precedence to competition law. Thus, the enforcement of competition law in CARICOM is yet to be realized due to many factors including challenges regarding the decision making structure of investigating agencies, the subordination of competition law to other areas of law, but also to the incomplete incorporation of provisions of the Revised Treaty in the domestic law of several CARICOM countries.<sup>202</sup>

One of the policy instruments designed to advance the process of integration in the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) is **the development and implementation of a regional competition regime**. It was recognized by MS, however, that the benefits that are expected to be derived from the establishment of the CSME could be frustrated by anti-competitive business conduct by public and private enterprises. While tariff and non-tariff barriers are removed and free flow of goods, services and investment is anticipated, businesses could nullify this effect by colluding to divide up markets geographically, thus essentially maintaining national markets. Anti-competitive agreements to fix prices or bid rig in tendering could harm consumers and bar entry to non-members of cartels. Or firms may dominate product markets regionally and abuse their dominant position by engaging in predatory behavior or limiting competition through exclusionary distribution agreements, amongst other strategies.

Member States are required to enact the rules of competition as outlined in Chapter VIII of the Treaty, and to establish national competition authorities to implement and enforce the rules. Member States are also required to take effective measures to ensure access by nationals of other MS to enforcement authorities, including courts, on an equitable, transparent and non-discriminatory basis.<sup>203</sup>

**Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and St. Vincent and Grenadines have passed competition legislation. The countries of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States are in the process of establishing a sub-regional competition authority that will enforce harmonised competition legislation. Suriname has completed its**

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<sup>202</sup> Delroy S. Beckford, *Enforcement Of Competition Law In Caricom: Perspectives On Domestic, Regional, And Multilateral Obligations*

<sup>203</sup> Taimoon Stewart, *The Role Of Competition Policy In Regional Integration: The Case Of The Caribbean Community*, St. Augustine, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago

legislation and is in the process of enacting it. Belize is receiving technical assistance to complete its fair competition legislation<sup>204</sup>.

*Under the CARICOM Treaty member states will not be allowed to introduce any restrictions to the right of establishment of nationals of other member states unless otherwise provided in the Treaty. This means that individuals from all of the signatory states will have an equal right to create and manage “economic enterprises” anywhere in the region with no greater stipulations than are required for a local business.*<sup>205</sup>

Also the protection of consumer interests is highlighted, as an objective of CSME competition law, may be pursued by novel approaches, not necessarily copied from elsewhere, but appropriate to local conditions. **The local conditions are that all CSME countries are developing countries and thus suffer the usual constraints deriving from underdevelopment.** Most of them are small, highly vulnerable economies with: limited availability of investment capital; excessive dependency on external sources for food and energy; a volatile rate of growth of GDP; limited natural resources; high transportation costs; and a limited range of exportable goods, i.e. bananas, sugar and tourism. Some of them have additional problems with the enforcement of law against smuggling, corruption, informal society, organised crime, etc.

**The small size of most CSME countries, which prevents them from exploiting economies of scale, combined with the historical circumstances results in CSME markets being not only highly concentrated, but also in a high concentration of company management and ownership in the hands of relatively few individuals, most of whom are mainly descendents of the plantocracy, or foreign.** Therefore, even if a firm has no market power in the relevant product market its owner is sufficiently powerful to prevent new entrants into, or to eliminate existing competitors in that market given his/her overall superior financial and economic resources in other markets, either vertically related or totally unrelated. Further, those who have wealth are often in a key position in the government. Additionally, business culture is based on family relations and networks, and in some CSME countries there is no legislation protecting consumers. These factors alone lead to exploitation of consumers and necessitate the taking of a new radical approach to the protection of consumers in the CSME. From the above it can be seen that consumer protection policy and competition policy should enhance each other and be used to create a fair, efficient, and accessible CSME consumer market<sup>206</sup>.

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<sup>204</sup> Fair Trading Commissions,

[http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=57&Itemid=78](http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=57&Itemid=78)

<sup>205</sup> Business Monday newspaper, March, 2010,

[http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=176&Itemid=28](http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=176&Itemid=28)

<sup>206</sup> Alina Kaczorowska, The Competition Law Review, Volume 8 Issue 2 pp 185-207, July 2012



## Implementation in National Law

The Community Competition law must be expressed in the national competition laws of each CARICOM Member State. The competition legislation in Member States must also:

- require national competition authorities to cooperate with the Commission in achieving compliance with the rules of competition; and
- give power to the Commission to conduct investigations in their jurisdiction if an offence of a cross-border nature is believed to have taken place.

## Types of Conducts Prohibited

*Article 177 of the Revised Treaty prohibits:*

*1. Anti-competitive agreements between enterprises, decisions by associations of enterprises and concerted practices by enterprises which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Community*

*2. Actions by which an enterprise abuses its dominant position within the Community; or*

*3. Any other like conduct by enterprises whose object or effect is to frustrate the benefits expected from the establishment of the CSME.*

Conducts identified as anti-competitive include price fixing, limit or control of production, artificial dividing up of markets or restriction of supply sources, the application of unequal conditions to equivalent contracts, tied selling, unauthorized denial of access to networks or essential infrastructure, predatory pricing, price discrimination, loyalty discounts or concessions, exclusionary vertical restrictions and bid rigging.

Exemptions are provided for instances where the conduct results in improved production or distribution of goods and services, the promotion of technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit (Art. 177 (4) (a)). However, restrictions on other enterprises must be only what are indispensable to the attainment of the above objectives; competition must not be eliminated in a substantial part of the market (Art. 177 (4) (b) & (c)).

Abuse of a dominant position in a market constitutes prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in the market. Such action includes restricting the entry of any enterprise in a market, preventing or deterring any enterprise from engaging in competition in a market, directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other restrictive practices, limits the

production of goods and services for a market to the prejudice of consumers, tied selling, or engaging in business conduct that results in the exploitation of its customers or suppliers.<sup>207</sup>

### **Case Study: State of Competition Law in CARICOM**

What if a Barbadian company takes issue with the conduct of a Trinidadian company, because it perceives that the conduct of the Trinidadian company is likely to unfairly affect the operation of its business? Who can that Barbadian company turn to for assistance that would ensure that the matter is at least investigated and that fair competition is restored to the market? The Barbadian company can contact the Barbados Fair Trading Commission which while not having jurisdiction over the conduct of the Trinidadian company, should be able to forward the matter to the CARICOM Competition Commission (CCC) which has jurisdiction over cross-border anticompetitive conduct and may therefore have jurisdiction in the matter.

In theory this is what should happen. The facts are that this scenario is unlikely to play itself out as it should for several reasons. First, Trinidad and Tobago (T&T) has not yet established its competition authority. The country passed its law in 2006, but to date it has not established the requisite authority to administer that law. This circumstance is not unusual regionally because only Barbados and Jamaica, have so far established the requisite authorities to administer their competition laws as required under the Treaty of Chaguaramas.

None of the other member states have functional competition authorities in place. Guyana also passed Competition legislation in 2006, but their Competition authority though further advanced than that of T&T is still not fully operational. Guyana has in principle established an authority and has a set of part-time commissioners in place, but they have not yet agreed on the technical staffing for the organisation making it non-operational.

Suriname, Belize and the OECS member states are in a similar state of un-readiness. None of these member states have as yet passed their laws so naturally do not have authorities that address issues of unfair competition. The OECS has agreed to the establishment of a sub-regional authority that will perform the function of the national authority for the individual states, but to date this is merely a written commitment.

The CCC, which is located in Suriname, is supposed to sit at the centre of the regional competition framework, but has had its share of challenges. It was established in 2008 with seven commissioners and has had significant difficulty in recruiting highly technical personnel to man its operations. It is currently still not fully staffed and therefore not adequately operational.

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<sup>207</sup> Taimoon Stewart, *The Role Of Competition Policy In Regional Integration: The Case Of The Caribbean Community*, St. Augustine, Republic of Trinidad and Tobago



What therefore are the implications for the company in our initial scenario? The Barbados Fair Trading Commission would seek to investigate the matter but its ability to get a comprehensive solution would be limited given its lack of jurisdictional power to address cross-border unfair conduct. Under a fully operational CARICOM competition network where all the member states would have fulfilled their commitments, the Treaty states that the company in Barbados could draw the matter to the attention of the Barbados Fair Trading Commission, which would then request the CCC to commence an investigation into the matter.

The CCC would then call on the T&T Competition authority to facilitate the necessary part of the investigation to fully determine the matter. The CCC would then give the T&T company alleged to have engaged in the anti-competitive activity, an opportunity to defend its interest. If after hearing the defence, the CCC is of the view that the company has engaged in anti-competitive conduct, the CCC would require the company to take appropriate action to correct the breach. It should be noted that a fully functioning CCC will have all of the powers as set out in our national legislations, and in addition the CCC also has powers not only to order companies to cease and desist anti-competitive conduct, but the power to order payment of compensation to persons affected by the conduct (for example to the Barbadian firm in our scenario). Further, the CCC will be able to impose fines on the offending company for breaching the rules of competition.

This would be a much healthier resolution for all affected parties and for the furtherance of our regional economic objectives. It is therefore important that the member states, which are still at varying stages of implementation of the rules of competition, establish the requisite rules and enforcement authorities to allow companies their right to redress in regard to unfair market practices throughout the region<sup>208</sup>.

## Conclusion

Community competition policy aims to ensure that the benefits expected from the implementation of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) are not frustrated by anticompetitive business conduct.

Implementation is a shared obligation under Art.170. As such, **the Community shall**

- subject to Articles 164, 177, 178 and 179 of this Treaty, establish appropriate norms and institutional arrangements to prohibit and penalise anticompetitive business conduct
- establish and maintain information systems to enable enterprises and consumers to be kept informed about the operation of markets within the CSME.

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<sup>208</sup> Business Monday newspaper, n April, 2011,  
[http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=209&Itemid=87](http://www.ftc.gov.bb/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=209&Itemid=87)

The **Member States** shall:

- take necessary legislative measures
- establish and maintain institutional arrangements and administrative procedures
- disseminate information to facilitate consumer choice
- Ensure equitable, transparent and nondiscriminatory access by nationals of other member states

**As for the process**, the Revised Treaty sets Community competition framework. Member States agreed on Model competition law and enactment of harmonised domestic legislation and establishment of national competition authorities. Additionally, CARICOM Competition Commission was formed.

**Major Institutional challenges** that the institution is facing are:

- Majority of Member States have not enacted competition laws and/or established national competition authorities (NCAs) as per Chapter VIII of the Revised Treaty
- Member State obligation under Chapter VIII to provide for jurisdiction of CCC in a Member State – Jamaica has no such provisions in its national competition law
- Obligation under RTC for national competition law to provide for enforcement of determinations of CCC

Yet, if there is no national competition law and/ or NCAs then this hampers the effectiveness of CCC's operations under Article 174 in the Member States.

**Action taken by CCC to provide technical assistance to Member States included:**

- Suriname – significant redrafting of the Competition Bill with expected enactment into law in 2014
- Belize – assistance in developing a Strategic and Action Plan to enable access to funding for the establishment of a national authority by 2015
- Guyana – training of Commissioners, judiciary and magistracy, and staff of national authority to facilitate operation of NCA in 2010; provided technical assistance on Draft Rules of Procedure in 2013
- OECS – technical assistance in developing Strategic and Action Plan for establishment of sub-regional competition authority in 2015, for the St. Lucia-based Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States
- Executed Workshops on CCC Rules of Procedure in Antigua, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana and Suriname in 2012
- Launched web site in July 2013 to disseminate information on community competition and consumer protection matters

Additionally; CCC established Regional Competition and Consumer Protection Forums in 2012

An example of benefits of Competition was Waiving safeguard measures on the monopoly on the supply of cement in Jamaica. The monopoly producer generated approximately \$694. million less revenue because competitive forces, stimulated by the waiver of safeguard measures, constrained its ability to profitably increase the domestic price of cement. Prices were on average 3 percent lower than they would have been without the waiver.<sup>209</sup>



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The advertisement features a collage of nature and wildlife images: a lynx, a wolf, a lake, a person with sheep, a bird, a castle, a river, a herd of elephants, and a person waving.

<sup>209</sup> Barry Headley & Rommell Hippolyte, CARICOM Competition Commission Removing Hurdles To Regional Integration Challenges Faced By The CCC As A Supranational Agency, CARICOM Competition Commission, Lima, Peru, 18-19 June, 2013.

## *Making Your Brand Matter in Asia*

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### **Sourajit Aiyer**



*Sourajit Aiyer works with a leading capital markets company in Mumbai. Previously, he worked with financial companies in Delhi, London and Dhaka. As a personal interest, he writes for business publications and runs his comics page. He has written on over 60 topics in 30 publications across 13 countries. His news/satire comics' page is now on Facebook, "Sourajit Aiyer Comics".*

*This article was originally published in InBusiness UAE.*

There are many brands in Asia, and more cropping up each day. How do you ensure your brand grabs client attention for a long time? Each country in Asia is as heterogeneous as the entire of Europe. Many are yet to consume brands the West takes for granted. More importantly, many are yet to realize the utility from consuming it in the first place.

Start with your own employees. Everyone says if your company is not good enough for your employees, it isn't going to be good for your customers either. However, employee attrition rates are amongst the highest in Asian markets today, as various reasons compel employees to look beyond. Look at any jobs-website of an Asian country. You will notice many roles do not seem to be new openings of new companies. Rather, given the vintage of the companies in question, those roles seem to sound like they should have been up-and-running for some time. It means they are to replace, not create. If you cannot retain your best employees, the rest will hardly be able to deliver the best-in-class service to your esteemed clients - makes sense, right? Making the organization a good place to work for may be the first step. If your policies always act as an impediment to employees to do their work, be it for delegation issues, cost-control, or bureaucracies, then employees will eventually lose patience with you. At this rate of switching-over of employees serving a specific client, you can hardly expect that client to keep his patience with your company's brand.

Serve a need by creating an improvement in your client's life. Many in Asia are yet to use your brand, or to use that product itself. They will ask why they need it in the first place. Sell a need; and a need is best sold by showing how it can make an improvement in people's lives. Many years ago, when mobile phones were yet to pick up amongst India's masses due to its perception

as a luxury-status product, Bangladesh's Grameen Bank was already pitching it to women entrepreneurs across villages to set up phone-centers by showing how it enables families-friends to remain connected with each other in an affordable way. I saw this myself while touring Bangladeshi villages during a Grameen Bank project back then. This means you need to sell a value, not a product. Value creates long-term relationships, while short-term transaction can often lead to mis-selling which negates brand loyalty. He perceives you as someone who helped him with a need which no one else was giving to him at that time. That connect often overcomes other aspects, like if your price eventually becomes marginally higher than peers. Identify the critical things the client wants, or may want, by consuming what you offer, and pitch that. It gives him a reason to start looking at you in the first place. Create a value where clients thought none existed before. You may start with first becoming a consumer of your own product yourself.

If you cannot differentiate in a crowded market, then exit. Many brands have jumped into the over-crowded swimming pool called Asia, but are yet to find bearings in the form of profits. Why should the client come to you; is it something he cannot get elsewhere? Is it a niche need, a unique product, best service, or something. If you cannot answer that, then you are just burning capital of your promoters and private equity investors to create long-term accumulated losses. Eventually, you will sell out proclaiming that the market is an over-hyped one, and there's no money to be made there. Actually, the market was great, but you were not! Even if you are super-market of your industry serving 360o needs and products, even then your differentiation may be the lowest price or quickest service.

Identify your target client, and make him your ambassador for word-of-mouth promotion. Asian middle-class may often be sceptical when it comes to new things – not because they don't want, but because they don't know which one to choose. Many brands have not been available, hence unknown. As markets opened up, a plethora of new brands flooded local markets. ATL promotions may make people aware of your brand, but may not push people to start consuming it. Although Asian societies are becoming nuclear, their community-bonhomie still remains, albeit in an altered way. What traditionally used to be family-communities is making way for friend-communities – and people still place a certain faith on what their community says. Your most loyal clients may be your best brand ambassadors, by referring you by word-of-mouth since they had a great experience with you. There is a better chance of people believing what their community says, and then consuming it themselves. A celebrity endorsing your brand is merely making people aware, but not always pushing people to consume it, since they know he was paid millions to say what he said. Think about it – how many times have you bought a specific shampoo, insurance or a packed food, just because someone suggested it to you? The good news is that nowhere is the desire to associate with new things more than in Asia, which is seeing many brands, products and features for the first time, and your few loyal clients may just help enlarge that pool.

Do the simple things properly first, but companies often overlook this. In the quest to run ahead of competitors in an over-crowded market by coming out with the next big-thing, many brands often fail to do the simple things properly. Ask how many people across Asian markets have had a tough time with customer-service call operators, and the response may surprise you! A taken-for-granted activity like customer service often results in many things, but not what you were looking for. What do clients do then? They stop using that product, and move to another. That's the end of your brand, for that client and his near-circle, at least. While concentrating on delivering the next big-thing is critical to stay ahead of the curve, failing to do simple things is rank sloppiness. Unless you fill the car with petrol and press the pedal steadily, the car will not move properly, irrespective of the all the brilliant features you may have stuffed into it.

Mass-customization may hold key in virgin territory. Turnaround times and product-lives are getting shorter, and the next innovation is coming even quicker. Mass customization, i.e. fulfil niche needs in an assembly line, may be your best bet to hasten your time-to-market within that short window of opportunity. If you cannot produce en-masse, your client size will never reach scale; and if you cannot produce niche, your product will never reach scale. Don't always look at existing market research, since research on virgin markets will always be inadequate. In new markets hungry for new brands and products, the time-to-market may be even shorter, since that is what is attracting other brands too. You might also think in which new methods your clients will consume your product in future, and be ready to invest for that.

In conclusion, if you cannot reach Top-3 or 5 in your business, then exit. Most of these markets will consolidate eventually. If you cannot reach the top bracket in a reasonable time in a specific Asian country, then do not extend your futile life. That may just dilute your brand in the other Asian markets which may be better suited for you.

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**Hubert Heinelt & Michèle Knodt: Policies within the EU Multi-Level System: Instruments and Strategies of European Governance**

*Nomos, Baden-Baden, Germany, 2011, 410 pages, € 34, ISBN: 978-3-8329-6142-8*

The European Union and its functioning is known to be complex and at time, complicated. The Maastricht Treaty has officially granted the Union a status of a multilevel governmental entity, engaged in various areas of the EU and world-related policies and politics, increasing the necessity to research and comprehend the EU structures and systems.

In line with this, the book “Policies within the EU Multi-Level System: Instruments and Strategies of European Governance” edited by Hubert Heinelt and Michèle Knodt, comes to provide an wide-ranging description and explanation in such vulnerable fields as democratisation policy, common foreign and security policy, development policy, monetary policy, competition policy, structural funds, environmental policy, consumer policy, agricultural policy, labour and employment policy, health policy, transport policy, education policy, gender equality policy, internal security policy as well as asylum and migration policy. The value of the book is that it provides specific consideration to each of the policy fields, covering each of them discretely, identifying actors, internal and external factors and events that can have an impact on the agenda and policy makings and implementation. The book also examines which actors, among them EU Member States, its insitutions, as well as European various other entities, NGOs, organizations and civil society groupings, are and/or can be more influential and effective in specific areas and conditions, thus, underlying that the EU suggests a unique system of decision-making and implementing and that the Union’s multi-level governance is not homogenous and its functioning is not identical in different policy fields, either.

The strength of the book is that it not only defines and analyzes the targeted EU policies, but observes that in the lens of multi-level governance, presenting the Union policies in different ways and angels. The approach also enables to draw comparisons of how these policies function in a multi-level system. It is a concise, well-organized and well-structured overview of the EU policies, the development of these policies and their peculiarities.

**Funda Tekin: Differentiated Integration at Work: The Institutionalisation and Implementation of Opt-Outs from European Integration in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice**

*Nomos, Baden-Baden, Germany, 2012, 330 pages, € 54, ISBN: 978-3-8329-7167-0*

As the number of the EU Member states keeps increasing, the idea of ‘differentiated integration’ is getting more and more topical. Especially, the EU policy areas that cover fundamental sovereignty rights of the nation state – including Freedom, Security, and Justice (FSJ), give way to a diversity of flexible and differentiated integration.

To the point, the book “Differentiated Integration at Work: The Institutionalisation and Implementation of Opt-Outs from European Integration in the Freedom, Security and Justice” by Faunda Tekin, comes to examine the various forms differentiation that can enable the EU integration improved. Based on a profound treaty analysis, the term ‘differentiated integration’ is unearthed from the semantic avalanche of (inter)related concepts.

Building on this definition, an in-depth and thorough analysis of the implementation of British, Irish, and Danish opt-outs in the FSJ generates insights on the functional and structural patterns of integration that result from the interplay of institutionalization and implementation of opt-outs.

To this end, the analytical frame of the paths of differentiated integration at work has been developed by mutually fusing assumptions of historical institutionalism and of an extended version of differentiated integration theory. Furthermore, the book takes the reader on an expedition through the different facets and particularities of the FSJ, drawing a concise picture of its complex provisions, its incomplete communitarization, and the inter-linkage of its policies.



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